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I, mmoBmnQM 
aetlvlty eomtmetet tliromgh eo^ psrativ® uss©-
elattos'® represent# aa impmtmt «@g»at ©f the total 
aatloaal «©oaomic aetifity la^ tn® Umltst States aat Im m©«t 
of tM r®af©f til# ft®® worlt. Alttoagli parti emla^ tiy 
sttitei to iMuBtwims §&.ays@t«j?i»i fey small iM®p®Bt«at 
MsiMias »iit«rpri«@s smeli as agri®»ltmiet, ©o©f®i?mtiw asso-
elatiotts aa©ag large saamfsetmriag ami pi-o^ esstag 
wii©l#aal« eeaetuma, miXm&ds asi otfe®r relatively le,rg#' 
mrpomtioms km& hem smeeessfally 0'P®i*mte€ fo:r many years. 
Coepsratlv© assotiations of are ©©asoa, ®sp®elally 
ia lii.glssi aat ©tb«r luropf.am ©euatrlts. Sfstlal taatelisg 
statmtea for firms or ih.oms#&©14a lmter©«t@4 ia foming a 
©©©peratiT# as»©©iatl®a ar® atailall® tm all f©rty*ei^ t 
state! ia ttois ©©tiatry, Pmtolltly »iayp©rt@i researoli ani 
®dmeati©aal programs ©f 4lr#tt beasfit t© tM»@ taking part 
in e©©p«ratiT« activity ar® «arri«€ ©n in tkls ami ©ttor 
eoTOtri«i. 
• Iteth t&e f©rm- ©f or®aal!satioa ami tfe® ii@tb©d ©f 
©p©ratios wry ©easittrafely frea ©a© eoepsratif® ®ss©©iatioa 
t© anetfetr. ' Stat© ©aafeling aets wry wiAelyj ia »®ay states 
©©©p«ratiir®» are, ©rgaaiz@t find ©parattd mater stvtral laws, 
a© tw© of «&l©h art ii#ati©al. Mo tm asa©©iatioas aaier 
tl® sa»s law are ®rgiiais©4 ami ©psretefi iatatieally. Oo©p~ 
erativ® ®ssQ©iRtioms aay be losal ©r regional, ©©ntralizet 
or f«d#rat#d, stoek m aoa-atocM, aa^ d aa^  b® emgagsd ta al-
aost ail laagisable kiais of busiaess aotiTlfy, Sos® ©p®iret® 
oa a poel aad othtrs ©n a pttr^ has® aad ial® basis. fk@f 
finaa©©i by maay astlieds, T#t all kair® maay 
dlatiagmlabiag ofaaraQtetistieg ia ©csoaoa. fte basle ©eoaonte 
strwtmr® is always tlie sa»@, Sie bast© mttltliateral @eo« 
BOtti© s«latios8liipt wMioli #xist among tb© fims ©r lio«is#lioiii 
partioipatij^  la tli# Jeiat- aetivity are eom«a •%© all 
eoQptrativ® assoolatioa®., 
f^ Q basi© eioBoaio Eatare ©bermtttiMstie ©f all ooop- j 
I 
•©ratlT®. assoQlatloss is fb# smbj«@t t© wMsb tbis tb«sis i« • j 
aaaresiei. 
A, stat#atttt ©f tb® Probl®* 
fb« impQTt&mm ©f an at^ qmatsly i#"fel©p®d e©ii©®pt of 
tb® basic ®eon«»lo Bature^ of tbe tooperatlfe asso©iatioa is 
©aphasiE@d by ?r®f®i80ip lobotto; 
Slae® aoo'perative aotifity is essentially ©eo-
aoaie aetivlty end the cooperativ® is #s8®Btl6lly 
ail iastitutioB seekiag @«©a©ai@ ®ii4©, tbe 
basic oriteria mat b© proYldeft by ecoBoaic.s. Wa-
ieas it succ^ jads in attaining its economic objec­
tives, its isplieatiOiiK from ethical, legal or other 
poiiita of view hasre little more tbaa academic interest. 
. « .tbe economie consideratioiis are basic* 
de©lstonss.witii respeet to tb« oth@r8 sr® sound to tb© 
extent tbat they are eoBsisttat witfe tit# pesullay , 
«0©n©ffiic natm®, aims and pttrpos®® of «oop@rati©a. 
o^botka, Iraak. Lego-l#o»©iil.© laplieatioa® ©f Cooptr-
atioa. |B MefiesB eooperatiear 1S4S* p. Sgg-iS3, AA®tlmm 
lastitut® of coopftration, latbiagtoa, D, C* lS4i. p. ggS. 
- s -
•ffe« ©©omoml® Qt cooperatioa feas lagg«4 ©oBsii-
eralJif IthlM pjaetleal eoeperatlTi d@ir®lop»@at # Ooopa^ r®-
tiV9 assoeiatloas tew 4ef@l©p#i t© ttoir preseal state 
strmeturally by tjlai mi€ ®w©r* Hlstorloally sfuay 
of %h9 9XV0TB teft hmm wbtj oestlf, TM -p^ th is with 
tM wstlcag© Qt tmsmeeeisfiil attaiapts at bwslimsf oooperatlea 
a*oag soT«r(61pL eeoaesle. tmlta. iawt smell orgaai* 
aatioB wese sX©w to ^©•^•olop aa4 mm toiaj m'ptQMmt 
fiettiems'* ia ©riUmrf ©.©rfei-als# ,1a,wt ratti®!-. thaa feeiiig 
"tailor-aad®"" %q fSQogaia© tfe® ©sfi smit the m«®t» ©f 
tfe® eoopti-atlv® a,ss©©latlea, ThiB is a©t iwprisiag ©iae® 
matil reeeatlj littl® MaH %©©» d©ae tamM t@T@lopiag m 
adaqtaate eeeBeal©' ©eaeept of th© ©©operatlT© ass©eiatloii. 
On® still fttttg ®e©a©»,ie thmrf of ©©©peretioa 
fragaeatarf aad laeemyldte* lxe®ptiag »itllsa©,ff aofi Sotsotka, 
mthQT® eoB©#«#i with aaalysts 4«aliag sp©elfi©ellf with 
t|i#^ »^©fi,ipat,iw, ,©,»®©ala,t,ie,m„„Mw„ larg@lj us®4,,tlie 
tloaal,,,ratto@*...IMn the theoretical spprosoh., feo oftsa the 
applita ©eosoiiiat la this, fisld has aot mrm h,i»-
itlf with th® hatie «®©ao®ie mtum of tht • eoopesatife, hmt 
has mi© his poiat of A«p«tw« what h@ has somtwhat ais-
ta&tali' sallsi th# '•hasi© e©©p#ratiTe prinoipl#®**. Th© th®o-
rttieal ©ooaoaist, ©a th® othsr haad» wh«a h@ ha» dealt with 
eooaoai© strwetttres at all, has assiiaftt that th© ©ooperatlT® 
as such mn 8d«qiiat«iy he analysed with th© sodtls d«T®lep©d 
I 
for and adapttd to tli« ««oaoale firm. As ImsXiaaoff kas 
<l®»©astrat®i, tMls i®' a faulty atsmptioa aad om whHk 
l«at@ t© itriotts im&mmmMs aad lae©a»ist®aoi@s. fli#r® is 
a aetij tlsrefer#, to i«f®l©p a sore aaalysis ©f 
tlm basi© teoaemi© astmre' of tii« e#®per»ti¥e assoeiatioa aad 
similer Th« work ©f l®«ll&aoff aat 
loBotto aad tli® «©ats»p©rary g«a«ral emmmie thmwy ©f th® 
fira proTii# t&t |>riiio.ip.al fottatatioas for ieiag a o ,  
B* MBthoA of Aaalysli 
fhe. aaalysia ms®4 is pri»srily tliat of itduetiT® ©eoaeiile 
l©gl©, lattoaatleel aaalysis is aet ®aploy«€ «3c©®pt toy die-
gem to illmstrstf «©a©@pts wliiefe r@pres@ttt th@ moat pro-
aom@«4 4«parttir«8 from tl@ ©xistiag @eoa®ai« • literatmr® • 
a® iateatiea ia tteat of t©el bttildi,Bg ratlier thm tool appjly-
iaij ooa@«ta«stly ©i^ iriesl aaalysis is aot itt¥olir®4. 
followiflg a r®Ti®w ©f tli® lit«ratmr« t«altag sp«0lfie«lly 
witb tb® sab4«©t of tlie tMsia, th® fwadaaeatal struetar® ia 
tHe e0op©rati¥® assosiatioa is i®v»lep©i, Hfixt tli# ®0oa«i© 
rtlatioasliipa arisiag ia tn® eooptratiT® assoeiatioa ar® 
@xaaia®i. a®© tli® ooaiitioaa for profit aaxtsizatioa ia 
firas partieipatiat la a Joiat aetiTity ar® atadied la som® 
K^aellaaoff, Ifaa f. leoaomio fh®ory of Co©p®rati@a. 
iTaa ?. l«®liaaoff. Wasliiagtoa» B. C« lf4£. 
M4®3? dfaaait ©ondltioas atability as • w«lX as «ffl-
el«!i©f obj«otiT®s are eoa-sid@rM« fiaally a fm important 
applications of tfea eoat«pt'of the mtum of tfe« eooptrattv® 
asfOGiatioa ar® iaii®at@d, 
fh@ a»al^ ai« apfliss directly to all types of eooptra-
tiv@« whieii mm ©r@aiiiz«4 by firas for protm@ti©a purposes. 
Goop«ratl¥«® of, feonseliolis are ®»etly t&i saa® ia atrmotur®, 
io tMt 1>y smfeatitmtiag "eomsmptiom^  fm "proimetiaa", 
wtonstkoli** for «fira» ana «sttiif®eti©as** for profits" the 
aaalyjii® in apflitafel# for tlit isoat part t© oooperativ® 
aasoeiatioms of also, 
0. Ofe|e0tl¥®8 
ttie profelta to vhl&h th& amthor hm attr®ss@i feiaself i» 
tfer®«fold. fb#r® is, first of all, nmi, for a iyntbesis of 
th.® toest ttot tea b#®is *ritt®m doaotraiag tto aooaosio aatur® 
of tli« oooperstiv®. Btcoaily tji«r@ is a a@#4 to ®,rolF 
tool® aat mot#li of tHeoretioal ©doaosie aaalysi® to tlie 
firmi whiel partioipat# la tte eoop@ratl¥e assoeiatioa. litis 
mmm ttet at sob« poiats ties# tools sad aodsls will attd to 
sliarpeaed aad ©xpaadsd. Ia tli« third pl«@# a r®asoaafel,y 
eoMplftt® .aad eoasisteat th«or«tioal framswork of tfe® ©eoaomic 
aatar® of tli® eooptrati'sre a®®ds to fe© laid dowa,, aad tlie 
apflioatioa of tl.® eeasept to preotieal eoaditioas iadieat®d» 
fht ©ompaaioa profeltm, wM&h, is of greater »agait*id«, i« 
©mtS'li® s©op« ©f tlilfl stm4y# pi»©fe3.em ia tie davtlop-
mm% of ®0#a©*le tkmtf ©f IM®, wtlfar# aipttfa ©f ©oopera-
ttir® as»o$lati©iis tm a fr«« eat#fpi»|.st «oon©itr. fbis is « 
task' nfeieli T^aaian t© fe« t©a», litto tie ®.@©a©iiie m&tnm of 
%m e®©p«s&tiir« aiiweiatieft aadir iimtai© mu&itimsf 
t®©is ©f a©B©p©listi®. e©»f«titi©a, ®a.i welfajr® ©©©aoa-
ie® a« th® a^sts, tfe® i«ir#i©p»at' ef m mm@^t 
IB next Idiisal 8t®f« 
P®i»,liaps f©tii? sptelfi© ©fejeetive® tef® «%©@i f©3r®aQ®t in 
the ttiat ©f th& .amtMr im tli®' ft®pafati©a @f ttois tfe@«iis 
I. It is li©p«i tliit ta® tta©&®3f» l>©tl ia %M 
m& ia ®3:t«a.sio» »rl£, wiii fiai th® b®,®!© ,ffamew©3?k ami q©e-
•0@pts msefml t© Ilia im »]teing teasin®®® ®©op®yati©m a aor® 
t®«©Mfel« tiseiflitt®, 
t.. It is 'tefti. t&fit tbt gfiseyal ©©©iiGaiat will fiat liis 
ist®r«®t« ajomiti t© tie ®xt«at that h® will t«@t> mMy aai 
®3Epami • til® ®©aeeft» •pir#«e»t®i» • 
3. It is Mp«(i tfest f®a©ti«®l ©©©psyatiT® l®®a®rs will 
fiai.f®©^  fef %%m^ % and gmiAaii©® is tfe® f©ll©wlag pages. 
4* II i.« tepti t&at, tliaa setirliig as mj final 
aa8w®r, 11® pttssat ,att®®pt will «8i?tp® as tomiliiag atoa®.® 
tm fiiifth.®^ -• atte»ti©m ani s®i®«r®li, a©t ©nly 'bf tM® eeeii©-
miflt, but Iff ®tm4®at» ©f ©©©p@rati©m gtMi-'allf—»©©iolegist», 
©tt©!"!!®!"®, ®e@©mnt&ata, ®4ia,f®t©»», asi tM©s« ©f 9%h®s 
dts©iplia®» alik®. 
II, mmmwRM oi mi icoiomig mfrai o? m 
OOOPSRAflfl ASSOeiATlOM 
aoopef^ tlT® literature is,, folmiama# dating Jbaek t® 
etaiMttati.iy aM-^ sestittttlag,, wf .until tk« preseat 
tiffi®. ?@ry few authors writing about oboperatives liav® eoa-
0«rasi-.tii«»8«i"r8s with their aconomie nature, howsTsr., Aa 
one ^ ®s tlirougH tk« Ittdratur® prtoie to lf4e, h& g«%« %%» 
impression that th^ r® ar« those ®ono®rii®i with tli«ortti©ai 
eceaoaies and thos® Qon®«s'iit4 with ©©operation, hut that 
••s®vtr th® twain shall met** 
Prsdomiaast aaong ©ooptratif® writers are th©»® pre­
senting so©i©»r®f©raisti.e iat«rfr0tati0ni of the eooptretifff 
prot)ltffi« .tesliasoff haa presented aa @i:@@ll®nt stat®»«at 
r®gartiag this »^ h©©l ©f thoughts 
fh9 so0i©-rifoi?ai»ti© approath to tht^  @oop-
«ratiV9 problt® km always h®®B—©spetitHir lit 
lurof®"—decisively predominamt among thf iat@r-
pr@t#ra of coopex'ation an€ has @rystallis®4 out 
in th« «omrs# of a eentury in a sort of orthodoxy, 
originated supposedly in the philosophy of Robert 
Ow®n ami Charles Fourier, 6i"®sitly strengthened by 
the authority of J. S. Mill, jealously nurtured 
and piardti by th© christian Socialists in England 
sad by the ao-oalled "School of Nimes^  In fraaee, 
this traditional doctrine has gradually dOiMtisei 
into' &. set of kindergarten-truths or «BPlaelpl«a 
of cooperation"*^  
a® sotio-^ reforaisti# literature is e^ aly of passing 
intereft here sine® it i« largely «®tl©flally guided,. i« 
philosophieal rather than leientifi®, and-has little relation 
I^melianoff* op. ait., p. S. 
to tfa® pfa©tl$aX ooeperatlf® world cf today. It lias ©ob-
tlam«i, &0w«¥#t, fTom m&tlf leader® at lo-liei't Owea, 
B@&tri©# Pertsr-fefeto ssd iidatf Wsfeb, a» i*- lelyoake, ant 
eiiarlis fomri®]? to tM« to-ealltd '^ ©©a.siiitf eoeperatiir# 
1 
pliilusepbyw of totsy m mx&mplifM.hf wmmj I^ taooia, 1» M* 
•2 3 4 
l0w«m, (T» B, farltass®, aM tt. It Cosdy# 
Im addltlQa t© flutt ef « ®o0i©-^ #f©rBig.t aatwe tber# 
Ma alao bt«a s m&lth of t#s@3?tftiT® Ittmntme m eo©p®ra» 
tioB, partl-emlmrif im tk@ Oaitird States wt &«a4a, and ia 
tilt aeasdlaairlam torattlts# JKaeto of this lias liat to d© 
partitttlarly with agri§«|.tifal ©©•operatitss. 
D®#©rlptife pubJltcations represent %lm important 
sM mst valuable patt of the literetur# ©a eo®p®r8-
tion» The Americea literature on tiie subjstt is con-
msm^  mainly witli th.t aspect# of hmlmm effig|®B®y 
of cooperative organistion-and is strongly laekiag 
in any atsalytioal att«mpta»® 
1 Bm Lincoln, Murray Producer-constasr e©op@ratiw 
l«latl©aaliip. In American Cooperation; 19S6. p» Et-3i. 
la«riean Institute of cooperation* Washington, D, C» 193®. 
o 
••s©« I©w«B, 1# 1# T^m Aims and Objectives ©f ttot Ooa* 
sm@r® Cooper at iv© Movement. jUa i-mei'ican cooperation j 19S7» 
P» Amsiriean Institute of Cooperationt Weshingtoa, 
D, 0. i m f ,  
Wfirbais®! i» Goopsrative way, »arn®s and 
lobld, Ittc, Mm iQm* lS4e. 
m^-$ aoady, M., M, fh© Spiritual Slgaificano® of Scoaoaie 
Cooperation. In. Aiaerieaa Cooperationi lf4i, p, 6e-fS. 
laericaa InstiH't® of Cooperation. Washington, 0. It4®. 
®^a®liaa©ff, ®p, clt.i, p, Ig.. 
R«pr®seatatlT<i of %h.la ooae«faiag Msis^ iis 
m t f l H r n Q j  o f  a m i  o t f a ® r  i ® s € - j r l p t i i F ®  M - t s r l a l  a r «  
most of %lm ©f tM o©©p#3?etiT« l«iear®li smfl S«tir» 
let Sivisiom ©f %:&« ?«»» Aaal»J.#%TOtioa, laaS toaaf 
C@ll«ge biillstias mmmwnimg §00p«i?atif«g| a® eolleg# 
% s 
%m% 1i©0fe® smek as tSt©st au^eiret fey Qmltm* Powell,, !«#-
S • 4 S  ^ S '? 
Btss, Melsi" aai !,«•, IWI©, a»i lakkea 
8 
aat 3§lisairs, As m th%m ^ ©lityi^ mtieais mm, h©ir-
#vei?^ , tbty ©ffs? littl# #r no stttspt t© th® ®©©noisle 
mtmm of ©oopairfiflire • 
1 
J# Ooopsfatioa aaeag fara©i?«* stuf'gif ast 
Walt©B GO. »«ir T©?te. 191X. 
P^owel3.» S. Hr.roli, §©0ps^ «ti©a ia Mac-
sllXan Go. Mm Tori:. iilS, 
e.« B., The Coopermtiir© Marketing of fam 
Psoiwets. I* P. LIpplncott Co. Piiiiaisipklii. 1.S83, 
% e K & j f  A »  l i t  aM Laa®, ©• .H* tira«tl.«al Coopesetiv® 
»rtetimg, . fete tti«y ma€ S©a8, tm* 192®» 
®fill@y, H. 0. 0#©p®ratioa ia Agrietiltmj?#. ?©tui til«j 
ant S©tts, IB0* • Sew Ttsk* XM$,. 
o^misto,. I«w«X 1. eoGperatlf# Iftiy&ttlng ©f Agyieua.* 
tmraX D, applet ©a @aa eo# B«w York, lit©, 
1, y* ©©eperetlir# Jteflctfisg ©f fti® Preimcts 
la tfe® 'Oaltei stat««* Joha Browa llBiTOrslty Fress, Sil©aa 
Sprlaga, ItSf., . 
A 
'^Bakkea, I. aad Sehaar®, Mai-via A, fh® Sooaoait# 
of coepejeatlf® jterketiag. MaQraw-Hlll l©©k Q©. M#w York. 
i m f .  
» 10 • 
A. Pre-affltllsaoff on leoaoaie Watmr© 
Mei8 aaalyits toafe lb®ea a©d@ a®all»g with tb@ area 
of tMa specifis profelea fall into saparat# ©lasses, (1) 
1 
iastittttieml aaaly®@s and {M] Ibterttleal analyses, 
gevarsl imetiesa &^ imltnmX eom0iatsts madt 
iastltrntioael analyss® mmmniag tlie sco»©siic aatmre of the 
eooperatift mmiselatlQn, la 191f wi-ot®, 
. . »%hmf /co opera toy sj iiave feanted tog®tli«r for 
t&0 sosaea' purpoa® ©f doing foj tli«ffi®elTes Jotatly 
s©M®lhlag wftidi tfiali separattiy seiald aot €o m 
®©eaoal©ftlly, and wMcii tli@y d© not efaeess to 
l@aire t© omtsiae> m indeptatent, sg©aey»^  
i»©w@ll statud tin"©® years later, 
1 cso^ 'Optfatl'T# asi0Cifitioa is ©m© ia wtoloti 
tli« a«ab#rs foTia aa agfaty throti^  wliefe tlisy 
TOmi«et tbair csn Mfi»#ss tm tk®tr gfeat©st 
ramtttal advaatege, . • . 
tfe® fomadatioij of th® eo-op©rativ® aaeoeiatioa 
ii m»m aad, profarably, #aok sta%®| hm an @qual 
Toiee-in. direoting its ©p0:^ ftti©ii8»® 
F^or ft 4istiii0tio» hMtmmii thtse tm approaehes se® Hoi-
san, Paul f. Th.# lastitutloaal m%OGl* & lnoyeloptiia of 
th® soolal Seieae#®* f®l* §. p* 38f»-39S. fli» Maoaillaa Co. 
S®w Yorlc. 1931, .1# says Cp. ^ ©1 tb# Institmtioaal leoao-
®i»t l)eli@v«® "ttet social initae# mmat ital with r©al hxm.mm. 
beiags, not witli ratiomalisti i.m«a matmre, witii tlie vnn of 
fa0ts ratfe@r tMn a nomali&td pi©twrt of tliem«. ImeliaTOff 
top. slt») apparently completely Of«rl©©k®<l %%» institutional 
ttalisg with tils protol#® ia liis ©tkei'wise rnxmllmt 
Tmtm of •t&s lltsrfeturt Cp. 1-Sg)» 
B* 1* Oooptsmtioa. Wise. Agr. 
B^Kp• St®» Biil• B38* Mfi&isOB. 191?« js» 
®l0w«il, d# HferoM. fMatemtntal Friftoiples of ao-opwa-
tioB i3S l^ iemltw#* 0«lif«.A-fr* ^^ cp. Sts* 0-Us £Bg. 
B®ytel«y. Its©*, 'p# l-i.# 
* u 
M©tt of i* B, aatl|-sts kts 6oat«»a«a tli# ml% 
aEd p©s»ife ill ties ©f agrtomlttii'aj. eooptratlwa hm ii® has 
ooastaatly iookeS m the foeparatiT® aa a hofisoatal 
eoalstnation of aoertlaats tialta^ uumXlf «» #m essential fot 
seMwiag vtj?ti#al .iat®gi?tttioa eitbsr Mekwart or feiwayi is 
1 •• 
tfee asxtetiiig ®ystmo legai?iiiig tb@ ©e©,r4iaat«d 
Qt tlm eoeperatif® ssife®!"!, SLaek atatti tMt they Mat® 
agfQSi in wStmt to ioofayat® ©m tfa®se sp«eifi® .fiisetioas 
a 
wliila soatiauiag to e#ap#t® ©a ©tfe®?-®# 
fli® #airly aaalysla ©f Brof©#®.©? Bobot&a i® also largsly 
lastltmtioa&lij eri@Et®S, la 1§M %® «ta*«a, 
mrnu t&xm&m #tt6l5liib @©«3f«tatiTs hm%m&9M 
organlsatioas tfe® fiisfpot® mtttfilly is Rot t© ask# 
profits m  W B i m B B  a@ji ieaXlng mith tH® fufelie, 
but t§ mmkm their fataiag opcf«tl©ss msr© 
abl®. 
f#a, ,f0a»s lat$5 list@d six qaalifi®atl©n.s tm thm tru« 
®oop«jeattv0 asgooiatiottt 
1, Mambtfship must be llMt«d to produoera -lor aoa-
suMStsI of the produota ow ©©smoaities Madlai by 
til® eooptrativ® who &.re im sympatliy with the.pm.fpos® 
of th® orgenissatioa ana -Mhtt are willing to pletge 
tlieir patronage to it, and to assume an equitabl® 
BluiiTe ©f the flBoacial burden*, 
l^laot, f. C. Protecti0m l©osomie®.# -Hewy H^ lt# ll©w 
York. If26, p» @91 
£ 
aii., p, 8Si. Alio Biaolc, J, M» • leoaoai© F©«®ifeil-
iti#» of eaopsfatloa, la Ameticm eospeieatloai iS25. ¥el. 
1* p* ©5«91. Mericaa Institute of ©©©peratida, lasbiagt©% 
D. §» 1025, 
%€ibot^ a, ^ asl^ . So©f®j?atio3a 'mBtaf lewe G60p#fatl-r® 
Laws. I^wa Agr, Ixp, Sta. Oil*. ®i* Mmm* l,fE4. p. 4. 
IM -
B. shall to® ©ontla^ nl on peysoaal tat 
BO-fc ©a ©epital 
3, Oalf m sn©h. sMll tiaire a 
WQim ia tlhe' tffsljft ©f the ©rgaEizatlea* Oepital 
as ®m©li shsll bo to ice* 
4. Busiaaiss Is ta b® done Htli ii»ab«rs only emi tQw 
thdiir aiitual benefit, {Hoa-»0ab@f» s&otild b® gif®B 
lib@ral opportunity t© qualify a# 
5. G&pitel it to not mm tfean a isasosat)!® 
rat® of inte]^ «tt, and vmmTma in #»©»« of ©©.sts 
and interests at« t© aetru® t© tto« a«ab®r« aeeoriiaf 
t® patronage, 
6, Sine# atmbfti?# la aeeordiag. t© patroa* 
ag«, and sine® capital i® aot to store ia profits, 
rial® auit be borne by aeabers &@0ordiag t© patroasgii 
©r soa® ©tlitr ©twitabli basis.^  
la the iaa« b.ull#tia l©i®tka wrot® ©f th® patroaag® refund; 
'ibita a petroaag® dividend is paid, it my, la 
fast, include all^  thre® element#, aaanlys final 
papieat, if tli# price advanced, at tia® of iellwry 
wai not tb© full oompetltlve prle«| tb® profit 
wlilcb. the dealer would aoriwlly receiT® a® a reward 
for feis s©r?le®a ©s organiser aad ®aaag@r| and 
saTlafs^ r® suit lag, fr«i. amrketlng la a »or« ecoaeml.©®! 
manntr.*® 
By way of stttlBg up hi® measuring stiek for tto# ©o©per» 
ativ® «reeaerl®« la prattle®, Stitti wrotei 
•fb« paapos® of oooperatlv® aasoeiatloas la 
geaersl is to ^ ximla® net returns to waber®* 
. • ,t&® relationship @i:isting betw«tn tto® 
associatioa ant its patroas# .ia four fuadaaeatal 
aapeet®. . ,ar® (1) ©oatrolj ft) fiaaaelagi {$) 
patroaai®! and (4| pertlelpatioa.^ ' 
Althou# eoepsratl^ ® maaager rather than ©ooaoalst by 
profesaloa, qu«atia l«yaold« arrl-res at th® followlag aouad 
l^obotka., Iraale. *«bership Froblem® aad Btlatioas la 
Iowa farm lleirators. I©wa Age. Ixp.'Sta, Bal.# 3E1. Am#®. 
1934. p. Ii8-l§t» 
I^bid. p. iS5-184, 
®3titt«, f. S. ixteat to which Oooperatlv® ,cr®®a®rl®i 
- is 
eoaelmslea, «fk« ^ mseliaaia^  @oop«ralii^  is-as mmsh. tfe® 
pmreMsimg •tepayta«a% ©f tto® ffl«ab©*i It ssrws as in %h& 
I 
puip@li®siag i«pa2fta#iit mj e©rf©ratios." 
Of tho«® aaklsf ©oatritemtloaa t© m umds^ staaiisg of tti« 
aatma?®. ©f §©eptratlir@ fr« thm foiat of 
Tiew ©f iB»titmtl«ttai aaalysls,- Bt* r&ak# 
fiyst, 1# r«e©piiaed tto a»@d foy imoii- a» maderstaaiijag Im 
imu when to® '*fakoa fey a»4 latg®- e©@f®rat©rs are ioag 
g 
©a pi?ft©t4oe m& aTmwt ©a tb«©ry.** l©ar®# w@at ©a t© say, 
. . ,it la po'saible to ©rgamis® am »®oa©*i® ayate* 
fr©a t&« standpoint ami fet tli® ®f $itl«]p 
CI) ta® ©apitalist, {g) ta® wag® wetkef, m |3) 
ta» paty©a» Tim ®«pj.tal sleek' teiyosfatiea d©®« ta« 
fixit} l&hQT ©©•pftrtatffsaip km at ttsss ®tt®^ tei 
t© 4© ta® second; aad agriculfttT'al. ©e©p«fati©a ia 
gradaaily perfecting aethods for delag' tl® third.® 
Near#® aa« al®© wr4tt@a, 
la taeety,. tfe® ©©'©petttiT® a@®©eiatl©a d©es 
aot g© iat© Ik® mrket pi&®« to ©©apet® wita ©th@r 
coapaai®® for a share' of ta® tetiila®®®,; bat repre-
8@at8 ta® @©a4ai t©g«ta®r ©f s©»« a®X®et®d ^ ©ap 
If® frmly g©©p®ratif«.* Is ijierieta e©©p®rati©ai ii56» p. 
lES-i.38, Am®ri@ea Instifmt® of e®©p®ratl0a» fastoiagtoa, 
D. S. 19Si. p, 131-132. 
l^®ya©lds,. Q»®atla,, lltlMit® oa^ ®«tiv«s ©f Mm far-
eaasiag ©©©p«r®tiir».8. la la®i?i®aa C©op@rftti©*j lf39. p. 
Aaarieaa lattlfut® ©f §©oper8ti@a^ » fasaiagtta, 
B. e« 1936. p, 
%omr«®, Sdwia fa® l®©a®aie Fail©s©phy ©f Co-
op'er®ti©a. J«@ri®aa leeaeaie l«vt@w, ias-iS?-§f?. lt£2. 
p.. '§Sf. 
%©ar»®, Id via fa® I*®gal Ststas ©f Agri ©ml tarsi 
0©©p®i?ati6a. Tk® Maoaillan a©. »@* I©riE» IMf. p. SI. 
As will a® pointed ©ut lat®r, however, tier® is «®ri©m,a 
danger ©f feeing »4«l@sd by tai« aaalyti®. 
• i4 • 
t© i«t mp a mutual ftgeney fex a ' 
ley s«rirt«e Xn 
i.ai im ias at:at#a: 
fh® ©©-operative aoT«®at li as ©It as th@ 
I»iustflal levolutlon. , . fmia»®atal» 
ar® gaasrallj regarded as tuttraialag Its 
tlstiaitive'oharaoter: CH'It i««ks to r#saer 
at eost« to its a@ato®r» r&ther than t© 
profit from business with th® geatral fmfeiiu. 
fh« group s«rTi©« iut-mp 1« rtgard@4 as a mean® 
©f securing, ©ffi@i«aef with a miaiMja of 
(2) It insists that financial returns b® 
tiitributed to the members ^  producera after 
dedm©ting only the oompetitlve irate of interest 
to capital and wages and salaries to workers, 
{3| It hoMf to democratic control by all th® 
partioipamts in th© business,^  
fh# following qmotatioa, also frott loarse, it &mm more 
enlightening as to the eeonoaie struttur® of #©-op@retiires; 
. . .three outstanding charaeteristics by whieh 
th® cooperative asaooiation differs from the 
ordimary ooHJsaercial oompany. In the first plaee, 
it eoatemplates a group of persons engaged ia a 
mmmom toonoiolo enterprise who associate thea-
selves together to maintain a Joint agency which 
shall render service to ell these business asso­
ciates on a mutual or cost basis. . . . 
geoond, the phrase ••not conducted for profit** 
is one that has been much misunderstood, , . . 
It does not mean that the members of a co-operative 
association do not expect to receive ©coaoMie 
benefit from its operations. . .it does a«aii that 
these benefits, even though measurable in peeuniary 
tems,, shall accrue to participating mem%m$ to #n-
haae# the retura froia their OTO operattems at 
producers I, rather than going as profits to those 
persons who have furaishad capital to tin Joint 
enterprise. . . # 
1 
Ibid., p. M f & .  
2 
Sourse, Idwin Q, Th9 Philosophy of Cooperative 
- Ig -
Is tWfi plao®. • . . Oa tfas tMetf tJiaf 
%M oontril3iit|@a ©f capital iliomli is® y«iairi«i an 
aa obligation of mch xmixkm in |ir0BOfti©n to tJi« 
tts« which h© mimw of the faaiiitie« of th® ess©* 
tlation, they have treated capital, ®« l.©am fiiBds 
to he paid for at the market rat®, m ia «©!» 
iBitasees, even below thet rate«^  
Md finally tr, l^ mrse hs« .writtea. 
Hen®# ft truly cooperative organisation is om 
whi©h ©omsists only of perticipatiitg s®itoer« eeeh 
of ifeta askts his individual business part ®f tie « 
Joint hmeinets of the society eooferativ^ ,® 
•fhif «tat.«#at, of se-mr'ie, hae defimlt® i»fli©at,ions eon-
©erning the #®©ao»l® »®tmr# o^ f the ©ooperatlve a«i©©iation as 
it is, and had the last fart ef hi* -lemtent# read vis# verea 
|i,#,, the iuilaess ©f the cooperative repre-
sentini the «» at a part of eaelt of the iadividmal hmeinessee 
of iti he wmld hav# even wore nearly antieipated 
S 
the ©®ntrih«ti©ni ®f ^ ellan^ ff• 
Seneral theeretieal ®e@m©®i»t« have «ad« little or no 
eontrilstion t© m nmderstnnding of the nature of 
the eooferatlve ®«®oei®tl@n« •fhey^ have l®i>^ «a at th^  siaply 
as a special kind of eorp^ ati^ n, eoverei tmite^  adequately hy 
the general theory ©f the.flm., Ivea ionld,lni# althorn# more. 
Maricetiaai.. Fan l«#rieaa Union., .Division ef Agrteultural Coop­
eration# seriet i^ a e.@efer®tiv®.s# Mo, 1# fashingtoa,. D, 6. 
ISSf, p. g., 
%©'urte*. l.®igal itatue, •« . • pp« SO-®®* 
%©urse# l#oa«i,® thilesophy. # . # pp* 'SSf^ Si©. 
®l»eliam#ff« ep• ©it. 
u 
aware thaa most tleofists of tlm aatmr® of the eooperative, 
has writtea; 
raiTOBgli. all tilts# many fo^ s of orgaaizetloa 
oa® prlaeipl® holdi; Profits, th© 'difftrea®® h®-
tw®©m the Talm® of outputs end the valmt of laputa, 
Isloag, t© the.owatr® of a husiaess la proporttoa t© 
th« shar# whieh they own, fkiB pria§l|)l® applies 
etta to .«noth«r fora of husln«s® organlzatioa»»th® 
@o©p'®ratif« ®00i@ty—whieh has risen lato impor-
taa©® la th® past hundred years and whieh say be 
of @ir#a grsater ii^ ortanoe ia the future. A e#op-
eratiTf. soeitty is a business owatd by the people 
who pmrihase from it, or who sell to it, la th® 
proportion of the amomat of their pmrohase® or 
sale®, . . ,A cooperative society may be defined 
as a ©orporatioa whieh la financed entirely by 
flxed-iaterest seemrlties ("boads**! ,aat ia'whioh 
th® O'Waership resides ia th# people who buy from 
it or sell to it. Its profits, eoastt^ ently, also 
belong to the people who buy fro* it or sell t© it, 
la proportion to the .eaouat whioh they haf® bought 
or sold.,* 
la hit book Saeliaaoff preseated a review of the 
theoretical ooatribmtioas of luropeaa•eooaoaiets to the 
a 
maderstaadiag of the wAam of th# eooperative assoaiatioa. 
Apparemtly th# major ©ontributioa® were »a.de shortly after 
190© by Italian eooaoaiat® who were followeri of Maffeo 
Poataleoai, partioularly Shiao faleati aad.lariaao Meriaai, 
3 
®ad by lobert Liefaaaa in 1983. A» interpreted by laeHaa-O'Tf, 
%ouldiag, Keaasth 1, leoaoai© Analysis, lev. ed. 
Harper and Bros, Mew York. 1948. p. 444-44S, 
S^aieliaaoff« ©p. ©it., p. 15-2S. 
®Ibid. laeliaaoff has aeatioaed the writings of others 
also, iacludiag those of fmohs, lobbeao, Cobbi, Maacini, Tiv-
aate, Bohelli, Manure, and Bolaffio. fhese writings appear 
to ooatribute little, however, to th© underetaadiag of the 
- If 
hmmmT, t&lemVs aaaljfiils tes to i© pri3M«il|' witli tli» 
®0©ao«i0 r©i® of ©©©pwaltv^ t m%hm tban aatw@* Il« 
d«fialll@a ©f tlm m9p9W^%im i« ta tmt in %mm» ©f i%® r©JLe# 
A eQ0T?ggatlT« mmei&tim Is aa 
imsttWrn^ok tft®'*exl8'tlOik'_ sytiw 
ftm aiaa' to dorgeet iKIly ©r pailXy 
tim aa^ wki fc»p«»f#ofioa» of tb® Ai«iribS?ioa of 
liiaffe"• '' 
mximit m otiti? fctaii iitoil© also wltto tlmir 
©eoaoai.® tol#, i»« ooaoXmdiag tM followiag ia 
r©gafi to tte mmmiQ mtnm ©f eiaoperatty® awoeiattoas: 
A cooperative assooiation is a voluatagy 
aasoeTail^ aSFTEE uuroaasws qv silUlers of 
i&Ut aat""o^"migF ^boAa wilh' m"kM"U ImTom 
•mmmmmrnmrn niimiiiiiinMpiMi -mimim .iiHiiiiUMiiiiaii •iwnwmimni iiBnirtmumwiiii mmgaM mmmmmmmmrnrnimm 
ta® piigiRgeaea* im sgiiega* priefta^  ana aoniev-
It lay aa oggiaTganoa of tlieir own eateafpglst 
MTWWMT*. IJMIIJBW GI«WIII 'MIIMM UIWIII'MWII!iiiwiigiim> NMIIIFTUNM .IIS^ 
g«sp«el1Iytiy for mwim or TGi 
'mrnmmmmmbmmmmimimmmmmmmtm •IMN.IWWIWW • m IIWIJIITMWWWWWBIW mmmm UMIIWIIINWIWI 
Ai i.lstm»siii 'fey mtilaaeff, tl# eoatrlMtloai of t&# aot«4 
a©.waa ®©oa©fflist» Ms^ aa# w« ®y«a moa?# i«poi?taat, lis 
•^fiaitioa of tfe@ s©0f«3?atiy« is taotei a«, 
•fii« @©op«,t8tiy«s &m thm 
wfelek eaieavor tlyomiM a o©*oa baitftass ®0tafel,s|i« 
ji@a* to furtfoey m to ©®»fl«t© ©r eoa-
sa»lag aetivittes of th«l¥ 
ttifaaaa imthm that th« ®©©f®i?atiir® is n sptelal 
©coaoalo f03» whicii is «*»aatati&13>y ilffegeat from ©aterprig©"* 
©eoaoai© m%m& of tfe© ©©op«?atiye, aat ia so®« mnm ar© »ls-
l©«diag feeoei*## of %h%it ©fieatstioa to l«b©3? ®©-pa3rta®rskips, 
whiefa ar® strotttt^ aliy tifft^ eat froa ©oopttratiY© ft«s©eiatioas. 
'illJi4,, f. ii. 
^Iteid., f. 2,1# 
%bii.» p. g«. 
• is­
le has txpaaiti thia in the following ptssag# quoted 
fey meliaaoff; 
It is taportamf t© state in interests of 
imfi«rsti®aiag of tfe® ©oopsrmttvts, tJi«t 
they belong to a different sphere from the forms 
CTitt«t' bj Iht iadiiritualistie mot'if®® qS mit'in^  
meEt, wT^ mM''Mr, iktrefore. oonilagg i£@«• 
as s variety of collective enterprise* • . , 
finally, since the cooperative i® iah«r«ntly 
fmrth«rifti ©r @©mpl@tii^  the «©oa©ai© actiTlti@» 
of its all the a®ah«!S of ®©op#ratiT@ 
assooietiomi aetestarily participate in tb© 
ecoaomi® work^ of ths sssociatioa.* 
B. Si® OoatritetiOEs of :te«li®aeff 
fh® omtstiaiiag coatrifemtloa of th© lit«ratmr® relative 
to th® «aoa©»ie aatwe of the cooperatiw m8fi©|iatioB is 
Sffislianoff^ s '•icoaoaie a@ory of Oooperatiom"* 4Mr#s8ing 
hlas@lf ip@cifl©«lly to'Patt®#*! tmtitioa, 
1 waatti .to fiai omt ,|mst what w® have got 
to €o to b© «Btitl@a to h# • e©n@i4«r®.d o©op®rativ«. 
. . .1 am woattriag if tho^ t. aloag this lia« has 
gone far taom^  to ©aahlt its to s«t. «p a tafialtloa 
that i-i fii:td aa| staisfiari and eaa h® applitd. with;' 
«»ctB@as# • . 
'^ Ibii., p, £6» 
It is #viient from the r®f©reacts %j the amthor 
ia 'Mssiaa oitti i» hi« hihliogrephy (p* ii8»ESf) thet 
Haeliaaoff hat giv«a a good deal of'thott#.t and stmdy to this 
aattar ai ©arly as 19^ 4# 
ii«li®ri. 0OBf@r®noe oa f#®ts of Oooperatioas 1. 
a.'Noww, I,«adtij, la A»«ri©iai coopermtioaj li^ S# ?ol. 1. 
p. I§l-I6g. Affisrisaa laatitate of Coop@ration* 'ifashingtoa, 
D. C» IfSS, f» isg. 
« If • 
Iffltlianoff mted ttoe t©«Xs of ..tb®er®tieal emmmi® aaalysii 
t0 provid# t&# wbieli be kas statet as follows: 
. . .tli« ®©©p@ratlT« i?®pif#stats tbe assoelal;®^  
«©©aosle Haiti la fnaetioaiag ani met tlj#j|j? 
associetioa as a separate atoaoaie ®atitfi ®a 
asaooiatioa or aggesgat® is fttnetioBiag ©»l|r as a 
%raiie& part of a®#ooiat«i ©©oaomie mait«|,lii 
tteat yaspeet it it psipfectly identical witb th« 
®p«0ial 4«fii»tm0nti or branches of siagle ©eottoml© 
«ait»,i 
a© to@w aa analogy to a floeJfe of teirit. fb® ©ooftrativt 
. . .tooa not acfwii?® or spend; Jmat as a flock 
of bird® toy Itmlt dots not •^ fly^ , As « fl©o.,k 
is ©mlf ® group of flying birds, tHis "ttoolE; 
oorporatioB** is a gfomp of acquiring («n|«rprises) 
speadiltg Cliom«®fe©idsJ economic unit««* 
It 1» e»s«Btial tliat tfe® stmient of ©oop-
©rstiw organiz&tioat »M®« a olaar separation 
of th.& concept il) of sstablis&moat as a 
prodiBB'ifig • unit ^ laatT' froM ttost (Z) of #ate|-
prise as an ae<iulsittir® ©oonoaie mit £lrir^ .® 
If ©fsry' ©3Et#ting ©o#p#ratif« aisoeiatiom 
ii aa organisation of tcoaoai® mlts C«at«r-
prisoa or households) i,i., if it is ©oapoaed 
of smoii ooonomic units, w® ar® §«»p#ll#i to 
reeogmiz# that tM« fooperatif® Is e a#i?if«i 
oeoE©*i® formation.* 
S^ttoli&noff. op. oit,, p. E49, 
I^bid., p. lit. 
®Il)i«., p. IM# 
4 
Ibid., p. 91, 
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H© poiats ©mt ttet deoaomi© iatt^ etloa ©an talte# piae© 
Ca) -felirottgli expanalOB ©f exist tag iaiiTiimal ©©©aomio uaits, 
C%) tbrom^  fmgioa ©r ©©aieiidatiea. ©r (©| tliremgh th« 
eQ©rdiaati©8 ©f aetiirlti®® of ©xlstiag ©eoaosio ttuits, 
« »ir® me«€ aot g© imt© d«t®lX©d 41s©mi»iott ©f 
tit© first ©f tli«»« limea ©f i»t«p?ati©a siao® it 
©am s©t 'fe® exptettd that a ©©©ft^ tatiw ©rganisa-
ti©a, lj«i»g a 4#riir#d fmm ©f as #©!Wk©»i© wait, 
saa flai amf ©xplanatlfta ia tfe© ftQ®#®s ©f ®p©wtlt 
©f siBfl® ®©©ii©Bi© maits. . , 
fusion as a process of eo©n.emit iBt©gp©ti©a 
aemas a eompleta assimilation by a atwiy t«i?iv#d 
teoaeal© fe©dy of the economic ingrtiidats 
iaTolvei. These ingredients ia th® process of 
fmsl©a lose their indapendeac© and their soonoaie 
iadlviiaailty, "Phey cease to exif5t as eoosoMi© 
eatitits. . . .3hea the well-known independent 
stoelte etogamies eagagad in the manufecttar© of 
harTestiag aachines {McCormick, Deering, Milwamke© 
©©apanies and some others) were fused into th® 
International Hervester Compjuiy of pjmntm ahomt 
two decades ago, they were completely absorbed by 
the giganti© trtis^ " and as aepa'rati"'''''enteS^ rt'sS 
lave entirely'*l'pa'pi>©ar^ ; yet tkeir''factories 
Eave" eoni'lnued to work for a long tiae^  pr©batoly 
with©ut any visible changes and even,their isii-
vidual trade marks are still in tts©,* 
e^lianoff alt© pointed ©mt cas®# ©f gertiai fmsion such 
as the Tarioms ©^©abiae,©'* broaght ©boat by ® fasion ©f ©oamoa 
stock, bat stated! 
Ml th© itrivei ®©©B©»i§ ©rgeat sat ions b©ra 
ia the process©® ©f partial faiion reaaia distinct­
ly, either economi© anit» or their modificati©®,®. 
fhe enterprises partially fasei ©oatina# t© b© 
©eqaiaitive form© I th® ©^©»feia©s« © specift© pr©d-
aet of partial fasion—a|® wlthoat exception profit-
getting ©0©a©ml© bodies* 
I^mtliaaoff. ©p. ©it,, p« ig-93 
I^bld.,, p, 9#. 
« 21 •• 
Coortiaatioa, as a my of eoonoiil# integya-
•lioa, Is aot oalf radleallj 4iffereat fro® fmsi©a, 
•|imt from th@ atruetwal point of view Is 
rioally opposit® to it« I©if» . .every «©©r#iaati©B 
Is iatended only t£ echieve aQOesaary adjuatmeatg 
of ftmQtloaln^  ef*Thi^ arii'''oipaat8 without aay ** 
© noro& chmeat s ufia their individuality or their 
independence, fwaioa creates s®w econoaie malts, 
whii® coordinatiea alas only to harmonia® tli« 
seoaosic activities of existing ©©onomle individ-
atls. . . .Tlie product of eoonomie fusion ttoas 18 
an eoonoiai® malt with an ©conomic entity of its 
own, while the ©utaome of the coordinative process 
is aa aggregate of coordinated economio bodies, t 
flaralitjy of eoonomie entities of its ingf©di«nts, 
any iadapgadeat »atity of ita 2S&* 
It wa® pointed ©mt further that these aggreirates mj h® 
dl®ttagui®h®d froa a strmettir®! poiat ©f vi«w iato -CH 
aggr®gr®t®s of .#©©n©aie ftactioas and Cg| aggregrat®.® of 
eeoaomic maitt—aetmlaitiv# Cw^ ttpris®®! or ipeadiag 
{hoassholia), 
fhe economic fraction® that ar« susteplihl® 
to ©oordiaation into ftggreg&t®s mm ©xclmsively 
haaaa fractions (r®at#rs, creditors, weg# earners^  
salaried groups^  eatrapreaeurial fractions, ©tc.) 
atatral farn orgamizationa, Cht©b«i's ©f cemeree, 
proftssioaal societies^ i autosobil® elmto# and trmd® unioas are 
®miipl@s ©f ag^ agetei of ©coaoaic fractions as aielianoff 
ms®d tht ©oaceft. 
fh© eoncoption of aa aggregate of economic 
mit® 1® a strangely difficult coacspt* It caa 
sot b® oo»prehsnded pr®cl8@ly uaj.»®0 it is clearly 
undtrstood, tiiet an age*®gat« .of #eQaomi0 aaits 
I^hid., p. ef-f© 
H h U , ,  p. if. 
•• , gg •« 
Is not the ladepeadent eooaoailo unit but the 
froup ot fmietiOBiftg 9eoiiSia'le"' mnlt»»0qui 1 itlv« iii§22ElsiET~S/SisSM*l^ ffis^ HS&Tssl7'3Sis.* 
for®, all th® "iMMMMSMM. of tk® a^ gggate" are 
ultimately ^ th® fun^ tlQiS of the a^ gge^ atsA , ,. 
QeonomlQ mitm ani not of the amrmmte It&elf, 
Emeliaaoff*s analysis leads him to the conclusion that 
all ©o©fe3fmti¥0 dissociations, both unincorporated and th©«® 
incorporated-'either m a stock' on e non-st©®k h#ai®, 
iaeludlng'agriemltir®! marketing, agricult\iral pirthasiag, 
or QoafUst#r'-0Oop«fttiT0s, and cooperatives of ina«p®®i®iit 
retailers eind ©ther economic units, fall^  into-his' elaaslfi-
• cation of fin aggregate of eoonomic units. , a# aggr#gat® 
conslsti ©fa technical unit (establishment) but not an 
• 2 
eeonoiii©--unit tenterprise). Structurelly, earttli also fit 
3 
into this category. 
6onelua4©n® haaed on the mMmmmte coaeegt 
• With his eeniepf of the oooperat'ite association as a 
basia, imelianoff ia afele to demonstrate seferal important 
conclusions'j: 
Accepting the perfect aggregate struotur# 
of economic organization for the cooperative 
standard, we should obviously consider every 
deviation that distorts the aggregate structure 
of the cooperative body as a step toward the 
degeneration of this body. The basic charac­
teristics of the aggregated plurality of 
economic units are; 
"^ elimnoff#, . op,« eit.,, p. •!©•&. 
I^bid., p, lOf-gas. 
p. 219. 
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1, A., ©©opeyati-?® a.§gir®gst© of ©©omwiie wnita 
iota aot.a®tmlr# mor speni fey Itself b«eami® it is 
0o»p©s«i of ©r sptnfling 
a. All tM mmhmM »r® ©fellg®t tai. ©alj• tlit 
B©®to#r® ®r® I© us« th® «@oa®»i@ servieea 
of tli« itggp«g®te, 
3. Ml- e#©a@«i-e rtlatiesslilps ©f »»b«rs 
wittoim tlieir aggregate tr® b&s®d ©a th,® irrwokabl® 
priaeiple of proportlonalltf ©f tli«ir ®©©ii©mie par-
tielpation in aotivitie® ©f th® aggregate** 
flies® tMm p©l»ts have fftr-reaehiag liapli©eti©iis, Bom 
©f whioli gat3liaa©ff Mm»mXt hm polat®d omt« fi@ has. &mm a 
©©atiawm with a »pw# aggr«gat® of te©a@ale malts" ®t ©a® 
pol« aaa a «p«re §©ll®©tiv« s«so»®ai® mtt** at th® ©ther with 
six diatiaet pha««« ©f «ps«ui©-©©©periitl?#s*» falliag along 
th# aoatiamm, le ©oa@la4t» ia this rsg&rt that 
. , .bmsia«st tr«asaet,@i with ©mt»li®r» ia th® hasie 
faotor of th« 4$f®a«r«tloa of ©©©ptretiir® a.,g§r®eat®a 
throagh p0«m|©*#©0p«rRti^ « foms iat© e©ll«©tiv® 
«at«rpri«@«#^  $ 
H# has showi that th® lothdal® friaetples, a© act 
e©rr«®tly, «l@arlf mi coapletely r«fleet th® eooperstiv® 
eharaetsr ©f the ©rgaaia«ti©a# fw© ©f th«a, "prie®., to seahert 
at th® »®yk®t'» aai «hm«ia@«« ©a a ©ash ba®i«« ar® bmaiaeas 
prooedaras aai hav® little ©r aothiag ©f p@ealiar eoaQ«rn t© 
0oop®rativ@s, ••I.iaitaA amber ©f ^ ar@® ©f st©«k par »®mber« 
is aot gtaeral aa4 fioaa a©t apply to aoa-itoek assoeiati©as, 
aad eartaialy takea alom® mmM mot safdgaari th® aatar® of 
i^bii., p. ggs, 
®Xbit., p. M30* 
®fh® raits of ©rgaaisatioa aa4 op«ratioa attributed to 
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til® ©ooperativ®* diwM&n&s m stock" Imtiiaaeff 
has sliowo to b« ©oaslsttnt with Qoept^ iatlve charaot#? h##am,s# 
«divii«ttis m stook" &m aot m imm® of th® 
ass©©iatl©a, btit merely interest reekcnings 
affi©Bg th« seabsf® th«ms©l¥®s« Th«se reekoaiags 
metitf with perfect accuracy iisproportionality 
to@twe«a advaneei contributed aai the use of 
s@rvi-e«a.of tha aggregat® mad® %j individual 
asahers.i 
Kegardiag patreaai# iiviisad.s, Sa®lian©ff eQselmiedi 
T© h® &m&t w& sh©mld trsat thea aa 
ptythlt" to m (ia mse of deficits) "a©«toaat« 
rte@ivahie« tmm. m®mb#a?s oa th^ ir oarreat traas-
a^ tioag tMm0 cooperative ttssoeiations# la 
pmr« agipsgfttes, th® siirplu»@s |©r deficits) of 
associatioas have aothiag ia eowioa with the 
@atr«prta«ala3, iacoae of acquis itiv« economi© 
asits. AS loag a« a cooperative atsociotioa if 
treated ae as •'eaterpris©" and its smrpluaes are 
aisandtrstooi as "profits" th# ©conoaic eaigp® of 
patroaag# iifiitaii mmBt %# 
Of th« oa#-saa ©as-yote priacipl©;, la@liaaoff reached the 
followiag' •coaclusioat? 
l^ aality, a#, th# principle of votiag, is ia-
coaii8t@nt with th» principle of proportioaality 
madtrlyiafcall other' relations of a®»h«rs of aa 
, • »th® iat6rpretati©a of a cooperativ© aa a 
"aaioa.of pfirsons" is aot oaly without ©xplaaatory 
or descriptive value, hut it is •utterly aisltgediag; 
it divtrts mttention fr©» th«' poiat of tariiaal 
sigaificeace, aamely, that eT#ry ©ooper^ tivf 
orgaai«ati©s'is coaposti of «eoaomi@ uaits. 
Iquitahl® lioaeers ia lochdal®'laglaad ia 184i. They are 
oft@a ooasii#r#i th« *Bihl@" for cooperativ® purchasing 
assoaiatioas. 
l^aslienoff. ©p.» cit,, p. 18i. 
%hid,, p. 185. 
^Ihid., p* 18f. 
I^bid., p. fl. 
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fotlnf P0W#3? Qf aamfeer® ia aggregate# to b® 
eoasisttat witfe tfceip general struotur# sliomli 
h« propertioaal t© tIte ao-oaoaio partlolpatloB of 
IndlTiimal members la tli® sooperatlv® 4ggrsg®t@| 
pro-f©rtional fstlag is aotually ©fual ro%iug 
in aggregates with homogeaeous aeabershlp,. whll® 
it ia aecesaarilf unequal-itt, assooiations 
of li®terog®a©©ms laemberahip# Sinoe a majoritj ©f 
e€>©p@rativ®@ hmv# a fairly hoffiogeneous aeab®rahip, 
««<iual fotiag** ii s prtioai.naiit feature of eoop-
srstiv®* It themlft aot ©iferlooksd, however., 
that "equal fotimg** .in 0©operstiTas is that a high-
ly i®©«ptiir0 sp«atal ©ast of propertisnal voting.'^  
Anothsr important eonelmsiom that te®lia»off mm to is: 
fh© 19$&1 vestments of incorpor®t®i coop-
erativ# astotiations do not oorr®®p©nd t© their 
teonoai® ah-araeter. The l@gal unit ©f imeorpo-
rat@4 assoeietions conceals their plurality ami 
©loaics th#ir economic strueturt to such e tegp«@ 
that the law-givtrs as w«ll as th« eooneaists 
treat cooptrative aggregatti as economic units. 
, . .Such a tiisfjpprahensioa i« partially »up* 
pQrt#t b«©sus© external structural f®atur«» «f 
imo©rporat«4 "capital stock** aisoeiationt 
strikingly ifflitat® th© customary legal fora ®f 
©olle-Ctive units* fhis discrepancy of the .«conoM-
i© character of cooperative aggr#gat@s and their 
l@f®l eabodiment is one of the prinatpai aource# 
Qf confusion and inconsistencies in existing « 
iatarpr®tati'©na ©f @©©p#rstiv® organiaationa.^  
lis®wh®r® in his l3©©k la®lian©ff pointtA out that th® concept 
of th® co©p®rativ® fts an •'agency'* transacting business on 
bthalf of its meabsrs ii not only without «sonomic basis, 
but is often slsleadiag,' ainc® the cooparativ® is actually an 
intsgrel pert—a »i®p®rtm@nt"—-of ®ach of th® a«a©,ciat®d 
®conomie unit® ant not "an ©conoaie boty by itself. , . 
acting Indepeniently*# 
•^ Milianoft.. ©p. eit., p, tOO-SOl. 
fibit., p. g4i, 
3lbid., p. l?4-lfi. 
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latliaaoff 3f0a@to4 tli# conQlmglom that 
, .. .ia ali cooperatives raral end ushm^ ia-
fmm&l and incorporated, ®lem©atarf atti laott, 
eofflplicttt®i, the an^^-ooibtiea is tli© esat®!* 
whBm t&s ©Gonoisic activities of ii0al(«ti 
toosiiaatei#* 
fi@ Ml «apltaBiz0i howmms tliat 
. . .all toe economic units partisipatiag im 
ittclL oolleotiire endeavor o«a w4 ©perut® th^ it 
iaditltiuaJl establistoaeiits. , and deltgat# 
to tiltilr oolleetive estaolisteii^ m-l only som®, 
aM ligmftlly few, purely te^ toioal functims. 
, , .fli®s© t$obaieal fuaetloas to 
tk« «0iM©n ©stabliahiaent ar® paid for bj th# 
participating economic unit® at their actmal 
co»t. . .proportionally t© thtlr indiTidual 
us® ©f tit® eojastton ^stablislia^nt. . • 
asallanoff %m i^fotdd a sheptar to aa aaalysi® of tli© 
labor Q©-partnerslip, or what lis feat eallei «pr©tecti.T® 
cooperatiT© ass@el«tl©aa'«. 
. . .awry agaliay of a cooysrstiiry as80Qle.tt0m 
kaa his own eoonoBlo imlt 
act lT|¥i@3 ar® aainlV ooafiaaa. . . 
tt©' ©oonoffile pbsitlo'ii of aeafeers im pr©-
iuctiv© aasociaiiona is entirely different ia 
this roapect. . . .The workingjsien members ©f 
"productiY®" associations are thoiight of as 
persons v/itiiout their own individual sntsr-
prises or eata¥liato»#atf tfeey inaepeMeatly 
<P)w>.iiii iijiiwiBiiwiiiNyg- imnMUMif i>mii<iiw»iiitiiMimi NWIIW mimwii utuiW!N'»'*"*M»«i'»io>*wiW 'MNHWNMICMPMK 
operat»t^  
Is @plta of tills,, li0^T©r, becaiia© such orgaBlzatloa® are aot 
orgaai2®t liy and for tlit benefit of 8*ocktol«®r® at smh but 
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tfeat tk# lafeor eo*-pai"t»@f»b.ip is not a sptoial fom of 
eatei'prif#'* hut Ilk# the oooperati¥# I® aa 
1 
«aggreget# of «e©a©a4# uaitg^. 
la regajpd to tli® nature of atmbeyt* oapitai in tli© 
oo©p«atiT«i, :®ai>ll«a©ff ©©nfilaisd tliat , »tli® .shartu of 
tjapital 3 to oh: ©f tgeggayiitlf# •assooiatioae nr# no t SSSBSESl 
of emt^gi?reiiemi?8hi'P femt e-e.i^tif jgatea of ©gedit**, 
, . ..''jiapital gtoeS:" is Eot ©stseprcnemfial @ep* 
itsi ©f a eoll®ctiT@ anterpris®, but the sm;©# 
©dvaa@«8 a@«d®i for financing anticipated trans-
a©ti©a« of iadividual laembers ef the aggregate, 
, , .'•a«%tr»stoek holders" ere net identieal . 
with the stoekholders of the e^llective eater-' 
prisss, i.e.» they are net the fractioas of 
©elleetiTe entrepreneur but tM rtpresentativ®® 
of their indifidual aad, iaddpeadeat 
UBits coordineted into aa aggregate. 
.* » .."dividends on stoek** uo not r«pr#«eBt an 
©Btrepreneurial profit or aay iaeos# ©f the 
fesiociation; they are th# iatra-ftggrtgatfi 
interest reckonings amoag the mmhm» itsigned t© 
restore a perfect prop©rti©aal.ttf of %h<B advaaees 
C"shares of capital") paid by ®a©h.aeiiJtr aad hig 
Tolua® of business done through the esseeiatiea.^ 
fh« final eoseimsioa rtaohed by Smeltameff whish is 
worthy ©f not# her® isi 
Geatripetel forces are iatriasie in ©wry 
fused, «§oaosie roriaation iiEt# thsy ara tuMrmt 
iB every eaterprise or houteholdi im ag^egatea 
of tattrprise® or households (©©opa^atit# 
%aellaa®ff. ©p. oit., p* 841-843. 
^Ibid.,, p»- m, 
®Ibid., p, 3Sl-g52. 
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SisoQlatidss}» tb# opposite, centrifii©! fortes 
art alwai'i at w&tk, iSconomie units, %© thtf 
«iitarprls®s or households, ar« dtslgnefl for 
iadiTliual aai independent life, la oondltioas 
of ooapetitlft economy they striv® toward afiiia-
ttaamo® of tbair individmslity and iMiptadiinee, 
Iftliey huddle together into 6f^ #gat#«, they do 
It only under extrssa objeotiT® s®t®ssity»'^ ' 
the ^ eomomi# stshility ©f aggregatts of 
©©oaoaie unit« is l^ trently low, Ivery ©igregate 
of ©eonoaie unit® is saturated with dlsruptlTt 
fore®! and 'is tept together only hy tha pressure 
of external anoeastty. This is p|rtifularly 
true of aggregmtes of enterprise,^  
EyaluetiOB of'the laeliaaoff oontrihutiong 
fhere is little douht that S®@13anoff has developed a 
sound ©eonosio ©onoept of the oooperativ® assooiatlon whleh 
is Internally ©onslstemt, extreiiely ms«ful for analytical 
purposes, and of tonsiderahle praetltal iaportane®, Perhaps 
the teralaology used in the hoofe has h##© the greatest 
eontrihutlng faotor to the Imk of ii^ aet the work ha® »ade 
on the, thinking and writing ^ of marketing eeonoalst®, eoop'«-
erative attorneys, eooptratite aeoount^ nts, rural soelologisfes, 
praetl6«l tooperatift leaders and others. Melienoff him­
self reeognized some o f the iiffioulties with the tera 
"aggregate"« 
I^hid., p. 10®* 
I^hid., p,-10?»108. 
%o domht the fa©t that the hook we® lithographed on eon*-
traet and published by the author was also a tontrlhuting 
faetor. 
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at tdPffi f®4®3*atloa is alsoat lientieal la • 
i%» aeasiag witli thm tem. «aggyega$®« used in t&l# 
stuif taa lias ea iap©3?taat adTaBt«ga lelsig a 
g«n»'3rallf aai wi-ieljr w»,«i la eeeaoiilc 
literstttjrt.* Th% tea l» a4ept«i hem $mms@ til© t®m »f®i«rati©m« «tt8%«arilr 
to smm&mj ©rgaalsAti©aa/ 
He dots not eomsliti'' mslag ^aasoQiatlGa" feosftf©!-, ©Ithomgh 
tliia ttJPii woiiXi e©a¥©f^ Be;r« Qlearly his aeanlng ani m% 1©t« 
tli0 «looi® l)OBa« ©r t&0 «grottptd tog®th.6r witk ao ti®;:.' la or 
fslatleaBMp" TOaa®tatioa" tto.at lis '»aggr@gat®« hm. It is 
likely als© ttoat «fim« ant »plaat« tof® a aQr-® ©l«ar mt 
©eoaoiii© a<ieiiiBg ttosa tM® tdms **@at@i'pi'ls@»* aai »»atafelish-
m©Ht« mstd la Beeaonle ftoeogy o£ gO'eptyatiea. aad ©«rt®laly 
aore so tfeaa "ecQaomit nalt" aati "teebaitftl tinlt"' also u»®t 
•fey Saaliaaoff. 
It s@ea® _ ©ItTioas tket'lmeliaaoff 3a.as aot 6@alt ad©quat«ly 
with the ©ooaool® aatttjee of the lalior oo-paytaeriMp. It 
seem® ©M after km peiatti out th« iaportaat stracttural 
iistiaitloa th.@ two, that fet still ©lasses thw latooi' 
eo-partaarshlp §l©ag witib th« eooperatlv® as m "aggiregst® of 
Qeoaoai© ualts**. An indivitttal latoorlsg aaa Q@:rtainlr is aot 
aa «0oaoBlo "fim" o? ^housslioli** fent a faotor of proda@tioa 
til® San® m eapltal.. fim iBhoT eo-partB@rsliip obfiomsly is 
strmetiarally'a @®ll®®tiTt firm 8e«klag to maxialz® its profits 
tJie same as tb® stonk ©ompaay, ©xe@pt that It is orgaalistt 
aad 0oatroll@i fey, and ©p®ra.t®€ for th® aatieipated b®n@fit 
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G. a« C&atjpilimtiems of l©b©tka 
Uafortmaateiy lis.# eoatjitemtl-oas ©f "FrnfmBOT Roteotto to 
th.® tJi®oif®tieai tmmmwQtk ©f e@0p#tatl@ii mm-mot ail 
reT«al@t ia M b  pttfelisfeti writing® • l®t ©aly bag M b  ploatei' 
thlakiag bta«fit«d others *^ © Mir« »mm ia ©eattet with feim S& 
tu# mmj mitkBhopBt t©af«f«a©«f aa4 ©©mt'ealiems lias ©ttena-
®4, aat es GI a^imat® stmitmts maier LIA, femt MANY &®T® B«II®fit®I 
also tmm 'tois mp-atolltliei wylti»i» la thl.« fisld* Smeli eoati'l* 
butioaa ®f® set r«atily Mepssltei®, aai tm mmsm it'is 
dlffiomlt to aake speeifle t© tb««. 'She ocMeats 
mad® b»r# aa?® th#!?#?©*®' bas«t ©a tw#'tx-ti©l«a, l.e«e*l6#a©mie 
1 ' i • • • 
laplieatiQBa ^ mi A fkmitw #.f Q^egefatlQat wtoieh flo 'set &d»» 
qmtsly ?«fl»®t kls tiaiakiag at' t&ifi 
. BQlsotka*i eoatlmsida ms to fife# «©©aemie 'aatmy® of %h& 
Qooparatiw is «sii«atiallf tk® ««® as aB«l'iait©ff*»s 
. . .a <i©ep®ratif®', » . •& f#a®yatlOB ©f autoa-
mms ®0©®©iiie malt# whrnm 8Wi«4 pmjfOt® if is t© 
funetioa la tleir individual eapacities feat la a 00-
ortiaat# m®aa®3? with respect t© apecifie aetiTities 
iategrallf »®l&t®4 mat uommn to their iatiTifiaal 
#©©a©»le pwsait,##® 
fh@ iiess fee»i@ to a ooaeept of a txm ^ ©©fsratiTt 
a3?t at f0ll©wsi 
1, A eo©f®*atiT@ awaagiaeat ia n'Jiorisoatal 
o-offiilaatioa of eateaoaoas «t©B©ait maitt# 
H^ofeotke. L@go-s©©a©aiQ.. • • . 
l^obotjtea, Wrmk* A Tbmtf of eo©fewti®a. J©mraal ©f 
fam l0©a©ai©s» g-iilt §4-114, 104f# 
I^toii., p, 113* 
- M -
2, B®earns®. • tfe# uaita rat®la %h&it 
mtmmwt It f©3.1®w». tliat tli# ttoa^isatiw wiit 
. liaT# a f®.4#ral satli©^ ttea as torn 
of orgMiiatloa,. 
i, Itafy t*me ooopsratlve represents an 
#ff©rt OB tto paift of two or more eutonoxsouB 
unit® Jolmtlf to conduct, ccordiaetely with 
othes, gimm operations essential to the eeoaoaie 
sctiTitj ©f aeiaber unitis. It is the aTowei pur-
pos« of %3?u® eooperators n&t to impose a feusiatss 
enterpriad in the usual s@ii3e bettween themselves 
aM their market. In a t«<jliai@al economio sense, 
this can only »tan that it is their purpose to 
fumotioG in thtir own capacities st iOTer^ ign 
umits, that ii, to perform desigmtei funetioas 
or stririo«s a.s iate^ ated with their iaaiYitual 
mm0mi& pmrtuits* 
4* 'f^ e m©p0ratir& organization 0oaai#t» 
©f the stm of the relationships mi ^rmagmmtB 
established among member units ia ordtr te tf* 
fectuata thsir purpose,-^  
Drawing on thsf# fotiB' basit idtas, lobotte hat poiat#i 
out iaportant eoat.litratiohi rslatif® to th®- operations of a 
t©op@r&ti«} 
1. 'fh® »«mh«r maits of a ©o-operstiirt a©t 
ia thsir own ©apaoitf m mt.mmmB units. 
2. M integrated operation toes not eoa-
.stitmtf mm independent profit-r.iialia.i unit, that 
i® ft firs. Sa@h an operation i» a branch ©f 
department of'the integrating unit, or as i» 
th# ea#e la a looperative, of.a gfomp of iate-
grstittg units • 
Frotmaew lobotto has taken the position, however, that 
«4lthouih the o©ope»atiw dots not »et all of the apeoifioa-
tioas of a fir», it eaaaot be denied that it is an ecomoaie 
entity." It is not elear from his published work'^ -whether 
a^obotka, Lego-laoaosie. . . * p* sa$. 
%bid., p* mf» 
®lob©tte. a fkmwy* . # • p. 103. 
*• -
lofeo'tka »««&» %f alaplf Imeltaaoff ©tils 
m eatablislmeat or mhoth&T tli© tw«j art fmateiaemtalli' is iif-
agr®«mtalj ®t tlii» peiat* 'Sh® t^ t^atlon shows 
loljotls-'s rdssoEiag m tliis p©4a%i 
Saoh participant must surrendsr s©T©rel^ ty 
# • », iisaoe each participant's status as an 
iaiivlAual saksr of <leclsions in this particular 
respect is modified. Others aow participate witit 
Mia in tbis process, Tliose wlio tHus partioipfet# 
ia, .»king these decisions, thtrafore, constitrnt® 
a tt#w decision aaking unit. 
It .must, however, l)s reeognised that tiiin 
decision making unit cannot make deoisi®»s *hi©li 
are unrelated or inimical to the intareitg of 
atoisions, ana aince uios& mo make aeoiiioas ausi 
assume responsibility for their consequences, m 
a«w decision making body oennot emerge wltliomt ® 
sisaltaneous emergence of a corresponding rlsk-
toearing body, . . . Participants as a group will 
fe# effected by, • .fitrtlcular risk situation/^  
dtffer«»tly than they would he as non-partIclpanti* 
Agaia it fflutt b# reeogniaed that the new risk-
hearing body consists of the participants as 
producers, . » 
lobotka hat taphaslsei,. h©-iMivtr, ttaat, though it /%h« ©o-
©perativej Is both » legal and m mmmie entity, It does 
not of .hat o, U. 
mtmbers#'* 
Im'other r»ap©#t« lobotki fellows Sieliamoff very 
.@l©«elyi as the f@ll©*£af »pe«ifl© examples illustratei 
farticipants as, « .producers ^ epreseatatives 
© f  t h e i r  s o v e r e i g n  e c o n ' o m i c  m l t .  
• . .Since the decisions of the particlpsMts 
regarding their. * ./3oint7 activity are mm group 
i^bii., p. xm'-im, 
®aob©tkt. Lego-lc©tt©»ic,, ... p. Sg®. 
• m 
Ita -/III® 0o©f#3?atlv«'*|7 mA a®XX 
«ooriiaat#ly tiiremik tli® iastrmemtali-|j of 
eo©p«?attv«» Umm tM gros# sales irnitte ©f pr©-
imeta m llabllltt®® %© Llkewis® 
tke ®.3£p#m0«» ©f the Q©©p«satlT® ar# @:Ep»a®@# of 
th® Aieh tli«y amtlorlz# tifc# orgnmlzatiea 
to iaQuy to th«it b«Itif, ams tfe« m&mim%im 
a« saeb Ms a#lth0f grosa mmt exprns^ s^  
h#a«« it f©li©ws it eaanet Mm a a®t • . . 
S© ttm -©©©peraMv© detls with it#' ai®«b»r« In terms 
of trm# pyi©#s»^  
• , •» cooperBtive laay ©3* mmf mot kmm eapltal# . , . 
C©»timuous operations iEir#Bt©ti®» aai 
fa@illti@s will, of ii®®®stitat« of 
Bore ©r less permanent eapital of a®!i#®ts%. A sew 
mBit of eapital 'ihat is th# nat«r® 
©f this ©apitalf 
It# #«tri'tettti®a is a p«tttir®®«at whieh the 
»ei^ ®p m»t mmt ia ori«r t© ir®@«iir<t atrfioe. It 
it not m iiiT«itii@a% ©f "Temtii?®* ©apital ia th« 
ttaml . * •. 
•fht ©ttly Jiwtifieatisii tm payiag a retmra ©a 
a«b«rs* ©apital iS't© ©©upaasat# for tisproper-
tioaality in its ©oatrihtttioa hy a®iil(«rs. Memberi 
wh© e©atrlbut@ less thaa their pr®porti©aftt® share 
ia #ff®0t borrow fr©» th©i@ wh© s©atribmt« a©r« 
thaa thtit proporti©a«t® shsr®, rttura t© 
oafital ia saoh aa«#s iftiM b® iat«»«t aafi Jfw&t ® 
distribtttioa ©f profit.® 
froa ® «trietly ®e©a©aie poiat ©f iretiag 
rights womM b« app©rti©a®i aoooMiag t© siitk as-
m4 aim®® ia a ©©©psrativ® th®»© ar® bora® 
prop©rti©a«Xly t© p®tif©a®g@, ir©tiag w©mli fe® bai®i 
©a patr©a«g«, if aot strietly pr©p©rtl©aal thereto.^  
Maay ©©©petatl-y® l®w«. • .©aly partially 
r®©ogaiz® th®,@®eac»i® satmr® ©f a trm® ©©©perative 
'^Ibia., p# it?# S®® al8© »«lisa©ff* ©p. 0it», p. 185, 
%©b©tk®. I,®g©-le©a©iiie. • • , p. sa8-5E#. Se® als© 
®^llaa©ff. ©p. ®it,., p.* f&f 
l^obotka, A fb®©ry, ... p. 112-113. s®a alt© 
Smeliaaoff* ©p# ©It., p. l&f., iOO-EOl. 
' m * 
issoeiattea# Umf of th®« a®siga«i to glw 
l«.gal 3?® e® gal "lion %q iatt»®aiet® stages la tk® 
«T©3.tttlom t©wari twm amefe ®» 
a©dlfl0atioBS of ©rltearj 0Oi?p©»ati©ji«^  issi-gnti 
t© p@mlt th®a t© sMar® profit# ©» & fatroaaf® 
feasls, 
fha law .says ttel a eooperativ® mtu m mg&ut 
tot its M m§mt typbaliy etorg®# a f®« 
f©f hi* itrTltes* lfetth«y ©r not tM« tm ©oters 
or fails to Qmm iiis ®,a:pems«8 is thm ag®mt*s 
mspmatMXitf, . , * Hs pmyimet &a mommiQ 
mtmt iait'Tptaieat ©f tliat of tho»« he a@r'^ @s &M 
msBmm tba eofolMfr tiak®. lot so ia %k& eas® 
of s «©©p®ifativ«*« 
The max r«ason why ©o©p«sti'r« a@tlfities 
ar® sai4 t© fe# ©onduct@t ®t ©oaf i« tli®y 
a»« a pa?t of tfe® iBt®g»at©a aetivltiea of tli® 
parti^ ifaati# • « .. 
m tmet e©of®fati¥e i®als. with its patroas ©a 
a ©ompetitif® hatis. . • »a «©op#»atiw 
patroa'a iat®jpe«t ia th® tjfmniaetioa ©©atiaiits im 
the s0»s« that the transaetioa is aot, ®@a®tii!iiat«€ 
uatil it if atjmittd t© a ©ost hmaisi* » ..the 
»ettX«»sst at the ti«® of th® ttaataetiea, i» aot 
a pgie® settlement hmt a t®atatl^ ®^  m "preTiaioaal* 
setHeEeBt sabject to adjm@ta«nt ^ aft®? fiaal »©•• 
tomtiag, fh% p&tfoaag® 3?@faai mai«r ®m#h ©ifemi-
staaeei i« a fi®-?!®® 4@i|gB®-i to ftd|mat th# traas-
aetioa to a eoit hasi®.® 
1. iTalaattoa of th® toatgihmtiQa® of Pgof»;»g©if lehotka 
It is ®ppat«at that th® aaaly#ia sad ©oaslmsioas of 
Bohotlea 0oa®®'raiag th® ®®©ao»ie aetms® of the .©©©peratiT® 
%©b®tlEe.» A fh®©i?j. • . •• p* 114# S»® al®© 'Isftliaaoff. 
op • oit»I p» » 
%ohotte. I,®^ »le©a©mi©. • . . p» Sgi« See als© 
ItoBliaaoff# op. ©it#, p. l?4*lfS. 
®a©hotfea# A theory. • . . p» l©i-i08. S«® also Saelia-
aoff, ©p. eit., p# 132-133• 
• 3@ 
assoeiatlott follow tliost of Bsftllaaoff very ©los®ly. ffeer# 
is a go#i i#8l of filffdi-eae.® is tli®' teraiiiolegy iis©4 hj the 
two amtltor®, tout upoa ©lose examiJiatiou th® iifferenets ap-
•pmj to he mt la tfee doacitpts' tlieas®l¥©s, hut only la th.® 
t9a?sa ms0d to rtpr-essnt tfaw. 
It is ©asf f©r tlie yesier to ,»islat03?pi'«l what Frofe«s©3P 
Sobotka mtaas by Us alitiassioB of tbs ®o©p®ratlir« assooia-
ti©,tt a® aa ©©©iiosie «i}.tit|', flis is pajrtioalarlsr trme since 
tb® eoateapo^arf dsfiaitioma of ^utmpmikBumht^ ©M of t]ft« 
X 
fitm, ©meii .m thoe© of l«tt., whl^h is©#® t© to® tto most tis®-
ful,„ Mse th© aefiaition ©f a tra® fi» ob a sovtraigE 
©ntrepseaenrial mait wkese ftmetioas are residtial ieeisioa-
makljag ami r@sld«ial mneertaimty-beiiyiag# So^ otke hm set® 
it ©Itar, Ii0ww®if • t&at tsaisloaf, rsgsr^ iag tli« JolBtXy 
0oadm0t®d activity ar# aot aats ia tb® eooperatiT© aisosia-
tio» as if it war# a so¥«r@igJi mit, but that &mh deoisioas 
will ba laade is tlis lmt«yest of tl# 3s®afeei' fims, beeams® 
mr9migu%f r#stt witfe Ih®®, le Ms shorn that tfe® risits . 
afisiag fr©a th® assoeiatti aetifity ai?© iii®©parabl© from 
those ©f th& iadlfldttal a«tiTiti®s of tli® mmhBw firas. He 
lias ®mptesi»©i, th©$ 
a# ©©operatiT© ofgsniiatioa ©oasists of tli© 
S'um of th.® relatioasblpa eM airangeroenta 
H^aft, AlDtyt Gaylpy4.» Aatioipatioas, tja§®rt®iaty ead 
O'Pifimi# mmmnlm* uniT. ot Ghlm^o Wtess^ CIil©ago. 1940. 
p * 2""S'» 
mmm§ mmhm unit a iM mi.m %©• 
•Qm %M% whiM hm» ©xplleitlf 
«"lii$di ®©®ptrativ6 m»mi9>%im if m aggregat® ©f 
80T«J!@i.^  mai%® aai l^ feetka l»i statst 
m® .f.#©p«at|ir# «s8©#l8t.iom i« aa mmwmts ©Jititr, 
i# aetmally a@ fettis Aim^ mmut li#tW9«a lM«li®ii©ff • 
did mt 'ftos. »!##»« *ii© tmtt3ef»a.atl©m8liip« 00m-
s©l.atl©m tMt %&0' tmm ««tgetgat®« mit lobetk® €14 
not lat«ad tl® ©part tmm tli@ fa#ti«lpttttef, 
mmmMim ttot tfc# ttw »®0©tt®ai« ®atity*» 
Both amtk0rs.|. m& a m%%m ©f f»©t, M&f® mm&m Mmtioa ©f tbe 
amlti-«a.at««a. ®@©a#»i®. ^ sl@t:l©a«litf• irHltii felmt t&® 
m-. l.to a .1.. to 
Joist mtlritf# f® ttoat eacteat tto® te#pe»tit* as«®@iati0a 
is aa ®©©m@a|© tatitri M-t t© tl«t «xt®at it is am ®,ggi*©i@t®, 
Th® t®3»s tli«ms®if@« imtieat# il»®®t limt aetmally 
thm Ijaai® eoasapts of tk« emmmU ftyaetir®. of tli® ©@©p«»«-
tiv® aiaofiatiea, Aa*«3»®f«t %f tM %m m%%m» mm mwf 
s,imila.i? att«l la m© iiratt ©tafli;0t. 
l@fe®tlfa 16» a4i«t »it«iela,l.Jlr t© tfea aoatsribrntioaa of 
Imeliaaoff %f i®fti.#piag tto »®aaiag aai ai^ ifitemt® ©f 
©^%©tka# l,®g©-It®a©ai©.« * . . p» i8i. 
@^3.iaa©ff iti tt©t t«T«l@p tla»« talationablpa to asy 
®xt«at, ummmw* 
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0©tteertd'i latagratioa tej partioipating fims tteougla their 
•eooperatiTs associativa. Sis ©aphasis om &m& of 
tiii® aalti-lataral aifetatats aai Iht «6©:me»ie rtlatiossbips 
©xistlag aacjug tk® partieipating firas ia ©rier to blsfi thea 
into a fmaetiemlag usit also ytpws^ atf a r«al eoatrltotttioa. 
The tw© aiittoi-i h&rm p3?6Vll.ei a soiii fomntatlem upoa wkloh 
to totilXt a jeasoaabiy e©apreh#asiTf t'beosiy.of th& mmmmit 
aatttr# of tli® ieooperBtlv® assooiatien* 
- 39 -
III. wtmmsmu. mioif oi ms mommfim smmfrnM 
The ®©o»o®lst las giT«» Basir mmfMf t®ms ©p«ei«l meaa-
iag is Ms prof®«sioaal laiipiage. ffee tixm. is one ©f 
1 
%©»§•# To the «<3oa©al«t the flm Is a aovertiga eeoaoaie iinl% 
withia wkieh proimetiv® rstotia?©®.® ar# all©eal«4 ani mtllizet 
for tto® pro^ metioa ©f teoaoale,goo€s aai s®rfie®«, l^a a 
©apttallfti© society tto® Urn %M tlk® t#©t»ioa making.prod-aetlm 
.mlt.,,,.. wlier®,, s.ttfe:4-®0t.to t®rtai» governa«nt •restrictions .and 
ooatrols,. tb@ ©oonemie t©©istoas affeeting tfe® ..alloeatlon ami 
utlliEStioB of pro4m©tiT@ r@®©mr®0« tak« plaee, Tb« flna may 
rang# la sis® tmm a oorner rn'Mlmg maetola® ©peyatloa, to a 
Hag# Qorporat® »a©poly. B@'it lari© ©r saali, however, 
®T«rf firm has its entrepreneur—tk® residual owner wfe© 
©oatr©ls the fina's 4#©isioaa, bears, tli® .ua©»rtaiaties of th® 
firm aa<l its ©psration, aai r©e.®lt-#s tfe©^ @iiiuftl profit or 
load resulting from thes# ©peratioaa, I>rofe«sor Hart las 
proYidti tl© fellowiag useful and eoaois® defiaitioa of tie 
firm, "A firm la d®fia©4 as an ©rganiaation for businaas 
pttrp©»08 of productiv® r©soure©i un4®r ©a« financial control, 
©Mrelsea by eapitalist sntr©pr«n«ur' ^ ©atrepreaeur for 
g 
abort)• 
•^ 3©ir«r#lfB ta th© ®®as« tlat tl® unit pursu®® an Ind®-
p@nd®nt eeen^ i© ®er@«r in its own beat interest© as ©a 
«©on©ml0 unit, 
Z 
Bart, op, ©it.., p. B» 
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Th® %o th® ©eoaeaist, is II10 slaliai- sover-
«iga mlt on the ©oasiaptioii slit, fh® lioms@toia m&f ©ensiat 
of a hn^ oypkaaag#, of a family, ot of m iailTldual bacfeslof, 
hut la aay ©as® It Is a sofarelga mlt aaklng th.e ooBS*i®ptl©B 
1 
itaisi©as aai fe«arlaf their e©as«qm«n0#a. 
la eeoaoalt. plaat oa tlie other haad is a©t a s©v«p®l|pi 
©eoBOBle ttElt but a fwetloiilag malt ©peratlag as e pert of 
so®® firm ©r lioms®to©ii. A, giv®B trntrnf^  for sxa®pl@, might 
not b« ® flra at all, tet ©mly om ©f sefaral plaati ma«r 
th© eoatfol of on# l&T$m tivm* fli® distiagaishlng featurt ©f 
a subsidiary,, plant,., m ©a« heai,,. and a flm or liomstliold om 
tli# otlitr, I®, thftt. th« fomar .has. ao amtomomoa® «iitrepr©ii©mi?lA 
tmlt.,. ,httt. Is .0p®»t#d ..a..,s..« .pert, of .soa© .flra. or hom.8®hold, 
whloh has sueh a malt, 
IhAt, more speolfleally, I® this ©atrepreaeiyirshlp which 
dlstlagttlshas th® pleat froa the firs or homssholdf Prof«®aw 
.might has written, 
It is this true meertalnty whloh by prewatlng 
th® theorstioally p«.rf©ot owt worklag of th® tead-
%mim of ©ompstltloa glir«i th® eharaeteri«tlo 
fora of th® eattrprls® £flrs^  to eooaoml.® orgaal?®-
tloa a® m whols «ai «®®omat| for th« peottllar 
iaeoffi® of th® aatif©pr«n®ur. ' 
1 fo th« ®xt#at that th@ houiehold has prodmotlv® mnasxma 
at Its ooaaaad it will elso ooasid®r th® optlsRi* «mploya®at 
of th©s« rtaottreas, either by maklag thea available.for hlra 
to flra® or by mtlllsatioa la m ladlvldmal proprietorship 
firs lisatlfltd with the homaehold,. 
%aight, fraak E* llsk, meertalaty aad Profit, 
lough tea lllffl.la 0©. Haw York. 1981. p, 19S* 
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Tfems «atr«p:p®a®u»aMlf gtowa out of tim iiB®»ftatm bwsimess 
world »ai la tlm tlm ©.oasist® of tk® iresiittal mnetrtalmty 
fe©«?iag est the ultiaa-t® 4«0l«l0n m&ktm 3r®8p©a«S,toili.ty. 
fli® ©apltaltst tatrepreneur is a pers©m ©r 
gfoiip ©f ptftons aaklag th® firm's fundemeatsl 
€«©isi©as—as a mlnlwaa choosing the managing 
pefsoaa®!—tad puttiaag up enough capital to *ak« 
th® fira financially jeesponsible* , , .Actlf® 
iMnti®»sat -ineludiiig waeh, of the fim*« hasl® 
planningi ®ay be on by «»ploy««s who-
are not »eA®3et of thf #ntr»pi'f.neurial group but 
act in its imttrestfi.* 
80taal, #mtf«pr@meurial toeiiion in »m®h e«s@® i® the 
i@ei®i©n at to what managerial p«s©ns®l .to. s»ploy and tht 
t@0isioa.to d«l®fatft th«..i«ois4®.a*»aMag-to :sueh.persons, 
A® Mb i# aptly poiatti ©mt., «« » ,«ati?©pr®n®nrial 
r«sponftibility &6anot b« 4«l«g®t«d to anybody ma4«3? any 
oonditiosf- m in mj de.gF«ii, fh# li«6 of *«al6,i*i«t dntr«-
g 
pr@a®mr* is p*«pO'at«roms,« 
It is this eon©«pt of «ati?«p3?@n«nfifeip whioh @lai?ifi«8 
th« ®©on©sist»a t«» profit. Profit, or "pure" profit as it 
is s©m«timt# eall«d,, i« a.asoeiated with, and only with ®nt»«-
prtneurship. A„.plant ©aanot make a profit or s^ fnt a loaa.^  
...Iti op«r8tions ean only add to or ambtraot ftoa th« profit of 
th@ parent firm. 
%art. ©p* ©it,, p. S. Ste also Inlght,. op# oit., p. 
308, 
a^tiliasoff. op# ©it., p* iS. 
®Sai^ t» op» 0lt», p. Sll, 
Im0©rf©tat4oa iott mt &kmg^ 'tiis aattir® 
©f a t%m ©t @f a A tttm mf lM®tf©afat«i ©i? 
A mf mlm Jaai ©ft®a I b ) imtoir-. 
m a Mt Its mtw® »«a4i«. 
iimebastiti, 
A* ©@tf«3r«ttir# ft m^ iit 
I 
iai®a a g^ otip 4»«iv44mtl tiMm-' f©» it .®®ep®r.ativ® 
a«»©eteti®» a$r«« mp s plant iiai 
|©lat3Ly #f«»te if,M «tt-4attgr«a. t«t 0f,»a-@fe,©f tkoijp 
ittiiTlittiii fimm f@t &#m»eh©Me tm tM fas© ©f th.® emmmav 
U 
m&pmwrntm)* m»f mmst t© 'fttiit.tiem e©©f€iaat®ly 
with te Jolttt attittty, aia agr#®ffi»at rma« 
ttea fe»tw««a. ®«.«ii. ©f t^ ®a ®ai joint «®tivity «» 
«««&* ®^«« pe'ttt«tfatim$ flmt mst- twmtim as am ©emumie 
t«aa la yelattoa to ®©«t:laate4 aeti.fltr,. m.i. siitoait 
soffi# of tfaeir iaiiTiittml e©f®f®liiitf t©- tlie»»»l*r®« m a t@®m, 
•®i® joiot mtifitf'm sm©&, 'Mmmtt km »® «®®a©mle llf® or 
f \irp@a«-• ay fit t tsm tM lativlimal astiviti#® ef tJi© jpaietiei* 
patlig.-fit*®. It -^ ©fftseat® a f«t Qt the t©tftl, pfoittctioa 
t®m m«®i Mm aai »3,®«if&«i?® will te® ttiid®ir-
#to@€ t® «®aa firm or housaholti sine® sti^ wtttralif eoop®r®* 
tlv«® ®f ftma ena coopsretlves of hom»#M©Ms &r« I4®ntl©el» 
S^®@ i®fe©tk®.» 'S^ ge-itoatai®, • . • p# 
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mm ©f %h»m t im»$ mkUh l l t« j  ha?® ©©ordi .*  
hf agr««iitat, it is t@cMiioall|r.....sofj?«et 
to «t«.ak jl&iit ,tai .©t^ .«©©f@ra1l4ai ft»8, 
,|mt. a®t ®f the cooperative Jf eooperatlv® emtefpris#•. 
©o©|Ni3?ati« a»»©etat:l.©ft it sot m& oygsBiiatioa of 
feT«©s», eltMif m a« eapitai ©©mt3?-i%mtors» or as 
p&t.t©a«., f®» tk«t aettei# It 4» am ®ygamt»6ti@a, as 
I»tllaii@ff |.#tet,i «mt, ©f mmmim mBi.t»»-fl3»« ©r 
&©u.s«^ ©lii,, anfta-i tliat a e@©p@ir«tl¥® a»«©©t«tl€ia 1« a 
Maiae## mmi. «ai ©oatwlXei %f it# fatroas 
mWki ®f«at«i fo* t&sije Wmt%% a* f«tt©a#., wfeile 4ei#,rip-
tlTflf sowttti f©attifeiitt» to tfe® ma4t»t®atiag of 
%M 9mwmiM of tto it@©p«tmti*s« jjtthom# eapltal 
«Bd firea 3La%o® mf i« iftiro2»ir«a i» it, fftt»©ttag®i aaJlikt 
tapital .laboti in aot a firotmitive mmmm ©afaHle of 
tatalag aa «®«©a4o y«taya 4tt tto® ps®€m©tittt ©f g©©4« «at 
'• • • •  ^ 1/ 
,s@i?Ti®a#, It ii aot f«s»4bl« «t© ©tgaalz# aa 9w»tm % 
% 
tmm th@ itaaiftiat ami tm tlie fe«a#fit of tfe#, » •fitooa" 
as tie m&tw&llm ^ of «• iiTsa fa#t@t ©f itoAattloa* %at it is 
p©#siM# fof fiws *©• Jo.lata.r oygaali# ami ©p#»t® a toiDBoa 
plaat with tl«. iita @f *a3iiai»ia« t^ e tt^ a©*!® leetaifaa t® 
eaeii ©f tM iait^ tiaal aasoftiattt firms^ y 
m® eatsapteseurs of tto® aasoeiatai fltma ®ast ®a#^  
•^fceliaaoff^ * ••®p# eit^ , f# 84«* 
%©m3e»»« L®gal itata®. • # . f. tl. 
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alioeat® pr©dm©tif« 3?@soui'«@s to'tlitir mmmm plaat, hQmfm,  
tfe# ©aiM at ® ami'll^ plaat fim want alleeat® s-mQVao&B t© 
®acli ot its pXaats* fr©® tk® stiaipoiat ef r@®ourc« -ailoea-
tioa th.® as@o©iat«i flws la ® ©©'©peratiw ©anaet to® ia 
statie ptrtial •ttmilibrim Cmadtr tii# profit asxiaiaalleii 
ssiaaptiom) ttnitss'3?®®otirtfa ®ll©@tt«4 to the Joist plamt 
to tfe© point whtf® tto« mafgiaal pj-otttotifity ©f ®a©|t yesowro# 
in tM Qoop®ratiT® plant is eftttl to tli® »ar.iiaal f^ oiw0tiTi% 
0f tliat rssemi"©# ia tlia iaii¥idtt&l pXaata of ©aeli of tfe© 
maab«r firms, ami tli® aasgiEal. ©f th« lust 
iollar is in. mmtj us® witfain saek fim, ( 
fh® <ioop©ratiirs is « flaat^ ratsd Joiatiy aa a part ©# 
stTsral firms—aotliag a©r«, aotliiag l«»s. fh« ooopsretif® 
as suoh. tos a© eatrepreaourial Maiti its SM'b'tr tiaita each 
liav@ tb«lr ©atr®pTOB®mi?« @mh retains its iatividmal 
I 
sovereignty, all semfetr fij»s art a©r@ tfeaa aggr®®ii"fe®€ with 
r®spe@t to thair Joiat plaat—thty ©re as®ociatt4'toy amlti*' 
let®ral a$r#«a«at ia a ratlitr ttfiait® amaa'tr. fli«y ar« aot 
merged tow«wr» Except for their Joiat operatioa of tfe© 
©oeperatiTfl plaat^  they ar®. maa-isocisted ©ai maQeeriiaatai, 
faa©tioaiBi latirtly iadepead@atly of ©a® aaotli@r».' l®efe. tatre-
p,r®a@mr , arri*.#« .at, produotiea ••©•qttilitoritia eoasiiering kis 
S«© imelisaeff# ©p. eit. 
s«parat®,, • •pinm-.-hi® proport lona te shar@ of tM« 
joint actlYlty together as an lnt©grat®€ production unit. 
fbls Btructur® is visaallsti Im fi.guf# 1. ft® trlaa-
gtilaf ai3al}®r«a sestleas m^ emnt tht a«®l>®r firms ami tliw 
small uaiss^ ribM elrol® at A tlaslr Joist plant,' Ifoti©t 
tliat th« eoafl«t@ fim is taeh esa# iaeltii®# a pai?t of tM© 
Joist plant 6t th# eeatsy (i*«. BaC for fia 4|., ani tliat 
th@r« is ao eoBa,e®tloa fe®tw«en. tH® firas mxmpt wfe«r® th&j 
Qom® togttliaie la the Jointly ©p@rat@a plaat. Sot# also 
that tills Joint plant is maiitiaet exoept «® s part of mok 
of its mml^ mT fims* If «11 fims to witMtaw Cia©i^ ® 
out ward, froa tfee OKatei?) thmm wowM te® no ©oopsMtiT® 
plant left. If om# fim mm to wltlteaw (nmbtr S for 
mm-Bl®} a atetiea of th» plsat womlt fet sad its 
sl2@ ©orrosfomSlagly 
figttf® I illngtrat®# anothtr laportent toasidejjatioa i» 
tM® »\ilti«»fir» plant.* It show.® htow th© iMlTlAml soop®?-
atiaf firaa sha»: in tl®lf Joist plant wMftt sizt of 
these flyms is.„iiot mniform.. fht larger tfe« flm th® larger 
is th@ pero®atag® of th® total eooptrstiT® plant r«pr6S®nt®d 
%j that firm. It mu b®. reaiily mm,, for «xa»pl«, that th® 
outpttt of, th® Joint plant would b® r©attO®t aittoh less hy th® 
wlthirawel of fi» g than hy th® withdrawal of fira 17. 
Figure 1. The cooperative structure. 
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B* leXfitioms&ip Amm eooptyatisg flr»» 
las mtttm,. 
Ml @#©»®aic relatioa^ lps of meabers tMix-
a^ yegatt are based ©m tli® irrevocable priaeipl# ©f 
propor-liemality of tk#lr t^ onomie participati©m Aa 
.a®tivltt«8 ©f th# aggT'ftg&t® /0O©p@ratlv«j7»^  
ftoat er« t^ ess e-§o»oal-e r©lati@ailiip» bttweea aembtr -flra* 
arisiai fre® tli®ir |©iat ©peratiea ©f-ft ©craaoa plaatf ftef 
Mm t© 4© with dl'tlt® m»@ w m M of tto® plaat, Cg| %h» 
4«'©i»l©a asking rtgatttlag %'M piaat mA its ©p«retl©as, C3| 
tfee flMaeial r®spoaaibllity fer plasty (4| tfet fixea 
aad variabl® t©st8 of •of®r®tlag their plaat,. (§) th© 
un®ert,®imtlti@fi la «©M«®tl©m with tli« plmnt aafl its ©p«rm-
ti©as,, aM (6) tfe® b«a®fits |p©@itl¥© or aegativ®) 
wilt0b result fr©a ©fsratinf this Jeiat plaat, 
Ooaserniag ea©! ef tM@ae rtlatioaalips tb® ®o©p®rattaf 
6Qtr«praaeiiri ar@ fa®@t titfa tlie tmaeti®Bs ©f wli© will 
partieipat® ta %h&9& reletiossfeips aai li©w tMf will bt 
share# by tti®. parti©ipamt®.« 'Oa tb# bast® ©f tb© trmrnQTU 
pr®seiit«4 bar®, tb« r©»p©asibl@ gromp'is ©tevietisly tli« «w 
ef tb« eatreprtmsmrs of tb« iMlviimal ftr®s tbat ar« ©p«r» 
attng tb# plaat .J©iBtly# 1© ©tber gromp eaa b® #xp@©t®i t© 
'^ M8liaE©ff. ©p# ©it», p.. 2g3» 
- 48 
me the plamt, to ©oatrol 0Y®r it, to asawe tli® 
fiaaneial respoasibility for it, to totar th@ eost® ia aonaee-
tion with it, to. te«ai? th# eoas®queue®! arising froa maeer-
taiati®® ia eoan®eti©a with it, or t© partak® of th® ecoaoaie 
h«aefits of th© Joiat plftat. 
Th® oaif ©quitahl® waj these ®aterfr®B®ars of th® 
iaiifidmal eooptratiag firm® ©aa s4»r«, ia th®®,® .teoaomio 
r®lationships i«,oa. a.proportioaal, basis. Froportioaality 
is 4et®riiia@d hy th® p«;r®®atage as®,which th® sia® ©f ®a©h 
g 
fir® di®tat®s ita ®ntr®pr«a®ar•will'»ak® ©f th®-Joist plaat. 
Mot ©aiy is this th® oaly mf whieh will h® aatmlly aatis-
factory to all psttifipatiag eatrepreaears, bat a static 
©•qailibriaa positioa withia th® tooperatiT® aat the »eii&©r 
S 
firms canaot he r®aeb@t if they ar® shartd ia ©ay other way. 
at® method of shariag all th® other eeoaoai® relatioaships 
amoag th® cooperatiag fims is th$r®for« ®p®eifi«d aaeorfiiag 
to th® propertioaat® a®® {patroaag®) of the Joiat plaat mad® 
hy ®aeh. 
f^his propositioa, aad others which follow i^  this 
chapter, ar® d®moaitrat®d ia ^ rnptemM throagh X'-, 
i^here th® Joist plaat p®rf©ra® a limited faaetioa C».g., 
oharaiag aad ®ark«tiag batt®r) th® si8« ©f th® par®at firms 
whieh'd@t®rffiiaes th® p®ro«at®g« of as® «a©h «atr®prea@ar will 
mak® of the plaat ^ ill oaly b® that part la •tech firia related 
dir®®tly to tM fuactioas of th® plaat poaads of hatter* 
fat proda©®dJ. 
B^eeaas® th® eoaditioa® for optimam r®®oar0® allooatioa 
withia ©aeh partieipatiag fira will aot -h® met if th®y ar® 
shared oa aay ©th#r hasi®. 
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la a ©a® 4@pt»ta«at ooopeTati-?® fer'a glTtu ©peratlag 
period, th% froportloaate us© aiai« of eooperativ® hj %M 
©atrepjromsuf at parlitlpatlsg ftm will, la other nerds, 
dsttralat' tM'aetlioi of shariag tli« tontrol ftretlBg), tb# m-
0®rtaiatj beariag, tia® ©©sts, the ftaaaetal rtspoasibllity, 
ana th® ©ooaoaie fe®ii«fits t3i.eideat t© or arlsisg fr©a tte® 
Joiat plaat*. from tbe staaipolat of ©•toaomle 
®tru:0tiir«, votlag la the oo©p#ratlv® sssoeiattoa will sot ij# 
ah&mi, ©a a par fim C©jQt@-aan oae-TOt©) baai« bat ©a a us« 
(patromag#) t>aslsj all matn %mlvi&,in^  eosts of'risks will 
shared ©a^ e m@ hmim*, tba umetrtftiBty bearimg will sot 
sliar®i oa a per firm feaais bmt oa a ms® basis| finaaeiel r#-
spoBsifeility |i»0,, 0itli«r providlag tfe® aetaal oapital or 
peyiag th® ist®r@®t r«t« aa4 proviiini tfes ««.eurity retulr«d 
t 
to obtaia it) will shared oa a ms,® basis*, aa4 tb® eeoaomi© 
bsaefits, if mj,  will ator#i m a mm ba®ls, /  
mat is tb# aatire of.tfees® @©oaomio b«a®fits from the 
Joiat pleat se^ rmiag t© partieipatiiif firas oa a patroaag® 
•n 
basis? A.S a »tt«r of fast this is aot m&llf a tistia^  
aeoBomio relatioaahip at -all, from tli® staaipoiat of ttoo-* 
retioal «trm©tmr«, but ©ae wiiieM U mmmA in th» cost sljar-
iag, relatioaslkip• fresmably tfe# partioipatiag eatr@pr@a®mr« 
would agr«« to m% ap aai ©perat® the Joiat plaat oalf- la 
aatieipatioa of aateiag tlie operatieas of tteir iatiYidual 
firais mow0 profitabl®* ®i®y organia® tli® plaat ia order to 
a®® it ia the opsratioa® of th@ir iadifitaal firms, mrnn th& 
m -
Qosta of th.® plaat ®Jit lt« operations eye sliarei on a basis 
proportlQMl t© tba'm® of tfee plaat, tfe® eoatribtttloiis 
of the Joiat plaot t© tlie profits of'tii© partieipaliag flraa 
are mutQmtlmlXf  iistiritemt#fi proportioaateXf among %Mm» 
Biis i®' true b©e®tt0® with botto groa» retwraa aad eosti shared 
©a ft basil pr©p©rtio»ai to as#, th% aet returas, if 6ay, are 
obTloasly ahartd ©a tks mm basis. la pra^ tic# tli® pr©por» 
ti©aal ®Mrlai of ©©sts iiaj b# workM ©at b|- a p©©llag opera-
tioa wh®r@ s«ttl«®@at it sad# aftw tb# pool is olosei ant 
eosts bev« b@«n tetermladd ©at iedaettdj bj a teatatlT® settl®«-
ii«at m& a patroaag® refaad (asaallj posit if®, bat mnmlmhXf 
a«gati?»| at tM «a4 ©f tb@ op«ratiag year wlea ©ofits teT® 
b®«a. 4#ttmia®ti or by iir@et ©aitssmeat of ©©©ts proportioaate 
witb as® to th@ aemb®r flrias as th« actaal costs er« iaearrei 
or aatleipate4» 
Qivsa perfttt toowl«ig« aa4 ©@rt®iaty, tbe'ral® ©f pro­
per tloaality la ttoe ifeariag ©f tb® eacmoml© relatioasMps 
amoag th@ eooptrativ® firai' also applies omn tia®. aad betwe®a 
•idpertaaats. Ia4®r thes® assusptioas tb® firms Jolatly op®r-
atlag emh iepartasat will partieipat® la all aeoaoale rela-
tioaihlpa ia proportloa to' tb®ir ai# of that departatat. 
Fartb@ra©r@ til reletioasblps' arisiag frc® tb© ©peratioB of 
til® Jolat plaat that are mmmn to several «i®partm©at® will 
bt poolsi by tb© firms psrticipatiag ia ©aeb of tb® fiepert-
laeats ©©a®®ra«4 aafi sbarefi aaoag tli#ia ©a a basis proportloaal 
to tbe fraatloa ©f total ©p«ratl©a of tb# Joiat plaat 
SI -
repr@s@at«d by of dtpartaeEts, firas operallng a 
department nakiiif mp m paretnt ,of. tti®, wtolt, Joint plant 
op®rati©n» for ©xaaplt, will «a a^ groep carry SO psreent ©f 
the voting oentrol in, mtters oono#xn4iig,.,tlie. plant aa a 
wli©l«, b0ar SO pertent of tto© Joint ©©sts, SO pm&mt of tl® 
Joint mn©®rtainti®#, and ta,rr|- iO. p®r©«nt of th® Joint 
1 
financial responsibilities• Goats, nne®rtaintiei, finanaifil 
r«aponslbilities, ant fittisions ipteifie to a given depart-
m©at will 1)0 of ©©nttrn ©nlf t© th® firms Jointly operating 
that i«partm®nt» 
that ahomt ,th® iatarfira rslationshlpt ovtr time which 
arls® fr©m partleipation In th® Joint aetlvityf A glv@n 
proportional sharing of th® Joint plant (smeh as that shown 
in figur® 1} for en® operating period will not nectasarilf 
holt for other ptrioii- Proportionalitf aiist thorefors h® 
aalntainad hetir«®a th«- .grompi of partieipating firms in ©aeh 
operating period as ii®ll ®s within eaoh sueh gromp. All 
r®lationships whi©h ©xteai ov®r time will ha shared among the 
groups of flraa- operetlng th® Joint plant in ®ash period on a 
basis proportional to th® relativ# aim®, of the plant in ®aeh 
2 
period. Mslationships which art sp®oifle to s givon 
issming that 60 p@re®nt of the total of each of th®s« 
Joint relationships relates to th® operation of this d®part-
mant, 
P^roviding th® relationahipa aff®et eaoh op®rating 
period on a hasis proportional to th® siie of the plant opera­
tion in ©aeh porioi. 
SS 
operating, peried will to© pertlcipat^ a in mlf hj tli© group of 
firms sbariag ia th# Joiat aetivity ia tliis perioi. Iat®r-
twporal itaS lat#r4®part«atal reiatioasfeipi ere pooled 
aaoag the partiaipating firms iav©lf«d ^ ad sterei proper-
ti©aat«lf hf tfe«a both witbia aad between tfe® participatiag 
groups, lelatioasbip# speaifie ia tia# aa€ Separtaeat 
will hw ihar@<i • ottlf hf tlie pertioipatiag group of firms ooa-
earaed. 
Ua4«r ooaiitiOBs' of aa^ ertaiaty aai iaptrf#,.©! kaowltdg®, 
proportioaality is also tli® basi® upoa wJiieh firms partiei--' 
patiag ia a Joiat plaat ibar® tfe®. »mlti-»iatsral ©coaomi® 
relatioaships, iaeluiiag tfeos# .wbieli art iattr4®parta®atal aai 
iat®rt«mp0ral# It is flaaa«4 proportioaality rather ttem 
actual reali^ M proportioaality, liow«v«r, ^ whiofti 4®t@imiB®s tli® 
stthod of s'toriag tie «eoaomie rtlatioasliips asoag tfe® partio-
ipatiag firms aaAer ttost foaftitioas. It aty also toe ecoaoaio 
to pool mao®rtaiati.f« tp«eiflo to a gifea t#partm®at or tin© 
period ia ord«r to ratae® th© escp^ et^ a 4isper«iea aroaafi th® 
most probalsle aatieipatti value® of rtlevaat variablta faelag 
©aoli partioipatiag @ntr«pres®ar. low far tlt®y will go la 
this iirtatioa d®p®ads apoa tit antieipatet aaesrtaiati®®, 
til® exp«et0i rmAmiim of sm©h a,ae«rtaiaties toy lat®ritpart-
m@atal aad iatcrtemporal pooliag, aafi th© iatifferea©# toward 
xtlatiT® eartaiaty aad r«iatif« tffieieaoy of th® majority of 
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the partlolpatlug eatyepreneiirs, To th© eictent that 
sp«0lfle mnefirtaiatiss &m poolsd, tJi©y also must lbs afear«i 
amoag th© iroups ©f pajrtielpattag firms iBfolvefi on th« basis 
of aatloipated proportloaelltf la ©rddr to fulfill all 
©ffiaieaoy ojit®yia. 
G. Profit Maxlaiaatioa aad tb© Coopwativ® 
f©llo«lag, tbi orthodox static assuraptions»„,.th« ®©opera» 
tiag firss iadlviiu®lly @®©iE to aaxlMis® their, prof it 
oeasld@ri'iig that part of their op#ratioas ia the Joiatly 
operated plaat as w#ll as th«lr indlTitual operetions outside 
©f it. two ooaditisas are aeeessarj la order t© aeooaplish 
this purpose, la th© first place each partiutpatlag.firm 
must be la production equilibriioiR. Secoadly the jQiat pleat 
must be of optimum sise. Although these two are r@lfit@S>It 
ia po'ssibl® for either oae to b# m% without ®@®tiag th® 
©th@r, fbe profits of th@ partieipatiag flr*s ar@ aot 
TOxiaizet iail«»s bo.th ®r® mmt, 
ascetserj proiuetioa efuiJ ibrias. ©iDsait.io.aa. are. th® 
saat as those for mj firm# fhs .best eombiaatioa..of outputs 
will b© produced at the Isast eost.ooabiaatloa whsa th# ratio 
^See Laag«, Osear. A lot« oa loaovatioas, Bevi®w of 
Sooaoait Statistl<ss.» 3&:lrl9-25# li4S» p. 20. 
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©acipeiidltm'e fog th® lapttt to tfet aar^ taal 
a| BS. imi ^ ia«® g^glmi mtmm 
tor tht output pgoamQgt Is ©qiial to«tw®®a ail iapmts is tM 
pi?odttetl©B ©f all omtpmta witMa th& flm. ,The optimum firm 
®iz« will b@ iefiasi at t&e output wMoh- etuates tb® mrglml 
rtvaau® wltfa th© margiasl eost ©f eaeh preiuot produeed aad 
for all products tak©.a togetfetr. ffeta© ecailtioas t©g®tli«r 
4 
a@an tbst the amrgiaal ptvtau® proiuotivity must equal tfe® 
MrgiBal expeailtsr® for ©acM iaput ia. tli,« production of 
®eofe oijtput, 
partiolftttag firms ar® ordinsrilf vertieally inte­
grated in the sasfe.that tlie output of tlie Joiat plaat is tb@ 
raw produet input ©f the isdifiiml flants of th® p«rtieip«feteg 
fir»s, or ©IterBatlfsly ttoa output of th« tafiividual plant# 
of th« partieipatittg firms is tk® raw preauot i»put of thm 
g 
Joiat plaBt. AS protuet® aoft fro® oa« pliuat to aaotli®r ia 
1 S®fia©i as %im iaeremeat of tl® fira»s total eost for 
iaputs resulting fr©» aa aMltioaal uait of tbia iaput. 
%«fla®d 6i til® a@t aMitloa to the physieal outputs of 
tb« flrii r®gttltiag from the us® of aa adciitioaal uait of this 
iaput. 
D^@fia®i as th# iasr«a«at of tht fir®*® total r#v©au® for 
output rdsultiag txm th« sal® of t&# a4i«i amouat of this 
output plus th© sal® of tli« fl«t ohasg# la ®®©uat of ©th@r out­
puts. 
%@fla©d as til® proiuot of aarginal pb^ Bieal produotivity 
aai »rgiaal retura. 
®The txteptioa is tte plaat operated Joiatly hf two or 
ii  ^
a ¥«rti©alX|^ iatsgi^al©! flra m taraasfej of title takea 
plae® aad m pri8« is ®8tablifli«i for thm» Smeli a fim i® 
aot iatfrested in tli« profitability'of any ost of its plants 
oonsifl®r®i aioa®, hut la th® profitafeility of th® 
oomflet® oMia of ittt©gr«t®i plants operating as ® malt, 
'a® optlattfi output i® d®t®i'itia®4 ©a tht feesia of tMe ooi^l®t« 
ofdratioa sad if ataiared ia oosparaila waits will b® tb« 
sem® fot, eaeb of tfe# flaats. The wtieallj lategrated flr« 
dsttminss this opt law ©ttt pmt by ©tuating th«-.sm.,©f, tli® 
ma-rgiaal oost ftt»ttioas la all plants witb t,b® aargiaal 
TBfmm la th® fiasl plaat froa waiefe tk© prodttot is Barlctt-
1 'jf 
ed,^yTh® ©ooperatiag fiim ®q«.at®a tht staa of tbe marglM,! 
0C3fit la its individual plaat m plants aai th® imTglml cfo»t 
in tli0 Joint plant witli tfee w&T^iml r®v«iiu« faoiag th© firm 
in tlae maafket rnhm® tli# p^odmet is ioli. fbis oritt^i®'^ 
mO'^® fims to p?o<3ur« speoifie oapltal yeeomree®, smcli as f« 
ffieobiaery for agrioultiiral firms, la this case m®h partlei-
patiag •«ati'®pr@aeur will ©fwat® tli® Marginal eost in the 
Joiat flaat with th® mtgisal tmmm.® produetiirity of th.® 
rasowroe ia liis indiTldmal plant, 
•j.A S€« lii'soh, termdt 'ivi. flie leoaoales of Iat®gratloa 
la Agrieultmral Marketing* llspmblis&#i B* Tii0®ii.. Waiv. 
of Califoriil®. til3?aj?y. Btrtolty., If50.. p» f?»144» Hlrscli 
doe® act dosl witli this geaeral 0es« althou^ it follows 
logieally tmm ^i® walysis» 1« teals iaitaad with tit® 
followia^ coadlti©a« se^speetlTelyj (1) ao oharges Ceo®t.s) ia 
aay plaat @x©«pt that fartli®it from tto« ooasw®«r, (1) only 
fixed 'eb®rg®« (@ost«| la all plaats ©xeept thst fart&ost fr®e 
th® toaiwaer, (S| p#r ualt charges .^eoats). «t a eoastaat rat# 
ia all pleats ®:io®pt that farthest from the #©asw©r, (4) 
wh®r« fi»d paya«ats are made outside th« fism for sserviees, 
and (5) wh@r® a fi^«d pfr malt paf»®at Is aat« ©utsid® th« 
lategrat«d firm for ®«r-ri@e®. 
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applies both to, short m& m& to loag mn aaalys«#. 
im® r@levaat aegmeat of the »argla®l eost fwaetloa la 
the Jolat plant to ©a®h particlpatiag ©atrtprasear la that 
part beglaaiag with th@ svm of th® ©qaillhrimi ©atprnts of @11 
other partlelpatiag tatrtfrtaears rather thaa at zero oatpat. 
laoh 8atr@prsa®ar iiast ©oaslder th® aiiltloaal eosts la th® 
jolat plaat resultlag froa his volaa® of ©atpat, fh® pr®els® 
©qulllhrlam ©wtpmt of my oa® partlelpattag. firm ..emaaot„h# 
dettrmlaei ualtss th« e<ittilihrlaa output for all others is 
giTsa,. heoaus® without this iaforaatloa, ,tho, em©t sdgBsat of 
1 
th© margiaal oost fuaetloa wlileh'la r@l®Taat Is uatoowa. 
Foriaal aolutloa of th@ optlaua output for ©aoh partlolpatlag 
fir® aad la th® Joist plaat, glwm tht auaher of partioipatlag 
firas., is possible bf siaultaaeous ©quatioas onlj. If th© oat-
i Ti 
put product of th© partioip®t«C flrm« Is Barketei from their 
Jolat plant, ©irtrythiag whloh has be«a said ahout th@ rslwaat 
r&ag® of the jolat plaat aargiaal ©ost ©art® to ©aeh fir® is 
tru® also of th« r@l©faat raag« of th© aerglnal reireau® ©arm 
Asli®" froa irerlatioas due to th# afijuatmeat of optimum 
output ia eaeh firm, th@ slis# of the Jolat plaat is d@t®r-
mia«4 hf the auah«r «a4 size of th« pertioipatiag firms. f!h® 
©eoaomic motlvatloa for eooptrstioa «oag sovtreiga firms ia 
f^his is aot tru® if th@ margla®! oost fuaotioa is 
horizoatal over th® relevaat raag«. 
m • 
a dtereaslag l©ag rm eo®t eurve oTer a ooasiieretol© 
raag# for a pai?i ©f tli® totttl esoacaile fnaetlom, ©y eeatsa* 
platei fmetioa, of tli,® stTsral firms* 9j pooling _thl!i.„..5®.r:1? 
of their activities sad functioning coordinately throu^  a 
eosmoa^  plant, tiiej ere able., ttnAsr ©©niittona, to in­
crease thtir •00©EOiii0; «ffi©i«a@y by more clos«lf spproaelilag 
optianm siz® for tbis op®r®tioa. Once several firms agr®@ to 
set np and ©ptrmtt a plant Jointly, tli#y are interest®A in 
obtainiag th® aize in their Joint plant wlii«to will siaxl»iz« 
plant ©ffieiaaey and aak® tto« p-'tatest posaibl® ©ontributioa 
to th® profits of ssQli participating firm, ihtn th« opti»m. 
aim for th® Joint pl^ ant Mm b@en t#t«rminea, this optiwta is 
laaintainti owr th© long rma hf varying th® nnabar of partici­
pating firme. Plant sis# is reineti %j failnr# t® r«pla©« 
firms that retir® fro® partioipation and ©i^ andei bi* ©neomr-
aging new firms to f®rtieip«t«* 
How i® the optimn® &X&m for the Joint plant i@t®rain®4? 
fh.# Joint plant will b« of optiatm ®iz# wh#n th® long rnn 
average »«t mtnm turn, th® plant is at ® aaiitona b®can©« the 
,gr®at#®t eontribntion of th« plant to th® profit of ®aoh 
partieipating firffl|. r®giir€lt«s of th^  sis® of th« fir®, will 
1 
b« at thi« point. fh#r0 th® ©mtpmt of th« Joint plsnt ii mw 
•^ Qf, Phillips, liehari. sharing Risks an4 iOfn®8rtainti«s 
in Faraer Oo©p«r«.tivts». tJapmblished M. S« ®i6Sii. low® Stal® 
Colltge Llbrarj. Am#s» 1949« p. 7S-64. 
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proiiiet ©r ip©0ltl© msmsm iaput for tfe® ladtvidmal pleats 
of th® pertieipatlag firms, ©ptiam sizm la the Jolat plaat 
1® d®fia®i TUf tl« mittlaaa peiat in the loaf r«a air®rag® cost 
ftiEetion ia the Joist plant, ais sost fuaetloa laelmdes, 
fixei mM vartabla reeoure# eosts flad ©osti of tMf raw 
produet iaputsi it i® eoaparafele to tfee long rma average eost 
fttoftion la «a ladltlim®! firm performiag ftot same fuaotioa 
as that p®rfori»i in tM Joiat pl«at# ila©® tfe© partioipa^  
firms fa®« a© tmmm fitaetlos fro* tb«lr Jolat plaat, optl» 
mm plaat aise will aot h® tk# same a® tii@ opti»!» sl2® for 
sttcsfe an ladlvlimal fir®, Mow«v®r, mnless tlie ieiiaai ©urve for 
Otttput faeiag this firm is p®rf«#tly elastl©» 
flitr« tke omtpmt of th« lattvldual plaats of tli« partl<^ -
petlag firms is tfa® raw prodaot iapmt of th® Joiat plaat, %%» 
optlmiai siz® for ttojoiat plaat is Seflaai at tk® ©mtpmt 
wtilel wxlmls#® tto« ir®rtl®al €istma«t fcetw#©a th« loag rua 
ftvtrtge re-reaii®. ©wrv# aad th@ loag rua ®T#rag# eost ©arv« la 
the Jeiat pleat, Th% plaat loag rma averag® ©ost faaetloa la 
this oma® Is aet of tb« eost of raw protmot lapmts sappllea 
froa tfc.® lailTiaml plaats of tli® partlolpatlag flra®. Agala 
th# loag rm opjfciana &im for tli® Jolat plaat will aot 
sarlly b@ at t3a« s®as omtpmt .as tb« optlaraa slz® for aa lai.»-
p9aa.tat flr» la tht s«.ai® ©aTlroaaeat mal«»i th« domaai mtr® 
for output aad. al^ o, tb® ampplf ©arve for tli« raw proimot la-
put for til®'flra ar® perfeetly. #lastl© -aad tli® otlt«r ooaSlteaa 
perfect ©ompstitloa ar« »#t. 
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If tjfai® prodtieti©a ®arri®d m by tiat participating fims 
makes it #©oo©ffii©, aafi if th® long t\m per uait Joint oost 
ieerease# with volims ia tb® Joiat piaat, t%% partieiimtisg 
firmi will all maxiaiz© tMeir profits hf Min$ iepattmeata, 
aaeli ©f optiisaa nlm, la thm Joiat plaat matil a siz# is 
mhi&h aim,i»isea th« lomg rmm per mit joiat eost. 
!Sit tet®mi»atieB -of lb® l©Bg rm optiiam siz® is tli« Joint 
plant ii aiatia©t fmm tht d®t®minatiea ©f th# long ani 
sh©rt raa ©ptima siz® for aa©! pertieipatiag fira. LQng rm 
optiatt® J©l®t plamt aia« is a.Qki@¥@i by farjittg tli« aiiab®]? of 
partiQipatini fira®, ®aeb of l©»g tuu optifflsi» siz®. lotto 
optimmss att»t restlifti if the profits ©f ©aob partioipating 
fira are to to® an. absolmt# maxiwm. 
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I?. THE m&m coHcapf 
ttte k®f t© an loMttrstaaAiag ot tit© ©eoaoml© of "te 
so©p#ratlT» stfaetw# is tih® smlti-flfs flaat ©oiicept, eai tli® 
iB"fe®3?tirm rtlatioasMipi resmltiag tTm %M Joiat ommTaMp b.M 
optraties of a ©eamiaa plmt* It is oaly on ths basis of amh 
a Goae®pt tbat appliei ©©©aoaist ©stt afiequsttelf'ie-ai,, with 
tfa®' mmy w«tioni mi. ptolleBS ®liieh. |jipaofieal eooperetoy® 
anfi sttQii frof#ssi6»l psepl® as eoop@3?a,tiir@ aooomataiits aafi 
®©opei?atlv@ a"lt©«i®ys l>j?ia.g to Mm. tetay.. , laimraouats.fel# 
iiffitultl®® sni |S0.0asisttM«ii«s aria# wli«tt t&t eo®]^ rEtiTe 
is loo&ei upoa aa a firm «a4 it.a operatiens stmAitd^ apart 
from th,« iaii-^ itoiil operatioms of aoafeem# lirselfe, for 
«xampl®, itaa aait siibstaatial pi-ogfess ia ta©Iyzing Tsrtieal 
mtegfatioa mhrn fey a larg® fira opSTatiag pleats 
at lewli, hut eatistly inafleqmattly wit& 
iatsgyatiOB la agi'iQiiltiiral marketiag thron# eooperatioa 
{%k% fielt to whlsl be afiteessei kift®«lf| Ijfeatts® of hia im-
plieit, assmptioa ti|®t th# assoeiatioa as imefe is 
a firm. 
As a ttashiag fitvi#®, aai ewa for acalytioel purposes, 
til® eoop#rativ3 asiociatioa is ,oft®E ©mpei?e4 to tJi® stook 
ooapaay, aM tlie ©iailiayities «b4 differescts toetwsea tte.® 
H^irsoli. ®p, 0tt« 
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two aotti. -fill® is aetmallf @ompai'l»g am assoelatloa of 
toomomlQ wkitn with & ttogX® soir®ir®lgB mm&mie mit md. 1® 
misleading, feetb to tta® stmAent of ®o©f®rati©ii ami th© @ooa©»ic5 
aaelyit* Th« appirepfiat© ®©®paria©a' is hntm&m tli® coopeya-
tiv® asiosiation'®aa ©tli«y f©Mal ®ssoeiatl©Ms of ©eoaoBie 
uaits suoh as'tMt ®art«l aM tfate e»»©#i«tl©», as th© 
I 2 
ooBolmaioas of both lofeotMa ami laellaneff smgg««t. 
4. Soeperatif# Asaoelatioa aot a W%m 
flat aetmaXly faappsns wkm a gyomp ©f fims i©r bouse-
lioias) fiM it to few ami optret# e si'-ogl© plaat 
o^iffltlyt Th&f ohitim&lj do sot aeyg# aad los# tb#ir identity 
as ia4i¥idmal flraa. If, 4ast©s4 of forming a Jolat plant, 
tte« tw#aty^ 8®TeR fimS' la figMr® I hM aea?g#i, tb@ a®isarca-
tioms fettwesa th.® iadlTidmal firms wo'ald no..longer be evident 
ant tb« a@'W fim ^ ©suiting from tb-e aerg#? isomM to© atsoribtd 
by m miiferote®B eipemf®r®iie#'®®¥saaia§ tM« tmtir® strmetw®. 
I«it]fe«r €©• tliayJ.oiatlf set mp a n@w firm b«tiire#a tli®a-
telvts and the aftutet witk wfaioh t© io hmimsu* If »mh w@r® 
the ©as®, point A la flgaa?® 1 womli b® «BQl©s®a' by an mabrokea 
eii?QWf«3?®no® and tb® s®TOatf®B indiTiiiial ftrmi wotiia not 
tomoh eaob otMer at all, tout would. b« to.«lt to.g»t.fa8r only by 
B^obotka. A Thmsj, • . . and ftobotlca* L©g©-Eeonoai© 
* 
• # • • 
S^aeliaaoff. ,op* oit. 
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ft "pipslise" fro® eaeJb of tbea to the new flm, 
ladi-rldwal emt:fepr«»ews of %M SBmntmu firms wooli a® a 
gromp soapjls® t&t Jeiat «strepy®a©mt Ca new ttaoQStainty 
bsariag and iselsloa mafciag bodj) fojp tfet etatrsl firm. 
wouM to® m amlti-lateyal relatloasiilp aaoog tfe® smmntem 
firms—oalf a xtlattoBsfeip ©fioli of fhaa and th® 
c@ntral fi3?a» As with all fir»s., tills mntml flra woulA 
pmrsw Its owH eeoaoalc msmt a® gaidei %f tli® dletatts of 
Ita joiiit @Bt?®pr®aetir, pigtag Its pi-Qfitg (positlf® or 
feaok to tii# sewststm paraat fliiiis, allosatiiig tii®» 
•aiioag tlaf mmntBrnM mm^ dlng, to th® tesis is wliieli they stew 
im til® Joint ©Rtreprsaeyrslilf. 
It is abomt sw.cli a Go»®#ft of tM eoep®?atiV8 as this 
wiiiO'li lisa loBg %©#ii iapliaitlf'.ssswiwa hj m&j eeoaoaiats, 
aM 'whiQh implioitlj guldea tli« thlaklng aai aotiom of aeii|f 
soop@rs.tlY@ a«mto®rs asi leadwg toiaj, Maaj, if not most of 
our Qtat® eo©pei?ati¥® lews t©na to throw th® eooperativ® iat© 
tills soft of tTtmmoTU* Swell a firm-tJieory of tM« eoopsfBtlw 
a3s0@istl©» is fsTiltj and aisltadlag, Immmmr, bath tmm th® 
point of fitir of eooaoaii logie aa<l tmm tb® point of wimw ©f 
practieal applleatiOE, aa Saaliamoff' lias quit® foreefullj 
pointed out.. concept ignores tli@ rejatlsnaliip between 
tixQ imiiTiflmally ooadti«^ t@« bustaess aetivifj of tlie m®afe«y 
1 
laeli&soff, ©p• Q it• 
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Qntrepreneurs mn& their aatlfitlea conducted jointly through 
th® eooperatifs arraag6m®at| it fails to adequately recognizt 
tb# mult I-lateral relation ship# fettwttm fh® .®sso©iet®fi aeatjcr 
firms i it canaot ez|>laia, tfee ©eoaoaio netur® of patj?©iia.g« 
refuaisj it eanaot eeemrattly iefia# tie squililiiriuffi positloa 
In til® oQoptrativs sssociatioii en€ ia tto« iaiiTifiml mtab®!? 
firmg; asi it mnm% ©xflais er aid la aolatioa of the 
many problms peemliar in tlielr aeturs or la tleir applie®tlc«i 
to ths eoop«ratl'rs assoolati©!!. It ia,, is -^ ort^  as #ntir«ly 
uasatiafaotory eoa©@p1», 
llstttraiag to tfes original, quastlon ef titet tepp®as whm 
a ooeparatif# fessocietica is fomed, it 1» apparent tlist a 
naw firm does liot ©laerg©. The, Joiat plant »«t up by Xh® 
firait i'#i»iins plant in an mommi^  Mmnm* fh© 
plant, as all plants mm,  Is mly a part Qf a pareat firk­
in tbi® sate a part of tli® stir®ral B®ab®r firms, fh® 4©lat 
plant is as oleaelf iategratti with. tli« rest of tfe® ©eoaoat® 
aetifiti#® ©f th^  TObiler firmt ai is « plant s®t up ana ©fer-
at«i. ss a part of a sift#© firm |s®e Figure 1). 
B. Mttltl-iatsral Agsrnmmt to@tw®#.a Firiui 
In ordsr to s«t up and optrat© a flaat Jointly, liow«T®r, 
two or more firmi sust umlti-lftterally com® to an agreement 
with r#sp«®t to their pisat—tli®f must agr©® to optrate it 
joiatly aai @©03?4tatt#lF* fhii Buitl-latsrsl £g3?e®ra@nt la a 
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formal oae—ertlaarllj' a bladlag ooatraet so¥er®lgn 
aM otbtrwiS't iBi«p®aa®Bt firms, fills formal agretasat does 
not alter the tatr#pr«a«iirlal itelsi©a making 'bodi^ —tliat 
fmaetloii eoatlaats to^  r«st with th« ladtiriiMal fir®s. It 
does., iiow©T®rs IhtoIt# ocoriiaaties of tli® aotlvlties aai 
fmactioiii of til# IseislGB' making mits witb resp«ot to tfe® 
Joiat plaat• 
Isa'Ordtr t© aehleT® this eooraiaatiom, th© indiviaual 
tatrepreaeur® ©f tfee ©©eporatiag firms mwst aaerlfioe somt 
indiTidiaal ifdtslon Battng. ®o,M:r®lg»ty witli resp«ot to tli® 
joint plant., since eoch mmt mnMi^er tli©, ©f. all th® 
©,t.h« entrapremuirs -ocstlolpatiag# Aa a group ttoej Jtust 
r@©oaoil« coaflieting Tiews aad arrive at a singl© e©©rdi-
nst@d daoision eoaotrRtag aacli of tha ©eosaosi.® ia'smts fased 
1 
fey the Joint pla.Et. It ia to this extent tru# that th© 
d«<3isloii ma'«iag funetion of tH© cooperating eBtr9pre»®wra Is 
aodifisd with pespaat to tlieir <|oimt plaat* fhey gQiaaln 
indlYldual oooperatiiig antreprenauraj... aM. <3.0 not 
l3©s.9s©,.Q joiati sBtraprgTOmi * Seoli makta liis deaisloss 
relati?0 to liis firm aa e wliola—tliat part In th® joiat plaat 
as trail &s tiaat part otitsld® of it« His ^ ©oisioas outside 
t'm joint plaat aro aatiraly inaa.p0adaat, but witli rasp®ot 
T^h@ study of tills proe«ss it largely ia tli© field of 



































































































































fim® i® m importaat and diitinetlve featw® of th® ©oop-
<ira*tlT« mttrntum. I© greup of firms eomli Joiatly ©p@rat« a 
e©iia©tt plaat without it. It is this &gs@®mn% wfeieh aaktii 
th® o,0©p«rativ« assoeimtioa what it is heeaws© It sp«oifi#« 
th« wjlti-lattral d.eoaeale aai Xogal arelationshipa estahlistosd 
aaoaf th« partieipatiag Mo smth agfeeaeat la 
ia the ®®8© of a sl&£L» Mttlti-plaat fim, be it th@ retalt of 
0ttt3?ight mfmt, sliipl® ©xpaaiiea os the ahsorptioa of oa® 
fis* hy aaoth®r, fhis agyeeaeat h®tw®®a oooperatiag flras 
is, la fast, th® eo©p©ratiT@ asgoetatioa. 
This a.gi««B«at hy fims t© eoordiaat® a past of their 
teoaoiii© aotiiritl«s hf fomalialag ths process of makiag 
deeisloas aad i>®ai?iag iia@#rtsiatl«s as a gsoap by ao a«i®8 
ertatsfi a aew eatreprta®mrl&l mit. ' Th@ flws as a groap 
opsfat® th® Joist plaat' ss a part of «a<ih fim. fher® 1# ao 
groap apart from th® iailTltoal flras.. fh# agif®®ffi«at by whl^  
th®y ao0o»plith th«lr parpos® simply apeoifl## that as lati-
•itaal flms they will shar® the iaeisloa aaklag aad aae«r-
taiaty beariag of th® jolat pleat, aat the iiaiBi@r ia whieh 
th@y will shar© th®st faaetioas, th®P@ 1« ao ©eoaoaie 
3e@latioaihip betwita any ©a® of aaeh fims eai amy a®* 
eeoaotti® eatlty# fhe eeoaoai® r®lati©aship» are iaterfira 
relatioaship®. 'ftmf raa »mlti-lateraily aaoag th® fir»» 
saakiag mp th® p«rtaia only to th® op@ratioa® of 
th® Joiafplaat* 
It is ©atlrtly aarselisti® to foem® atteatioa oa th® 
- m • 
ef til# plaaf apatt tM ttm» of 
wMeli it ii a paft* It pursues a© eoonomic eareor of ita 
OK®, but is l(y tk& mtmprmmm of ih& pmH&ip&t" 
iag fims to twsth®s tfet of %h@lw msfrntim fims 
as t&«y iMiri&mHw tMsi* Tk» 
«atjapr«aeurlal ististsB# m&® ml&tlm t© th® of 
tk« Jeial fliimt #©asit«f met ©alf t5i« plaat as smefa but ita 
r«lati©m t© tli® aatit® ©f t^® ambtr firas, ®s mm 
lB%#,graI «.®ea©aie pmt ©f m@h of t&ea« fb® ©sly ffuitful 
ap3p3f©@i0.,to» if t© ®<ia»itf#if %h% ©©©nolle 1iebairi©r of 
tfe» aentotif fitas,. intimiiag thm% pn^t ©f ©seh, in tb® Joint 
plant, aai tto amlti-lattyal «©9a«i§ stlmtieaaliift h&%mm 
tl3i«s® atmb®3? fi^'MS »isiBi fnm tMir @©©raiBat®i ®©ttviti©« 
ia tfe« Joiat piaat# 
Q, t«Xatita^ if» 
out.U. Of t.» 
mommiut ia tk« a©»« mtmw s»a»®, it is stp|>,3r©pfiat# to 
te3c» a QlQsm XmU at t&ig multi-latei-al h@%mm 
firm® r«aalti»i tsm tk®ii? ^©eisioa to 6@t mp aai ©p®ret« s 
©owBom plaat Jointif• fitii i«spi>©t to tliat pa^t of theii? 
iMlTiiuai «©@»«it a«ti¥lti«® ®is fira« whie& i« iHTOlwt la 
E 
t&@ Joiat plaatg tktf t«flt«4 to fwetioa ©O0^aiaat«ly» 
as ii<itiB:imisfe«d tmm %k9 «folit<ical» economist. 
'^TkU fatt is «0*«ti*s ©Epr®.»««€ toy tM 
• fiS • 
Mmh 'tattiffetttut »mst- mgme t® tm&tim. as a 
mm%m of %h« ©ntrepi*«»@iri. it iim«t 
t& «»awm Me mum, aai omlf h,i» 
©f #«©s©ml« jafl-tetfatiisa C#o.tttril»mtlai, i?#i©ittr®ea, ma&ing 
4«©lsi:«iBi, feaaflag mf«stala%i®s, feaajjlmg @©at», m€ 'els© 
tasalviag w%%% uaifaet to tM# |©lBt plant. 
1# owaa tM9  t# tta ©tfear pa.irtl@lf«tiiig ®atf»» 
py#ii®'tiur» «.» Imitvl4mal..s.> a©t -t© tl« gf-®af as sm®b» If la 
©Bly iiiiia^  tlasa tuatltleai that tit sava^ al aattaprsaettfa a» 
latlftimaia will to tak© fart in ttaa Joimt plant • 
ittn re.®p«®t t0 tiBi aeorilmtai aeoaoal© aatlTity, aaeli 
pa^ tieipatlBi ©mtfapfamant' Mist »aarifl®« mm #f tela «ifmgget 
ia€lTtamalifm«g aai a^ :»« t© tea-aos® ®aa m«a%at ©f an aaoa©ate 
taam, ,Ea aitat »«%»it t© taioa ia®isi©B| a« 4«tam|aa4 %f 
tfaa »a|0fit|- of tm iailYiittal aaa&aya ©f tha' taaa,, airam 
tli®ttgii tha^ sal' s.»®tii»a mutliMt with l&ia iMitl&mX 
tarasta# Ha smat te Aaia weattaiiatlaa aM aaata^  
fagarilasa ©f fela ©ira peaitiea. If tlfct iBtajasts ©f tfea 
iaditiimal pautlslpatlmg fitmt iiffat ir©»ir iimah, tba .J©iat 
©patatlea 0f a pl&at will ba mateTOai® to tliaa, feaeamaa 
t&a 8s@s«la« #f a^ ala lit tiia pla»t will m&w® tiiaa o-ffaat 
liir tl® dlaatvaatagaa raamltlmg f^ oa tka liii|Tl4mal dlffay* 
f^ eaa awisi ttea fltas# ®it#.p?®fel«*.t©a8>©t &w%m-
nmf mm taaMat to a®©pamla yatlar tliam. tiapata". 
S,g», aaa lo^ atlia*- A . f. Itl* 
•IB ' FT ** 
afflong partioifatiag malti of a joiat tatjeepreaturstoip, smell 
as In tfe® Btoek mrn^ &uj ©a? latooj? ©o^ partmsuskip, slae® tli«y 
&m eoaesraei omlj wi,tli %h& seeaomic of a singl® 
flf», ratfe®!- thm tit otjJ®etl"f®s of th« sewral flma 
opesatiag a ea*0B pXaat ia m ©oop^ rstlir® assotiatioa, 
file eoop©rating flras^.:hose$«3e.., s&«lfle@ ao _ joTtxmi.gaty 
whi®ts©«v©r with respeet to their Individual .,a^ ieati-©ii» ©mt-
sid@'" tlif Joist plent, ffae iadlvitmal tatrtprtaeurs carry 
e©afl@t« r«8f©aslbllitf aad fuaeti©m «atir«ly ©part fro» tli® 
©tli#rs a® far'ai this iJart of %h9iT ©perationa is eoaeerned. 
fli® ooopetetlEg eatrtpreae-mrs m m t««a hav® no influeaee 
over til# aetlvlti«s ©f-tli# iadivitml psrtieipattng firms 
whieh are oataid® tie Joint plsnt. for tMs part of tti®ir 
operations tfet asmi t©©n©»i© aodtlt ©f ii©3^ »t4tiQa» aomopo-
liati® QOMpttitios, ©ligofoly., «ts,.,. t®f#»iing upon ©rgani-
aatioa of tli# iMustryj ars approprlat# for tfe© eooptrsting 
firat,, ®x0«pt thst tM@ e©©»«i0'bsliavior of m&h fira ®oa-
siitrs. t&at part of tM fim in tli« Joint plant as w«ll as 
til® part out.sld® of it, 
flis fait ttet fir®. d#eisioas ©utsid® tfe# Joint plant 
ar® uasoordiaafti M» a bearing on tli© Joint operation b®-
©aui.« while «©st of the deolaions iiffeoting tb® plant ar® madt 
hj the partielpating fntr@pr«a«mrs e©©rdia&t@ly a« a group, 
so»« ar® »ad@ fey tli«* iadiTldually and ®atir«lr lnd@p«nd®iife3y of 
« fO 
on© mmthmx, Bi« im»t iaportant of-these ttnooordinat«4 
fleoisioaa ®f@ tli# de-ttraiaation ©f tli« -short mm output of 
the Joint plant» end th# siz® of th« plant iasofar as-it i® 
mttmtM hf ©-atry ®M withdrawal of fims frcaa' partioipatioB 
in th« Joint plant. :fh® short run, output i® dstermined by 
th@ sum of tht produota haudlti through th« plant by ®aeli' 
a@abor sntrtprea-eur,, ani ®aeh ©ntrepreaeur makes this 
ieeision, aa far as hl« own firs is ooaosrned, iniopendently 
of th@ others. In a potato »ark®ting oooperativ®, for 
exampl#-, the aa^ ority of the entroprenours in the partiei- ' 
paling group io®s not 4©oii« the volua® of potatoes to bt 
produe«i in @aeh farm firm, ant do®s not thartfor® te-eit® 
the short run voluwt of potato®® Mrketei through the ©oop-
orati'T® asaooiation. ttis tooision is m4@ la meh fira 
in-dlTidually by its own «atr«pr@a@ur, so that th« short rm 
•folua® in the Joint plant is sp«-eifl®i e priori as far a« th® 
pirtieipating eatrdpren«ur« m & group is eoaoerned. 
fhe ®la« of th# Joint plant is also to a l®rg® extent 
speeifitd by the pftrtisipftting #ntr®pr®neurs iniiviiually. 
fhil® th® eoop®rating group cm Halt n®w firms fro® 
partioipatiom in th® Joint plant, th@ group eannot prevent 
withdrawal of iniividual partioipating firm®. furth®raor® 
@¥®n though th® nature of the long rum average oost funotiom 
in the Joint plant warrants it, th® partieipeting entr®* 
pren«urs as a group tannot fore® mw firms to partieipst® la 
th® Joint plant, fh® a«Qlsion to partieipate in or t® 
- fl -
witMjraw tmm J®iat aetlflty is a itolsiom aat« i»ti-
fiiaalif ia ©©eh fim. fMe #atr«p^ ememrs as a §Toup may liif 
etoX® t© iaflu«iie« tk® sMi-t rm ©utptit «M the Biz® of 
til© Jolat plast toy eduoatiea, prowittoa m mm 0li8Stis«aeBt 
of thm »ma<30©p®3?tttiv®'« firms., bmt sot toy ©otroio'a. 
Thw ladlTiauftl partieipatini aatfeprtaears pMfepa tit# 
«ati?#pr®a«ii3fial tumtion m & «pool« toasi» with t© 
their Jelat plaat, Mt m m. inaiviimal basis with r@ap«et 
to tli@ op«ati©ii ©f tlseii* iadiTiduttl fims omtsia® th« Joint 
plaat# As 'hm Just hmm feows^ er, «oa# of tfe® iaii-
Ti<lual ©ati-eprenswial dteitions sfftet tlit Joiat plaat. 
"mrnm th® Bommim "aaita p©©l theii? ®atrefr#a®mrial faaeti®® 
QOBetrniaf thd Jeiat' plaat, they do aot loss theijr iadifidmal 
iieatity ami hteoiis a J©iat ®ati?®f?«a®ar, bmt they *n«t abi4« 
by aajotity <l9«i®i©m if tii»y art t© fmaetioa ®tte©®safmHy oa 
a 0©ordlaa.tei basis ia this tespeet, fhiM pmim eat*«ps©-
atmrsbip »y wmult^  ia b«tt®? tmtr®pTea®aa?ial deeisioai by e 
«hybridiEstloa« of b«st of tli« iaiiiriimcLl ©atrtprasettrial 
thiakiag, m& ia © ast soeial gaia by f«4«©iag th« raag#' of 
th® probability aiatribMtioas of aae.tjptaiaties faeiag. th® 
IniiTidml eatrtprtatmrs of the paol. eatr«pr«a©arial 
®ffiei«a©y aey b@ ©at de-iro, bowdTex',. by tb@ sl©wa«aa aai 3?ed 
tap® of deiao«jp®ti® aeties. 
- fM -
F«4etat®i OOGptratlves 
cooperative aotl.lt, been calXod -ooncertea Int.-
grstioa" feeeams® ia th@ msmal ess© wliem firms Jolatly 8®t mp 
and 0p©rat« a plant th«y tatt'grata fsrtieally fey aMlag 
funotioas s«Xat@i to tbels iailvidwai op«:ratioaa Wt not 
duplicatiag th@». Biey imtQ&e&t® T«rtlemliy forward toward 
tli« 0oa8ttii0r |*ark«tiag e©©p«rgtlT®8| ©r toestwa^ d towerd. the 
primary prodwir Ipmrejhftslng ©©operatives). Firaa that ®a?# 
too wall to mhlm® tli® ©eeaoalt® of v®rtl§®l iutsgration 
ludlTidually and t^ at insist on retaining tfetlr Imdlvldual 
ii@atltl0a may flwd it ©eo»o»i© to assoeiat© aai op®rat® tb® 
iattgrated plaat Jolatly, so that ooB.e«rt#d latsiratlon 
aptly i©»®rlb«® tM« arraagtaeat. I^is oomld be shows im 
WiguT® 1 in thxm dimensioas toy eltt-atiag tli# uadessrlbed 
©irsl® afeont point A f@rti©ally upward from th# page. ¥ary» 
lag d«irt«s of int®grttion eo'ald abowa fey varying lielgbts 
of this @l®Tatioa. 
•ais iatsgratioa is oft«n earried mmh fartto«r toy 
Qoop@ratiT« ffdsratioas—s®®©adary eooptratiT® adsooiatioas 
wfaose mtabers art primary co©p®ratlv® ass©oi«tloas. Tim-
resulting strmetur® eaa be aeatally visualized la tliree 
#l»osioaa by iisaglniag two or »or® fiultl-firm plaata illk© 
S^m lofeertsoa, B, 1. eoatrol of ladmitry. Ser^  
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par®at firaa pursme tbeli* toenoaic •eer&er© tteomgh their 
sevsral i?esp@eti?© Jolat lategratlag plants and their eow»a 
Jolat eeatral plaat. doois aad resoiire®® do not ehamg© haM.i 
as ftotf ffiO¥a from ftm to Joiat iat.egratlag plant, oi? froa 
lategratlEg pitat t© Joint eeftitral plaat, Ifo rtal pr im i s  
establiatedl as they mof# wltMn tke strmetmr®, tot oalj as 
tliey ao?0 into tlie at^ nettir# froa ©mtslft® flraa, or from it 
to oatsM# flms# 
T!i9 «e©aoiiie r«latioaa&lps !» a ooop®i'tttlirs f®a®,ratl©a 
nam amlti-lateipallf aaoag tli© ampml intntmllf oooraiaDt^ a 
gi*o«ps of firms. la tit# ©psratioas of tli# lattgrating Jeist 
plants outsid® the etntral Joint plaat, the isttraally. ooor-
flinatai groups of flMS operate entirslf ia«l0pes^ @atlj of on® 
another, lltli r®sp®et to th« esntral Jeint plant operations,. 
Ii0w©f@r» thas® grcjups fmaotiea eoordliiat«l|r is an latt^ group • 
««nst* As lateraallf ooorilaatsd groups th»f multi-laterally 
agre© to abar® tit® deelsioa raakiag aad unesrtainty feearlEg of 
tfe@ Joint eeatral plant on a proportional basia—to fuaatloa 
es m teonomie teea. of teams. All tli© previously diseusssd 
rslttioasliips fe®tw#ta th® partloipatiag firms, ana tMeir 
tnmtlQm iadep©iiieatly aad m s greup, apply to the partici­
pating groups of firms in tfte eo^ p^ rstiv# f#t»ratioa. far« 
th®raora fedtratisa dots aot o.]haiig« tb© intragroup r^ l^atioa-
sMpa betweea part lei pet lag firms at tii® primary 19T®1. 
eo0p®r0tlv« fsderstlott is a plaat Jeiatly operat®a hf two or 
ffior® aulti*firm plaats. 
- -
T. ffil PHOfOlflomiff GOIClPf 
•file pj-oportleaalllf eoE§t|>t is fessie to an uaitrstaBilag 
of the mmlti-X.©t#i'8l «©oiioa'i@ y-elatioasMp# whleh. arise aamg 
a group of Goop^ rattag fira@ wkmn tMf J©iatlf optratt a 
mmmn plaat» asa of how tbs ooop®rati»g fims fliar® t]^ ®®e 
I?®lfiti©ii®liip0» fhis prop03?tl©malitf ia t«tti?siii«i ¥y 
a^sis on 'WhisM %h®f sters ia the «©0M»i® aetiiriti®®. ©f th® 
group—th@ basis m whioli tfe® partioipatiag firas sliai?© tk® 
Z 
Joint plant. fk© 4©iat a®tiTitj is an iatagtattt part of 
til® total s>roductl@a a©tl¥ities of «aeli partioipatiag fiia. 
©xtsnt of tlioit a©tiviti«» in the individual pl®sts ©f 
meh partieipatlag fim «liiok ar® iBt'®grat©4 witfe th® Joimt 
aeti¥ity d®t#mia«s tli« p3?op©?-ti«i»at» partioipetiom ©f t&ete 
fim ia til® jQiat a^ otivitf. if tfee Joiat astiTity is a 
marketiag plaat» ttoit 'pmpoTtiomlltj is iet«iMia®A by thm 
p«r«eata^  of tto totel iapttt of p^ otmcts t© b@ mai?kttet ia 
tti@ Joist pleat *lilete is proimati ia th® iadividual plaata of 
«a0li of tli« partieipatlag firms. If tb« Joist netivity is a 
ptiretoalag pleat, propoftioaality is istemiatd by tb« per-
Qtatag® of t&« total omtpiit of tiis Joiat plamt whieh s®rir«t 
•as iapttt in tie iativifiual plaat© of mmh of tli« partioipalii^  
S^®@ aieliaaoff* ©p. eit., p. gSS. 
as^ staptioa throughout this Gbapttr is a sia.®!.,© 
depart®©at joiat plaat over a single opsratiag tai aetomatiag 
parioi, «.g., a fmw* The modificatioa-# *Ji@a tfe#8® assmp-
ti©a« art ir©pp-«d ar-« eo^ asiitred ia tfe# two sme©©®iiBi eliastei. 
flya«. ft# tetal |©lal pXm% iaelnt«i as a 
part of t60li ©f tli, faiftmt fl»», will, ^Ise €e.fla«i 'by th® r®lm-
tiT# sis# ©f tl® fWQ€mt%m' 1E th# imiifidmal 
plaat {m flaalil ©f m^ h ?!»• tlat aie iiit©fi^ at«a 
with th9 of tm plaiit {mm flgmr# 1|, fhm 
la t wl®l#«&lt B«a$ pmsihtsimi .©©©fti-atlf©, tl# paf©pottioa ©f 
"lis# |oiii$ |>laiil iBQlatoi a« a pajrt ©f @a®fe ©f tli« paiftielpatii® 
ggm%Wf flms wtll %« €©%tfal»«i' 'hj thm tslatlve sla© of th.# 
fatall mm% ttpsttanati,. ©mtfttt ©f %h& Joiat 
plant, la %k% r«tai,3. ®f ®#efa ©f %M part.loipattag fimi, 
f&is a«*feo.4 #f ahmim^ $a. %M Jetel attlfitf hf th& 
resptstire as«@@latt4 flyas .Is.mamally r®f®fip«4 t© as bslng 
m a fatteaag® m m& Msis, l.s#i fea&ti m %h0 m#« ©a«fe flm 
aaS:®® of.tfe© fliiat* .?»©pejptioiialitj mm m patsoiiag# 
las hmm. p©la"fc#i ©»t as it'ltrmlEiag %a«t« m ifeieti all ©f 
tli« #®.@a©ai,® ftiattoaaliif* ttislmg fmm %h9 ep#t'atioB ©f th« 
pltat ar® to 1# sliasit by tte patfl.sifalilag fii?iis, Iffitis 
»ttt«i!iiat li fattwlly nwrmt fe@«aast tto# #atk aak»s Qt 
t&@ plmt ipmwM&m§ ©3f':®al#» it) is a aftas»i 
of tkm sis® ©f tli« froiiuotion attivltitft la th& inAividual 
plasti ©f tM« &.m iiitsg^ eettd with tli# 
aetivitit».-©f'ffe# |©i»t flsmt, 0©«««tw»tty pi*®f©a?ti©Bat« 
m§® ©3? « ataTOif* ©f tM« ft'ftgtiom ©f t&t J^ iat' 
plaat w&i®k t« a f«ft ®f ©f th« ®©©i>«*atiag fims* 
%#« Of# «4t., sat lofe#-tka» A »i«©ty. . , » 
Froportloaat® ms© of Joimt plaat follewi logieelli' froa 
th® itruotui*® of tkm e©ep®3?ati¥9 ftssoelatioa} it is a 
*@®s\a« of this ps-epoytleaalitj aaeag th® t©0p«r©tlag firiii. 
Propo^ tloaality is th® ealy feesis for sharing %hm 
®e©a©ai© r#lati©ii«liifi. ia ©©•aaeetiem witb %M Joimt aetifity 
wMeh will be atatmally satisfaetojey to 0ao.l1 ef i®v©»6l 
partisipating entrtprEmk mMtm^ emnuT amst ptoirli# 
iaputs in %hm Jolat plaat in tM ®mm fir©foi'ti©a that to 
sliar«s ia tfe« total ©mtpttt of the jol»t activity#• laeh must 
mautm jre.spoasibilltits fo? tlie Joint 
autiTlty In tfe# ssm ffoportioa tliat b« ator#s in ttoe total 
antioipatti teonoaie l»«a®fits ffo» tlfe® proimettoa aotiviti®,® 
e©a4mett..d in th® Joint plaat. If tfe«s« 0©aiitio.ns ar» not 
B®t, ® alsall©©ati©n of 'WBSQmms asoag tli« fim« partiolpat-
im in tM Joint aetiTity will result, la -oMbt t© aeM®'Te 
int«?firii eqmiliteim within th® eeoperatif® struetnre, all 
inpnti in ttee Joint plant mnst h% nhmmiL hf %lm pa^ tieipating 
fim« OB tlas samt basis &.a tlmj shar® the oxitput of tli® 
e©»on plant, m& all entif«p-^ @aeurlal r®spOn@ifeilltl«s antt 
b« shardd toy tlies oa tfe.® .saas ba$it as the antisipatei «0©-
noaie gain ftoa thm Joint aetiTity. Tkis aea.ns that the 
pa3?tiolpating firms mast shay® th® .®®onoai®. mse of tl# Joint 
plant oa the sam feasls 8® they sliiir# tl« plant {s«« figmi'® 
Hi tbat tlity Wft shme tin© ©nti'@pr®n©n^ ial i«.0isi©n«, til® 
mne®rtainty feeasing, tl@ flnaa^ ial i?®sp©nsibility, th& costs. 
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aai th® tooaoaie fetnsfits la eoaaeetion witli tli© jolat 
aetlTiti" oa tie same propostioaal. basis. 
A# ¥s® .©f tto Joiat 
fh® use iiat® ©f tlm Joiat piamt fey ©f tli« partiei*-
patlag ©iitrtp?«a«wfi, tMea, ®ay b« ©ossi^ itred one of %h% 
©ooaomie rela1;i©asfcifs arising wlita a amlti-fira plaat is 
fomtd* aey -will shmm tM um of tMe piaat oa the saa® 
basis as th^ f sh&m tfe® plaat as a part ©f ®a©fa ©f tktir 
I 
firms, as iilwts&tti i» 1. A» l,©ag as he Tm&inm e 
m®ab0j? of til® ftssoi^ iatei ami hm rtsewees aH.©0&t®4 to 
th© Joint plaat, eaeli #Btr0pr©a®iir will, if h® mtB' fatiomalljf 
ia tfcie fesst Interests Qf kis firm, ®ak« bis full pr©p©rti®Bat® 
Z 
me of %k% JolBt plaat.# Sim©® %M joiat plant is p®^ ?t of 
til# total iatigjatad pso4iiotioa aetiTitf of sash firm, tto 
r@soi»eta of th® fim in tfet joimt plaat eipe prolmetiw onlf 
if us©4 hj the firm. If paftieipatioa ia tb® joiat plant i® 
ua®e©S0iii©, tbe fira »lioml4 witMi'air ooi^ l®t«ly from tht 
a®soei«ti©tt, As long ai a fim eoatinti®# to haw resomrees 
all©eat«t to tit® Joimt plantit is ©^ ©noiiie aooeems® to 
T^hi9 almost goes without sayiag, of siiic® it 
was antioipatti md&itions to the psefita of th® partieipatimg 
firm® thyem^ tts® of (economic protmetiea itti th® J©iat pla,3ftt 
which aotiTOt®4 its organizatioii in the fisai place. 
in the ttxminology of praotioal cooperativ® eircl®®, 
gi¥e hia ©.©©paret if® 100 p©rc@at of his patronag©*. 
- -
'iiaeostlam® mat of plmat as long as wiflafel® eosta cam tee 
0©v®r«i la tte® Jolat attifltf. Ia sliort tvm sitmatloas wb«r© 
vaflafei© costs §sim©t b® att hj operatiag t^ « |©lat plasty It 
may tee ia the teeft latertsts of ail partioipatiag estrapr®-
aturs to Itt til® Joint plaat a?e»iiia id® terimg tlm period 
•w%m. sueto. eoadltloiis txltt. 
If tb® per ttBit tost® IB th© Joint plaat a#er@as« witb 
Tolm® OTsr tilt releiraat range, «aeli firm al®o ow@s it to tte« 
otte@r partioipatiag firaa to aak:® ftill proportioaat© us® of 
th® JolBt aetivity, failtir# to io so wouli m%&,n 
oosts in %M Joint aotlTity to tbe other purtieipetiag firms, 
fto partieipating entrepremturs hsT® mwlti-laterally ©®r®®i 
that -©aeh will toatiati® to make proportlomat# u»« of tli«ir 
JolEt plant aa loag as it it mmamlQ to do so. Ttia 
m«at is a®#®,»8ary so tMt t:^ ® eooptratlag. firms a group 
will te@ atel® t© aelisT# tooaoaiss of slsse in tte® plaat, &M 
so tteat faeh firm will te® able to mak® its iai®grat@i opera-
tiOBS sm.©e«ssfml. 
til® otlier teat,, on th® basis of tli@o?eti®al struetw®, 
®acli @atr8pr#ii®iir muiit aulti-laterally ®gr®® witli tlie otte«r 
partieipatlag ®atr®pren©urs sot to use tte® Jolat plant ia am 
amount la mmm of tli« proportios of tli® total Joiat pleat 
iaelmdei as a part of him o«Q fira. fo do so would giv® Mm 
a greater stear®-of tli® @®onoaio^  teeaefita of tte® Joiat plant, 
if any, than tH® proportlom of th« eatr»pr@neurial funotioa® 
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Qt uae«rtaint|' bearing ani itaiaion maklsg is e©aa®eti©a with 
th« Jolat piaat ©s»iia«a hf him* 1% leuld giv® him. a sliar® of 
%h0 omiput fro® tm Jelat piant wlilefe is tiiproporti©nal®lr 
lii^ tr than th® shara of th® total lapmt ia the joiat plant 
profiasa hy hia# fels is trmt hteamse #xpli®lt essts in th® 
joiat plant to, ©eeh partieipatiag firm io mot mtm all ia-
put®« Sow ,r®®omr©es.tt««4 ia th® Joiat plaat ar« alloefttefi 
dlrsetly to tha joiat aetlTitf hf th® partieipatiag flras» 
so that 'the eost of th®ir. as® is i»|5litit rather thaa «ip2icit 
t©' eash firm* If say ©a® partieipetiag fim msts th® Joiat 
plaat to m ©xtsat gr«at®r thaa proportloaal to th® eMmat ©f 
smeh rtsomte iapmts pr©vii®i hy that fir*, « misalloeetioa ©f 
r®somr©®« aawsag'the pirtioipatiag fir»» r@iults# fh@ gaim to 
this fir® la amM e&s® will h© at th® ©xp«as@ of all.or part 
of th® other partloipatiag tatrtpreaaars. fh®r©for®,'th® 
iadiviAual «atr®prsa®ars will agree to ®®t ap aad optrat®' a 
coaaoa plaat. Jolatlf oaly ©a eoaiitioa that aaeh partieipatiag 
eatr©pr@B®ar will m$mm m laer«as«i fraetioa of th® Joiat 
plaat whsa his as® of th® Joiat aetiYity iaer®a«®», ao that 
proportioaalitf 'fttto^ - the partitipatiag firiis will h® maia-
taia«fi. 
B» Satr®pr«a@ariel. Bacisioas 
It ha® h«@a s«®a tehapt@r Wl that th® iadlTitaal ®atre-
praaeur® of th® eooptratiag fira® mkm the ®atr®pr@aeari®l 
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a«elsiOES eoaetmiag ©p«ratlon of the Jolat plant ts 
repp©s®Btativ@s ©f atttoaoaoms «ooaoaio mlts, r®th®r thaa hy 
btooaiag part of a Joiat estrepreaoiirial uait, bmt that 
tli@y faaetioa eeerainat^ ly a« a#ab@rs. of th© partiaipetlag 
group* latrtprfaettrlel, i#elaio,as,af«eif 1© to th# Joint 
plant amft fe© tli« Joint teeiaions of %M participating 
@ntr®prenetar«, ratlidr tliaa the am. of the nneoordinatei 
deoiiiona aaia hf etoh ©f tht ®©¥®r»l partleipatimg ®ntBe-
pr®n®nrs s®parat@l|-« lesh must abii® hf '»t®aa« 
d©eision» 'With 3?«sp«@t t© th® Joint attivityj h® has wlti-
laterally a^ «@4 with th® other partloipating firms to" do 
so. ' • 
Only in a «trn®tnif# wh«r® «o-f®rei^  mit« 
fnn©tion eoorilastely with roapeet to a part of -their total 
proiuetlon aetifiti®# l# th® entr®pt@n®mrial ^ eeislon making 
funotion poolei in this atns#. 4# a gromp thty Bwat rseonoil® 
eonfliotinf Yi#w« end trrlv® at a single eo©riinat«-i isoision 
oono®rning ©aoh of th« •oonomio iiines fae«4'toy the Joint 
plant, fht decision on »aeh of these issmos affteta eaeh 
participating ®ntrspr®nenr on a proportional haais, not 
only with rs®p#ot to hi« shar® of the associate aetlTlty, 
hut, btoatise of th« integr®t#a natnr®- of th® two, with 
resptct to hi® proinotion activity omtaiie the Joint plant 
m w«ll. Xf an «ntr«pE«nemr anticipates thfit seny of the 
pooled dseision# w,ill eonfli©t with tht h®«t ©oonomie 
int®r«st of his fiw, partielpatlon in th© Joint plant ii 
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itlctlf to toirn* 
a® fims will ifeay#. to'this ^mX of ®atr<i* 
^mmmTi&X 4«@iil©ji aaklag. ©a a f?©f»t4©aal .fea«ls«-©ii tji« 
saa# 1iaii«' tfcat Mh&m .tb« Jotot •flaat ami it» ma#,.. • 
my 9mb ptirtliifatlag mgintmn ^ la ©wa dfe.ci-
sitms th» J#imt plumt l« %f lits. m Bpmtti^  
aatttrt ,y«qulrlag. i«el,gt©» m %Mf rnrns mf# It f©ll®ws 
fvm %M strrndtar-# of ths 
tl©"! tfeey w$Xl v#t« ffefdrttettally* 
tttft s©a@li4si«B :©f votiai ©«fliet« witk 
til# wlit ®t«tp%6»e« ©f %hm ©&«*¥©%«• tat-lmaiiy ea#-
ot ..anng eo.t,ovi. 
As tmltm&tf' aM • teTs ^ f#«•» feowtf®?, 
fotiag l«.©a4f a. sf«@lsl'«&§« ©f firefti-ttesaJ. wto«r© 
tfe@ paf-ti.0i^ pst4ai fims tli® |©lat pJLsal epftexlmttly 
#11 am %q%MX fims Maf# lteta«t 
tM k&Ti. ^kmmM ©f tkmt etmml wetimg mmm 
mm mm MMm |©4a$ fl«a% ©a m mt-qml 
feasit, %mt also fednams® ©f tM tifnouXty '4a immw «.©«p®ifatlws 
&f «*Wfelr toew.tlt |otet will te« shfixet 
msimg .%M fattlsipatlai tims W %im to ©f tli® 
SE »at£#pysstntial i®ti«l©a l3«s«»e l^ mal 
«p» ®lt#i ft 3.#f»S0l« 
A ThmMj* m p« 111-l.iSfc 
i 
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fotlag m&f %& bolt apprexinatioa avaiXabi©. l0V@^ tli«le»% 
tht a,i?gMa«at» ot%m hj ©eoftifat.iT® leaders for 
fotliig, «•«.» It Is real i@i&©era«yi th@ eoopeyatlv® 
is aa aasoeiatlea of p««'ple,. a©t' e^ itali sts.,. largely 
i©g®a in ©oepeifativ® thtakiag, Tt@f &m oospletely 
wlttoomt seitntlfif t©i»oittie basit. . 
titer® th« of fims paftieipatiag' in tli®, ^ oiat 
plaat ®X0e®ia a ©@ftalm aaxiwim (sey flft#«a. or tw@aty) it 
fe®ooaa® .a®®«s»ary for tb®a to ieirtlep Aefiait® aaeliiaery for 
aakiag th« poelfd ©iitr#pr'#m®tttial ieelsi©as, m&we #©• 
tailed ©f tfee tatr®pr®m®tt»ial deeisieas ooa0#ra4ag tli# o^iat 
plaat at® ordiaarily i®l@gat#i to a feoa?4 ©f itr®eloirs, 
While tle'tei-eaa ®Btie®pi'«Bt@u.rial poli@i#» ai?® ®8ta.felisk@d, m& 
tlie feoari •of'4ii?#otc>2'2'is'&#l©et®a, fey ttll partieipatiag 
©atr®prta8«j?« at amausl asetiagt oi sp«0iai meetiags f©r this 
ptapos®. a®-pool#t m^ imlorn are mad® at 
S 
stt:0li aastiags l»y mjorlty Tot®, witli saeM partloipatiag «atr»-
p:;ie;tteur fotiag oii a p:popo?tioaal feaaig. la deeltlsf hm h.© 
will cast bi,i Tot© m^ h @atr@pi»©a0m3r Qomi^ Qm not only tfe® 
\ op®ratios» ©f III® Jeiat plaat ai suslt, hut the wliol# ©peratto 
of his imdiTi^ itial firm. 
Se® lewfsa, liwla 0. FroBi Dogma to Seltae© in Go©p»ra« 
tife Thi'aklBg,. iaezlo-ea Cooperationi X94«» p. i-XS. 
AaidFieaa lastitmt® ©f eospsyation. Wesliliigt©ii, S^ . C. IMS. 
f^ha partioipatiag flMs .®ay sp®©ify ia aytioX® or 
toy Xawi that sptiifi® @atr©pr®a©mfial aaeisiojis requir® M©3f« 
thaa a siapl# mjei'ity# 
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fht mom ieslsioaa am 
to tht b-oari ©f ^iTm%6t» W %h% pastietpatii^ ©alrepreatmrs 
m s, gf©mp* MwmtmM %m sleeted tmm tlie group of tb® 
la€i¥lteal pattisipatij^ QBtsapfsneiiys atoortlag t© tb#lr 
fttjiXity to. mmM ®at3f®pj?«aeiiyi®.l itslsloas aai t© 
rspraseat, adaqmttly ths |Bt®res.ts of at least tli® aa|©i'lt|' 
of tto$ iaii-ritml farti®i|sattsg ©atrsprtaamrs* fhos® tleetM 
will aot nectstatily fe® fs©a th® partieipatlag fims' wJaieli 
iMr® til® largest ffa«ti©aa of tb# joittt plant. Th® pattiel-
patiag @atf«pi'«ii@tir» t®l«gate aiit^tpr®a#u?lal d©aisi©ma eoa-
eersiag tli©ir Jeist plaat to %tim bDard of difeetoys ma a 
Ijody ©Bly, Kg airaetet or ©ffle«r bag authority t© mM« 
estr«pr@a©uriel ttelsloat fos tk® whol© group as aa imfilvldmsl. 
If 6 ©filari©d maa§«r for tlit plant lis liir«d, he is r®spo»« 
ailsl® t© th® boeri ©f dirtetore mt a bt^ari, mt to tli® iiidl* 
Tldual aireoters aa ia ©.ttutly t^e sems seas# tliat li« 
la r^spoaslfel®, tlirowgto tM to tte psrtiQipatiag eatr#-
preasur© ^as a gr©mp, b^t n.ot to aay ©a# ©f tkem isdlvidmally. 
fto# asRagsr Mkes ©aly tfe#«® ^©gartlng tfe® ©ptre^m 
of tlia plaat wMiel haw feeeii 4®l«^t®t t© itia# H® is not aa 
tstrapMrndir ta amy stait of th.« wori, but a higlily 0p««lal-
ia»4 lal5'©2?®r i^ioa® p3?odti©tlifity la the plant will dsttmla® 
Ilia talary, considering the market price for such productiyity, 
la order to insure that th# board ©f director® will 
rtpresemt th@ entlr# group in the 0atrspr#s#urlal deeisi©»® 
iel«get@i %Q partieipatlag .®at»@pr#a®ws tii.tli« 
Jotat pleat usmaiif .pire-iriae that as a gromp tfetf mn y@aov® 
from off lee ami mj ilri#te^ s, ©r eli ©f tli®a, fey a 
vot« of ao»a speaifitfi »a|©^itj of tm prtltipatlEg «atr©-
,fmrtli«sii©r«, milks a Joist enty@py@a#walilp, 
tJi« ladivldmal aaty^pirsaaars opsfatiag a eeara^m plaat |©lBtly 
f«t int© 4lffi©mlti0s aai iateriial iisttntloa it th«y 
dtlegat® t©o a«#fe ®iiti»®pf«a#mrlal <i®elsioa aa&isg rsspoa-
1 
SibilItf to theji? Qt 4ir#©t©t»* If ttoty ar® t© %# 
follrwd hj smmBBful txeewtloa, »aaj of tlies® declsloB® 
the support ©f all pai?ti0ipfit lug ssti'®p:r«aemr8. ^is 
©an lia^ aij hm #*peete4 msltss %h%f 'all tak« pm% la »akiii|| 
tk«s« «atr#pf«a«m?lal 4@Qlsloa®, aad do s© ©a a proportlosal 
hmiM, 
C« fa#®rt«iatj isftriiif 
The ©ati#pieta®«l?s of tli# ferticlpatltig fli-ma- fetaj- tlfee 
aeoa©ml® of th«lf Jelat aetlirttf ®a a g-roup. 
these flMS sMr®- tli« mB#«taiatF l)eai?iag yaspQiiallllity. as 
tlitj sbar« th» |©lHt plaat# fh® naetttaiatiss arising fm& 
thQ mmm-U aetlvltj of tfe® Jelat plaat art o^rtainly aot 
«liffiia«t#a, but at® »difl®a b®©£ns.a of th® fa@t tliat 
^Thls polat is «is0m©sea la ucw dttalX ia seetlom 0 of 
Ohaptsir XII. 
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s«¥®ral firm® owa and ©fsratt tb© plant tegetbsr. tmk 
pertlolpmting ®Btip#pr#ae«r Mist hmr tb© maertaiati^ s of 
til® etmmmiQ aetiTltits •&£' Mb eomplet# fim, whieli iaeimiet 
bi# proportioiate sbaf# of th« Jotet plaat Ctaeflgui?# I), 
Mm mseertsiaties fat# bis fia as tli® flm is «xpaai«l, ly 
aMing -IM •aMllloaal fttattioas. If M la maabl® or 
lag to b@ay these mw tts§®ytaint|.es la ¥l@w of tl# sati'©!-
p«t®a higli®!' profits to iiii fim, It ia ttaaeoaoiaie for lis 
t© eeop.dffate# 
?iiGdrtaiati©s as tlisy fao© mf fir®, iaolmilag firaa 
operating e plant as oentyatted to rtafes, ©aaBet fe® 
iastired agaiast m latr©&§«4 nimbly as Itmma of eost. fk® 
UBo®rt£iiatl«s faoing iM ©atrepreattAar ©f any fim »f h-m 
©laasifiti m followsi 
!• Markt't ii»e©rtaimties—-eeused fey uin^ rtlietateX# 
tmtma of ®mpplf aad dtsaal ©©»iiti©ms mmi. ©rii* 
iiariiy isaaifestfti hf mpirefilctatel# p£le«s ©f s 
a» ThB feotors of fy©iu#tl«a 
h» Inputs (yaw mttftils) • 
0, Outpmt freimetj 
t. fselmoleglesl tta®trtalnti®#»*mamife8t#t e# ©tesol-es-
G®E«t ®f preseiit mathods ef psodMeties, pl&at ani 
®tuipa«at, Mftftim iaputs qt mwm emtprnt, ®M 
hyt 
a • M« obs ai eai iaaowt i oa s 
ht Ciiemical isnoiratioag 
Biological iimovation» 
a, - oyganizatieual iimoTatiGas 
3. fmhmimX useartaintie®»--eaiias4 hf tli@ aBpi'®4i©ta'b3.« 
aatmi'# of scat fast or ©* fettets ia %hm •pm'&.mttmm 
fmaettoa 
4# Opdfstioaal ^ iweftaiaties—-mapradietsljle la 
tfe® ©p#afatl#a ef tto® flm, smh mt 
8? -
a. Cmrtall@d productloB beeatis# of. latooy strikes 
b. • ]u©ss of key figures la 
0, OQvmwmQntal iaterf®r®,a@«, as: 
(1) faxes or othtr mfawrabi® l^ glslatioa 
it) lBt@rv©iition, or r««trleti©n of oatptit or 
raw iaat@rieli.* 
In adilttom to tli®B« four, tatreproaeurs of iadividmal 
firms mhi&h ©perat# a mmmm plaat Jointly faoe a fifth typ® 
of mae.ertalaty wtol©h growe out ©f t^ # faet that tb« «atr«-
pr«B®mrial 4««isio.ns eoassralag tbsir Jolat piaat mast be 
ma4« eoordiaately, r««ultlag ia a ©oaaoa d@©lsioa for tli« 
o^mp. til® autlor lia« talltd tbi® flftb type of uaetrtalaty 
E 
«iB®ab@rsM.lp mae«rtalBty". 
The. •i«gr®« of tfei® p«©mliar uae#rtaiaty la 
th« 0oop®r6tiv«- is a«peat«at oa tb@ ability of iti 
member ^ atreproatmrj^  to get aloag wltfe oa« 
saot&tr—to sgr®f ©a th^  policy, of the <s©®p«ratlv®. 
'^«at«r ttoe h©»ig®^ ty of lat«r®st» of the 
»®ab®rs, the Its® laporlfeat tills typ® of aa©@r« 
taiaty beeoaes. . . 
l:ia»pl@s of meabersbif ^maeirtalaty faelag @mh partielpatlag 
firm ia a eooperatift assoeiatioa iaelad#» (11 aaeertalaty of 
ooatlaaed participatioa of %M other a«soeiat@d-firm®., iU) aas-
G«rtaiaty as to Aetber or aot tli® poolei itcisioas will 
eoiaoit© .with %m best isterest of'tli® ladiTidual participat-
iag @atr@pr«aew., (3) maeertalaty as to wtotber or aot tb® 
board of iireotora will aa©arat#ly sat offleieatly r©pr®s«at 
tli€s best iat®r«st» of tka majority of ta« partioipetiag 
%Mlllps# op. ©it,., p. £2-2.3, 
I^bii.p p. 10a» 
®Ibit., p. 104, 
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@a.ti?®py®a#tixa, and (4| ttseertaiaty of the coii,tiam«d opera-
ti©m of th« Joial ©etivlti' o¥«r tiae. 
It is i*p©rtaat to tlat tto« participatiag 
#atr9pif«a®mr» teeftj? the mastrtaiJities of tjbt optratioa of tli«ir 
Joint pl«at, mm thevt^  mmj of th®m er# poolei wltliia tli« 
group, la th®lr r@«p@etiT© fimi as Bmh, IMlTlimlly ©aeli 
©iitr«pr@aemr it fasti with motrtalaties toeoaias® of %h9 
optratioB of &ls firm m a whol©. 1« Mat eoasider the \iiic@r-
taimti«s arisiag fr©« th® optristioii of fcia eoapiete firm, tk# 
sam® as th© ®atr@prea«» of a siagi® wtl^ aXlir Integrat®i 
fir® aast ©oaaiier tli® ua©®rtaiati©s trisiag froa all of Ms 
pleats as tli@y fao® th& firm «s t wfaol®. fli® uaeertaiaties 
fae® «a@b partielpatiag firm as a wltol® aai th® prof it 0, if 
aai", aeerm® to th# parti®ipstimg fiw ai t wbol®. ®iis 
straotmr# is tatirtlf iiffereat froa tliat la Jolat ©atrtpre-
a«ttr8Mps, statb a® tb® atook eompaai-, wtoer® %M mae«rtaintl®s 
fae®' tM@ ®o»p®af a® sash aad ar® shereA aaoag th® iadivita®!® 
m&klm «tp th® Joiat @atr®pr®a®ar aeaoriiag to their propor-
tlooat® siiar® of tM» «atr«pr«afiarship. 
fh® Jolat op®ratioa of a plant, a® iistiagaished froa 
the adiitioa of'a plaat toj a siagle firm, aoiifie® th@ aaeer-
taiatie® arisiag ©at of the op«ratioa of th® pleat which fae® 
th® iadiYidaal p&rtioipatiag ®atr®pr@a#ar-» hj spreadiag or 
pool lag th®m* Jks a fromp th® pert ioipat lag firms b@ar all 
th® aao®rt®iatl®s arisiag-oat of th®, optratioa of th® Joiat 
plaat. fh®®e aaoertaiati®® ar® 'ahared hy th«» oa a 
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proportional feasis, flius the aotutl uaeertalaty faelag @ae.fe 
partioipatiag #str®pr«m»ttr 1»©1«4«.» bis proportioaat® sbare 
of til® total maoertalaty arising out of %h& operatioa'of tbe 
Joint plaat. aimaprtiiotafel® lots ooomrs,. all partiei-
pating ©atrepreaetir® fe@ar their. propertionat® share of it, 
ratto.«r tkaa tlis few omt of th® wbol© gromp wlio would b« af-
fsotei iir@ctly if tb® mnetrtalEti®® were not pooled, sine# 
aos® of teow ® priori wtort or w|i«a tfet uapr®4iotafel® 
loss ffiight osomr, tliis poolia^  of mne#rtaintl®@ arisiag froa 
%h® Joiat plant operatioas rtimoes th® antioipatod dispersioa 
aromaa %M proteble @xp@©tati©Bs faee-d toy partieipatiag eiitr®-
pr®a®ttr. loa# of the ttaotrtaiatiss toaaeettfi witii tb® opera-
tioa of %h® Joittt plant are «li®iaat«d, bmt they are spread 
amoag all tli# p&rtieipatiag firm®* 'Siis has the #ff®ct of 
r®i«©ittg th® uaesrtaiaty fming ®a#h @Btr@pr«aettr, as eoa-
p®r«i to tli« ©as® where ©a-oh coaimoti the saa© total prodiio-
tioa aotiirity iatiflAmmliy. 
®i« partioipatiag fims totar th#8© moertaiatits which 
aria# fro» the operatioa of the Jolat plant, iir«etly as 
firas. latrafira B©v®m«at of r#soaro®® profiuets b@tw®®a 
plaats fioes aot ia^ olT© title ohaage nor establish a priee 
for th®a, Th&mtQx® th® market «ao«rtaiatiei arislag fro® 
th« operatioa of, th® Jolat plant ar« bora® dir®etly by the 
meabtr firas oa a proportioaal basin breams® th@y retaia 
titl® to all th© prodaets aad r«so\ire®s la th® Jolat plant 
oa a proportioaal basis,. Uneertaiatio® as to th® futmr® 
proauetiTify of th© fl»i plant and etulpaeat, thoiigli ©rdi-
aarliy speelfi© to tb® Joiat plant, ar# lora© bf th® ©ntre-
prtnaurs of th® paftieipsttag firms as a group aad are sliared 
hj them ©a a proportleael basis, Tkm% maeertsiati®® t&m 
tfee inSiTliaal partloipatiag firms ©a a proportioaal hmi» 
also b®.eaii»« tk# eatrepreaemrlal owner skip of tb« fa©lliti®s 
of %k& Joiat plant is htli by thea® firai as aaeh aad sbarei 
hy %km oa a bati® proportioaal to tieir relative sls«'aaa 
tliertfor# tii«ir proporttoaat® attlisatioa of tb@ Joiat plant. 
»• flaaacial isspoaslbility 
fh^  pwtiQipatiag flr»s b»ar tb# flaaaolal respoasibility 
for tlelr Joiat aotiTity as a group itare it m iatlviiaal 
partioipatiag fims oa tli« San# proportiomal basis as tbey 
parti0lpat«.la th& ©waership aat ©Qoaoai# mtiliaatioa of tb« 
Joiat plaat. It sbottli b« «a€t •el®ar that tb© propertioaality 
©0a§«pt iefin®# bow %im partieipatiag firs® will shmr® tbe 
fiaaaoial respoasibility for tb© Joiat plaat, aot a#e®«sarily 
bow tbsy sbare ia profia^  tb® sstaal ©apltal for tb« plaat. 
&« loas as partieipatiag firms bear tbe ©eoaomi© maoertalatJtei 
aai sbar® tli#m oa a proportioaate bails, it is imaterial 
wb®tb@r tb®y aotaally owa tb© eapital reso^ iro®® used la th@ 
plaat or slaply hire tb®B in tto® oapitsl aerket. ais appUes 
aot oaly to tb® firms eoattrasi as e gremp, but for @acb 
pertiGipatlag ®atr«preaear laiiTitmally, r®garil#8s of tbe^  ^
positioa of th.# ottotsr partialpants, 
Owatrs of capital rtsottre®# are eoneermea mot 
only witto aaxiaizijo^  tb® laterast rat® oa tfeelr memjf but 
alao about stentity agaimst l©sl»g their prineipal, so tliet 
tb® fttaatitjr of .©epital sappllti is a funetioa of both tli« 
iater#it rat® and tlia r@©iprooal of tb® risi: of lois ©f 
1 
prlaeipal, Ooasetiisatly,, the partielpatiag firms will dia-
obarg® tbeir proportioaat® fiasasial rsspoaslfeility is their 
Joint pleat toy pmttiag up ©aottgh attnal ©apital on a pro-
portieaal Ijesii t© provide aetmritj amffi0i&Bt to attraet 
loaa capital at tfce airktt rat® of imterest a,M agreeing to 
shar® tli» -lat#r®st «xp«as« on « preportioaal feasis aa m 
adiitioa t© plaat ©p@ra;tlag costs for t,fee rtmiaiag oapital 
ae®d@d. 
S©op®ratlag firas will tot r«quir®i t© put tip 
©Eougli 4ir@§t eapital so tMt as ® gromp thty toav® ©aottgli to 
provide s«©mritf to l@,ai®rs. pereeatagt this will be of 
th« total capital r#tmir®d for tfa# |oiat plaat i®p«ii4s upon 
til® abtolut®' ameuat aad p®re®atag® owitr ©tuity in, tfe® per-
i 
tiGipatimg firas, tli® iollar aiz® of tl® Joint pleat 
%sft also other variabl®®, of ©ours®, suoto as tb® exp©e-
tatioas r#garitng lnt®r®®t rat® eMngts in rtlation to tl® 
Isttgtl of tha loam, expectatioa® regardlnf tte puretosing 
power of mousy# lit^ idity pr«fsr®a©®, et®.*, ail of wbiofe ar® 
highly iaportant la other r®garia but of littl® coaeera h®r®. 
%«eaus® th® Joint plant ia as int0|pfat®€ part of tM®s® 
firms., so tliat owssd aquity in th® iadlviaual plants mn serr® 
as sesurity for loan capital n#®4®i la th® Joint plaat. 
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eoapaftd to that of th® member flms, and tte® oiigiiitmA® of 
til© mneertalBtles fa®tag tbe entire ©peratlons of th® a«ber 
firmi, incluiiag tlie Joiat plant. fliet®T#r percentage the 
owner equity mj b® of total eapital, tlit-oepitai whiofc must 
be allocated ilreetly to ti® Joint plant by the participating 
firms 'Will be sharei- bf thea on a proportionate basis. Such 
capital will iraw aaiiher a fixed mm of interest nor a diti-
dead. Its us® cost is simply aa implicit eoit to each partic-
ipstiag ©ntreprentmr in the operation of his complete firm. 
In eases where th# mrglael productivity of capital 
•?s.ri«s considerably between the several indlTiduel firms 
partieipsting in the Joint plant, it will be economic to 
modify the ®b©¥© generalization to permit the member firms to 
share the direct allocation of capital on a disproportional 
basils while still sharing the full fineneiel responsibility 
1 
on a proportional basis, fhia may be quite simply done with­
in the group of partieipatii^  firms by allowing thote in which 
the marginal productlflty of capital is low to contribute mecpe 
than their proportionate ahar© of the required actual capital 
and the®® in which the marginal productivity of capital is 
g 
high to contributt less than their proportionate share. 
%rdffiaa is describing this ease when he writes , , 
coop®ratiTe-miad#ds®a« is not coexteaaiv# with ability to 
contribute capital to a cooperative essociattoa.'** iriaaa, H. 
1, Shifting the fimaacing Burden laosg members of Goopera-
tivea. In Aaeriema eoopsratioa - lf4i,^  p. S@2-5®fi. e^ri­
cas laatWmte of Cooperatioa. Washingtoa^ i 0# G. _ li4#. p. 
%ad@r the r*?strl©tive assui^ tioas of a periect capital 
market it would be impossible to better the economic position 
of either group of firms by the modification, of course. 
iS • 
IneeatiTa to %h® tovmT 'tim» to do so will eonsiet of 
eottftasatioa ia the form of tb@ n@ees«6ff fixed rat® of 
iater®st, tJMsi* this arrangemeat psrtisipatlag firms will 
proTid® aetmi capital for tli# joist plaat on a proportional 
bsisia ttp to a poiat somewhat short of that aeeeasary to mBk& 
th® operatioa fiaftaaltlly s@©ur®, mad the differeae® will he 
med® up hy tnt&m&t htariag l©®aa »ad® to th® group ©s © 
whole fey tho®« firms ia whioh th® margiaal productiTity of 
eapitfel mato® it .©ooaomie to do «o. The iaterest oa these 
loans will b® aa it«» of cost ia the pl®at operatioas, ©lis 
cost will be horae hy all participatiag tXms and shared by 
thea oa a proportioaal baa is, lilc® all other costs. Ia aa 
empirical ©a«@, givea the »arglaal prodmctlTity of capitsl 
of @soh participatiag firm ead'th© total capital required for 
security ia the Joiat plaat t© outfide leader®, the solmtioa, 
ia terms of the ©tuilllirlum iaterett rat® oa th@ae loaas, the 
aaouat of such lomas hy each firm to the group as a whole, 
aad the proportioa® of ateaher fir® •capital allocated to the 
joiat plaat ia the form of •these loeas aad slso oa a propor­
tioaal hatis, ©aa he formally worked out. 
If the aargiaal productiTity of capital in all paytlcl* 
patiat •firms, is less thaa 'the aartat rate of iaterest oa loaa 
capital, it will he ecoaoaic to hare oae huadred perceat 
ia®mh®r fira equity la the Joiat plaatj hat as loag as aarglael 
productiylty of capital ia 80» of the participatiag firms is 
higher thaa the aarfeet rate of laterest, it will aot he 
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«o©aoaio fer theai m a group t© b« '•tsbt la Jolat 
plaat. It will be ©©©seiti® toT tli©a t© 'stemrt tb® us# ©f 
soa® borrow«i §apital»' If tb® aargisal predmotlvltr of 
capital is h®lm tb# m&wk@% rat# ©f imterest ia som® of tb® 
usiibtr firms, but a©t all of tbea, it will b« ©eoaoaie for 
thest witb low aargiiial protettifttl®® of' .eapital to mMk& 
l©ajQ»t)tb« gromp ©§ » wbols-, tbe sasw m am oatsii© leader 
wotili, at tb® aarkst rat® of iat©r@st*' 
fbe group of eoop®rating fims will amk to obtain tb®ir 
loaa, eapital froa wliftt«f®r ..sottr®® tbej mn gst it aost •«©•©-
a©»ieally, smd om tb@ a©it fewrablt t@,r»s, a«y may g®t 
BGm of it by s®lliBg »b©a49" ©r ©tber "boad-typ®" sseuritie® 
to tbe g@a®rftl lair#sting pablie, as w®ll as to soa® of tb® 
partioipatiag fir»», ami so» of it by seemring botb long ani 
short t«rii loans ia rtlatiTely large ataomiaations from ooa-
»@r@ial Isaiiag agaaelts. and siailtr smrma, Regardless of 
tbs somre® of loaa Q.«plt©l to tb® gromp^  tb« iaterest m tbis 
borr©w«i mm@f is « mst it«m, ia tb# Joint plsat to b® bora® 
by all partifipatiag firm® as a grotip, mA sb®r®d mom tb®® 
m a proportional basis. 
1, 0o®ts is tb® iQim% Plaat 
All fix@4 mA variable eosts, inelmiiiig tbos® of risks, 
arlsl»g from tb® operatioas of tb® Joint plant will b« bora® 
by tb® parti@ipatiag firms as a group, fbey will b® ®bar®4 
by tb®ae firms ia tb® aana proportioaa as tb®y »har« tb® Jo-fet 
m . 
plaat. fkB momt ©f o©8t borne br partielpating firm 
will to® ©Qiial to tht psotoct of th# m&mm total uatt cost 
Is tilt Jolat plant tiats th# aiimbtr ©f maits ef tM mo&uot 
1 
QW 8t?Tlo® it aO'Tts tlfomgBi %M plaat. fli© mtnml p@r mit 
e^ ost aai tbe r«B«lttag pei- uait a«t r®t«Pii, ia tti® Joiat plant 
will sot pr©a®iit a @0»plet# .pietw# to Ite partieipatiBg 
fim«, line.® tb# g©0i® aM i?®s©iai?o«s do Bot aliaag® titla ia 
ii©v#a®Bt ffoa tto® mmhmv fita# to III©- Joiat plaat or vim 
f«rse. la tli® first plaee, tli© m©r» of th.« r#sotire®s ia tli« 
Joiat plaat mm& %f tli® partiolpatinf entrapTOBTOrs oa a 
presortioBal baait* tli# less will %« tk% txplioit- per aittit 
aost of optratiom ia tlyB plaat# 
la 'ttoe 0«e©a.a plaee, whm t&e output of tli® iniiTifimal 
plants of thm parti©ipatiEg. finas i» i»pttt to tli@ joint 
plant, the net f«s mait r#tttrn to atjiteer fim® from tli® plaat 
app®iirs t© b® lii^ @r ttoa is aotmally tli®' ©as® siao#^  plaat 
costs are'a®t of tbe raw .proiaet isprnt oos%» ?@r uait eosts 
ia %h& parti©ipeti»g firms omtsii®^  tb# Joist plaatj ia aMi-
tiom to thos® 'in tli® pleat, mun% b© oomslderti ia orter t© 
arrive at a realistie »t reirtsme. the ©mtput of tt@ 
Joiaf plaat is iapttt t© the iatiTlimal pla,at« of tfa® partioi-
patiBg firms, tie firas first tato tltl§ to protmots or 
I^xespt wh&T9 ii»®0rttabl« totieipatet (liff®r@ae#» im tM® 
©osts to 41ff«reat firms exist, ^ia wbloh ©as® eost::dlffer«a,0®» 
will bt tak«B isto aeeomt im 4tt»nttlJiiJig tb® eost aai m%. 
retttra to mtmh partleipatlBg fiim. 
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apealfi© eapltal t^ esoutees in tbair' eoioiion plaittt as a gromp. 
io sot 3P«0Siiif« for tM#a uatil th® piroteats are ' 
sold fwQM tfe@li« iadiTidual plaats, ©r m»tiX the resoure®® 
toavt besn tttiliaei ia %Me psodmetioa of ssleabl© goois aM 
ser?ie®s ia tfeesa piBSts, lii tkla' @as@ also, thm per mit 
«ost« ia b©tli tfe® Jeiat pleat aai t'li« iaiifidttel plaata of 
«a©k fifa atiit takea lat© aee®wat. 
ft® fix#t tests -©f tfe© • Joint plant &x® usmally kmm «x 
tmt® aad -oemlt fee pr©Tli#i for in adTamo© oa a 
proporti©aal feasli tfe® p@rti©ipatimg ©atrepreaeurs. fotal 
unit a©its oaasGt ^ ©rdiaarily to® 4i»t®r»ia@d *mtil tto® ®ad of 
til® aeeomtiag period,, however'. eoa®«cni®fttly th« pertieipat-
iag fira,s g®B® rally opt rata titeir J ©tat plant ®ith®r oa m 
p^o©l« or a *»fiiireMais aai sale" Ms is, ©r a ooatoiaatioa of 
th® two. HkiB tfe® .Joiat pi tat is ©peratftd oa ® "pool" basis, 
the parti0ipati»g firms io4iTi4mall|' hme title to all proi-
met» la the Joiat plaat oa a proportioaal basis. «i®a tli« 
proiaet® art ao^ td omt of tli# o^iat plaat. aad the traasaetioa 
eoafl«t«d, tlie pool i® elos-ei ©ai partieipatiag ©atrepraaeurs 
ree@iir« tli@ a®t rstmras, aft«r all plaat 0©sts hmm beea peii, 
oa a proportioaAl basis. laeh partieipatiag @atr@pr@a©ur ia-
otirs- tbe avsrag® per unit eost in tli® plaat a»t T®m%rm tli®. 
Jl 
aTtrag® a«t r®i»am# for Ms proportioaate s&are of tl® volaa#.. 
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th@ aetlied of sliarla^  th® um aad® of aad per iialt costs ia 
tb# Joist plant. Sim®# tli«s« flmi sliar® •tli® use mat® of th® 
plant and tte p«r mnit ©ostf in the plant ©n th« saa® pr©« 
portieaat# ftasis, tfety slisr# tli@ btnefita of th® Joint plant 
proportiom.at®l|r ®ls©. 
fli© patromag® rtfund does not mmmB the ©eonomie 
b®atfit of til® Joint plant to %M pafttoipating flms. In 
tfat first plas® it is not mni¥«psallf «s#i in •eooperatiT® 
atsoQiat i©n»--tM«r« aaj fee no patrona^  refmad at all in a 
••"pool" operation. It is siaply a fieTite tef aeans of whiok 
tsatati'T® iliarges to tbs parti©ipating firas er® adjusttd t© 
a.©tmal p@r mnit toats in Joint plant ia. the "purotose ant 
sale« typ© ©f operation. It lias Jmst b®«n m@m. that th® 
si 2#' of tfes patrosagt m.fnM d#p«a€.s mpoa tM. relet ion®lilp 
b«tw«@n tsntativ# aettltaent and realls®# per nnit eo®t ia 
til:® Joint plant, Fartk^ rmora eatplioit per malt oosts will to® 
kigfe or low la t^ ® Joint plant i«p®ndiag on the parc©ntag« of 
total eepital and,©th©r resoarets is t&« Joiat plant farninai^  
Sirsotlf by tto® partloipatiag flras on e proportional basis 
and on wkiofe no as® rat® m m opsratiag ©xpent® is paid. 
So mm if on® lianiret per©®nt of tb® taomat rtaalning in tli® 
Joint plant after all operating @xp«n8®s ar® paid ia alloeated. 
proportionatfly to tM® • partioipating firas aa a patrona.ge 
refand, tfe® «im« of %h.mm r®faad.s do«a not aeoarately refleet 
tfe« ti0©ae»le fe«nefit of tM® Joiat plant to aaeM partloipatinf 
firs. 
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fht to m&h participating firm ©as ©sly h& 
«stiiia.tta toy eoaparlBg tl® total per mmit mst {i*flielt eg 
wsll as ©xflieitl of tli# s®rirl©#a to their own 
plaat ®v«r aa ©yeratlag ptrlei with tht' eosti aafi i®r¥i®@fi 
to th#* whleh they «^ #0t wouli prevail In the abseas® of 
th#lr joint sitiTltf.. fh#s« h@ii©fit« ©f th@ Joist plant 
will 1® shar«d among th# partisipatiag firas oe th« saa« 
preportioiiml hasit' that tlty share the joist plaat aM it« 
©ooaoaie ms<i# This is really only aaother way of ssyiag 
that ths oooperating fi«» sM?« th® total p«r mit oost 
of th®ir joiat plant oa^'s proportioaal %mi&. 
I^t is likely that th«y cannot find exact Auplieatioa hy 
omtaid# firms of the #«rTi@«i performed in the Joint plant, 
«ith«r htcams® outsid® fims provide services thsy are not 
willia« to pay for Ce*S«» advertising) or fail to provii® 
want@d .servic##, or beoaus® of eoonomies of int®®eetiom which' 
would not b@ availabl® ©mtsit© th® Joint pleat. 
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PIOFOHflOlAlIff QWR Tim 
J& t giTfea «ee«ttatimg p#rl®4 a .gf©mp ©f firms opeyatiag 
a mwmon plaat |©iEtif will ^ paytieipat® on a prepoif.tieael 
feasli ia %h® wltt-lat«fal eeoaoai©^  f«l«tloastoip8 resultisg 
fr©a til® fast tliat %Mf km% ©ssosiatiti th®a»#lTa» .ami 
mmttttlly rngsm^  %•©• ©pe^ at® %%& plaat Jeiiitly» It is ©¥ia#a%, 
feowe^ tr, tbst iBtertsmpeial stlatioiitMp® amst be eoR®i«i«r«4 
alio slm% fittob Joint plants ' ©riiaarily ©p#rat«'i aom-
timm®tt#ly mm mmj ateemtiai pe^iois, J^»lto#y»or© th® 
prop^ ftioiiatt f«3f%i«ip&ti#a im Joist plsat %f tb« ©oop-
©ratimg fimSi aM «¥« tit teopii-atiiig flm® tb#as@lv#s may 
©feang# ®T@je tia#. wMt Sammelsea ©alls «e©«pasa» 
1 
tiir# ®%ati®®« must M doasid«r«t .in tay amalysis of th® 
0con©mi# felatioa^ ip# aifisiiig f*oa tl# ttifttetmie® ©f tii® 
amlti-fir» pla»t* Set only mm% tit a?«lati©aB&lps -aaeng tii4 
fii?ii« ©pei-atiag tto# Joiat plamt for «aeli nfoeimtiag p®ri©i te# 
coasiityet, as la® fe#«a ioa#, limt th« r#latiomatoip« |j®tw«ea 
tiie groups of fias ©p#ratiiig th© Joist plant is different 
aeeoiiatiag f@i?i04i am«t. also to# tatos iat© 
.mm %Ue ©p®?ati©a® ©f t.fe® Joint plaat ©T®ff tim® are 
ooiisl4«i?«d, tilt strmetart vi8»lisi«t ia figfflr® 1 is »ot a 
coastaat pi©twr« ©rtiBa.3?ilyt but ©vsr sewrsl ©peratlag 
Q^&mmlsmf taml A. Fe\m4atioa® of Em&omie Analysis, 
lar^ ayi tJaiTsrsity Fr#.w.. Gmfetiig«» lt48. OMp. t. 
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p«ri©da son© of tli® fltms may in©lM« a largti' fraotion of 
tfed total Joint plant aad ©then a snaller fraotloa, so that 
thQ propertimality aaosg tM«« sltaiagea.. If a long ©nomgb 
tima p«rlo^  is ©oaalitrdd, aai th« fmastioas of tti© Joint 
plaGt ar« still ©©onosle to tb® partlsipatlag firms, a 
anbstaatlal proportloa of tli« first origiaally taking part 
may liave lj«®m r®fla@«i hf mm flr®s, total Eumber of 
firaa partlelpatlng may h.m& iaoreassfi er'teereasei. la feotli 
agri«ultwal aM eoasttser ooop^ ratlvss this tmraoirtr of 
partioipatijag flrat a»4 ctlisngaa la tb@ proportionality among 
tkm will b® ffioro rapli tbaa ta eooperetiv®® ©f corporatlost 
suoli as- rallroais or fattorles, but ttolt teai©a©y for shift-
lag partieipatloa et l^ ast proportloaatsly i® a general on® 
la eooperetlfe assoelatlons. ProTisios must be wd® to 
adJmit to shifts la proportiooality witbla th© iroup of 
p8rti0lpatliig firms froa om ©paratlag period to anothsr. 
Bi® group opdratiag the Joint plaat in mmh operating period 
will b« somewiiat .iiffsreat, ®rm tbomgli tl@ s©a® flras may to® 
imrolTtd, feteaus® tli«y will atere tM« plant m a aomewiiat 
aifftrsat proportioaal ^ aal® la m&h opsratlag period, Th& 
isstaaots of m ©liaage la. a@afe«rs&ip of proportioaallty are 
oaly a 8p«olal 6as@ of tm general oa© wliioli pemits tka^ s®' 
ohaag«s. 
fha iBt0rt.«por@l rtlatioa^ ips l&«twf©» th« different 
groups of ooortlsat® firms op-tratlag a plant Jolatly Ao@a aot 
lea -
oMag® tto.® relstloiisllps bstweta tin® pa^ tl®!-
patli^  fitms ia tlm® period* Thm py©p©rtionality ral® 
p©iat@d ©lit la Ik# prsvioas eliap$@» eoatiata^ s t© speeify toow 
th.© pastioipating fitms will sliare tli® 
of to©i8ioa. salEiiig asd me&rtalaty besrlag, ©e-oBoaie ms@,, 
fiatmeial reipoasibillty, total nal-l eost, aad te©a©ale 
benefit® la mmmmtiQn with flisir Joiat plaat la ®aoM operat-
lag pei»i©d. Aad witMla ©aeli gromp tb# ?«sttl%s of poollag 
th#8e faaetloat toy eoc^ rdlaat# flms' ooatiam®® to hold witlioat 
aodifi0«fl@a whm tb# iatny-t^ opoi'al f#lat4ott.aliip# ar« eoasid-
0i?®d» 
It is» tfe«a, tfe« i*«|.ati©atfeips .aaoag ®e©mps of flrsa 
paytloipatiag la -iiffeirent aoeoaatli^  p@.rloda whieli ar® of 
at tills polat* ©oas4d«5«d ®i?« tk@ @ff©ot8 of 
avtragiag tJi«s« ?#lattQaiWp» to«tw®«a t&s dlff«p®Bt op©ratiag 
periods over tls# ead th.9 pjpopoi'tioaality guide for ahariag 
tli@* aaoag th® grompa of partioipfttlag firms la dlffereat 
aoooaatiag ptyiois, !ai9 is doa# ia two 8t«p»i first tb# 
iate^ tempofal r«lat|oa»falps mm eoasldersd tiadei? tli® ass^ aap-
tioa of perf«©t toowltdgt aad @«irtBlaty, aai aecoad tli® 
a#0tSiS3?y-aodifi©etiea«- ia tli@ aaalysls aadar imperfsot 
kaowl»dg# aad aaoertalaty a'r®' ©oa»id®,red, 
A» P®yfeet imowlsdg® and e®3?taiaty 
fltl paufeet km©wl#dg# aad ao maetrtaiaty, the ©ooaoaie 
- im • 
r«Xatl©a®Mifs wlitfti #,s:tsad ov@r tlw® will b® shar«a by tfa© 
partieipatlEf fims of ilfftrtat tia© p®^i©is as gyoups-, wit^ 
mot ssmp pattleifatinf is eetii rtlatioasklp ©a a propor-
tloaal lAsis,* f&os# t#lati©asMip@ iliieh to aot txtaad oir«r 
tl»i Isttt whieto ai# sp«®ifi« to a glTsa ©ptratlag ptfiod ia 
t&« Joist plaat will M pattieipatei ia omly hf th« group of 
fims'partitipatiag ia ttoat op®reti»i ps^iei* 
Ua4«? thmm asamaptiOB® thm teeaoaie relati^ mship# tj«-
tif®«ii %h9 ifempa ©f fims opftrati&g tfe® Joimt plant ia 
diffsi-amt tl»@ pexiMs 4© B©t iaeltt€« tfe# sliariag of mB0aif-
taiatj b@atlBg tli@ that lag'©f ieolsioa 
asking, slaot tli«s« tw© tumtimM r«sttlt oiilf from tmperf@#t 
ta0wl®4g« and meertalntf, RslatlT® paftieipatioa ia ©atr®-
preadnrlal &.misim sukiag i® not ©tBsatielly differeat from 
tMt in th« mn%tm 4«©isl©a aakiag r®tela®i mat®r this ei-
swaptioa aa4 littlt aotifiolatlea wHl a«e«8«®ry when it 
is ar©pptd. Si# •sMfiag of th# uaeii^taintf hmwimg faaetioa 
OTtr tiia® will h& dsttloptd la th« stte§©®tiiig seetioa. Tfe# 
3?@lati©asfeip» tliat remala &m tlit sba^iag of tli® ©eoaomle m% 
of %M Joiat plaat, tli# sliaifiag of roatia# iteiniea-s ia 
«ona«etloa witto tl» op«ratiaa of tb® e©i«©a plaat, tfee sliar­
iag ©f til® flaaatitl fsipoatiiiliti' fo? tli«,|olat plaat», %im 
steai-lag of %h9 flMt aat irarlabia eosts ©f the plaat., aad the 
nhekXim§ of thm «ooaeaie feta«flts from tji® Jolat plaat hm%mm 
tM grempt of fims optratiag It la <iiff«?®at tira® ptrlois. 
» 3.©4 • 
»o iiit«»t©ap©2?ai ge©mf will iaemr more tlian It® proportioaat® 
sMi?« ©f taletloaaMps la tii® Jolat pla»t, eltl®!? hj 
storiag la mj of tli# wlatl^ aslilps spetifi® t© aaotli«i'' 
®p#3?atiag' pe^ loi, » fey itoflsg mors tliaa It# pfopoytl^ wate 
part of l&t r'@lati©asliips wlii©^  aif# p#©ltt, of«r several 
opti-alilsg psslMs, 
Consiiti? flirat tli« r0iatloaE.lilfs ia ©©»#etloa vith tto® 
Joist plaat 'wMefe &m spteifie to a gi-rna ©pti-atlag p#riod. 
lad®? 'afeefs mM'mptims, it womlS- :r4pi'e8eiit a alsalloea-
ti®a ©f #^so«r6@s t® p@@i tto®s® r#lati©maMip« sfseifle to ome 
p®tio€ OTr«r »f®ml p«ri©ds of tlai#. Ao i© wo'^ li irequir# 
tliat tl« gromp of fim» opeyatiag tfe® Jolmt plant la mf 
p®rloi, stibsitlg# tlte .®e©mp operatlni it im some oth@a? period, 
or ®©mT0rs©lf to li« smt>tidi®#ii by anetto©? gromp. tt© flms 
©pa^ atiag th® Jslal plant la glwm @p#3?atiat period will 
slias# its ma® proporfeieaattl^  us thmj stei?« the joint plant 
im that pesloa, aot proportioaately as tli«y stoj?®€ it,, im so«© 
paat perioi, m m tlitf will ator®. it la aoa® ,f*ttm^ « perloi. 
ThQf will sfeaf® tfe® deeiiioBs mnmmim Joist pl^ mt 
sg«ei.floally a s.%rm os tla 3aa@ lasis, aM will 
asto smh €m%»iQm ia4«p«iia®atly of tke flms ©peratiag tfe® 
JoiBt plant ia past or fiitW'f ©p®Mtliif p«jrlod©. flity will 
sliax# th9 fiBaselal r^ apoasitelllties speeifi® to a glir«a 
optrfttiag period ©a © Mslf. propertioaal to tlia batis oe 
wlii0!i they iliar# t,li« Joiat plaat ia tlsis sm® p©rlQd, aad 
wit&omt smbBldy f^ om or te^ x to tbt firms optjeatiag tto Jolat 
- lOf -
plaat ia any ©tlisa? pirioft, fh«y wia.1 alao sMre the avtxag© 
fariatol# mats, mi tltrefoi?® the ta^aemle bea«fit», of th® 
plant for tHis op«ratiag period oa tfei« saa® hmiB and sub* 
J@0t to the ia»# f^strletloas. Ml tlio mmmU relation* 
sfeiips mom$ tm partlfisipatlag fims to ® givea 
©ptratisg period in the Joint pltat will b« pertieifated is 
oalj lif tlfeos® firms ©ad sbsret ®s©ag t!i« oa tM mm basis 
as tb&Y skare tfa# |oiat plant la tli« aam* ©peratiag period* 
fi© r«latioasiiif« arising from tli« operatioa of th@ 
Joist plaat «r« a©t tpeeifie to a givm operating 
period, bmt w&ieli ars Joiat ©r pooled ©?®r s®T@ral op®retiag 
fariods au«t M botB# by ths a*oagg of firms operating tli® 
Joint plaat in ©a-tk Oftrating period, fttder tli® e8®t»®4 
©enditioa®. of strtaisty ®ad p®rf®ot kROwl#df®, tbty will b® 
sMred by th®s® group® ©a fi frofortioaal basis j ®®eb, group 
of fi»s will oelleotittly partieifat® in tb«se r®letioBslilp« 
©xtsatiag ov®r tia®.©m a basii proportional to t&« relative 
frafttion ©f tit® Joint plant op®rationi ov«r th® ®ntir® 
ptriod of tiia® eon»id®r«d represtnttd by its respeetiv® 
oparating period, .4® long as tte© sim of ©p®rationa of tfe® 
Joint plant re*i»« rslatively ©onstftBt over tia®, th® groups 
of participating fira® operating fk® plant in tb® different 
aeeounting ptriod® inulrndtd will partieipmt® ©tnally in inter-
gromp r®l«tti©as^ips mt&Mimg ovsr ti»«. lte«te tb® ®ia® of 
tb® plant, ts a@as«r«d by fixed iav®stffi®Bt ratb®r tban short 
rna Tariations•ia output, i® itt©r««a«d or d#or®®s®d ov®r tint. 
• im 
hQvm&Wf th# gfemf# ©f pa^ tiGipatimg flmi will not 
tlids® lat«rt®aporal reletlossfelps #fuall|*j, hut Instead ®,e-
mw&im§ to pi?op«tioaatt 0120 of tli® |©iat plaat of®re-
tloas .Im ttefe of@:p®tliig atejeiag ©f tiitei"-
t®®poiral i-eletiuat&lpt m m eqaajL basis Is ttoms onlf e 
«f0eifel eas« of storing tliea ©a a proforti©aal basis, la 
thitf if©0p©0t tto# sitmatiea is ®xa®tly parallel t© tb« sMfiiig 
of tk^  mommi^  r#lati®msfeips aaoag the. pirtiaifaltiig fims 
fos a givta ©pdi-atlBg period la tli» Jolat flaat, 
1% sl»mM b# «®pliasig«d t,Mat it is tM f©latiT@ sizt of 
thm '^Olat plaat ia %M &.itfemnt aeoQmatimg p©jiois wfeiefe 
isttraiat# tk« ps©poa?ti-©aallt|' sl«i?lag th» mXmtto&sMpM 
txtsndlag oir« tin®, in m% M9Tnlm.& hf 
aiff«y®st' positi#a» alOBg tli« a|i©ft tm omt nwtw&, femt oalf 
ly 4ifft'i?#at p©siti©»ii aleag tto« l©ag res ®®st smrv®, whiel 
i?tpr®aeat iifftreat Bh.m% rm mat Qmma altog®tier. Short 
rm Tsriatlctaa la th® ©mtpmt of tit© J©lat plmal aodifi- tk® 
000ta aM rttmrat «p®#ifi0 to a givaa ©ptratiag f®rto4, %n% 
mt thos® wtolcfe ar# j.©iat 'mm tt»«. If the mIz® of tfe« 
J©l»t flaat io®s aet^  m&nm «•«» ttoagh stoert rim 
omtpmt vari#a froa em ©peratiag p®rioi to a,aotb#3f, pertiei-
patiom ia tli« iBtertespsral rslatioasliip* %f th9 gromps ©f 
firm# operating thm J©|mt plmst^ ln iiffersnt tia# p®rio4« 
*ill li# on an et^ sl. feasi«. It is ©aly a» tl« «ia« of tb® 
Joist plaat is graamallf txpamtoi, ©r ^ aittallf e©atraet®a, 
that •tkty will partieifst# oa an eltfeowgli still 
pi?of©a?t|©Bal, basis* 1B both, ©asiis tMs® relatloaahips will 
be stertfi pfop^ rtioiiattlf hj -th© fimt p«ti©ipatiag in amy 
aiyen psriefi., 
files# r®lati©iisMfs wlii©h ©xt@s4 mm tim tmm 
tfe® ©psratisa tka jeittt plast Imelmit fitoiaions «©s@.®raisig 
thm plaat wliiek 'tetta# o¥tr mme tlam ©m© op«ratiag 
til® fi%ei, «©stt eai tli© e-osti ef risk whi§k ars peeled ot01» 
tlM®, aai tfa@ fiaaaoial rtspeasibility for tfe© timi. plant 
&M ©fttipaaat mi imT«at«i®® osi*rl.©i fy®m. ©as ©p«rstiii@ 
period iato late-jrtaapoafal ieeisieas will be 
aaoag gyemps of tiwmm ©pemtimg tfe® ,|©tat plant la Stf-
f0a?«at tiM# periods aat stored prepettienat®!^  bf %h&m» f&is 
is tfm# botb ia tli« eas® wbtrt .aew firms yeplaet soa® of tli® 
old ©a@t as pairtieipaata ia tli« .Jeiat aetiTiti' ©f®r ti»® aM 
in tto mam vhrnm %im »Bam fims sliar# the Jeiat pleat ia 
iiff«r@at ef«,;r®tiag p©irie4a»^  bmt oa a. diffewat propertioaal 
basis ia meh pet led# .Sttppese, for exaiipl®, ia a plaat. 
operated Jeiatly bf tteee fima, a deeisioa »ad® ia oat tiae 
ptfied affetti the partieipatiag fims aet oaly la that 
period, bmt ia tbe ttee® smeteediag ©ae« as well. Sappese 
furtber t.bat the ttee® fims do aet sMm tb® Joiat plaat ©a 
tbe eaae pyoportioaal basis la ell fomi? eperatiag periods, 
but oa & i-i-i basis ia tbe fear respee-
tiTe optratii^  period®. If tbe effeets of the deeisioa oa 
tlie tbre® ttms will be spread etmally over tbe foar periode, 
tbej will p«rtl0ipat® ia the deoisioa oa a 9-l©-13 basie 
• 108 » 
mfkmT llisa a hmi»t the ®ffm%» will fe® %wim s® 
stroBf ia tliirt asft fomrtli f©riot ee in tte® fi3?@$. a»t 
s«e©ai, tkef will paiytieipet® ia tJi© aeeisioa m a 13-2t»li 
feasis; if all m« eff®ets will fall in operetini 
%h&j will sfear® tfe© fteeitioa os s feaiiaj if tfe# 
fij?tt fim plaim®4 t© fllseentiatts in tfa® joiat 
plant eft#x Itoe semn^  period, eaa tJi# mm spyeai 
aquftlly ofer til# tmw p#j?iods, tit firms w©iil€ sl»3?© th# 
d@'®iai©s, sm a §»18-1S feaeit.; tlisre,©^ © &mf otii®? pestilto 
!>:©««» f0r sM?iaf ifat €#fiisioiis ©aek mat#!? dlffe^ eat asamp-
tioas, ia tiiis siaple ^ exaapl®, Witli p#yf#®-| teowledge aM 
oertalnty 4esi8i#»s affieflag sweral tla® periods will hm 
made Joimtly fey tli@ smeml grottpB of B,S8oeiat®i firms aaft 
partioipated ia nroijortioaetsly by tlitss gTOsps.. 
Fixtfi eosts In th« Joiat plant are p0©l@4 ttoongii tim& 
and sMai^ ai propertleaally •Isy tli®. groups of oo©p@ratlag fim® 
ia tli« iifferaat tim# periods ia^ oilwd*- ffeii l& doa^  simply, 
firea ao aeoomatlag ataadpeint, hj asoi-tising tli® fixed flamt 
and tqiiipaeat ©vts tM#l^  @xp©0t«a life and l«¥ying a maifora 
aaamel €tpr€Qiatloa agaiast th® gr©mp of fims opsrat-
img til# Joiat plant ia «aeh period. If th# size 
of til® plaiit ii sxpaaiad Ik# aaaml d®pj?©oi&tioa charge will 
l3e geoattr ia op«atiag f®3?ioas 4atlag fmm tli© ©xpajisioB} 
if th.& sia@ of tb« plamt is sKUitsaetsA "by liqmidatloa of m 
part of it, asBttal 4«pif®®iati©a chmgm will b« saallea? froa 
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attraet oiitsii® ©api-|al# ©a fe.or*0W«i eapital u##d 
%Q f imnm tM# flx«i feeilitits im Joist plant is m 
itmm ©f fix«ll o©st»^ tla® sh&sins ef has Jtiit be®a aiaous-
s«i, "bmt tli®. 0®pital preflitA by psietieipating fim« 
Mfmtlf is a 4latim#t 3?alat iom,sMp of ap©ei&l sigBlfi®aae# 
or&T tin#* flit flx®A plaiiat m&& eqwipasat teqmirlag smeh 
©apit&l mm&% to© liquidated et th© «a4 of mQh. 
©pei-ating, ptriofi, bmt amst ¥« aaiataiaeS ofti* tl«ir astfiil 
lif® '©f aaay eperatisg p«iote, Witli a tmmr@T of firas 
participating la the jQiat plaRt, .otoaag® is %M 
jpjfopojtioaality amoiag %km. iwiag tit® ms«ful lif® of tjfe® 
fix«4 plaat. aai tqmipttsnt., e basis of shsyiug %h& all©©.ati©a 
of @a,pital to th@ Joist pleat ^iob is fr©p©pti©aal ia tfe® 
fiirst p@ri©i 0e»t®i^y will Is® aeitlief propostioaal nor 
«qmit6bl« mmml perlois later* It is appaifeat that soa® 
formal or inforsiil mathoi of revolfiag tke aHoeationa. of 
©apital to tilt Joimt plant, fey th« partieipating fims will b« 
mmBM&Tj or&w t.!®# if toafomity to t:h«-proportioaality 
©riteria is to be salBtaim«t. 
I®i0rtl#«® of the a®tl©i msed fey th® farfieipating 
fims for proportioaately ©llosating csapital to tli$ .Joint 
plant in th$ first period,, it is slsar tliat ©tjuataeats amst • 
Is# aad® im smocesti.ag periods as partitipatioa a»a propor- ' 
tionality eliaig®* With a ooiistaat plant sis®, & mmtm% 
a«mto@r fim ••l^ity im tk® p.laBt, aat eoaataat aoaay r&lue 
0T«r time, tfeeae- aAJmstmsats mast teria,g ateomt reapportioaaeats 
Ill -• 
0f tfe0 MQmf alloeatioBS of capital withia tk® ^©up ©f 
QO0p®ratiiig fimi as thsii* pfopoi-tioaat® partieipatioa 
okanges,. ami. aa oM'tisag 5top ©ut aa€ maw oa®s tak® their 
pXsco as parti0ipaats in %t® jolat ®©tiTit^* kB fims with* 
toaw from tu® Joiat a^tifity th^it espital equities in %lm 
4oi3at plant will b# i?©tm3PE@d t© them, aaad b® replaetfi by 
capital all©©at®i to tl^^8 plant by tb# sew firms wliieb talce 
t.h@ir pla.@@, M e©©ps3fatiiig firms tb®i3? partieip®-
tl0» in tk© Joint aeti¥ity,•tb^ir eapital ©t^ity iE tb« Joiat 
plaat will b« properti©aat®iy 4«®r®as«d, wbil® th« tquity ia 
tb« plaat of fiw® ia®»iia®iag tfaei? partieipatioa will b® 
ooyrtsp-oasiia^ y ifl#r«as«€. 
If tb« sia® of th« plaat is ©xpaadsd, tbe particsipatiag 
firm ©.quitf ia tb® plaat is iatrsassi, or the value of moaey 
<i«ar@®s®® over tim®, tli# partiolpatiag firms a® a group will 
ia0r«as« tli«ir ®©aey aHeeatioa ©f eapital to tM joiat 
plaat fr©m ©a® op@retiag period t© If tb© siae of 
the joiot plaat is @oatra©t«4, tb@ partieipstiag firm equity 
ia 'tbe plaat is i«©r®asti, or tbe ?alu@ of aoa@y iaersases 
over tim®, allooatioms of »OB#y eapital to ,tb« Joiat plaat 
by tb® partieipatiag firms as & ^oup will b® .dooreased* If 
oa# of these tbrt# factors is operatiag la ©a© tireotioa aai 
oa«' or both of the other two ia the other 4ir«.etioa, so 'that 
th®j 0xa®tly offset. oa« aaother, th« aoaty ompitai allooetea 
to tiie Joiat plaat by th# firms partiaipatiag as a .group will 
112 -
130 soaataat ormw tint. If woflEiag 4a ©yp©sit® tire©*li©a«, 
howsfet,, tk&m %kwm» fmtot9 ai-® li&tif m% to offsiit ©n® 
aaotMf txactly, a© ttot th« a«l «ffeet will b@ «itli#r ® 
positif® 03e aegatifs ©liaag® from &m tia« pti-ioi t© anotlisr. 
.B«gaiife.ss of IMS pf#s®at.ft or flirtetlOB ©f ©hang# la tim 
allotstion of eapital to ths Jotat plaat hf th@ group 
of partieifttiag flr«i as a whole ©•?«?• tias, %h@ alloeatloa 
of capital to th.# Joittt plaat bf #aelii, •pai^tl^ipatlai firm 
SMst fe® edjustei, to keep the iifott eapltal la the 
Joint plant in the toais of the parti eiilai? fimt pertieipat-
iBg iB.tlie 0u«®iit ti*' p«3?ioi, and »o that it will fe® 
sliar#i eaoag thm ©a a ibasli propoi-tiomal to th«i3P partiei-
patios ia tfe@ Joiat plmat im tlia ©mifx^at pe^ioi# 
•tterii are €iff«eat metboi® bj wiiiali this ©aa aail lias 
hmu aoat ia eoopsrativ# assoaiatloa®,. _ It aay fe© ioa® 
iiartotlir fej pertioipati»g' fim to pajofid® its 
puopertioaat® shaif® of tli® aoa«f oapital in tl® joint 
plant in tli« iaittal p«»i©4 ia m&h at a eoaAitioa of asab®?-
sMip, anA tli«a©®forth adjusting iir«0tlf th® 'eapitel allocated 
to tk® Joint pliiat ea©to mdafeti? fim ea okang## in. a®sd for 
a©m«y ©apital 'im tb® plaat, and ia tM pa^titipatioa fey md 
ptopostiomlitf aaoat tii« ««T«2?al fim®, tak« pla©«. for 
«»apl®, if tM® saa® firat stos® t&® Joiat plaat oa tfa® ®aa® 
pi-opoytioaal ^aais la tto seooai opeT«ti»g p®riot as tfe® 
first» tottt if tm mm of tfa® r«asQiis ,a@BtiOB«€ al5oifa'>.'»0t® 
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mmf etpit&l imm% m © ! ! © § & t ©  %%% pl®at, %h9 firnn will 
proTM«' tM aSdltionai eapttsl ©a tli# .ssaf fropertioaal 
tasis es titi" pfoviisi ths ©rj.glii®l.^ capital for tfe«' J©iii1; 
pleat* , tf ©M'flms i^ ep mt of the Joist e«tiTlty thsy will 
lE Iiiit4r pr©-p@rt l^ a&ta star® of %h@ Boaey ©api-
•fcal im tk® Jelmt plamt, ami %i%hm il) tlie sis® ©f t%& plaat 
mil hQ m^ nmM (B) tb# r'Saalatag fias will 
pfotii® ad4itt©aal mm%j tapltal oa m propertioaal basis t® 
jr@pla@# til® amommt witMfawtt fy@a -tli# J©tat flaat, -(S) ad-
<llti©aal' fe@,i?:r©w®i tspit&l will b« olj-laia®! to rtplat® that 
wi%iii3?awn, tte« reto«iag %M mmMw fim ixiuitr ia t3a«iaf 
Joint plant, or {4) mw tims will tsMmn iat© -fcliQ Jeist 
aotiTity, asd will all©©at# mmef oafltal iif^ ttly t© tli® 
4©iat plamt t© repl&e®, tliat It s©m« fims ia* 
tr®fts« itt .elz# mm. tia#, titm® iaertasiag t&sir proportioaat® 
paiftioipatioB ia %%» Jeiat plaat, tM«y will if®quir«d t© 
ail@®s"l# aiiitioaal eapital .%& th« Joiat plaat la csasfe, 
while tiiess i» sis® will fet wmfm^ eA part of tb«ir 
ftll#eatad eepital ia msh la t© naiataia proportioasiitsr* 
kmtk&t mttMi ®f maiataiaiaf tte etpi.tal alloeatta t© 
t>ta Joiat plaat by tb# paipti§ipafiBg fims ©a a proportiea&l 
'teasli Qm'T tia»,», ©t- at least appxoxiaatslf ae» ia tfe« fowal 
t^Tol^ iag eapital plaa m ^ tasea'ia ©eop^ rati-r® assoaiatioma,. 
fbla l-i trmt wMthm eapital is 8ll©eat«4 to tb© Joiat plaat 
bf th® partieipatiag firas a p#r aait ''•<i«taeti©a« oa 
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velaas as am aMitisa t© eost, ©y toy d«f@r3?img th© eaafe pay-
m%nt of -p&tmmm r«fma«s* la hoth mM%M th© greats®!* tte© 
ftnetiiit tli©oat@i %o %km :r©TOlTiag fttad in taeli operatimg 
ptriodg 6ai thm tfe# ohmtm th-t ptrloi to ©oaplet^  
rtwlT® • this capital fuuA, »©r@ ©l.^ -stlf' *111 o©mpl®t« 
pro^ Dftioatlity te# appf©ai9liti aaoag tli® first ©liafiag t&® 
allooatlQm ©f capital te tkflr J#lat plant, M#ftllf %hM 
fuM would smolm ooaplately ©aab ©p®ra,tiag p©3?l©i, so tfeat 
tli« dedmetioB# ose tb© tefeyrefi pstroaag^  r®.fimta a3Pl©®atet t© 
tii9 Joimt plant Attriag thQ first op«atiag pasioi wouli 
sesT© as aeaber ft» gapital ©quity la th& plant for t^ e 
aeGoafi-op«Tattag p®i?l©d| aaA tfe@a w©tii4 h@ replaott fey the 
or ijatremgii •j-el'iimts slloeatsi ia tit® secost 
pericsa ant T&tum^A to tM# mmhm ftmn 1e easM at tfa® 
b-tglaalBg ©f tb# tMrt psjried m tli® saas freportioaad 
lasia m osigiaally ©©Btfitetei. ©^ aimafily, hmwmwmt th®. 
opsrsti©Bs ©f tbs Joiat plaat will tea Bmh that partioipatiag 
firms a«»t all&mM boT9 • eapl^ tal to tM plamt tliaa it is 
praetical fow thm to io wltli a eepital fiat whisk rafolT®# 
sffiamally, fli® imt#st«ipoi'al aiaposti^ aillti## ay# @®s?taialy 
sot as serioms, ef®a with a fiw or six yaaf rtTelfiag f©,ri..©4 
a a tii«y ase wfeeii. a© r&relrimg fuai. i& ms#d aaA ao at^ mstiaeat 
ii mdQ tQT ehaages ia the pi?Qp©?tioaality among th® partiel* 
patiui' tti?B3 mm tim* 
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preelseij wbleb m&t» ia tli@ Joi»t plaat will fe® Joint over 
tine a.a<l wMch will %& «p®@lfie t© taeli ©p«ratiag ptriod. 
GoKs.tqmfatli' tven tleugli t^ # participating' firms plan to 
pool over tia® ©nlf tli® fixed costs, tlie.oost of iiit®apte»* 
foral risfe®, aiii tM® eost of i»ir®iit©rl®s «,©rri®t from on® 
op«i*ating p«ifioi to tli« a@xt, it aaf a®v®lof tliat, froa m 
®je post Tiewpoiat, ®oa® oost® sptoifie to only on® Optratiig 
period h&m b««a stoar®i 8®T®ral ©ptratiag ptrioAi. Th® 
iftt®rt®Bfe»al pooling of tli®se plant eosts wlii®to tura out to 
be sptsifi® to a giTea opermtiag porioA to®s aot r®pr®seat 
irratioaal b®li®vior hf %k% mtmptmems of tto® partioipmtiag 
firiBiS, however, si»@® tbey oeimot eatioipat® tbat tli«s® ®o«t» 
will bo sp«©lfi® to oa® op®r®tiag' p@rioi or ia wiiieh period 
m%f will oemr, 
fo th® «xt®at that tb® peroomtag® fmtwr® partioipatiom 
ia t&® Joint plant by taofa eooperatiiig firm taaaot b® antiei-
pat®d, til® proportioaat® partioipatiom ia teoisiona which 
©fftot tJi® of«rsti©a of th& Joint plaat over tia® is aofiifi®t 
also.. Ia the ©xtram® oms® wfcitr® sothiag mn b® aiitioipat®i 
rogariisg th® probabl® increase or itorea®® ia partieipatioa 
of ®aoh fira ia tl® Joist plaat, or @v«a, a« to probabl® 
firms witMrawiag froa or eatoriag into tlie Joint activity., 
«0®.h partioipatiag fia will sher® ia th« aalciag of a@eisto« 
aff«®tiag %m'Joittt plaat ov®r tia® oa a baai® proportiooal 
to it® rolativ® parti eipatioa ia tte® Joiat pleat ia th,® 
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ottrrtat oper^ atisg period. In tb® pre^ iotts. hypotb@tical 
eas®, to'H e^ mplt, the tire® fii-ms wo^ tild participate in tlies® 
deeisioas on a 3-3-4 basis, ^ ©fardltss ©f how tb»ir propor-
tioaat® partieipatiom in tJnir Joint plant might obang® omr 
tb# tim» n«e#ts«ry to th® full «ff©ets of tb« deel-
sions. this Inability to antieipat® futtir# partieipatioa i» 
tfe#- Joint plant «ay b# a ®lm® as to why t^ mal ratli«r. than 
proportional voting hm apparently worked so W9ll in tfe© 
ffiajority of 0©op©ratl"re assooiatioas. It la ^ mit® possiblt, 
in oasss wher® relatif®. fmtw® participation in the Joint 
activity oannot be antloipet®d with any ft^ gr©® of aoouraey, 
that @qnal participation in d«©islon»' which aff«et th® 
operations of th® Joist plant ov«r tia«'will more eios«ly, 
approxlafite inttrtsaporel proportionality aaong th® partioi-
pa ting 'firms than -will parti eipation in th®s« deolaions on a 
baais whioh is proportional 'in th« ©nrr©at operating period, 
ihsn this is trttt| and when'the. najorlty of th© deeisions 
mad® aff@et mor« than one optratlag period la th® Joint 
plant, it is possihla that eqttal voting may represent a 
b«tt®r estiuat® of proportionality ov«r tia# than voting ae-
eording to proportionality in th® owrsnt tim# ptriod. 
With mnofrtftinty and lBp«rfe©t 'knowledg© it is aoiaewhat 
easier 'to keep th« eapltal alloeated t© the Joint plant by 
th« participating firms aort nearly proportional through 
time with a rtvolving, oapital fmnd aad® up of patronag® 
deductions than om- Bade np of deferred patronage refunds. 
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Fstronag® dtdmetioss, tine® ar® flxei per uait ©aouBt, 
rals® a faai o f  alloeatitd capital to th® Joiat plant wlii©h 
variei fmm ©n@ ©pitratiag pariod to anotlitr only as th@ 
volme of omtput ia J©i»t plant varies. This means that if 
tli® volm® 0f %hB Joint plant'is eoastant th« revolving 
perioi is eonstant, lurtbermor® es volm® inertts©® or 
iectrisaasa dii® to & ohmm ia th« sia© of th« Joint plant, 
.holding thm revolving period constant will attteaatieally male# 
th® nt®d«d tipwart or downward adjustment 'in tfe® total capital 
all©©at®a to til® Joint plant fey tli© partieipating firms. 
Sxeept for ©0etsio.Bel aodifieatioas dm® to short run varia­
tions in pl.ant volma, tli® revolving period of patronage 
deductions §an bs s®t up and maintained witlt a ainiaum of 
diffioulty, ttes maintaining approxiaat® proportionality ov«r 
time in tlb® sliaria® of tlis alloeation of oapital to the Joint 
plant by tl« participating firms. 
Fatronagu rafund®, ualsss d«life®rmt®ly maintained at a 
somtwfeat eoastant lw®l by aaaipulation of th©•tentativ® 
settleaeat "priet" at wMieb produets mov® from' tli@ individual 
partieipating firms into th© Joint plant., or vie® versa, and/ 
or asnipulatioa of iav@»tori®s carried ov®r froa ont period 
to snotlatr, ordinarily ar® not a fix«d per unit amount wliioli 
em bt antioipattd ia advenes, Dtferr«d patronage refunds 
ordinarily do not raia© « fund of oapital allocated to th® 
Joint' plant hy tlie partieipating firms wliiek, if aaintaintd 
at a eonstant lsv@l, ean b,« revolvsd at a eonstant rat®.. 
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la opeyatiag periods ••*&#» patr©iiag® fefmnis are large, tli« 
re-^olTimg rato of th® i#f®ri?#4 pstroaag® will h@ 
aoo«l@rat@i. fkQ perloi of tia® to eoaplettlf 
reTolT# this ©apital tm& will %@ la©r@a8«a hy patroaag® 
r®ftt,ads miQh art B«611tr tlian asMsl* farthemor# th® Biz® 
of fmtmr® patjosag® stfwadi e&aaot fea aati'Sipated with 
eaytaiaty so tkat the pip©p©rtioiiat@ all©©atioa of capital hj 
til® partieipatiag fims t© tto® Joiat plaat in iaefe op«i?@tiiig 
f®ri©'t is ma0®rtaim as wll as smljleet t© tariebilitf over 
tim®.; It is M©r« diffieult, tli@3p«fof®, to Bsiataia prepor-
tioaalitj ©far ti*e ia. tb® siaaring of, all©eati®a of aspital 
to th@ Joiat plant witk tMs typ® ot fevolfiag fuat thaa 
witli a r@¥OlTiag fmat of pat^ eaag® i«dmotidas, 
la mdiition to tlt®«« aodlfi:@atioB® tm tlie working omt 
of proportieaality foj? afearii^  %hm .f®lati©a®i.ip@ amoag firms 
©ir®r tia@. la tlis oparatiea ©f thsir Joiat pleat, wk®a maear-
taiatf aai iaptrfett kaowltig® mm telcea into aeaoaat, th® 
sMrisg. of til® liaeertainty bsarimg fuaetioa ow tia® mMt 
ho 0oa«ii«r®4» Waetrtaiati®# ©xteadiag ©Tsr tia® whieli grow 
out of tb«'©peratioa ©f tb@ J©lat pleat, su©h as teebaologieol 
aai operati©Bal •m^ raQietaisti®®., sat prie® ma®@rt®iati©s of thM 
r®s©mr®8s employed ia thm plaat ©T®r tim®, will to® stored 
aiao^ ag tli® Tarious opsratiag p®rl®ds ©a a prep©rtioaal basis. 
Thia is «©Biaoaly d©a« toy ereatii®. eapital rsserT®® itt eoaa®e-
ti©a 'Witto tb® Jeiat plaat whiefe ®r« a©t alloeated to th® 
pertieipatiag fijas ©a a proportioaal toasis, feat retaiaed is 
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tfe® j0ia.t plant hj tlx partioipatlag firas as a group. 
3?«s®rf©s are tout up by saall aMitioas In t^ ® p®r 
mait eosts of ©peMtiag th® Joint plant to tim a»®b@r firM— 
eesta of aalntaiBing' a oontiattsms operation ot©!* tia®---aai 
tr® irawa mpoa only m ImMm qt ecssti aria# fr©« th@s« 
1 
ttoe®?taintieSi fkme aneertaiaty fetssiag fss®?ir«s are ©ften 
rtf®3?r@4 to as »8tstttt©?y testirv©®'* they are usually 
pro¥li«d for fey the tnalling atatmte®, 
Beeatis® of iti aatmre, it is iiffieiilt t© antieipate liow 
lajygs this ttnoaartaiaty k@a:rlag mnrnwrn sbeuM lit. Firms 
ordiBurily will not ©oerdiaat® t&eir «#on©ai® «.eti¥lti®»' in 
m eowos plant for an ©p®ratioa that ImmVfm txtrea# nnecr-
taisty, and often may operat® tlie Joint plant ia a way to 
minimis# moertaiatits^ * ftoersfor®,, ©rdlaarily th# r®s®rT« 
against uneartainties ia tM Joint plant wMeh -oxist OT@r 
tia« will not fe« Qxoassiwly l&xgm* If it turns ont that to© 
au0& Mas ba«a sat aaid® ia the mnoartainty b««rlni rtser*?®, 
it abonli r«Yol?t4 on a long ti»@ Msis, of say fifteen 
or twenty ytars, in ori^ r to k®tp th® mnetrtainty bearing 
proportional over tis®. If, wli#n a mamm whiefe appears 
suffiolent hm leta femilt mp, it is maintained and no fiartfeer 
I^n pmrofeas® and sal# e©op@rati¥# ss^ oolations additions 
to tb©s® rtstrvas sr« miiially mad® at th# @nd of »aoh operat-
ing, period from tti» »n«t earnings" of th# plant b®for« pat­
ronage • refunds are .allooeted. loonoaieally tliis mmunte to 
til® same thing ®»#pt that tb« per wait aostii of »mc.b r©s#rt^ @s 
far lei from on® ©psrating period to anotlisr. 
• U1 
additions are aste to It uatil less®® oeeiw, flmi, partiei-
patiBf la the Joint pleat ia pa«t periois ®r® ferc^ d to 
fe®er mox« then theif prop©rtl©aat® sbar® of tli© intertsa-
portl ttii?#i?taiatl©f t© tM fe«a®flt of firm® partleipeting 
lE^ emrrtat and futar® p®rl©fl®. slowly revolTiag th® meevm 
Hial»lE«@ tfeis latqttitj. 
Ia sdiltiOB to the uBesrtalatiea whieli «xt®M ovar tim® 
is tfed Jesint plant, tli# partleipatlBg-^ atrepreaeur® may 
ehoos® to sfesr® teotoioal rnesrtaintits aad prie® maoertaia-
tl#s of goods ttofsd through th« plaat whleh are speelfle to 
glvsn ©ptratlag periods OT©r ti®« in ordtr to rsdaee th® 
raaga of th« probability distrlhutioa of naetrtaiaty faeing 
@e.0h of th®a, ©Tea thom^  it say m®aa obvious disproportloa-
ality 0f@r tim« ia aa ^  peat If tlis- teohaieal 
rtlatleashlp aai th® iadifferea-ee map t)#tw#®a stahilitj aad 
effiel«aey la their fim®,f©r th# fartieipatlag eatr®prea«mrs 
it sM0h that th« a©r@ itahl® op®r®ti©as are pr@ftrr«d. It 
will h® teoaoMi® for tkea ta f©ol' a pgrt of thts# latra* 
i; 
t«poral taaeertainti@s ©ftr tia«* ®i4a aay %rm fe« trae 
la 0ast« wher® the »©gt prohehl® profits to th© partieipatlag 
firms ia aay ©a® of#»tlag parioi ®r® l©w«r«d at the same 
tim# the proha^ l# aattrtaiatlss faoiag «aoh «atr«pr®a®ar ®r® 
r®4ao0d hj p©oliag ©wr tls®. Ia ©ases'Whert It is mt 
1 
sm flgar© s. 
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kaosa, ©x a&t®. la wbleli partlettlar foriois a©s.t protoabl® 
pieoflts to tli® pattioipatiag @Btrep:rea#tti7i will be low@r«d 
ana la whl&h tlioy will- bt jfalset by lat®rt#apQral poollag, 
thin latter t©eialoii m&f sot be a®e«»sap|^ » 
Mf mj of aa exsaple of seomoale poollag of latr a tem­
poral maoertalatlw omt tla®, coaeli®^  a grata saTketlag 
plaat operattd jGlatly bf setaral agrltaltar'Sl flraa^ . fh®s« 
firms aay aatlelpat® gela by spticmlatiag oa sojbeaas belt la 
their Jolat plant froa hardest tlm® uatll l®t®r la th© 
aarli®tiag s@asoa ala® jmTn mt of tea, bat th® oa® la tea 
probability of loss might ladao® them mot to msTj th® aoy-
b@eas without h@4g@ aaless th@y oaa laterteaporaily pool 
this prie® aaoertalaty sptolfio to eaeli optratlag p®rlo4. 
By poollag thi® maciertalaty over tlm® so that It 1® bora® 
proportionately by sswral op@retlag perlois, «aoh firm ©aa 
aov® to a hl#i®r ®t»billty-®ffioi»aay ladlfferene® oarv®, 
aad if aatielpatioa® B«t#rlalis®, laertase Its profit® la 
ail operatlag period®. 
froportioaallty faralsh®® th® pilt© for th® p®r®®atage 
partlolpatloa la th® oomoale r®latioa«hipa arislag froa 
th® of®ratioa of a eoa»©a plaat Jolatly by eaeh of th® 
eooperatiag flms# 1^ 1® 1® true over tla® aa well as wlthla 
®aeh opsretlag ptriod. fh@a iaf@rf@et kaowlodg® aad maosr-
talaty ar® eoaslderod, it is plaaaod propertioaality 0T«r 
tlm® rather thaa aetaal r®aliz@i proportionality which gaid@» 
th® partieipatiag flraa, Uai®r th®®® eoaditioa® ®om® of 
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t.h«s« Bttltl-lattraX reiationskips amoag partielpating fii®s 
may bs pooltd aad sbareS preportloaatelf m%t tin© @v»ii 
though tliey mr# specifi© to a ®iagl® operatiag perioi, fMs 
is partiQttlarlf- tni® of tto® mQertaiaty Itasriag .ftmistioa in 
©oaaeetiea witij the Joiat plaat. In as •« mt@ «®as«, by 
i>©eliiig su©& maGtrtalntiti ,©¥«? tia®, partieipating flms'ar® 
Qttm all# to l©w@r- still fwtbet th® raag® ©f ©xpeotet 
disp®rii©a« tfe® most pi?©baljle aiiti©ipat«i values fac­
ing «a©h of them# If tbi». fla-oea th® e©0p®ratiag fim® oa a 
higher stateiiity-effieitEoy lniiffer®n@# ©mrv® it will 
repr«s#at ratioaal ©©oaomi© aetioa, aaS m&j allow eatrt-
pr®a«ttriei €#eisi©ms aad rtsomre® alloeatioa whiefe will pro­
vide aot oaly Imm variatol®, but also IiigM,«r av@rag« profits 
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iat«r«st Mtwmmn %b® fl»s paaftlQlpatliig ia th® tw© iepart-
•maats, l»ot& as t© tM# mm&mmnt muA m to th® aeeotmtiag "pple# 
of tilt gooi or ftsour©® at time of traasfer. If tJi® atiitioa. 
of a, mw i®fea?tatflt i® eoat®Bp2.at®4, %%®m say ddftlop a 
©oaflitt of iat@y®st amoag th®' firms partioifatiag in. tti© 
Joist plaat as to the kia4 ©f optratioa th® a®w aspartiwat 
Skoals ImlMm, aat as to wtettor or aot %km aMitioa of tlie 
a@w, d®p6rtai«at r$pt#s#st« ©toaomie r«'toyj?e® ailocitioa. 
Sapp©s« MtwmtmQ la Figay# 1 reprsseats 
th® p3?oportl©i»t® payti©ipati©a of tUt ©ooperatiag fimi ia 
©at i®partstat ©f tfe® |oiat plaati it is profeafel® tliat tliss® 
firBS will Joiatlr otiitr i@p®rtiB9at8 ©f th® plaat oa s 
soTOWtot iiff«r«at hmia* Mrm it t&® aa»® flms partioipat® 
ia all i«pastiaaats., proportioaat® gheriag of tM® epeaifio 
s^latioailiips smoag t^ @ patti©ifstiag ftms ia oa# iepartaeat 
will lik#ly b#,dispropoftioaato ia ^ tMw ispartatat®. Fay-
tfe®wor« aot all ralatioasliips will' be sptoifie to a gimn 
diipaiftswati aoa# will'to® Joiat teetw®#a all of ttoem.. ®t® 
proportioaaliti' eoaetpt mast ©xteatei to smbfa©® th® 
yelatioasfeip® txistiag amosg fim© Joiatlf operatiag a eoamoa 
plaat of aor« tlian ©a« &@pm%mut wfeea thej mm.f aot shara all 
of tfe«at aspaietmsats oa tfe« same feasi®. ' • 
eoasitssatioa of ttot iatari^ pairtBeatal relatioaslilps 
4o©s aot ffioilfy tb® eoaetpt as 4#ir@lop@d foi* shariag th« 
eeoaoffil® rtlatioaaMps of a tiagl# depai'ta-aat joiat plaat, 
- 12% • 
©Itlier wit&ta en ©ftraliag ptrioi ©r otm tiro®# 'fh@ eoopet-
atlEg ftms witliiE tasli will parti@ipat@ i« 
ml&timshlpm on a pf©po:pti©mal feas.ls, as ba# %mn a®falop«t 
in tfe© two prevtems efeapttyt. fbt ta®l ytaaiaimg is t© apply 
t]i@ pr©peyti023alit|- 0©ii©tpt t© tbe shej-ing of tb® ©e©iioaie 
3?@lat iaatlfelps aaoag ttot pattieipatlsg tltm tMe plaat 
Joiatlf sfear® eoaststf of tw© or nof© iipertmeiit® whlsli 
ar© Bot mmmmilj pa'rti®lpet#4 Is'm the saa© p3?oportioaat« 
bails toy tlies® aii^  agaim will b© <I©b@ i»'t*© sttps— 
first with psrfset tei©wl©ig« aat mwt'&intj, sai steoM 
tmeertalEtf aat l»p«rttet toeirl«dg«. 
A-. PtJpftef iBowltdg© asi Gertaiaty 
IMti' til# assmapti&n of p®yr®et teewleige aad m uae®r-
taiatj, all #@©iiOBio rtlatieailiipt whi&h ©i-ls® sptelfleally 
froa a gii"@a ^ epaftosat la tfa« 4.@iat plaat will Ise partlei-
pat®t la ©aly %f tli©s© ftrss sbai'iag.ia thet t#fart«@at, and 
will hf tMa oa %%& aamt ppope^ tieaml •feaals m tkty 
sbsr© thi® d@pa]ettt#at. All i?#l«tioastelpa arising fwai tli« 
opfratioa of tli« J#ist plaat tMat am aot apteifie to a gives 
dtpaftasat,. bmt ©eMB.ea to i®ver«l, 'Will fe® Bh&mi. -asBoag tfciofi© 
flriia parti©ipatiag ia aaok iopertseat ©a a basis proporticoal 
to %h® fmctim of tli« total ©p«3?atloa of tk# Joiat plant 
f@pr«»eat@a fey emh ©f tl#!? 4«partm®at®^ . 
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la fef tha firat sharlag ttol® S®p«rta«iit| 
not po@X#t to^ tweea a#pmi;tatat». It woiiia r«pr,©-
ifiit a misalleeatlea' of to a© a© wltM p.iff®et 
teowldtg® aad ©ertaiaty, 'beea^ a# it muM rstmir® tliat tjaos® 
fira® ptytieipfttlai la «eii@ i®.fart»©»ts safesitiz® tbos® 
paftiotpatlag la ©tli@.r fiepertetats.. O-aiy %k&B& fim# wMeli 
p]p0p©i'tl®a®t®a.y bMt® la ^ all *®lati©astoips wltb t®sp®et to 
a gi«a dtpartasat la- tli® |©iat plaat will partiolpat® la its 
a®« a.® a pajrt ef ttot' @«©aoait it,©itt#tl©a ©arsiti ©a by tii«a, 
aat ttosy will slass lt« ait oa tfe# saa® prepeytloaal toatl® 
a»''th#y sliar® ttolfi i«fa3?tB#at la tte# plaat., as 111ms trated la 
flgmr® 1. fJaey will sfeai?® th® ,i#elsloas «pe©lfl-®ally eoaetya-
lag tfa®' tepmartaeat oa %M Bmm teasl®, aad will aak® tfe®®, 
iai®p»a4®atly ©f -tli® timS' sharlrg tto« Qtkm i®f «t®®at» la 
tl® ,|©lat pleat* Aa a i3?oap t»«y will tto® flaaaol®! 
.r«»p©astfellltl®s, «p®a4fl© t©'"tte« i®p®i»ta«at wltfeoat saljsiiy 
fmm tto® tisms opeiatlag aay i#p®rte®at, As a 'grpap 
tfeey will feeaa? a©a® of %h@ flaaaolal iif®sp©asl%llltles speolfte 
to aay o'^ t&er i«pa*'tia®at» a#y will pr©p©ytl©aat©ly sliaf® 
all fixed «ai Tatlaisl® laelatlag rlsJc cost®, aad 
tto«r®f©f® ®l©.o tli® »e©a©ml® bea«flt.s, speilflaally la coa-
a@®ti©a wlta tfe® ©p®i»®ti©a ©f tfel« d®farta®at» Hoae ©f tli®so 
eost«-aa4'beatflts -sptelfl® to tfe® ,;4®p®ifttt®at will b® p®©l«d 
wn% ®th«» dep®^ ta«at®# »@a g^ ets •©» m& traas-
tBTW&i. tw&m. ©a® i®patt»®at to'^  aaotto®* la tto®. Joiat plaat, 
©f" ®»'i^ l®, tojra traasfftrrtd fifoa tli® ©eala 
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market valtts at tl® %im of transfer will tot ti»«i «» 
tb® eests to th@ iepartaaat teeaiviag th®m aai the retsipts 
to 'tl# tmm vhinh tMf ar@ ti-masf«ri?®4» flitts all 
%m #&€>aoai.@ .3?#latl©a,slilp» aii©ag t%% to®p@ratiaf firms wliiek 
ajft sp«'©lfi© to a glv©a d«parti»st will b® participated ia 
©Bly th©s« firai. iawlirti ia tli® particmlar' tepartaftat, 
«ad will fe« slierta amoag ttoa ta s feasis prepertioafel to th© 
basis oa whitli tfatf stoar® tJals 4«p«rta«at ia tli® Joiat plaat, 
ft# r®lati#a8iiip» iwoag tht e®©p#r®tlag firms erlsiag 
froa lift# ©psrstiom of tli® Jotat plaat w}ii©ii ar© aot @p®©ifie 
to a. flTta A®parta®at ia tiit plaat, bat whisto relat® to 
s#T®ral i«perta#Bt«, mast hm »Mmi. «©ag tlit groai&g of fir«« 
parti-Qipatiag la eaeM itpartaeal. With. p#rf@@t toowl©dg« aat 
©ertaiatf tMf will fe® sfttsrti liy ttee ttparta®at«il gromps oa a 
propertioaal fe&sisj ©aoto ttp&rtaoatal gromp of firas will 
colleotiwly parti©ipstt ia tti® iatera^ pertmeatal relatioa-
flhipa oa a toasia proportioaal to th® p#r®«ataft of th® total 
of meh r«lati©ai&ip arisiag fro» or ®©.a»ottd witfe tkii 
operatioa of tlieir i«p«rtm®at. M is ticaoBstratet below ia 
the ©a»« of Joiat oost®, th# firms ©peratiag ©aoh S«parta«at 
will oriiaarlly as a groap assaa® %li®ir fall aroaortioaata 
shar® Qf•thm total ©f ®aeh iattrdepertmtatal relatioaship, 
aot' jmst the a®rgi»l r®lati©aships arlslag from th® aifiitioa 
aerehaatlsisi iapartatat to th® f@®a ailliag -itpartiaeat ia a 
oooptratiT# titvator assoeiatioa.. 
- im -
©f the itpartaest to thm Joiat pleat. If, as a®w i«parta«at» 
me ata®d to' t^ « joiat ®©ti¥itr, tli« fimi paftioipatlag ia 
th® aew 4eparta®ats wmm to slitaf® oalf the margiaal relatloa-
sliips, firma partislpatlag la %M ©Idtr d«partB®at® nouM 
assuae ®oi'® thm. thel^ propoirtloaat# ilia?e of th® lat®rd®P'g»t-
meatal i?®latloai^ .lp» whll® tlfeoi® partl«ipetlag la tfe® a®wer 
t«part»tBts would pftrtiolpat# less tltaa proportioaat«lf la 
tii#a, 
ffe.t»e 4at«40pa,i?ts«at®l sslatloasliip® arlslag ia jolat 
plaats ©f more ttea oa® iepartatat laelMe 4#olslons eoaeera-
lag tM@ plaat whlQh &ttm% tto- ssTwal i«pttftoi®ata, all oosts 
la tfe® pleat wtolesli Joiat tostw@®a depaftasats, and the 
fiaaaelal I's'tpoasitolllty for tli« fixtd aai-woyklag eapltel 
atlll8«t Joiatlf la mor© tlaa oae a^ pirtssat. laeii'lat«r-
depastmeatal detltloa eoae#»lag th« Joiat plaat will toe 
pai?tl©lpat®a la hf tlie groups of flraa partl®ipatlBf la Bmh 
of the i®part»@ats, aai stoarti toy the gromp® oa a toa@l« 
proportloaal to tli® r®lati¥@ «ff@et tli® dselsloa will have 
©a m@h i®partaeat. la a tto«« topartneat plaat operated hj 
four firms joiatly a,appo8«, for txaapl®, ttot tJi®y aliar® tli® 
4epartm®at# ©a t 1-1g-3-.g-.l, aai 4-3-2-1 teasls r®®p«o* 
ti^ ®ly. If the Jolat ieolsioa will affeet «a©h' i®partffi®at 
til® i®part»eatal group® of firmi woulfi shar® la a 
a®alsloa r#garilag' tli® ®aplofa®at of aa asalstaat aaaager oa 
a toasia proportloaal to th® p®re«ata^  of bis tlsa aad salary 
to be allo0at®a t© @mh t@partii®at. 
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mqmllTt will partleipat® ia the i®©isi©b ok a 
basis. If tilt Joint i©<5i0loii will sff@et ©jily th# «©eoiifi aaH 
thiri 4«partMat, aai affeet tM«a »qmall|-, thty will pertiei-
pat® in til® &misim o» « 6.a-4-i or 3-3»i*l basis• If the 
d«®lsi@a aff@®t« ©11 tto@$ ispartmeats, bwt th® first twie® 
as mmh as tto« otli#r tw©, %Mj will star© tlis .dacisioa ©a an 
or 4**4f4«"S 'feasis. If th® d##isioa affteta th« thr©® 
€«partii«at8 m a l-S-3 rati© r©®peetiv©lf tM® foar partiei» 
pttiag firms will mMm %hm Joiat iaeisiea oa ® 19-16-lg-? 
hasit, and so m tm th® mmj other pessihl® ®oabia®ti©as 
of «ff@ets th# aeeisioa laay haT« on th® thre® department® 
la this siaplifi«i ©awple, fith ptrfeet toiowleig® and 
etrtainty, 4®oisiona aff@©tiat ssfersl departaest® Joiatly 
will b® parti©ipat«.4 in hy the grornp® of firas operating 
©SQh 4@partBent ami shared fey thta ©a a proportional h®si», 
s» .d«t®raia®d hf th« reletif® effeet ©aeh joint decision 
will hat® on th® s«¥®rel departatnt®. 
Bseh fixtd aM fariahl® aost, inelmding, riife costs, 
whi©h is Joint h®tw«®a -®®¥®ral dtpartaent® in the oo»aon 
plant, will h® sharod hy th» gr^ onp® of pertioipating firms 
of aaeli d®parta®nt on a hasi® proportional to th® pertanta®® 
of th® total Joint eost itea ntillzQd la ®a®h department, 
l6@h d@part»at will a@ra®lly h®er its fnll psreentag® of 
®aeh sp#elfl® total Joint oost, as i®t®rMln@d hy th® fraction 
of th® total 0ost itaa ntillz®! in this department. The 
alloc®tion of Joint 00at® b9tw®®ii departaents will aot he 
fey tli® to tto® total ©©'©t of @a©Ji 
spteifie Joint it#» ^ efreatatei fey th© aiiition of ©aeh 
atpartffltat in tht Jeiat plaat, Tliis is illmst^ atei ia figttf® 
g tos a paartiemlajf Jeiat e©®t ia & ©OBaom plant with. fiT« 
i®l>arta«iits. The total cost i» tke pl«at for thia ptrtiomlar 
Joiat eif:p«a«# ii OffiS « OMM, whieb is dl"?ii«i among tJa® 
flv« &®pa»tm«ats as follows! itpartmeat 1, OILS; i«parte«iit 
2, ABKL; a@partmtat S, BOM; iftfs^ tsent 4, ODl^ j amt itpart-
ffi@nt S, DIHI.. Til® pa:3?ti©lftttliig firms art atele t© fedmea 
tto# mst of tM» pejptlomlaf ©xptmst fr@o OF to OB 
fef baTiag five d^ partaemts la tM Jolat flaat ratfe«r ttoaa 
four, bteaus® iepaftaiat 5 will hmr its fall shmm of tli© 
average Joittt ©osts, DSHI, ^ attef %km only the aiditloa to 
ffiafgiaal ©os'ts, DlfG# 
at ftllaey of r«a#oaiiig that an adi«i fttpartaeiit shomlt 
baai- omlf tl® additioa to margiaal Joiat' eosti eaa be «©®ii 
hf iaagialiig^ ''iB Mgmm 8 ttoat i®fafta«ati 3, 4 and i have 
b®eB^  a4d«t to tte Joiat plaat oteoa©l©gle.ally.t If eaali wsr® 
to h@m oaly iti ia©.r®s«atal aiAltioa to Jolat eost8» tli® 
©ost» h&T.m fey tW» ammA 4@part»«at woalt %@ pfoportioaally 
®aall®i? tHaa tM first bmt lay gay thm t&® s««oai, ®ai so oa 
foa? »aeh of tii® flv« a®partm®ats* firms paytieipatlag la tii« 
fifst «stmfellal3ie.i ttpartseat® womM coatiaa© to r«e«iir® ao 
b@a«fit ia terat of rtdattioas ia th® Joiat eost® feorae %f 









Units of cost item employed 
Figure 2. Allocating joint costs. 
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cQm0@rm@4..,. it appro®whil® fima pertiolpatiag ia the 
1 
last d:it®feli®li«4 t«|)ai*t»®ftt w©iild reeeife ^ all suoh b«ii@fits. 
It ia posilbl® t© isBgiae oo»ditioa» wat®r wlii§hi m 
aMtd Mpertmmt in tb@ Jolat pleat, wbi'#li i*®fresents ©ptiaii» 
slleeatiQB ©f 2?es© i^r®®s- wimin th® partlslpatiag fiyas, wo'mli 
mt hmr its full pmpotHemte aU&m &f tl# total Joint eost 
la tis plant 0 In tto# ittermiaatioa of %h& b@8t pi-otoctlea 
€i©»bl»atioa im mf tim pTMmimg »©r« tliam ©a® psoiuot* tli« 
Qt m ®xpansi©E ia the omtpttt of ®»y pr©dm©t ©n all 
aayglaal ©xptafiitmres aai amsglmal 3fwtiiw p3?©imQtlTiti®« 
1 
witliia tto flm mmt h9 If ail Jeiat oosts la 
tM® amlti-d@part®®at Joist plast tmkmrn t€3g®tlt@i? teertas® 
smbstaatisllf with, siz® o¥@r tb® relevant raag®» aa fioti tto® 
®p®©i,fio Joiat 003% in flgttT® 2, aai if Joiat eosts r@pr®s#Bt 
a smltstaatial ••p«re®n.tag« of tfae total ©oats In eaob depart-
a@at, an aM«i or ©nutated attivity la tbe Joiat plaat vhiQh 
will earn®® aay rtaaetiom in &w&mg0 Joint eosts la tli® other' 
.a®tiTiti«8 may b® ©eoaomio, mm thougii it will aot be abl® 
to li#a3? its ftall proportionate ater® of the total Joiat eoat®, 
H@W0Ter, th® «M@a or ta^ anied aetivitf must r«pres@nt tfe® 
fetst alteraitiT® way to eebiSY® tie ©pti«w @im® la tli® Joiat 
f^h® 4®t®misatloa of optiBwa «ls® ia ft ffialti-4©partm®Bt 
Joiat plaat is 4i8«mss«4 ia stotioa G ©f ©liapter 
O^f. Carlsoa, S«a®^  A StMy ia tfa® Mm m@ory of Pro-
auotioa* atoekfeola leoaomie Stmdi®s. Ko. 9, P. S« Siag sad 
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basis ia aelii#T«d simply by pi^ o^ iaiag for it in the aooounltog 
system i» t&e Joiat flaat. Ifim a tliipt« itpartsieiit plant, 
for sxaapl®, t&s aasager^ s tia® is utilised.by tlits® depart-
mmts m •& 3-2-1 basis, tb# eoat of bis salary will b® 
allo@at#d ®B©ag tto.®a ©a a S^ -g-l basis, AaS witb ©©rtaiaty 
aad p®rf«et toowlaig# emek will b® allo®at@a ita 
proportioaat® Mhmm of av®rag@ total Joiat ©ost, not tbe 
aaaitioa to total Joint cost a^ isiE^ fSeos tli« ©atablishatat 
of tbi d@p©yt»«at in tb® Joiat pleat* 
la a4diti©a to Joiat oosts, tbe fli«« partieipatiag ia 
tbe i«*rt»al i®parta®ats i» tb# plaat will,, as groups, abare 
tb® fsspoasibility foje protiiing'fixed aad woy&iag capital 
wber# it i» mtilii#t la tb« ^ arlotts tspirtmeata Joiatly. 
Tb©y will oriiaarily falflll a part of tbis Joiat tespoasi-
btllty by allotatiag ©apital d-lTOOtly to tbe Joiat plaat aad 
a, part ef it by pyovidiag tbt: s««Jmrlty iateifest a®e@s«aj?y 
to attieet ©mtsii# ©aplt®!# fkm 3att«r astb©€ ®ia®ly aM.« 
to Joiat eo®ts, th« iate^ rfiepftj-taeatal sbariag of wbieb bas 
Just be®a 41.aem«s«d, 1® eapital atilla,«4 sp«eifioally by 
say oa« ,i#parta®at will be' p^ ©vli#a by eoopf^ atlag fi3»ia». ao% 
partieipstiag la tbat itpartasati sueb ©apltal will b« 
alloefitfsi to it by oaly tboae firas pajftioipatiag ia tb.® 
partietil.^  itpartanat# fh& fixme pa^ tioipetiag ia tbe 
diff®r«at • d«paftmeat.» will, ea gfompt, ®bay@ th@ alloeatioa 
Qt latesispartrntatal espltal Alreetly to tb# Joiat plaat oa 
- ISf . 
s feasis p5oportlo»al to the f«latlv@ amomat# of tlil® Joint 
©epital mtili!§@a tey each .i«pafta®mt ia th® plaEt—the 
3?@latiT® siE® of emh 4«p©rto@at m Measttfti fey tfe® reqmlr®^  
fi3i-@S aad workiag • ©tpital for its operatiea# foi' ©rafflpl® 
if t^ e I'ttttii'ei• eapital all©emti©ii 'tey-tiie partioipatiag 
fimi to tli® Joist flaat f©^  y@@citite#s ®»pl©ye4 Jointly %y 
the a.e?er«l itpajptatnts ia th@ plsat ii |i00,©00, tM« fims 
as ©dil0'©tif® gtomp« pajtisipating ia tMe id-rttal iep^ aft* 
is«iit» will sliar« tto# |i00.|©§0 alloeetiea to tM Joiat pleat 
S>r©portl0nately as tb@ pmmmt&g® of tke.s« Jeiat capital 
,f®®0urs«8 is ami msei, in sa^li depaftoeat. With thxm 
i@'parta@at.f la t&« Joint plaat aad tM first reqmirlag 1/2, 
tbt s«@o»a 3/1^ 3, tli« tfeiift i/§ of th® ms® ©f %Mb® Joiat 
eapltel resomrot® ia th® plaat, tto flma partieipatiag ia 
tk© first €epart«ieiit will ©•©lltetiTtly pr©irid@ |g§0,GOO, 
thos© partislpattiif ia tli© itteai |1SO,O©0, aat tliof® la tii® 
tliird |100,000j the total aaklng mp tfe® settmirt't |800,©G0. 
fli® fims pertlcipatiag ia 0a©li i«fettm®at will sliara tills 
eapltsl ia tte® »awi •psoportloaS'e« t&ey stoase that depart-
meat ia tb« Joiat plsat, of eotirs®* ftoua a siagl© eooperatSag 
eatr«p5e®aemjr of a tixm afspftseatiag .1^  ©f tli« first <i«part-
a#at, .2^  of th® «@0©a4 ttpertmeat «ai *3^ . of the third 
4®parta#at wmM ellesat# |8i© ©it of th® total oapitai ©f 
his flra t© til® JolEt plaat la fttaitiea to his properti.oaat« 
share of thft r@qmlr©d tmpital alioeati©a f©r r«somr©es ms@4 
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speolfleaXly la ©asli of tli« tkre© dspartmeat®, 
Witfe p«rf®©t kaowledgt aM ©©fftaiati- %h@ proportiosality 
0oa0«pt, s«T«s as a giilda toT tke siiarlag ia the ©eonoale 
reletloiisfeips amosg firiia parlieipating la aiff»x#iit iepai-t-
iseats of tl»lr JeiEt plant, as well as wltbla eaoli depei-tatat 
and over ti»@. All yelatioEfMps wfeieM are speeifle.to a 
gif«n d«parta#Et will bsparticipatti in oaly tbos# firas 
©peratiag tli® plsat ia that p©ri©a^  asi slisr#4. fej tli« on tto« 
same proportioaal feasis as thtf slfeei?© tb© departueiit, ,411 
relatioaihips whioh mm Joist b@tw©®ii topartmeats will he 
sharti aaon^  th® groups of fixaa partioipatiag in thf 
se¥®ral departmeats oa a basis proportional te ths peretatag® 
of @mh relstloasMp arislag frea or ©onaeetsfi with th# 
operation of ©aab d«part®«at, TM proportienat® share of 
tb®s® iaterteptrtmeatel relet loastiips partieipsttd In %h® 
gromp of firms operating moh tepartraeat will b© sMrea amoag 
th# firms wittoia &mh gromp on a basis propertloaal to thtir 
rislatiT© parti©ipati®m ia tMat i0partm©at, 
1, :]aip@rfa©t laowleAg# and iFaetrtaiaty 
4s ia tli0 mm of iat®rt@ap#ral r®lati©a0hlps, certain 
qualifisatioas ®«®t iatredme^ d into tha spplioatioa of tk« 
proportioaallty @os@®pt to iaterd^ partaental ralationshlps 
wh®n tlia assmptioaa ©f eertaiaty aai perftet kaowledg® ar« 
firoppad. The iat0i?fi«partaentai relatioasliips will still b© 
" . i m  -
sfeiarei fey th© groapi of firms oa a,"basis proportiomal. to th© 
rtlativ# slz© ef «a©h. fiepartm®.mt, but this proportionality 
will %m d®t0mia«i im s "plaaati" or @£ aiif sens©, rather 
thaa ia a r^taliadfi" or «x pogt stase. Siae® proportioaality. 
•eaaaot be aati^ ipatea with ©©rtaiaty, inttrtspertmeat®! 
reletioashipa may.tara omt to haT© beta shared oa a dispro-
portioaal basig. fhis is i»aat«rial howtvtrj tht importaat 
thiag is that they h« shar@4 ©a th® ha«is of aatieipat@4 
proportioaality. It asmy h® lapoisihlt, to©, to aatieipat® 
eeemrately what part of ®a#h total r«latioashlp arisiag froa 
th® ©ptratioa of th# joiat plaat is ®p«olfi@ to th@ Tarioms 
tepartaaats aad what part is iat«riepartai®atal* fhs aatiei-
pat©d sp«oifio relatiottshipt will h@ psrtieipat«a ia oaly by 
thos® firms mtiliziag tha rtipeetif© iepartmtats iasofar as 
1 
it is eeoaoBio to ietsrttia® whieh are speeifio, and those 
whieh are aatieipattd to ha iataritpartaeatsl ittll he 
shared among tha se's'tral tepartaeats oa a propertioaal basis 
iasofar as it ia eoeaoaie to dtteraia® aoettrate proportioaal 
iateriepartiieat alleoetioa. 
It m&f aot b® possihl# to tell ex sate precisely whieh 
costs ia the Joiat. plaat will be Joiat betweea departmeats 
aad whieh will b® speoifie to each Aepartaeat. Or ,it may 
l^ad, as is poiated out later ia this ehapter, exeept 
where pooliag speoifi© relatioaships betweea depertmeats is 
desirable to the partiaipatiag eatrepreaears because of the 
reduetioa of the raags of the probability dietribatioa of 
uaoertaiaties faeiag eaeh of them iadi'-^ ridually. 
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iOTolv® smek d@tail#<i iavtato'ry aaaegerasnt aat aoeounting 
tliet it is ©©©iio®l«all|' lapraotioal to do so l>eyond a esrtaia 
point* C©as®i|^ ®iitly. it may tmi-a out that sejii® ooats speeifie 
to a glvoa departaant w#rt sliared ^ y s®Ter®l departments. 
ffe« iattrdepartaeatal sMriag of plant ©osta whioh two out 
to to® sptoifie to a giT«tt ©perating period doss not reprtseat 
irratioaal fefli®Tior toy tli® eatrepreaettr® of tbe participatiiig 
firaa, $inm they ®itM«r ©aaaot aatieipat®, or 
beeaus# it is m«0©E©aie to proTidt tli® details aeeessary to 
more aeeurat®ly aatieipat«, whether ©r not thme o-osta will 
"b® ip#0ifie t© ©at i«p@rt»sttt, aad if t-li®y are im, 
d#partm0at tli®y *111 ©eeiir* 
©It eost® wMeh are aatieipated to ¥e iBtsrd®par.itea«iital 
will slmartd fey tfe# grotips of firms optratiag @aoh depart*-
aeat'tn a toasia preeistly proportional to tlitir r@lati?® 
smplo-paent of, tli«, it«as aaMag mp tli® Joint eoats 'Osly if it 
is ass-aMd tliat a© additiom&l eests are iaeurred ia d®t@raim-
img this proportioaal ms© of ths Joiat e©at it®a. If ooats 
ar® iasmrrad ia so doiag, tb® detemiaatioa will b@ mad® 
oaly mp to th.® peiat wli«r© th« marginal eost of makiag th@ 
d@t@raiaatiQa #tmals tli® aargiaal benefit 'fro® tlie aecurat# 
all©0ati©B of the Joint oost. It is t^ ite lifcely tliat it 
will mmomlmllf fsasifel# to dettrmin© oaly a rang© of 
po®@itol« iiiterd@part»atal mllQmtiQm rougMy approxiaatiag 
proportioEality, for examplt ia » Joint plaat with tlir©© 
departaeata, smppos# that it is easily aad ine^ sntively 
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tliat alioeating aor# tton titty psroaiit of tlbe 
manager^  B B&l&ry to tk@ fi3?8t iw unfair to th© 
flms opei-atiag thmt i@pai"tii@Rt aM that em elloestiea of 
lea® than fortf-flv« p«i*oent t© tfe® i®part®eiit is wnfair to 
thos© op0i?atiag tb© ot&e^  depattntats, wMle the easily 
d«t®mia©i raag@ fot t&t othsi? tw© dspartaeats is tw«aty-fiv« 
te thirty pti*@@at tad twmtf to ^ thirty p»eeat of tli@ t©tal 
©f tti« aaaag@r*a talary, reapeetiTtly. It will b& ©conomic 
to arbitrarily s#l«©t ®o®e alloeatios betw®«a tfees® limits, 
®ay 474^  « - 2^  rsspettlvtly, rather tkaa incur extra 
®icp0ii4itw«s to ittttrmta® aore preeistly wlitr® diTisioa 
sboulcl to® mat® if tli© ©ost of ».aklng a mere accurate allooa-
tioii Is r«latlT®ly high &M thd arbitrary divisloa is 
reatoaafely a©eurat«. If, the a®aagar'«s sslary is #10,000, the 
aetuel dlTisioa 4©^  • 10 - S®#, aad tM« eost of a®termialiig 
aafi, aaking the mmmt§ diirisi©a |1,0§0, for iastane©, th® 
firas ©paretiag th@ tfer®® ispartatats a» groups woultt to© 
respeetiirely #530 • |110 - |3@© tops© off if the aeourat® 
iatar<i©partB@mtel dltision wsr® to aadt# With. u»e«rtaiaty 
aa4 lttp@rf«et icaowl©tg©| partieipatiag firat will strive oaly 
for sueli. 4@gre« of umwemy in thm alleoatioa of Joiat costs 
b®tw@«a i@partit©ats as cea tot eclil©v®d osoaomieally. Biis is 
also true ia regard te th® value of goods aai capital re-
s©uro«a tramsf«rr®d from ©a« #®parta®at t© aaothar ia t!i« 
Joiat plaat. It will ©aly bt ®B-oaomie to oharg« th@ fi«part-
ia©at raceiving th« good or rtsouree its actual market value 
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at tlB», of wliea til© margiaal cost of aakiag tbe 
aaemrat® iet®miEatlo» of ?aiu® Is not mor® than th© 
mrgiaal benefit d©riir@4 from aaklag tM acemi-at® dttarmiaa-
tioB« If th# valw of tl® good ©r r«semi?c© at tim® of 
tramsfex mn. he sstiaatet fairlf a©ouratel|r, and tb« eost of 
making a mom presis® ietemlaatloa of falm® Is it 
will b@ nmcomml^  to'make- the nor© prt©i@« d9t®j»miiiatloii. 
ij alimiaatiag sttsii Qoatu as those of treBspoi-tfitioa, mar-
O'liaaiisimg and advsrtisiaf, hj interdspartstatal traasfer as 
eoaparid to omtsii® pwoteses aad tlie traasaotiom aaj 
retttra a a@t benefit to both tb© fims of tli@ traasferiring 
departseat aM tHose ©f %M - ree#i¥lBg department, mm thomgb 
oa« group benefits sli^ tly at th# sxpeas® of tb« other froM 
©atiaatlEf r®th@r thaa in aeeurateli- detemini-iig tto® -ralue 
at time of traasftr* 
It'ha® b®@m 8«®a that with eertainty and perfect kiiow-
Isig# iat@rd«partatat®l Jeiat eosts are shartd proportioae1»iy 
hj th# r®®p«0tif® dfspdrtatats, with the firms oparating ®aeh 
a® a gr@mp htariag th«ir r®»p©etiv« shar® of averag© Jolat 
eoits, ttis is orilaariiy trm« for new i®partaeiits in th© 
joiat plant'at wtll m preflousli' «stahllsh@d onta (Bm Figure 
£}. With ma@@rtaiaty aM iaperfeet taiowledg®, the oosta 
which ar® aatieipat®i as Jolat h0tw«®n d®p&rtii#]ttts will h® 
shartd pr©portioBat«ly, insofar as it is ©aoaomio to deter-
aiat proportionality, hy th@ several d^ partaeats. la©h 
dapartasat will still normally its proportionate shar® 
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of th® tv®rag® Jolat eosts rather than per unit marginal 
Joint ©eats assoeitttd with that d«parta©nt# lf0w d©parta©ats 
will ttsmally not b@ atd«i mnless they are «atl«ipat®i to he 
produetiTe eaom^ i to eowr total speeifi© • oosts pirns their 
proportl©a&t« share ©f th« ettrag® total Joint csosts. This 
is trm© mm wher® tha average total Joint eost eurv® ii 
falling ©T@r the eatir# r«l®vant rang#,, males® th@ addition 
of a d®p-artii#at will lower aTsragt total Joint eosts ©aomgh 
to aak® it ©eoaoaie to the participating, firms to subsidize 
th« addtd d@parta«at with th® other departments in th# Joint 
plant. And eir«n in this ©a®® suoh a proeedur® will not 
represent optiwa rtaour©® allotation in th« partioipating 
firm# if it is' posiitole to add other departmants or expand 
existing ones ia the Joint plant which ©an h@ «xp®et®d to 
<sof®r thsir proportionate share of avarag® total Joint costs 
as if@ll as total aTtrag® spe'sifio oosts. 
With titto@rtalnty and iap@rf«et knowltdg®, it is alto-
gsther possihlt that th# entrtprendwra of the firms operating 
th® Joint plant m&j eonsldtr it in their hest long run 
interest, whsra Joint costs ar© d@or®asing throughout th« 
r©levant rang#, sot to burden a new departatnt with ita full 
shar® of overhtad costs during, th® period in whleh it is 
becoming ©stablished. This is altogether different, however, 
from th© ©as® whtr# th© proposed new department ©an only be 
Justified if it bears only th© aiaount edd«d to total Joint 
costs. If th® new d«part»«nt ©an, from th@ beginniag, pay 
its ap©§lfie eosts pirns the aMitioa to total Jolat eosts 
imw ia flgmt# M) ttoe new latpartaent will net Ise s liabilitj 
is the joint pleat wbilt' it is beoomimg sstatelished sine® 
total Joint eosti to t^ t otlit®r departments will b® unehangsd 
CHIG • SBIF in ?l.gar® g). And 'as soon aa' tlie n®w department 
isf abl© to btar its proportionat® shar® of ©Terag® total 
Joint oosts, all psrtieipating firms will totnefit from tfee 
addition ©f tli© mm dtpertaeat, wliether or not th@y partiei-
pat® la it, sine© ©wrMa-ad ©oats p«r nnit will b@ r®d\20@d 
{froa m to M in Figw® i). 
Altbougfa with ttnc«rt«inty and imperfect knowledge tb® 
deeisions in tM oomoa plsnt wliith affeot several depart-
aents Jointly are entrsprensurial decision®, th® dseisioa 
making will also b® ®h.sr«d by tli® fir»i-partieipatiag in eaoh 
d@partaent proportionately as tli© d®©isioa affeets the opera­
tion of each department, .exeept that this proportionality 
mu®t be determined ea: ante at tbe tiae the deoision is made. 
Sine® the detisien is made gx ante, antiaipated proportion­
ality regarding the relatiT® effeet® of the deeision oa the 
seTeral departaiat% ratJ»r than- aetmal proportionality, is 
relevant, fo the extent that the peroentag® effect of the 
deoiiion on eath departaent cannot he anticipated, the pro­
portionate participation in decisions which affect the 
operation of the several dep®rt»@at® Jointly is approximate 
rather than accttrate. In the extreas case where it is. 
anticipated that the dec!iion will affect the several 
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d@partffieats Joiatlj but nothing oaa be antioipatei regarding 
the proportional ®ffe©ti of the ietlsloB, th® firms operetiag 
&mh of th® dapartaettta will a® greups partleipat® squally 
in tha eatraprtatttrisl Sseislea, as th« best iipproxliaatioa 
to proportieaality. Wh®as¥®r the proportioaal «ff©ot of th« 
i@©ial0fl oa tii« various i®partm®ats oaa he aatiaipatei to amy 
«xt«at, propertioaality, rather thaa ©.qualitys» is the hasis • 
up-oa whieh th® ieaisloa will h® shared iaterd«part»©at8lly. 
fith ufl0®rtalaty ia the pietar®, the pr©porti©aet@ 
atiliaatioB of joiat ©apital resoarets ia th# mm&om plaat 
hy th® 'rarioas tepartmsat# is also aatieipatsd rather thaa 
gi¥0a. fhi« •oapital will he pro-ritoi hy th# froaps of firas 
parti©ipatiag ia m&h of th« i@part»eats aad shared oa a 
hasia propertioaal to th« ©atieipatM rtlatlT® um to h® mai« 
of the Joiat r@soars# ia i»oh i®parttt®at.# Ordiaarily, how-
e-rer, it will he p©sfiihl« to qait® e«ear®t«ly aatioipat® the 
proportioaate atiligatioa of Joiat capital rasoaroes ia th® 
©OMioa plaat hy ®a.eh iepartaeat ©v«r short periods. As 
aati©ipat®d proportioaality ohaag-#s owr tis®, th® relatiT® 
amoast of total Joiat eapital ©oatrlbut«d hy the firas 
op@ratiBg ®a©h iepartmtat ia th® Joiat plaat eaa be adja®t«d 
©ceordlagly. 
®is aaeertsiaty haariag r@lati©aship betwe®a the firas 
op«ratiag @aeh of th® iepftrtmtati ia th® Joiat plaat was 
rtti@4 oat hy assmptioa la th® prevloms »®6tioa. la geaeral 
those aaetrtaiatl®®, sa©h as priee ead te0,haologlcal 
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ttuoertaiattes, wtol©! ar# specifle to a, gi¥#ii department, 
will mot h@ p©oi®€ hetwem atpartrntnts, Mt iast®ai will %e 
hmm witMia tk® itpartaent ani shared properti^ mately fey 
th.® firms partieipatlag in that a@partaeat. tfaetrtaiaties, 
amh as opsratiomefi ma©«rteliiti@®, whiefe are lat®ri@part-
Mtatal will b« aMar«i by the groups of firas partieipatiBi; ia 
emk of tlj« d«partffi@ati aeeordiag to th,« antleipattd trmtim 
of tilt' total J©iBt miie«rtaiiitits arisimg from tfe® ©paretion 
of ®m& iepart®®at. Oftsa tl« btst eiitleipat|©ii of this will 
b« th@ rtlstiv® size of the op®ratioss of #a©h department, 
but wlier© it apptars tMat gr@at©r uneertaiaty is assoeiated 
witli tM# aetifity of ©at a@parta@Bt ttoa mmthes this will 
elao to# tak«m iato aeeomt. lBt©ri®pertii@mtal ttaeertaiaties, 
along with intertemporal aaotrtaintits, ar® eoBmoaly sharsi 
properti©ii®tely mmug th® iiff«r©mt groups of firms hy means 
of capital restrv## rataiaeA by all participating firms- as a 
group as4 aaiataiaei as a fiaaaeial emshioa against unetr-
taiaties to %b tram gm m th« B#at arisas. fhes® r@s«rT«« 
are bmilt up hy aaall atiitiona t© aosts in all iapartaant-s 
of tha joint plant, tht ralativa amottat in-each iapartaeat 
basai oa tii® antieipatai proportionate amomat of Joint linear-
talaty whieh is assoeiatat with aaah dapartiaent. 
If tha laiiffaraaa® sap' ©f the participating «ntr®-
praaaiira is suah that thay plaae a'high valua on stafeility 
ralativa t© affiaiaaay (aaa fignra f), and if the antielpatai 
spao-ifi© ttneartaiatias arising fro-a' aaih of tha departaentf 
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in th9 Joint plant ai?« relatlwly ttntfora in degree, it is 
likslf to fee ®#©a©3al6 to tli® paftieipetiag ®iitreprem@mrs to 
pool so»« of tto® speeiflo moertaiaties l>@tw®«a fl@parta@ats, 
®v«a thmgk it results ia iiit@ri«partatBtAl disppoportioa-
1 
aliti®a in aa @x mat ®©bs®, Majbew has appereatli* draws 
m a ©ase where tli@a@ ooaditioaa mx% met wtim lie argues the 
superiority of single p©oliag or@s sttiltipl# pooling» In tli® 
siagl« po©l both pi-lt# mo«i?taiBti©® aai costs speoifie to 
®e0k departaeat as w#ll as thos® wliio'li &m tatertepartaental 
are pooled am©m§ dspartmeat® eai :0liar©t propertionatelf toy 
tbem* Suoh a poliay will b® ©e©ao®i« to eooperating firms 
only mBtor these sp@ol®l ooa€itio»», !idw@Tei!, and eannot be 
r@ooa®@ftd®i ia tli® gmmv&l mm beeauae of the miieooiiQmie 
disproportioaalitiea .whisli mm likely to rtamlt betwetn 
firm© pattiaifttiBg in iiffeteat fl@pertaaats in tlie Joiiit 
plant. 
®i« propertioaality oonoept applies to tli® sharing of 
all mmomiQ rtlatiensbipi aaojag ceoperatiag fims arisiag 
from their op«atioB of m oomoa plant Jaiatljt This is trm 
betw@®ii dtpartmeats aiiA o-rer •time m wtll as within a given 
i@part»ast m& OferatiBg period, •fith tmoertalaty in, the 
picture, these r@lationahipa are shartd by partioipatiiig 
firas on the basis of aaticipatad proportionality. Specific 
%iayh«w, •laya© 1. Siagl® and »ltipl© Fool Acoomting 
for Co©p«ratifes« la Assriean Cooperation; 1948. p. gl9-isa 
Ameriean Institat# oF Cooftration* Washington, B. C. 1949, 
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r«latloasblps will not Ij® pooled over time or between. 
i@partm©iita naltss tl is tGoaomifi for the partieipaling 
«iitr@pr®a«iirs to p©©l th@a ia order tcs redma® %h® maoertain-
tie» faolag ©a#h fira tadifiteally. 
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fill. OPfMJM PLAIT BlZt 
The types of acoaoMlc aetivlty Joiatly coaduoted by 
sevtral flma in a mimm plaat usually ^ ©quire'^ a i?elmtlT®ly 
large ©p©ratiom» #ith®r to mhiem best proportlonat® 
combiaatloa of inputs, ©r beo&us® of inoreasiag returns to 
seal®, ©r both, if th® loag run av®rag® oost curve la the 
plant is horizontal ov@r th® ©ntlr® ramg® of voluue, at 
Itast in a stati© s«ase'th« partielpatiag firm® would hav© 
had m laoentive, except a posslbl® aoaopoly laflueaoe over 
their markets, to a@t up the Joint plant, Saah firm oould 
set up aad operate its own plaat to perform for it th® sane. 
funotioa performed la th© Joiat plant with ao saerifie® of 
protuetiv® ®fflei®ncy. la th# abssaee of an opportunity to 
influeae© their markets by eomblaei ©ffort, if it war® 
possibl# to io this, firas would fun0ttoa iadepeadently 
rather thaa eoorilaata a part of their eetiviti©® ist a ooiraoa 
plaat, bseaua® of what Imeliaiioff calls th@ "centrifieal 
1 
foroQs'* worlciag agaiast sueh eoordiaatloa, llh®re th® long 
run av#rag@ ooat eurve is dtoreasing over ® ooasid'®rable 
rang# for a part of the total aconoaio funetion, or oontem-
plat#i fmnotioB, of soveral fir»s, however, by ooordinating 
this part of their aotivltie® and funotioning Jointly 
through a oomoa plant» th«y eaa iaareas© their eoonomio 
.^Sffiftlianoff• op. clt., p. 106. 
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etfleitaey by aolil©viag ©ptlam ilse In the plant. At tM© 
saa® time tli#y io aot eaea?!?!®® any ©ffioiency by moving 
into tfa© tmm of iaartasing loag run aT«J?age easts is their 
otbtr fiotiTities, slae© tksy ftinotioa iadividually aai 
iii<lep®Bi®atly witb yespeot to th«», f«rtfe®mor® tb© iailvid-
ml firms ratals tbeir' laiiviamal id«atlty aad sovereigEty, 
wbieb tbey would sot do if tbty wer® to merge ia order to 
gais tb® ©ooaoai®© of sise la tbia partietilar funotioa. 
Siat ratbtr tten scale is used 'tbroughonit tbis disomsato 
beoams® tb# aatur® ©f tb« loag rm averag® eost eurve aay 
reflect botb tb© aatwr® of .returas- t©. soele and different 
optiamii proportiooat® ooabiaatloas, lb® loag rm average 
oo®t omrv« is obtaiati by ooabiniag tbe poiats refleotiag tb® 
most favorablt laput ©oabiaatioa for ©very•outpot, it is of 
littl® 0©ac®rE for tb®' prsstmt iiaettisioa whether tb@ result­
ing loag ran average eost emrv® is a trm# soale He#, a 
proportionality lin®, or sons ©o»biaatioa of tbe two. It is 
tbe relatiottsbip betwesa long rua averag® cost and volm®, 
not the mmm of this relatloasbip as suob, wbiob determiaes 
tb© optiaw joist plaat si at, 
fb® siz« of tb® joint plamt will b# a funotion of two 
variabl@s—'tb® auaber of firms partloipatiag, aad tb® size 
1 
of aaob partioipating fira. If sitber of these factors is 
ooastant, tbe size of the joint plaat will be a direct 
P^articipating fir® siae agmim as definei only by those 
activities la tbe firm integrated wltb tbe activities of tb® 
joint plant. 
*• 1§1, •• 
fnactioa of th® otMe?. Th@ dettnalaetlea of th® optiwia 
slua of th# part iolpat lag flms, taking into o©aslder®tion 
tbat part of each iaelttidi ia tb@ Jeiat plant as well as 
that payt outside of it, is dlsewssed in tb# following 
cMptej?. It till b« aasttiMi li®f0 that mmk participating 
fim has iMiirl<i«ally aohl®v«i ©ptiaum slat and resomroe 
allGoatlon wh®a the total aetitity for eaeh firm, inelmdiag 
its proportioaat# shart of th® joint plaatj has been taken 
into ascoaat. as portrayed in Wigum 1, th® optiam aiz« 
for @aeh fim is not n®e#ssarilf atsmmet to b® «q.ual to thet 
of all ©the?.partioipating firss. Having hf assmption 
iateralnsd the ©ptiaua sl2® of eaeh participating or poten-
tlallf partlelpating fim, th© 4®t©rmiaation of the optimum 
siz® of the Joint plant will Bpmifj the aaaber of partiol-
patiag firms ia th® plaAt. th® optlam plant size will b® 
r@ali«®d by stcuriag th«, n®o®®sarj awaber of partieipating 
firas in the 60©p#ratiT® asgooiation at th© tlm® it is 
foratd, and oan b© ftdJuBtei in the long run as ocmaitions 
affecting' th® «s©a©alos of slz# oh®.ng®, by indnoing ne^ w firaa 
to partielpat©, ©r by failing to r®pla©@ firae whieh oea®® 
partioipation, as th# oas® w«rra»ts» 
As has bt«B pointed out, howewr, th® a®oision to 
partloipate in th© Joint aotivity and to withdraw from it is 
mad« iadiiridually by the ©ntr®pren®ttri of th© ©©operating 
firms rather than by th© partlGipating entrepreneurs ooorii-
nat@ly, ®xe®pt that, as a eooptrating grotip, th®y can Halt 
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parti0lpati©n la the Joint plant If desirable, ifhere th« 
optiattffi plant sia« is relatively lefge tbe asBotiatsd 
aotivity will tev® to r®f^ e®«at m ©eoao'iile mBourm allo-
©ati©m^  to. 6 smbatantial nmhe^  of firmB, rathef than only a 
few, beeems® fimi mmot h& ia&um&. t© partioipet® against 
tb®ir 0*m best eoeaosie iate?®3t ^ egariltss of how auoli 
plant ©ffieieney couM b® iaprovti by th#lr fartioipetion* 
MA mm when parti eipatlon ia the Joint aotiifity is in 
th#l3f b«st imt®r@st, son® fiiMS say not partieipat® beeaus® 
of impeffeet taiowl©ig@ ana lask of entreprenattrial ability. 
The oooperating fims may be able tQ'^ 3n<lue® smeh" firms to 
pastlQipate tbrottgla laforaatiomal m& etttoattoaal efforts, 
and. nay Jttstifiably iaemr csosts to do so if the partieipation 
of firms will ia©i?®as® plant effioieaey auffieiently. 
leaaus€ of tli« faet t^ t fiid Joint plant is an integrated 
part of 6aeto of the partieipatiag firms, the optiana siz® of 
th® plant will not neeessarily be id@nti©al' t© that of a 
firm p@rforming the aam® ©oonosie fttaetion mfier the 'sa®® 
oirewastaaeat* Frotoet® and resowoes ®o¥ing from tbe Joint 
plant to til® perticipating firms, or vim versa, do not 
eliang® liand®, bttt m® simply reallooettfi witfain tb© firms. 
m@r® t&« ©mtpmt ©f the IniitiAual plants of tli® partioipating 
firm® is iapmt t© tlieir Joint plant, the oost fmnotion in tht 
Joint plant inelmdis no oo«t for th& raw pxodtiet® wfeich are 
pro0@i804 and aarkttei in the Joint plant, • The quantity of 
snoli prodttots supplied to th,® plant is not tetemined in th# 
•* i53 •• 
pl®0« iir©©tly, but by tb® sua of tli® individual 
•satyeprdaeMrial deeisioas by tb© psrtieipatiag ®atr@pif©B@urs, 
eoEsidefiag betli th« eperstioBs of tbs JolEt plant end tbei? 
indifidmaX plants, as to bow Meli ©f tbes® proiuet® will b« 
produced i» eaob fira. fli« loag rua average oost mrm i» 
tb@ Joiat plaat ia tbtrefoi-# ieyived direotlj from tbe 
pbyaioal proimotloB trnQtiom'm it is afftetei bf Toltm®. 
fbis ttobaieal prodMctloa fmotiom In tb# plant will tek« 
iato 0oiisi4ei?ati©ii tb® inpmt-output relatioaafeip m aff^ etefl 
by volwa® ia th® proetsaiag, storage, aerobaadising ant 
tramsportatiom ©f tb« proteets (botli from tb® partieipating 
timB to tb® Jolat plant end froa tbt plant to outsifi® 
fi'rms proviaiag tb# ms,rk®t for tb# plant outpmt). fb® long • 
run avsrag® eost emrw ia tht aasketiiig plant will ooasidtr • 
only tb® Qosts iaTOlvti in stieb irelatlonabifs aM not tb® 
TOpply prio® of tb@ pfotm^ t iapmts as aff«ot®i by volua®. 
fb@ low point or I»A»G6 1B tb© loag run ATEYAG® §ost mtre in 
the Joint flaat will be st tb® sa» outptit as tb© low point 
in the long rm m®m§& ©o.st 0«rv@ ia a firm ia tb® sam® 
oirewstanoes, mlets th® «upply ciirv# of tb@ profinet input 
to sueb a firm is p®ipf@otly ©lastio, but will b© at ® 
larger voliuat» 
lb@3?® tb« output of th® Joint plant is input to tb® 
iadividnal plants of tb@ partieipating firms* tb© ©©operating 
entrspreaemri anat consider tbe prodmot supply onrv© facing 
tb# Joint'plant,, bnt m a gronp.tbay do not fao@ a demand 
QWtm ia tbe jolat plant siaee produtcts do not ohaage hands 
as ttoy aov® froa th® Jolat plaat to the participating firms. 
•Bie t^aatlty of amh proimets itsandtd froa th« plant is aot 
det'srmlttst in the aarlctt plae# dlreotly, bat by the sm of 
th© iaaiTidmal ®atrepr@a««rial^ deoisioa® hy th® partioipatlag 
•entr®pr®a«nrs, again ooasii«lag the operetions of both th® 
Joint pleat aad thsir individual plants, as to how mtieh of 
thfs® protoots will h® iitllizei la eaeh fira» la this oas® 
the-loag, rma'average cost omrv® ia th© Joint plaat will take 
into aeeowat eosts inv©lv#4 la the physieal prodmetlon fmac-
tioa and also the loag rma proitast supply eurv® faa@d la the 
joint plaat. ®i© optima, plaat slut will he d«fin#i directly 
hy th® lomg ran averag® eost sarv®, however# IRh® ©lastloity 
©f the loag ran i®Bi.and earvt will not h« ft faotor, siaoe th® 
itmaad for the oatpat of th® plaat is tetermined hy th® sam 
of th© iadividaal dtelsioas of the partloipating ©atreprtnoirs, 
aai is given las©far a® the Jolat plaat is aoa©®ra@i, 
fhea th® oatpat of th« iaiividaal plants of the pertiel-
patlag firs® ia input ia th# Jolat plant, the Jolat plaat 
will he reftri'^t to at a marketing plant# 'ihtn th® oatpat 
of th® Joint plaat is iapmt to the iadivliaal plants of th® 
partioipatlag firms, th® Joint plant will h® r@f®rred to as a 
parehasiag plaat, , Ixaaplts of Joint marketing plants inolud® 
all agrlealtarel marketing cooperatives, saeh as graia .©le­
vators, creameri@0 and flaiS ailk aasoeiatloa cottoa gins, 
llvtstosk markitlag aesosiationa, oanniag faotorlea, soybean 
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pr©§«ssln|| plants, eitrtis and small- fruit aarkating ass©0ia-
tiOBs, tofeaecG aarketlag agso.oi8tlooii,, T©g®tabl® and mt 
sarketlng assoeiatioas, aa4'WOel-markstiag aisoeiatioa®; 
flsb«iaaa*» market lag a-ssoelstioas; marteting mssoeiatioES 
of mamiifaetur«rsi amd aftrketlag associations of transporta­
tion Go»paiii®s, as tke iallwaj ixpress Agtnay, In 
tbese aisoelatiOBS tbs Joiat plant is lattpyated witfe aad 
optrated as a part of the total op«r©tioms ©f tm firms 
operating iBdivlfittal plants to produ©® th«,raw aaterial 
product inpmts for tli® Joiat plaat. lxaiipl@s of Joint pmr-
Qhming plaata iaeltt€© Stll. agriealtuiral purehaBiag ©oopera-
tiir@s, su©!i as, p®trolsm ass-ooiations, ge»@ral fara stapply 
©ssoeiations, ft®4 amd ss«4 assoeiations, f©rtlllz«r assoel®-^  
tioat, rmral elsetrle assealatieiis, farsi Imnwemm aiaoeia-
tioas; retail aera&aats* wholeaal® pmrehasii^  assoeiet-ieaa, 
srnah as groeers* wholeaal# aasoelatioas, Mrteard wbolaial® 
assoelatioas^  aM druggists* whole-sal© associations; aana-
faetttrsrs' smpply parO'liaslJig assooiatioai. aM eoaaraers' 
pmreliasimg asso©tatioii-s« In tliast assoeletioas tli© Joint 
plant, if intagratti -titb and operated a8\e part of tli® 
total optratlons of tha firms whi^ h opsrat© IMividmal plants 
tliat utilia® th@ finishat product output® of tha Joint plant. 
In tootte types, ©f Joint pleat tba opportuaitf to gain aeonoabB 
of &iz&f as a result of both tsohaleal proamotion eeonomias 
and opportmaitiea to inflmsnct t-h,e ma-rkats faeiag tb© fir®*, 
aM tile opportmaity -to rafiuea tto,@ range of mnoertaiatiea 
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faeiag' tli# Iniivtdml ®]otrepr©a««rs are th@ two laportaat 
faatoj?© BotiTfttiiig th« iitigsatioa tteoagh eoordlaatu attiom 
rather thaa Iby &mh tlm imiri&mXly* 
A. Optlam S4s« in the Joiat Marlcettiig Plaat 
Sit optiaum siz® la tfe« Joiat aarketlag plant, from, tli# 
standpoint of wmxiMm &mwmlQ «ffiei®atf ta tht partioi-
pa ting firms., is a®fiia«a by tM rslatioasMp hetwmn two 
funetiOBS .ia tJi® Joiat plaat. fles® two fanations are ttii© 
long run ®v®ra.g« total mit oost eurv® aaft tli® long .rua 
aTsrage reTsnue otirv®, fli® 4©ii.f rua airsrag® eosts in th® 
Joint ffia.rk@tiag plant will iaolM# all 0o.sts of process tag, 
storagt, mtreMndising, paekaging., advertisiag aad traas-
portatioa ia ooaneatloa with tl# prodacts Marketed through 
th« Joint pl«t.« Bmh eosts will lia¥@ B&m obaraeteristic 
rtgrasilon oa wlw®, 4@f#niing ©a tii® nature ©f tfee teetoaiesl 
proAactioa fmaotioas ia th.® plant aai th.® ®Mpply prio« of 
resoare® inpat-s to t:^ ®. psrtiQipatiag firms as a groap. 
tJaltss. this regrtssioa i# a liorizoatal strai^ t lin® over 
the wiiole rang®, ©ptiaaa si a© or optiwa sis® rang© for 
the plaat operation# will b# €®fiae4 fro® tfe« stentpoiat of 
miniffii.ziag long ran average totel aait costs, 
fiiis miaifflsw poiat or rang® in tie long ran awrag®. 
total aait ©oat oar^ ® ia %k» Joint plant will b® at the 
saa« volam© a® tH® loas ran airtrag« oost earTo for e firm 
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perfermtag the s®ae @8©a©Mi© fuaeti©a as tlie Jotat plant 
tit amm elt©m®tane«s o^ aly 'ia the special eas® wfe®r@ 
the lo:^ g mn raw protest smpply fmrnotioa faaiag smc& a firm 
is perf«etlf ©lastie. Thm leag rua average eost emre in 
til© JoiAt plaat -will to© l©wtr than the sijailer omrve for a 
firiB performiag the s®a® fmaetioa tlireugbemt the rmg® hj 
aa amouat ©qual t© tfa© supply priis® of tbe raw produets to 
ttois fira, Tk® amouat will fe® a ©oastaat wli«a this supply 
eurv® is perfectly ©lastie, but will Is.® an iseraasing 
funotioa Qf •©luffit wii®ii tii# long run aterag© @xp®n4itur® 
ourve for tte®@ pro4tt0t« to -Pi©! a fim hm mj -positiT# 
slop®. • If tli® latt®r is tfat oas0, the long rua av«rag® 
7^ •• total unit eost ourva ia tM Joint plant will ii©ir®r reaeli ^  
— • #• 
its'»iniffiuffi point m looa (-at as snail gia-®) as will tim 
long rua average tost @mrv« of a fim ia tli« ©-amis ©ireujB-
stane-es. 
®©s@ eliara©t®riiti©@ ar@ visuallaed ia Figure 3., fit® 
solta lia© ©urv®! r©present tlios® relevant in tli® Joint 
mark®ting plant wliil# those of ferolita lines represent thm 
r®l«vaat eurves in th# fi» perforaing the sa» funetioa. 
®i« priffl# notatiOB l®tt®r» r®fer to tm firm whil® tMos© wkida 
ar« not prime r®fer t© thm plant. Ia figur® M tfa® long rua 
average eost 'eurv® in th« aarfettiag plaat raaeli®# its miniam 
at output (plaat sis®) Q% ant tto® long rua average cost 
©urv® ia the fira r®tt©Ji®« it» miaiina at tl^ is saa® output, 














Figure 3B. Marketing plant. Long run equilibrium under 
monopolistic conditions. 
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flra, , is perfeetli' ©lastic tlirou^iout * LAG* is ©qmal 
to I^AG plus OS, iftileh Is a ooastant. 
Ia fignp® SB, ikmmQWf'M* is posit if ©ly sloped ao that 
th® sw of th® LS* .fmnetioi. aad th® Lie fmaotiom gives th® 
lAC* fttnotioa whioh mmmB itsilBiffliai et a saaller long mn 
outp^it Isize) than doas th® L40 fnnetion., In this eas# th@ 
size, OH, whioh ainimizas th# long rnn averag® ©ost in th« 
J o i n t  f f l f l y k « t i n g  p l a n t  i s  l a r g e r  t h a n  t h @  s i s © ,  O H - ' w h i e h  
aiaimizts the lo'ag ran av®rag@ ooat in th« fim tinder the 
aam® oonditioni# 
a® most ©ooaoffiio si^e for th® joint marketing plant i® 
not d®fin«i by th® long mn-av@rag® ©ost onrv® alon®,. how0v«r, 
tjrnd®r th® assmption that ®aoh partieipatiag ®ntr®pren@iir has 
arrived at th® optiiwa aHoeation of resoure®® in hi® total 
fir®, including that part in th® Joint plant, and has th«r@-
for® d®t«r»in«d tht' volua® r®prts@nt®d by his participation 
in th® Joint plants the coopereting eatrsprtneur® will striv® 
to obtain the amt>@r of participating firms ne®®ssary. to giv® 
th® Joint plant the siz® whi©h will maxiaia® th® eontribution 
of th® 'Joint plant to the profit of ®a@h participating firm, 
fh® size at Iflaish thi® optiwa ©oonomi® ®ffi©ioney will b® 
achieved in th® Joint marketing plant depends not alone on 
tha^ long run avarag® cost function, but instead upon th® 
r@lstionship b«twe®n thia function and th® long run averag® 
revenue funotioa. 
®i0 Joint marketing plant will b® of optimm.siz® whan 
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th@ Img per mit return in thm plaat is at a »axiwa, 
bteans© et ttet mime tlat mt ©oatriMtlon to tto© ia©©a« of 
mQh «ai #v©ry partieipetiag fira-, tot it larg® or small, will 
b« at a naxiattM. it this sia® ©f ©p^ratioms, which is 
aetoi8ir©i, r#a@Bfe®r, W t&e'partieipatioa of t&« optiaua 
aambtr of firms, th@. -©©eperatiBg tatrepreneurs will r@e®iv# 
th@ majEimw per unit realiztd pri©® for tim prodwets protueed 
im tli®ir inSiTiteal plants mi. marketti tferou^i th«ir Joint 
plant. By maxialaiag tfai® net realised prlt#, tli« partiol* 
pat lag «iitr®pr®B@mrs aaximl^t tli© addition to t&eir IndlTid-
ual n@t ineoa##. ftiii is trme, sin®® tli« fartioipating firms 
by assumption ar® iadlvlteally ia, ©^Milibrlm, rogardles® of 
tie mmb«r'Of malti prodmeed ia «a©li of their firm® and 
iiarkist^d tferougli tii«lr Joint plant, and regardless of t]&« 
average prodiaotion eosts ia tacli of their ittdiTtdmal firms. 
By way of illustrating this significant point, suppoa® 
tMat t&.®' long r«a awrag® per unit net return to th.® partiei-
pating firm® for the prodaets aark®t@d tbrottgh tb® Joint 
plant ia aaximlzed at on®'dollar by tk« optlwa, sis® of on® 
million 'Units of outpwt in tb® Joint plant, tt® oontrlbmtlon 
of tl® plant to tJft® profit of ©aeli partloipating firm will b® 
at a aaximm at %M'» omtpmt* Biis is' trn® for an individual 
participating firm prodttolng tea naits; it ia trn® for on® 
prodnaing tsn tbomaasd nnlts. It bolds ©qually trn® for a 
partioipating fim witl aa average prodmotlon cost of nine 
oonts and on© with an av®r®g® prodnetion oost of ninety e«nt8» 
• 3.61 -• 
If th® slM of this maarketlag plaat is either eon-
tra©t®t OT tmU'thia oa® aillloa malts ©f otjtput, 
m tliat til® av®j?ag« B«t mtuwm is to miastf-alae 
©tats, tb® profits of ell, paytieipatiag firaa will b® ©or-
rtspoaiinglf z«att®td» 
It ia ©f mm0% fessibls, m& mm liktlri tliat tb® 
BatOT® of tlie i©.iig tm. &wem aa€ tl® loag Tm 
avtsag® mwmm mtm ia tte Joint aarksting plant aaf b® 
suqil tHet thsye ia m.o ©s« ©ptiam pleat si.s®, fhem mf b# 
® wid®.optiBw size i?®iige. fM« is partiemlayly likely to 
be ti?\i« wfe®!-.# Urn loag sm average rav®mti« msm la pttir-
fettlf elasti©. Is &mk easda th®'eooperat'iag firns will 
striv# to ©btala a #12© is thtlj? .joint marketiag plamt som©-
wli«r® witfeia til® ©ptlaw mum* 3"tt4giag from th# e^ Kp^ riaac® 
©f oo0psi?atlT« aissjoiatioaa la prattle®, wk@i?« tfa®"partiel-
patiag firaa mm fa@ed witM oapital rstloalag, wn0®rtaiatl®8, 
impBwfBQt toowleiga, asd indifftraa©® bi- ©o»# of the pai?tlei-
pat lag @atf«pr®a#tirs I ttoey will probably stylv» for tfa® 
mlai«a mtMt tlias a larger ©pti®aa ats«, at l®ast at tli« 
primary lettl, 
fh© partieipatiag eatrepreneuj?® of a Joiat »arlc«tiag 
plaat, tli«a, Bmk to obtain «.nd maiataia a saffleieat aamber 
of flriis IB til© a»»o®iat«4 astiTlty to glT# a mlvsm la tli® 
Jolat plant w^ iols will maxialE® t^ e vtrtiQal dlst.aa©« bet®«®a 
the loag raa mst siiipve aad th® loag tw& m®mE@ 
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rmeum ©tu?T® faalmg th@m in ttotif jolmt plaat, fli@ loag, 
aferag© reTeam# tmm feeing tb« Jeint market lag plaat 
will %9 Idantieal to ttm long sma a-rtsag® rmmm mrm 
facing a ®0¥@rsiga fim la the «am« ©i^ ewitaae®#. If 
proteots «ark#t#d tteomgb tH® Joiat plaat ©onstittit® a suf-
ficieatly small part of tkes® toT tfa® indmstry so that th@ 
partioipating firm® eaaa©t' inflnsn©® th© prie# of thtie 
produotfl, end in the afea#a©9 of pi-oimet dlff@r©atittioii, 
tftia lm§ run average vme&w mww@ will be psrfeetly elastle, 
ani th# low point in tlbe l©ng ,imn aT®rag® ©ost enrT® will 
r«pr®s@at ttoe plant sizt at wliith per mait met reir®Bm© fro® 
th® operations of tb® Joint aark®ttng plant will b® at a 
asaiioffli. If tb® averaga «3:p®aiittire funttioa for tb® raw 
proinot inpmt:® to a fim p®rf©r»ing tb« sa»® function as tb® 
Joint plant it perf@etly tla^ ti®, tbe optlwim sia® of tbe 
Joint plant aM tb® optiium siz® of a firm in tbe sea® 
sitmation will b@ ii®ntiQal wafi®r tb®s® ©ondition®. 
•b@re th« ontpnt of tbe Joint plant is a iiff®r0nti®ta4 
prodnet, or wber® it r®pr«s®at« a Itrf.® «a©ngb part of tb® 
total iniiaatry omtpmt so that tb® participating firms ©an 
inflttdne® tb® pric® ©f tb® prodiiot, tb® long rnn afsrag® 
r«T®nu® carT® to tb® plant will b» nagstiTely eloped. In 
sn©b cas@^  tbe ©pti®uii plant siz® will b® at an ontpnt 
1 
ef. Fbillip®. ©p. oit., p. 72-80. 
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somewlat saalldj? tkaa tliat whiioli miai»ia®8 the long rm 
&T@mm ©osta# optiam will %e -fehat sis® wbi©h aaxi* 
iaiz®s lOBf rm p©r unit n®t raTOUti® fro® tb@ plant wbi^  
will be at tbt omtpmt wler® th« wrtiaal sp.^ @ai ]>®tw»©a 
loag 3?tm aTtragt mat aai lamg i-m aTsrmge r©v®aiie ia ttoe 
1 
plast is ir«at@st-. f&is will m&t a®e®ssarily l)« at tfa@ 
sam« omtput m th© opti«ffl siia tm a fim ia tlie saaie 
sitttation, altMomgM tk9 optiam «i2@ toT tli© two is lifc©lr 
to ®©rr©®poat fuit© alosel^ * lot ©»ly will tin® severe i©a 
firm hm® t Img irw memm c®st emi-ve,. but ia 
©rt«a? to «,axiaJa« profits, tto® optlam fim sizt will be 
at tfe.e output mhrnm tfet losg ifua margiaal mat ow¥« iat®r-
®@ot# til® long rms margimal wmmm eurf# in tli® fim, fh® 
participating firss d© s©.t to saximisse profits ia tb® 
Joint marketing' plaat m smel %ut rstli#? to mmlmim thtir 
profits iBdlviauallyj w&iel thmj will aohiete at th® joint 
plemt siao wlii©li ®s3Eiai2®t ®T®?a,ge mtt return, ratHer tbaa 
total mt r©T@au#, frsa tfatir Joint plant, 
©caaAition® ere^ eli© tisaelia«d in Fiiur© 3. In 
figur® 3A tb« partieipstiag firaa m&ximiE® tfe«ir profits by 
aaintaining tte® aia® Oq in tlisir Joint asrkstiag plant whlQh 
maxiaiEf® &mmg% net r@wnu#, Bl, from tbe plant, sin©® tiit 
M^atbeaati^ allf wli«r« th® first d®ri¥atiTes of tli«s® two 
funetions ar« tqmal# 
- 164 
loag Txm air«rage mmnm aarfe^  Is a horizontal straight 
lia®, thii till fe© at ths plaat sia® OQ, whieh aini®i2©s long 
rtta aferag© eosts. A fir® mnitr the sao® oircmstances faoeA 
with a perfeotly «lasti« marginal ©xpsaditmr® eurv® for its 
raw product iapwt, LS•, will also operate at th® size OQ, 
bsoaiis® at this outputs long rma aargiaal 'oost ©qrnal® loag 
rma margiaal xmrnrnxQ ia th© firm. If IS* is positivtly 
sloped, suoh a firat will r®a©h. its ©quilihrium output soa®-
whar® t© th® l®ft of Gq» 
la figur® SB the participating firms are fa©®d with a 
aegatively sloped loag rua averags rtTeam® cuTTe ia tbsir 
Joiat aarlcetiag plwat.- a«y.siaxiKize average m% retura from 
th® plaat, Cf| at th@ plaat siss® 01 whera th@ loag rua av®«gB 
rav®au@ ourv« eai th« loag rua avarage eost curve ar@' th® 
gr®at@st vsrtioal iistaae© apart... • A firm uater the aaa» 
sirouastano®s t&m& with th® positively slopei average ©xpaad-
itur« fuaetioa, LS*'.| will r©a©h its equilibrium siz@ at out­
put, 0^ 4% whith »xiiiis®s total set r«vtau«« fliis output 
will h® 4@fla©d where th® loag rua margiaal eoet Qwew® later-
seotE th® loag rua sarglaal r#v©am® curve ia th@ firai* 
ligurts 3A aai SB of eoura® r@prts«at oaly two oas®a out 
of maay possibi# oonditioa® la th#. laiustry ia whleh th® o^lab 
plant is op«rat8i, csoadltioas aay h® eompetitlv© oa the 
d@»aad aid# ®o that th® loag rua av«rag@ mrmue eurv® i,s 
p«rftetly slaatio aad iioa©p®oai@tie oa tht supply sld.« so 
that tht loag rua supply (av®rag® ®.xp«aditur®) our^ va for raw 
x®§ -
pjoimets fa©lttg a fira in tbe lam# situatioa as th® o^lnt 
plamt is positiveiy si©p®d. Or eoaiitioas mf b# aonopoliatie 
on til® itmaad ®ld# s© tfeat tk# iong mm ieaaad emrir® faoiag 
111® partiQipatlag fims ia ttotir 4©int piant (aad a firm la 
tit sam® sltmtioal is asgatlT€l|' sl©p©t aM, ooapetitiTe on 
tfe® smpply sld@ so tfeat tli® aveyag®^  ©xpenflitur® function to 
tbt firm is ptrfeetly slastii. fast iifferinosa in th# 
X 
of mmpQlj and, aojaepsoay ar® also pessifei©. 
It has h.m& mm th&t $hB sis# of Joint marketing plant 
wHieto maxl*i«®s tli# profits of §11 participating firms is 
that si a® whieh aaxiaizts tli® lo-af mm atemm a®t return from 
tbe Joint plant# »ls will to® at tMat plant output whloli 
©tuatQs til® alopt of the long run a-f«rags total unit oo®t 
eUTTt ®nd the slop® of th© long run. a¥«rag® reTeau® ourir© la 
tM plant. Th& reltTsnt long run averag® eost ourv© In the 
Joint aark®tii^  plant is not of tbm supply prle# of th.® raw 
product inputs, sine® ttessa ar@ not ©btaia©i, la th® »rk@t, 
but proSueed la the in4lTl4ual plants of tB® partloipating 
@ntr«pr«a®urs. lnfi®r tk& ass'uaptions mad#, tli© optiffiuia, pl®at 
size is obtain«a omly h& securing tJi® eptiaua auml»®r of• 
partiQipating aatrspreaeurs. in tk« Joint aotlTltr. 
B^»gr®e of aoaopolf la tii« L&age sense. S®@ Lang#, O e^r. 
Frle© fltxlbilitf and laplofa«nt, Oowlsi 0©*. for l®s. in 
l0on. Monograph !©• 8. PriaGipla fr®s», Ine. Bloomlngton, 
Indiana. IS44, p. 41. 
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B. Optlaua siz® ia tb® ^oint Vmthming Plsmt 
T&® optiam si2® ia %M Joiat pvLmhmlme pXaat, fro« th& 
staadpeiat of Msxiaim @«®a©mi© effieitncj" ia tl# paftioipatiag 
fifas, ii i®t@rfflia#4 by ©iilr oat tamtim in the Joint plant, 
aat tliat is tfe® loag mm total eost ftmctioa. Th@ 
payticipatiBg mtxeprmmtM ,a® a gfoup io mot fae# a 
fmaetioB f©s tb® ©mtpttt of thtiy Joiat pm»©hasiiig plant, sim® 
tfesf set lap tb@ Joiat plaat m a peepertionat® payt of ©acb 
of tbeir tirai to aamfattmra, pmmas or pa?©Q«r® raw profiiKrta. 
Of spseifie eapital ^ ®sour§®s mM@^  in tlieir iadividual 
prodmetioa operatioas. flier® ia no afetage fuaetiea 
in tha Joiat pwobssiag plant Isscaua© its output tees not 
mmm iato tb© aark®t to be sold to outsii® fims, tout iastsad 
.aov®i froffi tb.® JoiBt plaat to tlit separate first of ths indi­
vidual participating ®atytp^ ©a«mr8 without ©Mangi.ag haMs im 
til® ©ooaoiaic ssbs®* 
fli© paftieipatiag flmt indivitoally tttermia®, hmre 
a@t«mlii0a hf assmaptioa, tha ©ptiaua nuafeer of units of tk® 
Joiat plast output a®«d©t to supply tlie aggr@gate iaput ia 
tMir la4iYl4ual fims* me paa?ticipatisg 0»tif®p3?@a®ur'S have 
aeali ma4« this ietsmiaatioa ooasiie^ iug the total a©t p«r 
unit cost of ©uoli isput obtai3a®€ through tbelr .Joint purob®si-
iag plaat amd t!i« productivity of this input im ©aoli iaaivid-
ual fifii. Tto-® optiiiujffi plant eizs is aehievei by steuring ttoe 
nuEibe? of pai'tl'Cips.ttiii.g fijpifts wbieb will pTOvid# tM# vo,lu®® 
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mmm&Tf to mialaiat the af©3?age total mait oost of thm 
omtput of th# joist pwehasisf plaoat to the partieipating 
firms, startiag with eseh partieipatiag fim in pro4ttetioa 
©qmilitorim, tto© Joint pmrokasiag plaat size wliich ainiala«s 
thit average total tmit ooit of tli® plant output will aaxl-
aia® th« profits of @ae,ht participating firm, r«garil#sB of 
the aaab^ r of mlts msti, or tie marglaal prodtiotivity of 
this plaat output, in ©aeli, partioipatlng flra. 
As ©jcaapl® aaj agaia used to iUuitrat®. Suppose 
that la « glv@B Joint purofaa.slng pleat th® optimum size is 
aa output of fiv® huatrti thousaad malts aM the average 
total uBit oost is one dollar at this output. Bi® plant at 
this size will r#M®r the masciam eontributloa to th® profit 
of th®. partieipating fim using five units of the plant out­
put and the one using five thou»a.ad units alike. Biis is 
equally true for e partloipating firm in whieh the average 
proiuetlvity of this output of the Joint plant is one dollar 
and one seat and one where th® productivity is one dollar and 
ninety-nine oents. If the sia® of th# Joint purohaslng plant 
is either,expanded or eontraeted from this five hundred 
thousand units of output ao that th© average total per unit 
eost is inereased to a dollar and on® oent, the profite of 
all partloipating firms will he reduoei aoeordingly. 
In order to eonpare the long run average ooets in the 
Joint puretoslng plant with those'In the Joint aartetlng 
plant, the Joint purohaslng plant costs say he broken down 
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into coats of operating th# pl«iit, aad %M cost of raw 
proiuet iapmts ia tht plant. Tke long rwa avarag® operating 
or factor oott fmetion la th# Joint purebaslag plent is the 
BBm sort of eost ©«rv« m th® rsle-raat long rua average cost 
mtm in the Joint market lag plant* It will inoluft® all ©osts 
of proeur@ii«nt» msamhlj, ®torege, proe«ssiag» ami trans­
portation la eonneetlon with all produets' piirolia®®4 through 
th# Joint plant, aM will again hava am® elisraeterlstl© 
regression on volum®, depending upon the natmr® of tli® 
teofenieal proiuatioa funetions in the plant and th« supply 
prle® of resource inputs to th@ partieipating firiiS m a 
fh@ long run averag© raw proimat input in th® Joint 
purohasing plant will h® the long run supply funetlon of sueh 
products feoing th© participating entrepreneurs in the Joint 
plant, fhi® supply pries my he ©onstant to the Joint .plant 
OTtr all unit® of volua.®, as It wo.uia' h® uaa@r oompetitlve 
QoaAitions, or it may be an inertfising funetioa of volua®, a® 
it would he under aonopsonisti© oentitlons. It may @T®n h« a 
d©@r©asing function of volum® pv«r a limited rang# heeaus® of 
opportunities for quantity diseounts- and similar conoesslons, 
where th® p&rtioipating firms fme® aonopolistie selling of 
®uth produets, 
fh® relevant long run averege oost curve in th@ Joint 
purchasing plant, and also for a soverelga firm in th@ same 
conditions., i.s the sua of th® long run average total faetor 
cost function and th® long run tupply fuaetion of th« produet 
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iapmt« faaed in tli® jelat plant. Th« paytlelpatlag sntr®-
prmevitB of a Jolat pmrcteslng plaat s®»k to obtain ani 
aalatain a mftiQMmt ambts of flj^ as i» the aasooiatet 
-actiTitj to giw ® ¥olttm® la tiie Joiat plaat whieh will »iai-
mia« -tMe long mn total mit 0©st fiaaetlon Ib the 
joint plaat* mis will b« at tlis sam® omtput as a fiif® ia 
th« saae ei^ mmtmrnB whm the long mn ieaaM mwm faeiag 
th« firm la p#i?f#otlf #l«stl@, bmt tht optimm slz® fci' th«, 
two will flO't iieetssarily b© at tie mmm outpmt wfeta the long 
ma itaaai ettrv® faoiag 't,h® flra is megatifelf sl©p®t« 
fits® -QoaaitiOHs sf® Tlsualizti is figiwe 4» fb© saat 
BQhmm of ftotstioa that -was msefi in fi,gu3*® S is um&. fesr©. 
In figur® 4A %M ©ptiiawm siz© for th@ Joiat purchasiag plant 
is at tie outpttt OQ where thm rua aterag© total eoat 
eurTt i» at its -siaiwia. Is thi®' ©as® tkm loi^  rua supply 
mtf® fot the raw proiuots used la tfee Joiat plant is perf©0fe-
If ©lastle so ttot tto® low poiat in t,lis long rua averag® 
faetoy oost auTT# is also at its aiBiw» at tliia poiat. fb® 
avsrsgs r®ireamii eus¥# foy tb© fim ia tba aaa® .situation ia 
hOTlaoatal ia 'tkii ease eo tlat output OH also ftpr@s©nts 
th© opt law flm siz&m lotl tH® participatlag firias. in tli« 
•joint pureliasing plant ant the •soT®r«iga fim will pay 
suppliers of th® raw proiuets th® prie® QB per unit for Gq 
mits ia tliii'ease, . 






Figure 4A. Purchasing plant. Long run equilibrium under 





Figure 4B. Purchasing plant. Long run equilibrium under 
monopolistic conditions. 
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Im, Ilgttt® 41 thm opt4m«m slz® tow -th® Joint purehaslag 
plsat li also fit .tto® ©wtpiit wbejr® tli® l®Bg run average 
total east omrv® is at a ataiiiw# fbis optiaim size is 
smaller than tiis ©utpiat at wiiith tli® long r«a air©r©g® faetor 
©ost ottST® r#a©hes its miniam b®©aws® ttoit. l«s-ag rtm smpply 
mTVB for tli® i-a* pyoduets, wbil# dewa^ aiPd sl©plag over e 
llattsd ifaagQ., la mpward sl©plag. ores tb© r©l#¥a,at rang®, 
At till a opt lam tbf avefag® total mit aost to tli® partlei-
patlag fims foi? th® out put of the Jolat pleat ii i|i, o^ f wbl& 
QB go®@ to tl@ smppllejs ef tb© raw psoimet Input, flm 
\md.QT tto® #a»© 0lf0iimstaa®©s is la this ease a@®-um®d t© li® 
fae®€ witlt a asiatiwly ®l©pei loag rtts aT®rag® rBrmum earw. 
Til# optiam tlTM slae li at tbi omtput 0^ " w^ re tlie long rma 
majpgiaal cost ©mirv® iat®i?8@et8 tfee l©ag Tvm. marginal reTtau® 
amr?® tmm feelow. fM« flm atlla lt« ©mtpmt foi? a p©r mit 
pyie# §F* aad ©ptirat#® at a total mlt mst of OC*'. It oaa 
be se®m ffOB tMm diagsaas that tb# pui?Gteslag plaat size 
wliich maximizes the profits of tba partieipatiag firms Is 
mmm&a&rtlf at the same output m t%& ©ptimw size for a 
firs in tM mm& situation only tlie aemad miev® faeiag 
th® flm is perfectly tlaatio, 
Im suaffiisry • tfe«a, tto® aiz@ of the joint parcMslag plant 
wbloli' tbs profits of all, partioipatiag firms' is 
tliat elm mhUh mtmimima tljf long run a^ erag© total ualt 
©est fuaetioa ia the loiat plant, ffais average total ©ost, 
iEolmt«s both plaat operatiog 'oosts mA tests im the raw 
* i?a 
proamet inputs^ fkete i& ao d«aBd emrT# fading the partioi-
patiag @Btr«pr@ii0w® in th® Jeiat puifoMsiag plant siae® the 
plant ©mtpmt is a©t a®rk#t®d to 0Mtsi4® firms from the plant, 
hut ffiovss diseotly iato the iadividmal plaats ©f the partici­
pating eatr®f3p®B®mi's. • 
C. Optiaw Size in th® Mmltipl® Departaeat Plant 
So far th© optimm slat of th« 4©iat aarketiEg plant ani 
th® Joiat purehasing plant has hten eoasiier@i in th® case 
wher® it is ©eonoaie to th® partieipatimg flr»s to hav® only 
Qm a@pattfflfiiit in their Joint aetivity. It is entirely 
possibl®, howtver, that the aatttre of the prodmetion aetivi-
ti«s in th® iafilTltoal fims of th® partioipatiag entr®-
prenwr® is «m#h that savtral itpartaents in th® joint plant 
can to® effectively integrated with, th© indiTitoal ae-tifities 
of th«s« firm®, so long as the ©aonomie relationsh.ip8 taong 
participating firms are shared proportionately within and 
h®twt«n departments, firms partioipatiag in one department 
m.@©i not n«©#®s&rily participate in other dspartsents. Every 
firm will partieipat® only in thos# departmenta, .and only to 
th® #xt0nt in emh ©f. them, where it represents optiam 
resoure# alloeation within th® fir.» to to so. Th® datoraina'-
tion of th« opt.ii^ Blze for «a#h 4®partffi«at in a umltipl® 
d«partment Joint plant is md# on the assmaption that ®ach 
pertieipeting firm has aohiev«d optimw resourot allocation 
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comsidtriag Ih® mtim of tli® fim, InolMiiig 
mm® within t&@ Joiat plaat a® w«ii as theit ©utsiie of it. 
fto® ©ptiBWM si2@ for ©aoli ispastasiit, ©aft fox the Joiat 
plant as a ifeols, is a<jiii®"?«4 hf seenriag the aimber of • 
S>arti0i|!atiag flif*s ia ©aeli a®pajrta®at wM©li is mmsMBTf to 
aefeisT® tHis iizK. 
it©siasa ©f ladivisibilities of mTt&im. inputs, aad 
b®Gams@ ©f la«ffiei@aei«a ia tH# mm of §«rt®ia resowrees for 
otktr. smmm^  a tiagl® 4ep«rtm®at joiat plaat may b© maable 
to acbiff® tfa© a@gr«® of ©ffioieaey whleh is possible ia a 
aaltiplt a@partii©nt Joiot plaat. Ia both the Joiat aeric®tiag 
plaat aad th« Joiat pmpchasiag plaat of mor® thaa on© fi®payt-
aest th@r® is oftea aa opportaaity to ster® oertaia long rma 
aT@rag0 ioiat «0.®t» beti»@®a <lepartiB©ats« By making falltr 
as« of eeiftaia iaputs this usaally giyes rise to great®!-
•tcoaoai© effioi«aey thaa is possible ia a siagl# iepaytmeat 
plaat. If the,?# it ito oppo^ tmity to share soa® ef th®s« 
eosts aad iapata iaterdsfartaeatally ia th® aaltipl® depart-
ia«at plaat, sueli a pleat hft@ littl® ©ooaomi® advaatag® oir«if 
oa® with a siaglt dtpartatat. Furthtiaor®, aalesa the loag 
raa ®wa?ag® joiat ©oat ewT# is a i@er@asi3o^  faaotioa of 
folm® over a raag® greater than tha ©ptlmam for a single 
iepartaeat, th® partisipatiag firms em §aia little tooaomy 
froa b®tte* iapat eoabiaatioa® by ©xpaadiag th« siz® of th® 
Joiat plaat beyoai oa© d«partm«at» It i® probabl®, howtver, 
b@oaa«® of iaiivisibilitits aad the opportaaity for mor® 
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Beaflf b®st prepertioaat® OGsblaatlQii of iap«t« at larger 
sizes, that th© i©iig rma sf®rag® Jol»t oost ©mrT® will he 
1 
4©wnwari sloping ©Ter a swhitantlal raage. 
the partieipatiag tatrepreneirs of is sttltipl® depart­
ment Joiat pmrohasiag plant will aohieve the optiam size 
of their plaat ®heE a amffl©iest amber of tepartaents, eaeh 
of optiaw siE®, has heea sited to nimijBlze the lojig rwa 
average total mi% Jolat eost ia the plaat, Bie optiraiia 
size of eeoh Separtaeat will he iefiaed hy the l©w_^ _point ia 
the^ loag ram aireyage total eoet ear^ e for the departmeat. 
fhe loag raa average total cost fanetioa for eaeh depertaeat 
will be the sw of the loag rum average speeifie ©ost faae-
tioB aad the per mait average Jolat eost at the ©ptimaa 
pleat siae, whieh will he a eoaateat, fh® loag raa average 
speeifie eoet for eaeh departmeat will iaelude the lapply 
price for the raw proimet iapats m well as the speoifle 
operatiag eosts for the iepartiaeat. 
Figure SA viflualiaes this eitaatioa for a three depart-
meat Joiat parehaalag plaat. fh® output for all three depart-
aeats is assi»©d to he ia ooaparahle aaitt lo a» to he addi­
tive. fhe optiaam pleat size is at the -output Oq, whieh 
aiaimiaes the loag rua average 4oiat oost fuaotioa at Q0^ . 
f^he loag rua jolat eosts will iaelude euah thiags as 
maaager*# .-ealaty, ©o^ t of off lee huildiag, equipmeat aad 
employees, eosts of werehouBee aad traasportatioa equipmeat, 
lead reat, aad m ©a« 
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Figure 5A. Optimum size in a three department joint purchasing 
plant. 
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Figure 5B. Optimum size in a three department Joint marketing 
plant. 
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fto® ,U.f0 eurir® f©? ea^li idpaytaeat tli® t&SQ mrv® 
fer ttot a«fa»tm®nt plua ©ptimm eizs f'Or depart* 
a»3at 1 ia at tli® ©mtpttt Qk wb«?« ti© leag tm aftrage total 
eost i.s alaiai»i at AC, 'Bie eptiam size dspartmsat 2 
'is ®t ©utput Ai whtft t,hs long mn ateragt total eost is BB, 
aad toT fi@peiftm§»t 3 at omtfut IQ wh&m tli# loag mm aTerag® 
total 00st i.a la this mm it tii« J-olat pureiiftaing 
plant • ©oMist«d ©aly ©f isfairtaeat 1, %M optiffiom siza wQtild 
OQ* at the ©tttpmt wtey© %M aveifag® total eest fimctioa 
i%h.9 Sttm of tit long rma average sft@ifi§ seat fmetioa and 
til® lomg rwa average Joint eost fanetloa) is at a aiaiaiia# 
AmrBge total p@ir mait e-ost t© tM© fires pmrtleipatiBg im tb® 
depai'tsettt wouli thm "be Q,»l» mtUer th&m AS as at pr®E#at. 
ThB partieipatiag mtrepTmewPB of t smltipl® dep&rt-
atnt Joint ii.af&@tiiit plant will also aslit-sTii- th« opti»aa 
ai!s« in th@iT plaat vhm a smffleltut niomber of departstnts, 
«aoli of optiwm aissj has hma aad®^  to aiaiaiz® the long 
rua avefftge per mlt joint oost in th# plaat# optlam 
size in eacli depai-taeat will fe# at ttet fiepertaent output 
whieh maxiaiw® ths fs^ tieal aistaaoe bstweea th&. loag rua 
mm&ge total eost aurtt aai th® loag rua a-rerage mrmum 
©UTT® in tk® d©pa.ftme»t.» Th# loag ^ ua avsreg® total cost 
fuaotioa for taob iepartaeat will b« tbe sua of th® loag rua 
aremge speeifio ©oat fuaotloa aat the per wait airearage 
Joint eost at tli@ Optiww plaat siM, whioH will a ©oaateat. 
fii« loag rua avtrage spteifie oost foa? @a©h tepaiftmeat will 
. I f 'T  -
mt iaoiud® tli« supply prie® of the raw protests fEraishei 
to th© aepertaent ¥y tM partieipetiag firas, hmt only th® 
ap^Qlfl© ©paratiag mats-fm %h.@ iepa.i'tatat# 
files® Qosaitioas mm ill«ata?at@i ia fign^ t gi, fh& 
optiffittm plaat Bim is again at tlie emtpttt Oq whi.cb Mioiaizes 
til® losg rm fitf#rag@ Joint eost fmnotioa at q0, fh® optiwa 
sis® f©y €epartm#at 1 is ®t tta® output 04 wtere tb@ ir®rtieal 
distaac# %@tw««a Lit® aai ,L41,. eF, is aaxiaiztd, a® ©ptimua 
sia® for ^ iftpartaent g it at 'th.® ©tttpiit 11 where tli« 
distaacs Bl is maxlaizeA., aod foi? itpertntttt B at omtput BQ 
whm& th© "re^ tioal 11 is-MxiaigeA,. If th® o^liit 
majfketiiig plant eoasist®!. oaly of itpaytmant 1 madsi* th®s® 
oo»4itloas, tl® optiffiua size womXi lie ©%• at the outpttt wb®r@ 
th® f®rti©al-aistsB## fe®twe®B tb@ loag sua af-©i?ag« xevsam® 
@Msm aaS the loag wm aT«rag© total eost emrf® (the of 
til® • awi'ag® spteifia @ost fmnetios ani tb® m^ mge Joint cost 
fmnetioa). l^ 'l* is at a Thm total a¥®i?age net per 
UBit y«t©am® t© til® p«ti0ipstiBg fii^ »s for product® msrketei 
thfOMgli tto® i«pattm©8t Willi them be only H*S'« reth@r tliam. 
Gf as et P'i?®i®nt» 
111®re til® type of pTOauotion earyiei on by th® partici-
patiag fiifffis warrants it, .a»t wli@a loag mm Joiat per mait 
oosts 4®®r®as® with, folim® ia tis® Joint plaat, tha. partlei-
ptttiai fi»s all »ai:imia# tli®ir profits ^toy a4diag. i@part»«nt% 
eaoh at its optimal tis®, ustil a aize is i?«aoto«d in tb« 
Joiat plaat wliiob miaiaiE®® tli® leag rm aTsrag® Joint p®r 
- If8 
mit This ©ptiMa size, betb fox ©aeli iepartmeat aa4 
fQT t&e Joint plant as s whol®,. 1» a0lil8v®i toy seonring tlie 
atimfetr of partiieipstiiig firms in tli® Joint eattvlty which 
will provide tli« voliiwi netessar^ f®r th® ©ptiiMa, 
- If9 • 
IX, IQUILIBSim II ®I G00PS1A.OT0 FIEMS 
Tlaa prollsa ©onfr©at®d at tbis Is to tii© 
static equllltolia positlom in the firm partlelpatss in 
a §offl»aa plaat Joiatly ©perattd a® aa iiit@gxat@i past of 
sewyal firms. It involTet tl# applieati©!! of th« g®ii@ralte®A 
theory of fira w&iali,aaximizts profits to t&« 
firm to t&@ easd wli®r@ a part of the proAmotioa aotl-^itles 
of the fiw iatlmdt particiipatioa ia tfe® Joiat plant, for 
aaalytieal pwrpos©® tlit ietarataitloa of tlila tquilibrlw 
posttiom Is iistiaet ttam %h& ^©teraiaation at tl« GptimtiB 
Joint plaiat siz® whiGk is 4isouss@a ia tM prefious ©liaptsr. 
Hi® two ar« iBttrrtlatei., tiomr^Tt .siaod tbs actml Joint 
plant Bim at mj glvea tta®' is- a ftaiotioa of both the, at»b-tr 
of partisipatii^ firms mi. th® siz® of each partieipatiog 
a 
firm,, tad the optiaum position for #aeh firm aspeais ia 
part mfOtt tto@ siz® of th# Joint plant m it tff&ets plaat 
©osts aai rsTeames af tlis margis# 'fb® prof it i of ®a§ii par-
tiaipatiag ©atrdpr^ afttr will h% at tMeir- Bas:ia«» only whsa 
oftiana r«S0ur©# allo^ atioa Imn ^ roftaetloa has %®«E eeh,isT®a 
%#a@relige(i ia thm atasa tMt tli@ ttoori' eoasidsra th& 
utilizatiott of several r#BO'mre@s to prodti©® s©Teral prodmots, 
ooasiStrs a supply selitdttl® for faetors and a deaaad so-hedul# 
for produett facing thffira fwliitli wmj h& perftetly ©lastio 
hut mt B®e#saarilf so) m4. allow® for iisaootiuttiti®® in tl# 
prodmotioa fuaetiom, 
• %lrm sist for this ptirpos® iiioludes, oaly those aotlTt* 
tits witlia tl« fim of whieh tlie Joiatly eo*idmated aetivity 
is aa iat@gral part. 
-• mo -
ia «aeli p.attieipatl,ag fim irb®» th® mw^ m of fim» 
mmmsmf fm &im ia m« Joiat plaat partieipat® 
ia it . 
Ixstft wfa®s# Sl?at«i it will %® as»w®a ia 
tb® p3f®»®at th.® ©ptiim »w^ ®t #f fi»ffl pertiti-
pat® ia lii® |@iat attivitj, s© tfeatj at th® poiat of tfai* 
lifesim ©mtpa'l ia •»§& pwii$ip«%iBg fiia, f&« Jeiat plaat 
will to® 9f #plia«ia .sit®, fte® T^ m%Xm »t %ta» t«»olv®i ©oa-
sists ef flif i®|«miaa.'ii®a ef.tfe® ©tailifeifia* ptaitioa for 
®a©)i 0@tp«t*|iag #itm» lfei» problea haa tw© &®p®®t8, Oa« 
18: mli^ tatisa tf Tm^ m&m iritlin tfe® pa.i»tlelpatiag fi». 
to a®iiieT® tto« hm%' pr«)ductioa ®©»iiiaitti©a.,, mA %-fe® ot]^ e:r i® 
til® d«t#f»la«%l@a .of tM® -©pt-tew .©atpat tm tim* la 
%Qtk m»m %Q$k tto,. -prtiiitti^ a a<itifilJi®» ©.tata®t®4 iati-' 
ti^ malli' aai thm® #©at«@l®i 4@tatly ®m$h. fim w«t h@ 
e0a:Sii®»®i, - -
'Tim i®t®taiaati®a ©f %k% all©eaiti©a ®f hmmm 
tle'^ jQiat plamt afti 'iaiiflteal prMaetioa atfiTlti®® fm 
&mk fim it • aiatif tk® t#t.0i*|»ati©a ef th® ©ptiaw tesomr©® 
all®@ati®a witliia 'tli® fim# ©trii«i ©a ©atsid® 
ttoi® .Joiat plaat tat flat tarried m .ia it asr e.©aiii®..i?«i 
®.® tw© p&a*®.® ®f t&® fetal f^ ®4ae.tl©a ®f a siagl® omtpat,. 
®in®« th® ©atpat #f tli« |©iat plaat is aa iapmt ©f tli® ia€i-
viimal plaat® «f tm pftifti«ip®tias fi»s» « t®^ ®®, 
m® ®«f«iratiTr® pip.©im®tivity ©f r®s©ay®®s ia tli® |eiat 
plaat mi ia 4#p«rt»®at8 witJi-ia tM« fim till i®t®»ala® 
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3?®s©mt0« ell®ea-feioa fe#tw@«a %h% pl&at asfi ©tMts 
in 'tis fi2?a, aai in' extr#3®» ms& wtmtMr or 
sot It it «#.©a©alt to amy *@somre®9 tl all to th® 
jeiat aetiTitf* 
A. atatml §0mitim» ©f fim St^^iliferliMi 
1 S -i • 4 
?©ll@irl.ag €m»ls©m| liifes, S«mti®ls©m, asi 
tto# a@««ssatyi^  *ai tsfal for 
statie ©twtllfe3Pi» withia tto ft3» -mtiitsiaf «©r® tM«a mm 
faetojf t© prdimtt aor® ttoa ©b«' freimet aaybs' tptcifl®4 
mM&T profit i»x:tatiati©m «s»tti^tt©ii. firat vkmm tto» 
smpplj fmiiett©a'f©3? ••all laprnt* ^ wfi tb« teaaai fmattioa f©r 
all omtpmts t© the tim ar® i«f@§tly ©Isttl®., and %M 
5 
ppoteftioa. is giftai tke- fellewiag 
@0aiiti©Bs f©r fiw ftmillbrimt 
1. Memmmy oonditioa® 
a* ffe# teciinicai mt® ®f smtostitution fe@-
tw«»a any two products produce*! by tli® 
ft3?» must be equal to the price ratio 
btitwean these two products* 
b* fht fflarginal rate of substltutioa b»-
iwmn any two factors must b# tfttal 
©p.,» eit*, ssftoially Chap». i aat 
%aag®. fri©« fltxtbility. * .. • ekaf» f. 
«^i0to, 1, ftlmt ami Capitftl. tad «4» elareaAoa 
i»r#®s. Oxfori#: lf4i« 0,h6p# §• 
op* ©it#I etofif, 4-. 
@p» f. 
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to tb© prlo© ratio betweea tM@i® 'two 
factoj's* 
0. fh& aafgiaaX rate of traasforwition b@tw®ea 
my faetor and m.f pretiiot mtist b® #<iual to 
tb« prl00 rati© bttweea th® factor aM the 
product» 
3, smffi@i@at conditioBs 
a. marginal rat® of sttbstitwtion b@twe«a 
mf tiro produets, or two groups of produots, 
amst fe® iaereaslng. 
b, l&if aargimal rat® of smbstltuttoa b©tw@«H 
attf two faotori, or two group® of faotor®, 
must b« t«©r®a®lag, 
0, Tk% marglaal rat© of treatforfflatioa between 
aajr faetor ami mj proiuet or aajr group 
faators aai aaf group of protaets^  aust be 
itereasiag* 
3. fotal aoniitloaa 
a* It must aot pay to discoatiau®- proiuotioa 
ia tto# fira^  «atir®ly, to iisooatiau® tb® 
protuctioa of aay profiUGt or groups of 
protuot.®, or to dissoatiau® aay proauotioa 
proetas ia eo,aa®etioa with aay oa® product 
©r group of produetf. 
b» It must aot pay to. aid tb® produotioa of 
fiay a«w produot or group® ©f produots, or 
to add aay a#* produotioa pro©ess ia coa-
aeotioa witb «ay oa® produot or group of 
produots• 
©• It aust aot pay to us® aay iaput aot aow 
usad or to disooatiau® aay laput aow used, 
fh«#@ ooaiitioa# for static tquilibriun witbia tb® firm 
ar@ based oa tb# asauaptioa tbat priten for botb iaput# aad 
output® ar« giyea to tb® fira# fb®y aust b© gentrelized to 
allow for otbor tbaa p«rf®otly ©lastie supply eurv©« for 
iaputs ®ad deaaad curves 'for outputs faoing^ tbe firm. Mar-
giaal @3Ep#aditui?e for faotori of produotioa must b# substi­
tuted for fsetor prioea, wbere tb® aargiaal ©xptaditur.e for 
a faetor is defiaed as th« iBoreiieat of tb@ fira*« total 
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sermm for otttpttt irttuiting tvm. thm salt of aa adiitioaal 
mit of ttoe proiiiot..--Si® factor prlet and tM® aargiaal 
expenditure for tli© factor will b« ideatioal wh.«a th® supply 
of th® factor' to the fir®, ie perftctlj elastic, aa4 will he 
cOBstaat for all uaits of output*. Otli®rwi®.t tfe« two will not 
'tj® iitatical aai aargiaal sxpenaitur'® for "the factor will not 
b'0 soastant mm f@lua@# ixaetly tM SBm is tru® iaaofar as 
protmct prict mi the Margiaal retura for th® profiuct are 
3B 
ooBc«ra»i# 
fhus ia the f®»@r«l oftw tb» a«c#ssary eoaiitioaa for 
fim tquilibrita, gim& the proiuction functioas,. tin© supply 
fuactioas' for iaputa aad th® fisaaaa fuactioa for outputs, ®re: 
a. flk® t®^ aic®il rat© ©f sutestitutioa fe-etwtea aay 
two proSuets produced toy tM fira must be equal 
to tit ratio of tke margiaal returas bttweea 
• ttoss® two products. 
b* Tk® aargiaal rata of substitutioa betweea aay 
two factor# autt b® equal to tbe rati© of the 
Mtrgiaal expcaAiturts b^ tweea tlies® two factor#. 
c* ©i® margiaal rat® of traasfomatioa betweea aay 
factor ami any protect aust h@ equal to the 
ratio of tlie aargiaal ejEpeaditure for tli© factor 
aai the aargiaal retura for the proauct, 
la aMitioa to these the same iufficieat coaditioas aad total 
coafiitloas as ia the preTiome case-aust be set, 
B 
Samuelsoa has ihoira that Siseoat iauitie® la the 
I^f p is til© price of', the aMe4 uait of a factor aad S 
is the elasticity of its supply., the mrgiaal expeatiture is 
pCl l/l). Similarly if p is the'price' of &M®i. uait of a 
product 'produced aai e i.® the elasticity of Its ie®aat 
fuactioa., the margiaal retura is pil -* l/eK Gf. Laage. op. 
cit. $p'P • • 
•Sa»uelsoa, op. cit*, p. ?0«fS. 
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prodmotioa fuiieti©a, from whattTea? earns#, to not intirfere 
with til© ieteraiaatiott of tli® equili'b.rim positiea in a 
pei'tiettl.ar firm* • By sattl»g tip soaaitioas of Inequality, h® 
ha» that th® iie«®ssarr, suffiolemt and total 
0caiiitioas of ©tuiliteim apply wh®s® th# p3?o4u©tloa fumeti©a 
ooataias it@e©ati]&uiti«« as wtll as where it is ooatinuous 
aad with eeatiBU'Oas pmartlal dtriTOtives. BisGOKtiimitl®® 
t®B4 t© mak® th# #quillhfim p©sitloii musmally stable, but 
ceirtalttly not iaa«t®mi»atd. 
It i« uaii®©«s«a2ey for th® pmrpos® at hand to review 
the extersal •eoMiltOM for squillbi-liia in the firii, sino® 
th^ y art beyeafi th© eomtrol of th# firs ©ad t© aet enter 
iato its objetliftt. The fir® dees not seek to ©quat® 
avarag# eost with' aTera^ g® reireiiu# so,, that prefits are maxi-
ml2«4 at s#r©i if frtei©® of ©mtry la postulate, it may 
©vsntually b« fortet into this^ pesitioa by other firms ia 
th© market. Tht @x%mml eoBiltieas a@®d aot be ©oBsiderca 
ia order to aefis© th® eoaiitioas f©r profit mxlBliatloa ia 
aay giv®a flra, in«lti4iag the flra which perticiptt®® ia th® 
eoop@rat iv#'a asoeiati©a. 
fh® 0O0p©ratlag fim will aehi#v® optimum resoure® ws® 
when it has allcioat&i its resouress ia sush a way that the 
rati© of tha^ mergiBal axpeailtur® for ®a«h r®@our©@ to th« 
aarglaal physioal proametivlty of the' rasour®® tlm®s th® 
serglnal return from th« output protuesd is tqual-for all 
- 1.6P •• 
r®'«©fflptes ia th® flm aad f©r all alteseMtlT® ms«s of 
!• 
rssourees wltEia the. tlm* fb® fim will aaic.imiz® ita 
profits wii@a, ia addltlea to m^ tim tto®te emiitloas, it &a« 
©xpaadsA" totiil oferatieas to t.b@ joiat whem tka aergiaal 
@ost is «Q«sl t© tkm mT^iml mrmm f©r «aeli proiuot proi-
uo®4,, tli® aargiaal reveum# t© laelmi® ii©t only tb® 
Tmmnm inorses© of tie preimet, femt 'aliio tfe® e'haag© ia 
i 
r0Te»u@ of the otber proiuots* 
B* Bast Product ion aemljiaatioa 
ratio ©f tlie aargiaal ©xptMlttir®' for ®aoh resouro® to 
tb@ marglaal fitysieel proametlvity of tlie reioare® times th® 
protmot of til® margittftl returm fros tte ©tttp«t proimcad may be 
•S 
r@f«rr«4 to., afttr Carlsea, mm th® gest-i^ roametiYity rat lo for 
tH® reaour©#'. fM# ao«t-pr©4ti0tiTity rati© must b© ©qtial for 
all isfmta it«®4 aad for all omtpwt® prodmeet in the fir® ia 
©r<i®r' tMat tto® feast ooi-.aiaatiom of ©utprnts will Is© produced witb 
%k® Itaat ©est eo*l3iaatioa ©f inputs, fhe fira partieipating 
la til® Joint piaat'aii«t s^ mt® tM.s ©ost^ proamotivity ratio 
for sll #mtpmts pro4me©i by tli® fir®, wfeether tl®y ar® pro-
dme®d ®atir«ly omtsid® tlie j@.i.at pleat or partly o^ tsii® th® 
^ProTiaiag tfe® amffi©l®Bt ant total, oonditioaa^ are als© 
ffi®t 
C^arlson. op» ©it.,.p. 9f» 
O^arlsoa* op. cit., p, 33. 
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partly wltlila it, fhe eost-pretoatlTity ratio aust be 
tqiial for all mmvmmM ms«d by tb® flra la @aeli of the 
alt«raati?r® ms@s ia tl® total proimetioB aetivity of the 
firm. 
All thr@® of the ftinetieius ia this cost-profiuetiirtty 
ratio nay be affeetM by iat@rrelati©»ihlps between omtpmts 
1 
or between iaputs# tte aargiael physieal prodmotivtty of 
any factor ia aay mte in the firm, within the Joint plant or 
©ttteiat of It, will be affeeteS by the teehaieal intertepeni-
enee of the different protmets proiueei in the fira. the, 
margiatl phy®leal prodii0ttirity of a glTes faotor in a given 
use will be greater, mehaaged, or smaller depending npon 
whether on balanee the protuct is teehnieally ©oi^ limentary, 
Iniepenieat, or eoapeting with the other proinets produced 
by the flr». fhis inter4epentenoe may ehange ms voltme of 
omtpnt'ehanges. Sie effeat of teohniosl ooapleaentarity, 
indepeaiine®., or oospetitiTeness mj be lesseaei, laoiified 
or relaforoed,'reipeetively, if the inpnt priee inereaeea 
with the qnaatity of the inpmt used. 
fhe marginal return for the output protneed will be 
greater, nnehangei or lees tepeniln^  npoa whether the prodmot 
on balanee la eompleaentary, InfiepeMent, or eonpeting in 
demand with the other omtpmts produeed in the fira. The 
1 Of. Carlson, ©p. eit., ehap« i. 
-• ' .1©? •• 
margiaal txpeaditw® for factor will te# greater, ma-
©hanged, oy less 4®f®ai4ag ttpoa wbatto.@r tli« faetor ©n 
balans® i® oa»pl«a©3itary, iiii@p®ateat, er aoapatlsg in 
supply with o-th«r lapttts \is®i ia %M firm# la two 
eases agaia tli© iatsfi«|(eiid«a«® mf eliaag® as volm® cliaiig«s, 
la a gitta sit^ atiea, tbsse «ffs©ts will b®. tli®, stronger th© 
gr®st#r is tlis slop© ©f tli® ieaaad marmM for ©titpmt ani, tl.® 
smpply -emrires'fo^  lafut faeiag With th.% defiai-
tieas us®i for, aasgiaal «p«iiiitur# end aargiaal retui-ii 
Ip, 18.8*183), «.qttatiaf, tkm oost-prodtieti'ritf mtios 
for all iapiits ia @11 ms®« i«fia®s %M toest froductiom eoabi-
amtioa ia tfe® 0©op®i?@tii^  firm wh.aii th@ae t#©toieel, deaaad 
©334 impply iiitai?i®p®m4«a0i«s mm QomimmA, 
t!is pr@p©j?ti©a,al fjfattien of tfe« Joiat plaat operated as 
a part of a glv#a paftioipatiag fim will ©rdlaarily aot 
r@pr®seat a distiaet department or resomr^ ® ia tbe fir®, toat 
a past of om.,&T more distiaet i«pe^ tm®ati, mQh ppodaoiag a 
givoa oatpm.t» fli® eost-prodmstivity ifati©# for ea©M rssoaro® 
will be «<iaat@d betw«®a asts or dapaytaeats, aot 1j®tw©«a the 
Joiat plaat aad th# flm activitlss ©ataid©' the plant as sa^  
fb« pkytieal leoatioa aad gtparation ©f tbt prodaotioa aetif 
itie# of tlie.fim kas ao a®c«s8ajef Qoaa®@tios 'witli the faae-
tioaal aistiaetioa. between tbaai pbysieal looatioa also doea 
aot affect iat#y'ir#latioa®liip8 feetweea fuaetioaally related 
a©tiTiti®s of the fim. ifher® the prodmotioa of a siagl# 
oatpmt ia carritd oa hy th© firm ia part outsid® the Joiat 
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pltat aad tn part witfal» it, tb#r@ is onlf ©a® oost-protmo-
tivity ratio, f©r «a«li mmmm utilised ia tbe protuotioa of 
tJb-is parti<mlar ©utput.. Is eoBparisoa t© otb©r ©utpmts of 
tb© firm, til® fira. ©xpaMs tlili pftrticalar output to th® 
poiat wbor® th® cost proiuetiTity ratio for ®aoli. resoure® 
used ia pr©im,eiBg tli® output,, iaoludiag tliat part witkia m 
w«ll ®s that part outsit# tlit Joiat plaat, is ©qua! to th« 
cost-proauoti¥ity ratio for all resour®#® m&@d to produe# all 
otker outputs ia tM© fira, 
4a exmplt aay 'liitlp olarify this poiat. .Suppoi® a 
giT«a ptrtiotpating fira ii uBiag ,iaput® b, aad o to prod** 
uo® output# X| jf aad z, aM that x aad f ar® produced 
entirely outbid# the Joiat plsat whil« % is produced in part 
withia tii« pla,at and ia part outside of it, ttis fira will 
aehi«T« th® b®st produetioa oo-rtjiaation whsa it equates the 
eost*pr©duotiTity ratio for ®, h, aad c- ia th« productioa of 
®aoh of ft ftad % and also for emoh of », h, aad o ia th® 
prodmotioa of x, y» aad 2. fht oost-produotivity rati© for 
produolag 8 wi,ll d«p«ad upoa the »argiaal ©scpeaditure for 
b, aad th® aargiaal r®tura for z, aad tht oomhiaed itar-
giaal physieal produotiTity fwithia and outside th@ Joiat 
plaat) of taeh of s» h» aad © ia the produetioa of z. If 
th# partioipatiag firm i® a farm ©aterpris®,, th® joiat plaat 
is. a eooptratiT® «ir»«i®ry, ead z is butt«r, th® firm will 
equate th@ oost-produetivity rati© for all three iaputs us«d 
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ia tk« tomttsffat produetlon ©a tto® fam and tli® brntter 
pro4\ictioa ia %M taken t©g@t,teif, with tb® eost-
pfQdttQtivitf rati© of tfets® iaputs Ib pr©iUQiag x and j ou 
til® farm, 
la oth«r words the participatiag fim will emsiaer to-otJ^  
ttofit part of tb© proimotioa proeess relative to a giv@a ©tit-
pmt 'Qarrisa m witbia t^  Joint plant aai tteat tarriti oa 
OtttiiSe tb« plaat ia dotersiiaiiig tli® relatiT# amoimt of this 
output and tlie rtlatiT® amouat® of tli« ottesr omt|)ut@ of tfa® 
firm to produe®# TM fira will aot mmMex aay separate 
proetss ia %M pro-iuctioa of a giirea output alon® but *111 
©oasiiar thie ©atir© produotioa prooess of tbe output as a 
uait, la orfi®r to m.axlals® it® profits tli® firm aunt also 
satisfy tli« total eoaiitioas (s## p. l@i),. ftoaaa, aot tlbit 
aargiaal eoafiitioa®, iaaur® that thm Joiat activity 
optiMm resouro® alloeatioa as aa iat®p*atei part of th® 
total' operatioaa of th.# partioipatiag flra. If it is possilQ.© 
for ttl® particifatiag fim to ia©r«a«0 its profits by dis-
©oatiauiag tM# proes-sa, oariwi aa ia tb® Joiat plaat or aay 
part of it, or by diisoatiauiag protuotioa of tb© output 
pro©«8sed tbrougb Joiat plaat, tb® fira 1® aot ia statie 
©quilibriuffi sbouM reallooate its rtsourofis aoeordiagly. 
Ia all eases wli@r© tb® proiuotioa operatioa® of the partioi-
patiag fira with respeot to a giir«a product or produets ar® 
oarriei out ia part ia tb© Joiat plaat aad ia part ia its 
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tsaifiimtJ. plant ©r plamt®, tk® Joist plant op©j?etlen.s mmmt 
• e©aslit.i?#d ssf srateli' t3?0B the r-elattt op@3patlo»s of tfa® 
f irm, out Sid® tM plst«t | ©?©n tor pui?p@s«i Qt aefialng tli# 
best pfoimttioa oomfetaatioa ia tfe® fim# 
Is suBnary^ . %hmt paytiGipatlsg fim will ackiew 
tb« best pi>o<iu§tioa whm the- oost-p^ ifoduetiTity 
3?ati©—th« jrati© of th# marginal txpeaiitmr® tow an input t© 
th© proittet of the wJfglftal phfsioal fTOi\i©tiYit;f of th® 
inpmt tia«s tkm isitfgtiial rstwi-a feir th® ©mtput pyodme®d«--i® 
e^ ual ib«tw««a all tmpits la th® pr&fi"m©tl©a of all outprnts 
in the fim# smffieient ooaflttloas a,if® deereaaing aar-
giaal jrat© ©f traasfei-mation, inertiaslng marginal i?ate of 
smtstittttion batweta omtfats, aai M&mmimg aarginal rat# 
9t sm^ stittttten "b^ trnmn laputs • fhe total aonditions specify 
that it attit m% %e,p©sslhl® t© iB«af@e-8® aat mr®m^  hf 
litilialag any iapats. gt adding th# proimetioa, ot a proctaa 
in the pi-oimstloa, ©f any etttpmts whieh m® not ^ jiing mtlli.!Sia 
m ©©aduttti, o? by <it«©omtlaiiiag-any that at#. All thes« 
eonditieas aast hold foi' th® entir® &-p@mtiom of the partici­
pating fira, Ift-elmiiag that part ta'th® .Jeint plant. 
C. Optlawa flr» Siae 
fh@ optiM® ®ia.@ of th® flw partidipetisg in th® Joint 
plant, as for sny fim, if defined by the output which 
«Qmat«s th© aarglmal aost with th« marginal rmmm for ®aoh 
- xfi • 
1 
pro4.u@#i«-tli« ©tttpat. wliieli, asstalag thm best 
production eoBbitetloa, lb® nargiaal ?@veau« pr©am0-
tivity of inpmt la tli® p:r©am©tt©a of ©a©fe prodmet with 
g 
margiiiAl «a:p«ai4taye 'fei* that Ispttt-. this hold® tru.® 
ia th® img i-ua wh@a all iapmts &m soRaiterad irariatol® aafi 
also ia th® tho-rt mm wh@a ettftaia inputs a^t fix®a,* fh® 
OBlf is that tli« r«l«vattt eurvea at® loag raa ia 
tht•first oas® aaft nhQTt r«a im the ©©©©ad# 
Hues® ooaiitioBs liold as w@ll fot th® partioipating 
firm as fQt the firm whi®h take® pai-t ia ao Joiat astivitj, 
fli® OBlf special epplioatioii that m&AM to b® »aia is du« to 
th® fact that tilt partioipatiag fira Mg, Joiatlf lith othaj? 
firms, integrated the ecoaeaio funotieas ea^ ried 
©n la a 0o«.©ii plaat ^ ith th® iaiHriiual fmEetions of the 
fira omtsii® th® plant, fht two op&ratt®n8| taken togeth©?, 
Aetermin® th® ms'glml xmmm proiu^ tiTitf of the afesoarees 
us«d la the fiimi th© '©ptliwa fim sia® will th&x&tom ' 
deflEti coailt«riag th@ two ©p®ratli>»,s Jointly* fh@ fir®»»' 
eat3?ep-i*#aemt. i® iBte?@it®d in mmimizim apthiag l.a «ith«r 
the j©tat plaat Qt la %U% sspajat# plaat or plants ©f the 
fim iiii«p@mt«mtly as su©h, but rather in aaxiaiaiEg profits 
to hi® firm as a wholt. 
%rovi40d the aargiaal ©est iateraests th@ aargiaal 
reTsaat ©UTT® from below, 
M^argiaal prod'uetiirit,!' ia this eoaneetioii is 
d@fla«a as th© prsdmot of aargiaal phfsieal prodmetiTitT and 
aargimel ratmra* 
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AaalftiQally tli« appllQatloa of the aaxlaiEattoa 
ooaditloas to tfa® soopeiatiag firm ©an best b« ione by flnt 
spplyiag t&em to a siagl® Mmlti-plant ¥®rtl©ally lGl;@.grat#t 
fia ani tfeea pr©t««iiag to the e©©p®ra-ttag firm, 
•fertlQ-ally lategat^ t firm' wtXl fee i®fin®a as a 
siasls. mMM, MiMiiig mMM, & ifeila 
mm. nass. msm asanali im mm, 
liilM la smgl s 2a tfeg. ©BSlil Cllil 
i® the gay proautt intimt of the- leroM, the omtnat of the (imniKMiii «MIHMMIIWM» «MMMIMITIMM MFINMIIWMMIMMWAM !»i<«<MWWIAI|iiiiiiinii»iiir itmnmrn mummtinim mmmmmmmmmmrn' mmmmmm wmmiiiiiii «MIHMIMHMI* 
aeoeat is - |h# sm wQ^ mt iagmt ef the thlr€> aai so m* 
•Bi® frodaetloa will b® «ar-rl®i ©a sa©®©flslv«ly through, th« 
Tasiotii plaats lo that oaly the plaat fmrthtat from th® 
eoasmer faees a safply QUtm for raw predmet iaputs ®a4 
©aly the oa® a@ar®at tht ooasiMer faees a itaaai cmrv© for 
omtpat* 4ssmlag th® vsrtiealiy iBt®gr®t«d firm has aehiewA 
best protootloa ooabiaatloa, its obj#0tive is to ©p©rat® at 
the oatpmt which will aaxlalae Ita profits, 
1 
Hlraah- ha® ©oaiKlerea this eaa®« .E« i©iioastrat®s th® 
©qulllbri.tm omtpmt for sueh a wrtieally inttgratoa firm 
TOd«r ©aeh ©f five restrletlT# &ss«Bptl®a.s. fh®' oatpmt of 
©aeh plaat is asasurei ia. eomparablt waits so that th® 
r®levaat fuaetioas la ®aeh plant cea be plotted oa th® sane 
diagram. His five &m%» ant th« #quillbrlw ©atpat for th« 
\ir«©h. op. sit#, p* tf-144. 
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flra imitf ©atto are .as follow#: 
I# Costi are. assmei to l>t aero tor all ©titputs ia all 
plants ®»«pt tli» ©me furthtst fr©a %h# eoaiuatr. Ia tbis 
east tM ©qmiliferi* eatprnt is i«f ia«t bf tto® polat ©f 
b®tw@@» tfe# aarglEftl ©est fiaiictioa ia t&a plaat fa£th®st ftom 
in# ©OBsamtr aai the sargiaal rtveau® eiarf® in th@ plaint 
asarsat tUt. G©asiM#r# 
E* Oaly fixei sGsti ar® assiati is all ploatis ®xe@pt 
til® oa@ tvathmt tmm tke eensaatr. Margiaal 00sts in all 
plaatf- e.xeept tb« first are thas agata mm for all ©atpats 
aad tli@ fira agaia ©faates the" marglaal eost la tto.#' 1st plaat 
with the strglaal mmum ia th® ath plaat# 
3. aait Qosts at a fix#4 rat# (Ij are•aasamea for 
all ,©atpat« ia all plaats ®m-espt th# oa« fartli»st from th,« 
coasam®!". fk& fifm .®iaat«s. tha aarglaal eost la the 1st 
plaat plas S with the »rglaal r«ir@am« la the ath plaat. 
4. :»« saat fitaatloa is poetalat®^  m ia th® third 
mse, 0x«eipt a fix:«4 pa-fmeat is aai# to aa omtalt#.,firm for 
s«Tiets («•«», traasportatloal, fhi# flxsi pafseat does aot 
aater iato' Mrglaal eost so the fim agaia 9qmtMB th® 
sargiaal. oost la the 1st plaat plm® I with thf margiaal 
re¥eaa« la^ th® ath plaat. 
5. Agaia the saae slttiatioa i« postulate# as la th© 
third ©a®«, ®x©®pt 0 p®r aait payasat (L) is *4# to 
aa ©atsMa fira for »@rvie#s. fh# fira mhimm optlwffl 
output hf ©taatiag the margiaal @©st ia the fir.it plaat plas 
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1 plm» L with tli© aargimal la tMe mtli plant. 
Aft«r twionstratlag %M stttlliteriim po'sition of tb@ 
wftloallj tat©gra%«i flm w^ m thm® ikssisap-
tieas, dots m&t mtk# tk% %T&mitlm t© the g@ia«ral 
•oas®. It follows, l©gie«lly, howevai?, fi?OB Ms analysis* 
a firm will.., a'ssming it liaa aoMiefdi tb« ls#®t predme* 
tioa 0©mfeiaatloa, a»xiffiiss« its profits hf op^ rstiag at the 
rolvmm wbiek mm%m the of th# aarginaX &m% mrrm ©f 
all plftBts wltli t&« ©alf gagRittai orngTs it has, 
aamtly that faeed in tk® plant aea^ est th® mmmmw, fbis 
is tfa® g@a#3ral eas® wlileli ©ateae®® all flT® of th& postw-
lated sp®0ial eas®® ©f iftttiiaj tto« aarginal oost 
in somt ©f til® plants im a aoastant, it is z®m ia 
soffit of th®a, or wj^ ettot? it is a faaietioa in sll of thtsm, 
©^ matiag tli® tmm of tMt margiaal ©ost.s for all plaats with. 
tli.e margia®! rsvtame ia tb® fiaa.1 plant will defia® th® 
optiaia ©utpiit for tbs vertie&lly iat®grat®d fira, Th© 
integrated »ulti«plaat fim 4©®s not tsf to.aa3Eiffii» 
pfofits ia saeh, plaat fey mimg mom& sort ©f aeesO'Uating 
'"psie®*' for th® outpmt, of taoli.. It is not Gomoernei witb 
tli« pyofitafeiliti- of mf ©m# plant liagly, omm t&# feest 
pyoametiom oombiaatioa haa deteraiaet, hu% onlj with 
aaxittiaing tfe® profit® of all plaat.® tak®m .a® a mait, 
Tfea #.^ ttllibifiw, omtpmt fo^  a T®i?ti§8lly iategratei fomr-







Figure 6. Vertically integrated firm. Long run 
equilibrium. 
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torn plaats is mmme€ to b® meastiraljlt ia ©ei^ ai-e^ I® aaits 
s© tlist til© 'Otttprnt tot easli is a@®suy«a ©a th® aaa® seal# 
al©ag.th« X axii, fli« aargtsal ,©ost ia sftcli plaat is givta, 
with MO-l p«pr®s©atiii^  t&st toT the plant fittli«8t from tli® 
©oastimer, MC-S th® mfglaal eest f©r th® s®®©ad plant, MC-3 
tkat tm tJi® titiyd.^  ana M0-4 that foit thm plant ii®a2?est the 
ooaaiMty, M-4 and i-tprtseat the ®irtrag« i?«Yeam« aai 
aarglaal i-tTeam#., resp«®ti¥«ly, fae®4 In tfe® fiaml plant* 
* is tie total ita?gia«l eost fmaetioa wkiefe i» tb« am of 
th© fotJt fun.itioas «0-l, Me*8| lie*3 ani, MC-4i QjL i« oqmal to 
plus ^  plus QB plus.Qi# optiaua^  fim output, anfi 
output ia eaeh plaat, is 0-^  wliex© ®IC iat«?8«0t8 11-t. At 
t,liis outfut tbe iat0.$rat®i fim saxiaiiits its profits, thm 
area OMF« The iim i«lls O'Q malt® of output from tli@ flaal 
plmt for the .prite OP par uait. Tli© total p«r, uait eosts 
to til® firii Ciaeluaiag those la, all four plaats) is 00, fh« 
iaput oosts la tfe© ©esoaa, tliiri, ami fourth plaat® are a®t 
of Qosts for raw protluets feteaus® th®j &t@ furaislied hf th«. 
prtvious plaat la ©aeli ta»«, 
Thl» fifur# rt®r«»«ats tli® loag. rua tselysis oaly,. la 
th® short rua fAe would aot bt, total awragt oost®, feut 
inst«a.i total average Teriabl# oostsf total averag® oosta 
would thl® ©urve plus th« averago 'fii:e€ oosta for th© four 
plaats. Of oour®® ia th« ihort.ruii th® raarginal oost for 
«a0h pleat *juia hav® •& diffsreat shaft m& would he aemr@r 
the X axis, as wouli th® total mmrgiaal @ost ourire aai th« 
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total avetag® feriabl® ©ost curv©. llow«ir«i" tb© sfeort rum 
•qullibrim will ieteysiati in th® ssma fflaiai^ f as tli© l©sg 
rma ©qiiilils^ im la tb.® iatsgratei amltl-plaat flm, 1.®., toy 
etmatlBg tli«,iwa tli® aaygiaal tost f«n«ti©as for all 
plaats with marginal mmnm fmatios la th# plaat near-
mt tik® mmmmi, 
in osdi«r t© mhlmm tli® pr#t®#tloa ©oafeiaatioa, a 
fertiealli- iat®ff'at#d tim auQh as the oa® illttitratefi ia 
flgar# i aai ©p^ ratss oaly plaat# wfalsh rspreasat 
optiaw ?®S0U»0® mse ia the fim, as a$ts3?aia@i by its total 
optfatioaa. smsto a fira tJia eatpmt f©r all plaats 
©a t^ t basii of its total opsrati©as. itiat happaas if tfe© 
©eeaoaits ©f siae ia ©ae of tto® plaats aak® it aaeeoaeaid t© 
operate tto® plaat at tliis oatpat? Bmh a msm would b® 
Ti»malii«d la figaif® i, for ©XMple, if MG-l wmm locatat 
saffi©i«atly afew@ tha I aatis aad tomwart elopiag omw a 
TOlam# raag®' ts^ yead tbat sho'wa oa tfela iiagrea, ¥8^ ti-
©allf iat®grat«d flw would t&ea ©Mesa the-most «@oa©ai0 ot 
tliye® altayaativee• It msul^  «ltli®3PS CI) ©oafia© it® 
operetioas to plaat® Sg'S aat 4, paraliasiag tli® oatpat of 
plaat 1 i» tli« market $ C^ 1 ©p®3?at® plaat 1 at aa tcsoaeaie 
Tolwm®, raark®tiBg the diff@r«a@o betweea .0% and ta« optia^ ai 
oatprnt f03? t&is plaat I of C^ l ©pesat® plaat 1 Joiatly with 
aaotb®r similarly vsrtlaally iat®gyat®d fi» of saffiel®at 
sia® to git® a tomblaet telaa® ia plaat 1 gr®at saoagh to 
aak® its ©perstioa ®©oaoai# to lioth iat®.grat#d firas* 
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Uaier t&© first altei'aatlT® tb@ marglEal eost ia pXamt S 
would toe ttual to th® f^ aasat MO-a fltts tb® marginal ©jcpeaii-
turn fmaotioa for th» impat bow «mpfli@a to it try pleat 1. 
th® s®eoai alternative tli© fifa womia fa#« a 
Tmmm mwrn^  im plant 1 whicli «>mli h&m to fee eoasidsxet ia 
it® total opttatioas la ©:rt©r to mhimm ITMejf 
%h& ttoira alt@rmttiif« tli# mXmr&nt poirtioa of the margiaal 
©ost is plaEt 1 will not la ttoat ©f®!- th® OQ rang#, 
bmt that s®@B®at f3?oa tli# optimum oiatpat ©f tii« seooafl int®-
gyat#4 fir* ©a mBt tM output ramg® of ttie first iat«@rat«i 
fim. ffee fim will s®l«@t tli® aoat teonomi© of tfe.«f« ttored 
alt«faatiwa> eomsidsriag tk« «ff@et of eaob oa its total 
©p©ratioa. 
m® ttmilibriw position mSsj? tl« third altematiT® i# 
illmstrstst in flgmrt f* fh© two fifus, X aad il, optrat® 
plant 1 .Joiatl^ , laeli op©.rat«® m »mmA plant ®iitij?«ly 
of tb® otfesr. fto® output of.plaat 1 is us«t 
®Btif®lr as aa iapttt fo? tli® plaats operat®a iad®p«ad®Btlf hj 
moh of th® two fi:»s* .M0»1 is tli® »si?giaal aost faaotioa ia 
tti® 4oiat plant* Me-2. foi? fim % is tti® aargiaal oost ia tli® 
s®@oa€ plaat opepatst hj this fim, aai MG^ S toT fim II 4® 
til®• »a3?giaal oost la it® »®Qoaa pleat, fli® omtput for tb« 
Joiat flaat atai tl® mmM plaat of ©eol firs is ©ssaaei to 
to® ia ©oaparatel© wits ani measured on tbe ®am® oiatpat seal®, 
fim II proitt.®®® at th® output 1®. wh9T% tto® ®um of tli® 
Dollars 











Figure 7. Participating firm equilibrium. Two firm plant. 
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aargiatl aost ta tk« joint plant aad th# oost in it» 
s«e©iii plant «q[Bais %M mmgiml mmnm ta tfa® s«ooad pleat. 
•fh« ftltTaat ®#^ tiit of tfee MO-i ©mrv® t© fir® 11 la CF, 
feegiaaisg witfe %M ®<iailili®i«a output tttm I, TMm aiG. 
•ottrv® is the »m of t&« MG-i ©mft® • tot fim II ma %he s®g«. 
meat ®f tlie MO*! emre to the .right ©f c. Bf plus Ba 1« 
«tmal t«? m» tittllifeiw ©utpmt foa? firm II, ©ssmiag 
%h& b«st produotloa ©«ibittatioa,l i® at m m <l®fia«a by 
i 
the iattrseetioa of ®IG aad li-2, at I» 
firm I pr©te0«® at th® output,OA wher® th» &vm of th@ 
aargiaal eest ia tht Joiat pleat' aa€ the mafgiaal oost ia 
its sesoad plaat ©fuals th© mrgiael rev®au« ia the seooa€ 
plaat* fh@ rtltfaat i®^ ©at of the' MG-1 msr® ia that 
itarting at th© ftqttillhriam otttfat ©f fim II, rather thaa 
at SMO. Ia flgmr® f, siae# AM ia equal t© OA, th® r@l@Taat 
sepieat ©f this mTV® t© fim I is' al.s© Of.. fh« WC earv® 
for firm I is th® sim ©f its MO-..g cart© aat the MC*1 mvre 
to tht right .Qt 0# At flmS'Bf is tqaal to iS, fh@ ©qailih-
riaa oatpat for fira I i.» i@fia@t hy'th® iaterssetioa of IMC 
with Ml-2' at 1 as OA maits*. If fira J operattd plaat 1 
aloa«, th@ total aargiasl eost to th© firm woalt he IMC* 
rather thaa' me, siae« th® r«l®Taat ».0gs®iit of 1IC*1 would h® 
that startiag froB 38.«roaad m plas AB is tqaal to AS* * la 
®uah ©sst th® fira would aot h# abl« to .tover eosts, aad wotsaft 
aot s#t ap plaat 1 ia thi.® iiaaaer hat HOTS to th® best of th« 
thr«® altera®ti?0i »@stioa«d afeoft. 
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lotle® %Mt tM flae of the .Joist asifi© fyom tli« 
a.gt«ea@at by two fii?a» to ®®t it up m& operate it Jointly, 
ia aot a^ ttrmiati by a taotsioa aiai® by tb« two fims Jolally. 
It ia attemiiita by tim am o£ t^ rolmB ia ®mh 
firm, and ths optimal roluaa In flra. is detemiae^  
iadftgeaAeBtly. talsiag i»to eoasiiejfatloii tbs tutire mmm* 
lima ©f til© fim is ®e@ii oast* tn ?igai?« ?, tb® Joiat 
plaat ©atp«t, AB, is gifen wb«B tb« tmpmtim outpmt foi? 
tb® tw© partieipgtiag fimt,, QA aai it 4®t«miiiei.. How-
©T«^  tb« pretia© «qitilibriiia omtfat ia fira t eamot b® 
itt®miB#d unless tb® ttttilibjeiw output of firm II ^ is takes 
as given, btoamse witbout this informtioa tb® ©xaet se@i@at 
of the mei-giaal •oost ia tb® Joiat plaat *bi#b is relsfant i@ 
wakmrnn, fbt sam® is %sm regarding fir» II | tb# ©quilibriim 
otttpat of fira I mmst be taktja as %m- ©r4«r to fiefin® 
tb0 ©ptiftw® ©utpmt in fim II wb®m'aoasi^ ei'td alon®# fb© 
fomal Boliatioii of th® ©ftiaaa output ia eaeb partiolpating 
tlTm^ t 4a Joiat plaat, gltm tb® auaber of pa^ tici-
pating firas, «*% b# tea® ©imultaatously. Aetually, eirea in 
tb# stati© s,:ta®t mmlMmi. b«3?@, time® tb® mafginal oost 
iBousftd by ©aeb fim la tbt Joiat plant t«p©iid« aot oaly oa 
th« otttpttt of tbat fiw bat al«© oa tb® ©utpmt of the other 
pajtieipAting firm, tb« two firms aay apfroasb tbeit iaiivid-
wal eqmilibyims by ttini aad erroy« Sow qul^ 'kXf ami meoii-
rat«ly tb® two «atir«py«a«ttif,i will, appro-asb ©ptiam Tolm® im 
tb@ir s«sp«Gtiir® firms 4ef«ai» oa tb® aecttfaey of tbsiar 
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reapetotlf# • 0oa.J@0tu3?e of tiie otli®r*s eptimm voIubs aafi 
adjMstatBt to the optiiim, 
Tke pr'Qflt Baxlmizatlon Jmst deseribed fer 
the two T@ttioaiXy latsgratei firms Qparattug a #oiJat plaat 
art tttitt generallsiea for a i^ trtioipatiag firas in e 
eo0p«rati?® assoQiatioa.. ®b,« a participatiag firas are 
T^ rtieallf iat@gratdd fey the .d».fiaitioa mstd h«rs (s®e pag® 
1 
-fhty moh ©perate oae or more separate plants ani 
togethtr opsratt at least ob@ o^ aaoa plant Joiatly as a part 
of eaeh vertitslly integrated partiolFatiag fir®. If it is 
assmed that &mh of th® a partioipating firas profi^ ees only 
on® profiaet, aai that •©ach is protociiig-at th# htst proto©-
ti©a assffibinatiem, •aeh *ill aaximlza its profits mt the out-
pmt whi'oh «qu«t©s tli« ••aargiaal refaam® In the fiael plant 
with the sua ©f th® marginal &o&t fuaotioas for all plants. 
The • r@l®¥ant of 'the Joint plaat aergiaal cost ftiae-' 
tioa, to each fira for this pwpose is that part to th@ ri^ t 
of th« itim of th® aptiarai ontpmta for all ©th#r partieipatiag 
firms • 
If th@ ©litptit of the Joiat plaat is a raw pr«jciuet' imprnt 
ia th© iadifidrntl pleats of the partieipetiiig firms, ©aeh of 
'^Ther# the output of the Joint plant, is mot the raw 
proittot iaput of the individual plaints of the partitipfitiag 
fira.#, Imt- instead a specific resource Input, th® firm® are 
not aetmally Yortically iategfated under this' iefisition and 
th« aaalyais is modif i®d«.' S®« pag®® BOS-Sll below. 
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th® a partielpating firm® will fao® tli® marginal re-renu® 
our-r« la their inaifiteal plants, ©nd ©aoh m&y tm® a 
<ilff®r®nt marginal Tmrnnm fun@tl©n. Suoh is the oas® in 
th# exaapl# in figurs 7. Oa th® ©thsr hand, if 'th® output 
of th« indlTTidual plants is a raw proiust input for th® 
Joint plant, th« a partieipeting firms will fae© a oo«on 
marginal r@¥©nu© eurT® in th« Joint plant.. In this c«s@ 
th® only r®l®"rent se^ est of th® aergintl r@T«au© ourve to-
@.aeh partioipating entrepreneur is that part starting with 
th# sum of optimum outputs for sll othtr partieipating firms 
and ©ahraeing th® TOlua® adi«d hj th® given fir»* seeh fira 
must assum# tha.t all other participating fIms are producing 
at ©fuilihrlua output In order to det«rmin® not only th® 
®xaot total marginal oost funetion hut also th® ®xaet aarginal 
r@T@nu@ funetion. forsally th®'solution is ohtain®d sluul-
tan®ously with th® n equations {.total aarginal cost funotion 
equal to tha marginal r®f®nu® fun©ti©m| for the n partioipa­
ting f.iras and th® Cn !• l)th ©t^ ation "foutput in th® Joint 
plant equal to th® sum of th® outputs In th© n firms) for th® 
Joint plant, fh@ n -f- 1 unknowns ar® th® equilibrium output 
for 0a©h partioipating fira and th© ©quilitorium output in th® 
Joint plant. 
Ttm® eoniitions ar@ portrayad in figur® 8 for fiir® 
fira®,..e4eh optratlng on® plant ind#p®nd®.ntly| whieh op@rat® 
one plant Jointly, the diagram represents the oaa® whor® th® 
Joint plant is th® on® from i^ ieh th® output of th® 
Dollars 












Figure 8. Participating firm equilibrium. Five firm plant. 
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partioipatiag firms is aerkettd as well as tbe ea®© wli@r© th® 
Joiat plant omtpmt is a raw product laf«t for th® indlTidual 
plants of th® partlsipatiag fira®. ' A0-S aad M0-S are tb« 
avtrage oost and sargiaal eott 'famtima, rtspeotiveljr, ia 
tk® iodiTidmal plaat® of meU of tb© fiir® parti@ipatlag firaa, 
AC-J amd MO-3" are t&® mmmge oost fmetioa and tlie marginal 
mat fmaetion r«sp@otif©ly ia tfea Joint plant. A1 asd IH ar« 
the aTfirage r®T0am« aad aargimal Tmmm facing easli of tlie 
fiTt firms. Ttm fMO ©mrTt ia tto total aargiaal oost fuaetto 
ia taoli of til# flT® firm®. 
ft® ©qttiliterim omtputs art OA for fira I, AB for fira 
II,. BC for fira III, GB'for firm If, ead PQ for fira ?, as 
defined hj tb® iaterseotioii of MG and ia m%h oas®. Tli® 
fm omrf® is thB sua of tbe aariiaal ©ost ia th@ individual 
plant and tbe margiatl oost ia tli® Joist plant for eaofe fir®. 
relsfaat seotioa of MG-J to fira I is TC aia©« V reprtaaote 
til®, Joiftt plant ©mtpmt ©quel to tb® «« of IB, 10, 0B and DQ, 
To fira II tte® relevant s#etion of MS-f' is IS beoaws® ¥ 
r0pr«8@nts th® plant output «qual to th# sua of 0A» BC, CB 
and B'Q. Similarlf tb® relsvant amotion of tie IC-J funotion 
to firm III is ¥2, to firm I? is 12, and to fira ? is tJS. 
IS is ®ttt®l to AL pltts Qfi and qi is eqmal to Q,S plus C|f. 
If tli# output of tto,® Joint plant Is iapmt to the s«parati 
pleats of th® participating firms, no p®ou,llar relatioasMip 
t»0tw®«n tto# r«v®n«i« funetlons of th® fit® fi,m!i results froa 
tliair Joint operation of a ©oaaon plant, toeeanse ©aoli fira 
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iBsrkets Its omtpmt iaiiTiduallf. I f  tht ©utpwt of th® 
stparat# piaats of th® pertleipatlag firms %m iapmt ia their 
joint plant, liow#¥sr, tbei' fs©« tl® sai^. dtaaad and marginaH 
reftnu# fwnttioii joiatly. flata tlit a®a.asa ©wrvt is n@gativ^ 
sXopea, the prie® for tfe® prodmet to feaelfe fira is not i®t#r-
Bla«i al©B0. tey th® quaatitf proiueti fey it, but tb© 
marginal malt of th® prodmot martetei fr«i tl« Jolat plamt, 
rel«¥aat ®0@®,@at of' %lm marginal r®v«iiue fmction t© 
mmh' of tb® f itre. .fIma in figar® M is st tli® mmm output 
T 
raftge ia tli® Joiat plant as tbat of tb® seetioa of %h@ MC'-i 
fuaetioa whieh is r«l«?aot to 9meh ot the firms, respeetivtly. 
Tfao ftrtical dla-tan®®®' AK, IS, CG aai »f'are sll «tual t© tk® 
'Vsrtieai distem©# Cp, aai th®y muit to® in ora@r for all fiT® 
fir®s to be in ©quilibriua beeaus® tli® prit® ©f the ®atlre. 
output of thm jolat plaat (OQ ualti) is f|P* fh.® per uait 
profit for ®aeli of tli® firms will aot attftssarilf b# tli® s®»® 
la ©quilibriuii, li©w«vsr, b®eaus# tli® total^  avtrag® eost 
fuattioa for ea«li iaelut®® th» awrag© eosts la their sepa­
rate plaats, whieli mj yary from ©a® firs to aaotter, as well 
aa tto® av®r®.g« 00sts la tfe®lr «©»aoa plaatt 
"a® «quili¥riiiffl pesitioa la all partlelpatlmg firms does 
aet a®fia@ tin© opttau» size la tl® Joiat plant, siac® th® 
auffibsr of parti#ipatiag firms Is tak®a as giirea. The i®t©r-
ffiiaation ©f ©ptiwaajolat plaat sime is a aeparat® prO'ble» 
6ai' is di®cus®8i in th® pr®Tious chapt«r, la eeatratt to th® 
oai® ia figur® th® Jolat plaat la Figmr® 8 is aot of 
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optiwia, slE®, -©Itlier for Joint purchasing plaat or a Joint 
aarkttiag plant, fk®, ©ptiOM plant size is s©a«wh®r« to 
ths l®ft Qt otttput OB, with approxissttly tlir#« partioipatta^  
firms instead of tt# flf@. If.th# ©oaplet® average- oost 
etiTT# for tb® Joint plaat w®r© giv«a ia Figtir® 8^ tli® nt©«s-
B&Tf auffil3#r of participating firai for imximm optrating 
ia til® Joiat plsat oomli to® ietermta©^  aecwrat®ly. 
fM 4ia^ aa ia figwo 8 assymts all eosta to the parti®^  
patiiii firms are variatol®* therefore r«pr&s®nt® long rtm 
®qmilibrim. fh© short rua @aah firit is 
ieteriiiEsd ia. ©xaotlj the ^ aa® way, ex'oapt that all margiaal 
Qost fmetiona will laclMe only th@ -rariabl® sost items, aM 
th« short run ia»aiid aafl aargiasl mwmm fmetioaa will 
apply rather tha» thoaa for the loaf rmu# fli« short ran ottt-
p«t lE th« Joint plant will ha gifea hy the iettraiaatioa of 
tha short .riia omtput ia th® s«f@r&l partieipatiag firas, 
Iht -aaiit toaditioas that are aeotssary for loag rma ©quilih-
rim are also atets-aary for all partioipatiag firms to h© ia 
short rua ®q«llibri«ffi# -fhese ooiiditloaB provid® that ©aeh 
firm he at th® hest prod*iotioa soahioatioa ooatideriag its 
eiitirs operatiOB, aad that total asrgl»il coat @q«als 
margihal reveEm® for «a©h firm, consideriag th# relevant 
seg0i«at of the Joiat-plaat aargiaal cost, and in th@ Joint 
mark®ting plant also the relevaat' sepae-nt of tha marginal 
reveam# to the firm,• Both ia the' long rua ani th@ short rtm 
it i® not nteaasary mater imperfect eoapetitioa that th® 
- so® -
raargioal pmduotitity for saoli resowe© h& ^ qmX 
D0tw@@a parti•elpa'fciiig flms, howsve*^  sine# tb# oost func­
tions (aii4 with J'Olnt piir©basing plaEts tb© rtTemw® fuaetteisl 
of theiw IMlrMml plmuts may diff®i». lothii® iistlnetiv® 
to tkis typ@ of atm^ ture ia aMitloa t© the ooadltioiis 
Just is^  a®M<i4 ia ©riej? to g@»®ifalia® the tqalilfe'* 
yiiiffi eoiidltlona for fims proittciag a siagld output throu^  ^
two•or more iategratei plaste, on® of wkl&h is op@rate4 
JoiEtlf with otii9? firma, to swoJi ¥©rti<jail.y latsgrated 
fliemB pTQdmlug mmm thm om ©mtpiit. 
Bi# msuai #quilllJ3rim thm^f tm tto# fim proaweiag 
joiat products with Joint yssom^ eits is adet^ ate. flit fim 
protoeing sevetal pr©4meti, oae or Mor® of which is produced 
through two or »o?® •rattiealli' liit®grat®€ pleat a, some, of 
whiQh are ©p#?atfS J©inti|f with othtf fli-aia, will TOejelaiz® 
its profits wh#a it proaue®s at the h©st pyoduotioa coabina-
tioa m& ©xpeads the proauetios ©f taoh proiuet to th« output 
whiah ©qu®t®s the mai'ginal eoit aad aargiaai r®¥eau® for that 
proiuet* the margiaal revaaue for ©aoh pr©iU0t iaciudss not 
oaly the reireaue lueftas© ©f th® aM®i. iasresent of th@ 
pfoduo.t itself, hut also th@ assoeiatsA changes la th@ mmwB 
from tht oth»f prodaets. fh® ®uffi®l@at toaaitioas a3?« a@t 
if th® satglaal mat funo-tioa is iaereeaiag mosm rapidlf 
thaa th® mafgiaal rtftaue fuaetiea tow sa,oh produet. A 
eo^ ollary of thes® ooaditloaa is that the aaugiaal refenu® 
pi-oiuotlvity of eaoh iaput in each alt@3fiiatlT« mm in th# 
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filfm amst #qual to tli® aairgiaai expeaditur® for th© input. 
Th9 relevant margiael cost to tht fiw for ©aeli of the ' 
produot® through v«ytieallj iategeated plants is 
the am of th® marginal cost functions for all tlie integratea 
plants, inoluding tlieae ope.r«t®i o^iatlj with otber firms, 
and tM relsvant marginal reTeau# in such oas© is the' on® 
faced toy tke firm ia tli® plant fro» wliieh th® product i® 
laarketdd. fhis does not apply to tlios® products produced in 
and mart:®tad directly ftom a single plant, sino® th© marginal 
oost and mfirginal rsvanue for tliess proiuots are entirely 
ist©rmin©d in tbe plant wtiara they are produoed, 
a©' ©quilibritm position for firms participating in a 
joint plant is thus defla®i wbon tli® firms are ¥0rtie8lly 
int«grated» as »®t fortl in tli® dtfiaitioa on page 192. 
ilisre tlj,® joint plant is operated to obtain speeifie eapital 
r@soure«s to be used in the production aoti¥ities in tli® 
indi¥idual plants of tte partisipattng firms, tii@ firms 
optrating th@ Joint plant are .not iaoluded in this definitiaa, 
fli«r® %M firaa puroMse capit&l r«8euro®s, suoh as farm 
aaehinsry, fsrtiliztr, protein supple»ent, or obtain capital 
ttorough tteir Joint plant for use in tlieir individual plants, 
as distinguished froa. proouring raw products, sueli as wbole-
©al® gro©0i?i®8, iiardwar« or druga, feeder • sts®®, etc., joint­
ly, th@ output of the joint plant end tlie individual plants 
of thB participating firms ©annot he »@asured in comparable 
units#' fh® two do not represent two stages of th® vertioally 
• ZW " 
lat@g3fat«d produetloa of a slagl# produet. Th® Joiat plaat 
in this ea®f tea te@en 0®t mp by tli© partieipatiag eatrspre-
a®urs t# «oosomieally proour® resomrees a©®d©d ia th® prodme-
tioa <saiTi«4 on ia tkalr iadiTidaal plants, 
®hi® firms ©peratiag a Joiat plaat for tkia ptapose ©eeh 
itternis® %h® relati?# slg« of th®ir ©peratioa® in th® Joint 
plaat toy aofei@iriag %h.@ b«it pro4iiotioa eoMfeiaatloa ia the 
entire operations of the fir©. Seel will allesat® reiourees 
to the Joint pleat to %M point where tb@ ®argiaal 
©ost it th@ J©iat plant is @<|aal to th© margiaal r@veam® 
produotivity of th® resouree proeur«a through th@ Jolat plaat 
ia its iatifiiual pleat or pleats, fbe l>®st produotioa 
combiaatioa la each partieipatiag flra will be defined by tli® 
©quatiag of the eost-produotivity ratio of ©very resource, 
laoludiag thos© prooursd through th© Joiat plaat, with that 
of all O'thdr -smommn u»®d by th® fir® ia th® produatioa of 
all outputs of th® firm. Th® ©tuiUbrlw size of saeh of the 
s* 
particlpatiag firai will b® d©fla©4 at- th@ output of ©ach 
produet whloh ®quat»@ th® margiaal eost aai mrgiaal r®v@aue 
of th© product, fhi® dettrmiaatioa, exoept as aff@ot«d by 
th® margiaal ©xpeafiitur® of th@ reaourees proeured throu^  
th® Joiat plaat, will b® aafi© withia the ladividual pleats of 
th@ parti©ipatiag firas# 
tht opt lam Toluffi# of pertiolpetioa by @aeh fl.r» ia th@ 
Joint plaat will b$ -iefiatd by th# iat@ra@§tloa of the aargto-
al oost fuaotloa for th® tatirt plant with the margiaal 
gil -
proimotivllj fmnotloa of tb® plaat output ia th® 
iadivitual plaati of meh of tto particlpatiag firms, Agaia 
til® rslevaat s®^ ®at of th® Joint plaat margiaal oost fuao-
tioa to eaoli partiolpating fira is tbat -isgaint to tk® right 
of fat outputs greater thaal the suit' of the ©qullitoriim plant 
output for all ©th@r psrtioip«tiag firms'# This bbbumbb the 
a\ifflb«r of partlcipatiag flrffi.g,is gif«a| it is distiaot from 
th.t problem of optiMum Bim ia th,© Jeiat plant. If tlier® 
ar® differeaets ia the aatur® &»€ looatioa of tb@ margiaal 
f@rmm produotlTity fuaetioa .of ttoe Joiat plaat output ia 
tilt iaiivldual plaat# of tfei« partioipatiag firms, th,® , 
optiffitm volume of partieipstioa la th« Joiat plaat will vary 
b«tw««a The margiaal mveam pr©4uotlvity of'thi® 
last uait procured of tli® Joiat plaat output by taoh firm 
must bt equal to tlie margiaal reveau® produelivity of th@ 
last uait prooured by all othtr pftrtislpatiag firms/ however, 
ia ordtr for all firaa to tee' at th» least oost eomhiaatioa 
simultameously (tli® wrtieal distan©® from tli® I axis to tli« 
point of iat#rsectiOB of th© joiat plaat margiael cost aad 
the aargiasl reveam® productivity of tlie Joint plaat output 
must he the aam for all f.lrms|. fhis ia tru« hteause th« 
mfirginal r®v@nu« productivity funotiom for meh firm is 
.©quat@d to a coimioa mar'glaal eost fuaotioa la the Joiat plaat. 
X vertically iattgrated fira ©p«ratiBg more thaa oa® 
plaat so that tb® output of oa® is th# raw product iaput of 
another, aad oparatl.ag ©a© or mor® of th#i« plaats Joiatly 
With Other firms, «x|jaii<is the output of @aoh produat to the 
point ifher© the aiargiaal oost of this output equals th« 
1 
marginal rsTeau© fro® th® product. For product® produoed 
through two or raor# plaats tht firm equates th© nm& of th® 
marginal oost funetioas ia til plautt with the marginal 
rsTtaue is th© plant froH which the product is marketed, Im 
the plaat or plaat® opsratad joiotlj, with other firms,. th« 
st-gmient of tht aarglnal cost funotioa in th@ Joint plaat 
that i» releirast t© the fir® la that part at outputs h@gin-
nittg with th© SUB of the volum® of all'other partioipatimg ' 
firms ®ad ©xttndiag upward, fhis ia also tru« for th® 
marginal reYeaue fuaotion if ths produot ia marketed from 
the Joint plaat. Ivea thou^ th© participating firm® ar# 
all operatisag at optimum ¥olum®, th® Joint plant may aot he' 
of optiaua si»» Joiat plaat sim is optiaum, as was pointed 
out in tha previous chapter, at the output whtre th® ^oist 
plaat mek&B th® greatest per unit ii@t ©oatributioii to th« 
inooroe of ®aoh pertioipatiag firm, ead is "raritd over th® 
long run by varyiiig th© number of par-ticlpating firms. Th® 
pertioipatiEg ©atrepreueurs allooat® resources to and take 
part ia tb« Jolat plant wh#D they a,eximiE© their profits by 
doing so. Ia deteraiuing the ©ptlaum ailooatioa of resourees 
to th# Joiut plaat for ©aoh of tb© p®rtieipatiBg firms, the 
oferations of their individual plaats and tha operetioE® of 
^Ihioh is (i®fin@d to iaelude th® chaxiga in r©v©iiu@ of 
othar products. 
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the Joist plant mmist b® oonsiderad as aa lnt®g3*at@d 
proau0tio» aotiTitjr* fh® fim& partieipetiag ia eoop®rati¥® 
assooiatiOE® ar« sll Ttrtioally iiit®prat®i vm&w th& ab0f« 
iatiaition ®x0«pt wliere thm Joint aetiTlty is a rssouro® 
puroliasiBg plant. Ia tlila latter ©as®, ©aeh partioipatiBg 
fim ©acpaMs its aotlTlty ia tht Joiat plant to the poiat 
wfaer® th# mafgiaal eost for th® ®iitif@ |oiBt plant i® 
©q-ual to thm jaarglaal mTmm productivitir of tills r@sowe® 
proGtw®4 tkffomgli tto® Joiat plaat ia tM iniiTidual plants 
of «aefe of the partioipatiag fims. In tootli oases th® 
partioipatlag firms imst aeet tli# aeetismry contitioas for 
best pToduotloa ©oaMaatioa mM opt ism output, aai alao tfe® 
suffiol@at aad total eoaditioaa, if they art to tot ia statie 
«qttllibifi«». 
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ae ooEdltioas to'X ©quillbipim • in th® fira pattieipatiag 
in a Joint plast, and tliosa for the optisam Joist plant siz©, 
w&ioh iiave b®ea i®T®l©ptd in the tw© previotts ehsptti'®, ar® 
bas@i oa statie ft'ssimptiona, ffetes© stetie eoaditions inelud® 
tiaeless proiueti©!, iastamtaaeous ai|wstmeiit, perfeot 
kaowledg® aad esxtaisaty. fti® supply and iemaai fmnetioas 
facing til® firm af® gi?«ja rather ttoa aatioipatei. It ia' 
neo^ ssary tlierefor© to imiieat© tlm appHcatioa of these 
atatie #tuiiiteim,ooa4itioas in tli@ pa^ ticiipfttiag fimy ant 
the atsessarf aodifioiatioai''is thsa, mhm proteGtion tsi:«s 
place over tiae aai in an .ttao^ eftaia ©nfiroameat. - The int©a-
tioB h@r« is sot to attempt to tefis© a ooaplete'and satis­
factory dfuaiai© Bjatm .either for ©aeto pajrtisipating firm or 
for t!i@ s«Ttral •films a« a partioipttiag group in a ooraiaoa 
Joimt plant# It i® ratli«r to poiat out admptations a@e®»sary 
ia order to male® tli@ statio ©qiiiliferim ooaditioas reasoiaably 
eptlioafele ia ®or« iyaaaio ©iroxiastaaois, 
for til® prasoat pmrpos®, partlalpating fim is aa-
s\ia®€ to b« ia'eqmiliferiiia whm the .mtrepi^ mmr hsB plmm@d 
proiuiotloa so as to ototaitt tlie liigbest poasibl® position on 
bis iniiffartno® map toward tli® capitalizsfi ¥alM@ of the 
matieipatM profit strews «a4 the aatieipated stability of 
this profit strti® ©v«r tia@» fbe first .of thme two ooBsid* 
©rttioas is iisom»s@d ia tli@ first two aeotioas following. 
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and th@ seooad is iisoas'tsd ia the third stetion. fh© two 
e.r@ brought tegethsr ia the final @«otioa of this ehapter. 
It ii aasmmed thJ?ough©ttt that th# entrepr@Eeur prtfers a 
eOEstant profit iacoa® distrihmtioa thfomgh tlae rather than 
8oa@ other tia® ia©OM distributioa, Mf sssuaption, ?arla-
tioas ia his eonst^tion d®»aiid for iat©»e owr time ©re met 
hy ehanging the p«re«Btag® of ©«,#d equity ia the firm aad 
therafer# do aot aff@«t th® froduotion pla-rn* 
A. ProiuetioB Birou^  Time 
ProduotiOB throu^  time ©aaaot h« rigorously coasidtrid 
imless th® #c©Eomio variahlss in difftraat point® in^ tlae ar@ 
futnetieaally relatsd, fhis eaa be aem either with poly-
1 
perlM aaalysis, or by tontiauotts flow or rat® analysis. 
Th«. writings deallag with the dyaamie theory of the firm hav® 
prisiarily,ms0d the first of thts® two sethods. This is 
g@Eerally satisfastory siaee, if the periods ti«#d are short 
eaough, ehaagds within th®^  period eaa he neglected aad flowi 
through tiat are approx;laat@d. With this appmmh ths saa® 
lEput or output ia different period® is treated as a separat# 
E 
input or output im mmh period. By iatreduelug the inter­
temporal teehttleal aad pris« ralatioashipa h©tw@@n varlahl®® 
C^f.. Saauelsoa, Paul A. Cyaaaie Process Analysis. |a 
lllis, Howard s, A Surv.ty of • C©nt®mf©rary leeBoaiaa. p. 
S5E«g8f. fhe llakiBt©a Oo« Fhil#d®lphia, 194i. p« Si4. 
C^f* Hleks. op» ©it., p. 191-201# 
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in different psrlods of time a® well as those withia each 
period, th® static equilibriim -eonditioas within th© fira 
for b«st pr©4u0tloa eeabiaatioo and optism output may h® 
applied to produotioa oif«r tla®, 
fo do this it is a®o@0«ary to refisfio© TOrgiaal ©xpeadi-
tur®, marginal physioal produetivitf aad aargiaal return to 
iaelui® also th® intertemporal relatiooships b®twe®a aai 
among inputs mad output®. Anticipated supply aad demand 
price schedules faeing th® fir® mu@t he substituted for 
1 
given oats, aad ail aatioipated future Tsluets of inputs and 
g S 
output® must he properly iiscouatei, ''following Carlioa 
the marginal ©xpenditure for any input is defined as th® 
iaereaient of th© firm*® diseountad total cost str®aa result* 
ing from th® purchas® of an additional unit of th« input. 
fh« marginal physloal- produatiTity of any input i® th© net 
inereas# in all outputs, proparly disoountsd in physioal 
t«rmS| repulting froa ma additional unit of th© input. 
sarginal return for ®ay output is aow th® iner«a@at of th® 
fir®*© disoouat«t total mirmum stream resulting from th® 
sal© of th@ adi,«d aaount of thi® output plus th® sal® of the 
A^ati^ ipationi ar®, tatoa as tha most prohahla aohadula, 
adjustad for uneartainty preaiuas and disoounts. fhi® is 
diseuasad furthar in the seetton daaliag with anticipation® 
below. 
®At an assumad oonstaat antioipatad intarast rat® in 
@aoh period, fhs effaats of ohaages in th® antioipatad 
intaraat rate are disouisad below also. 
C^arlson. op» eit., p. 111-llB. 
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net etonge la aaomat ©f othtr outputs. By so defining 
thm& 0oa©@pts, proTition is mad® for'teclialcalj swpplr 
and ceaplsaeatai'ity, indsptadene©, or eoapetitiveness, 
as tht ®ase may b«, ijetw«®a inputs ftai feetwetn ©utpmta of 
diff@r«at time ptjrioAa as w®ll as within eettb tia@ ptrioi. 
Sine® til® ofc|®©ilT9 Qf ttot« partieipatlag fim now 
eenaiieration ia tk« iaftxiaiaation of the ©apltalizefi Tal«® 
©f th® antieipatet profit ntvem, %k@ ooatitions neetssary 
for statie equililsriem hold for @aek tia® period nnier 
iynamio assamptiea®, aiife^ eot to tiis abov® iefiaitions and 
to ©ap.italiz#a, aBtioipat@4 Tariables rethar tlian given ones, 
laoh firm will prodwt® th® feest oontolaatioa of ontpnt» at 
th# leaat eoat eombination wtosn tli© ratio of th® sarginal 
®xp®niitur® for 0mU Inpnt to th@ aarginsl phyiieel profine-
tivity of til® rtiomrte times th® marginal rttura for the 
ontpmt is equal for ail•inpnts in th® firm in all alt®r-
•1 
nativ® nets in th# firs» • laoh firm will maxiaizn its 
profit stream wh#tt, in'addition to mtetlng these eonditions,' 
it has «xpan€e4 total operationa in ®aoh period to th« point 
where the aargiaal eost is equal to marginal mrmu® for 
dacto protoet protoeti. Th© rslevant marginal r«"f@nn® fnns-
tioa inclttd®® sot only•iaeraases of th© produot bnt also th# 
e^on®id@rimg tht sail® inpmt or ontpmt in two different 
periods as two s@p.arat« inpmts or omtpmts* 
i- zm 
ehaagas in pieoitaets, fhis aeaijs that th.@ aerglaal 
mmnm produetlirtty ot «&Qh iaftit la tlit prodwttioa of 
«aeli output is tfe® »a3?giiial ezpenditui?® for 
tbat inp^ it fbotli fmotioas of ooupse aatieipattA aBi ais-
©otintai). iB, aMitioa to tlj@s® nocitaaary eoaiitloas fo3P 
©quilibrim la tli@ fim,' total aad safflotent, ow stafeillty, 
eoaditioai mmt also itapoaei# as mier statio ©ssmaptioiis. 
a«s# ©OBiitloas awt p^ bviae not oalf that tha et^ llitoi^ im 
I 
position' is a a'axiMan ratto«r thaa a ainiaya,. aM tliat 
•tffioieaey oanaot be iapfowi bf aMiag or teoppiag aaf 
produotioa pi-oetss m iapiit'mtiliiod, feut also that mj 
tim® tlie' fira is ttoowa out of '©^ uili'brim, adjmstmeat® to 
agais m®'8t tlie ooudittoas will oaus« ooBversioa 
1 ' 
to «qttilil»r'iim. 
tt@se eoaditioas•applf to t&® firm ia g#a@ral, aat 
ooasefueatly havt ao ps-emliar 'beaf lag o-a th.® ffttioally • 
int©girat#a fi3?m Jointly op®.fatiag oae or mor« plaats with 
otliar' fims, TMf are to suali flras, howe^ vw, ia 
tljo sam® m&mmw a« i®felep©i under statie atsmptioas ia th® 
previotts chapttr... Ia orits- to obtaia tb@ ^ ©st pro'daetioa 
©oaiiaatioa.^  ®aeh partloipetiag fir® tqaatss the cost-
produetivity ratio for ail inp'uts in the profitaetion of all 
! 
oatpat# of the firm, iaoladiag that fraetioa of the firn la 
a# posstbl® types; of stability {&&&, instability) for 
dyaaaie systems tad the ©oaiitioas for mmoh are iai«®d eoB'-
pi«3c. Probably th® btst refereae© aTsilabl® it Sfimm«laoa. 
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tlm joiat plaat, flm tfe.® sia Qt the mrgiaal 
@#st fmstlomt in all fXaitt# t®ase«titlTtlr tafetag past la 
%im pmMetim &f ft gimn pmm&t with Ife# »ifg4aa.l 
tor t&® pi?®ia0t» '©tttfits %&« .sin® p-ttimtt ia p®Ti.©ii 
otbas ttoa %hm ©m® «©ttsl.iti?«4 a?® staflj tateta 6« sspayatt 
pretmets, 'a® mm g©®8 f©r iafrnt*.. lBt«i»©,3lsll©iisteip» 
"b«tir®«a that# iat®rt®mporal. m& lafmtt ar© laoltiitt 
la IM® aer# Imsimslf® itfijaitiss ®f tto# implr@& 
im t%9 -fall©, y^gimal ana . 
natgiaal mtmm maAtf ^jmrnM seaiitieasi lia aMttlem t© 
th® te@&dsif deflaitiea, mtmXly %m ii«©©mat#i 
aii,rgi»l @x|itmtitm3?si aai Jlseomt## amtltlpatsa mrglael 
rttwai. Witli flits® Miifi#®1»l©as %&« «tmtl« - #.©.»41%1©B®. tm 
©qailiteflw iffelsfti la, t&« ^ #iri©ms tm 
wftisaili- iiiteg:ral®a tlm- f«®tt©lp®tl33f Im a Jeiat plaat 
li©14 mhm pi'oto^ tioB owm -tiai Is fk® mm 1» 
t3?u® for tii« fiTm ia t Jolat plasf- tm tJi« 
pr0'eto@B@at of tmonmm* litfe tli« setifleatioa® la 
.4«fialtioms, »mh a fim • Its €jpti»sw p©ttl§ip«lH©a 
la tb# Jolat pmift^ slsi. fiaat fey mqmttm 
aayglaal mlm psodttstlflty of %M usssmre® «© pjo@m3?®<l witli 
tl® marglaal e0«1s la %li® Jolat plwt,. fk§ mUmnt m.gmn% 
©f %m- plaat «ai?giaa3. 0O»t fiim@ti©a to. 
lag fim la 1»©tli m mmt stati® e©aaitl#a», la %hM% 
fomiatloa®. • • II-. Se® «sp®®iaUy |>» SSi-iif, SOB* 
30f, SS3-33i. 
gso • 
staytlEg at the otitpmt rep?«s©Bit®d by tb© sam of 
eqwiXlfei-itia parti Qipatioa of all other f irm® • a^tlier than at 
Z&tQ* 
i, Asatioipatioai 
IB a dyaasle ftttlag eiyeeted pri§® funQtlons for impmts 
and Otttputs to til® partidipatiEg fli® mttst to® s«iaetit\it@<i for 
actual ©lies, fit# atatie eoaditions for tqmili1j3?lm iii tfe@ 
fim mj b© generalized to^ djnaiiio ©ireuastfiaees, as lias Just 
te«#n ioue, tk@s« @xp«etatioaa ai?0 assumai to be 
slagl#-fslu#4, or ttoat tbe^ r eaa fee feda@®€ to sliigl#-¥aluei 
«xpe©tation® ttoougli tk# ua§ of mQertalatf pi-tsiums aM 
r 
iisoomts, fMe tts« of mctrtaiatf premiuas aai Sls0O"ttnts 
tak«» into eoEsideratiom th« degre© of uaeerteiat^ r of th® 
«xpe0tatioa, i.©., Ilit ilspsrsioa of expattea. prim fuaetiOH% 
as w©ll as tile aoit probalsl# oat. m imrmse ia ttoa dls-
persioa of tb® @xp0'0t@d prl@e fwaatioaa., ©Tea tlioti#i tte 
modal pri©« funQtiom is uasliaiigesl, would sekt fh« ^ peeta-
tioa lass favoyatol® te the eatmpreneuvg ant haire tha same 
@ff®et as a reteetloa la tbe ©xpeotai fiemaad fuaotion for a 
proimet or aa Inereas# in tii® ©xfeoted mipply fmotlon for 
an laput of the firm. Thus a ohsng© iii tb« dlspersloa in tli® 
«icp®ot®a pjfie,® fmotion.s is aocomnttd for by ©oasidtriag th® 
Most probatole prle® funotlon plua or ainms m ftllowaiie® for 
the uiiatrtaiaty of' tMe expeotatioa* 
. ggi « 
It is not posiibl© to tb@ antioipations rtgariiag 
the prie® fiinetloas t© a siagl© talued ©xpeotation if the 
©stir® probability diatribtitioa of tb® antloipatioas ia 
o©Bsid©r«4, .ftatbtraor© ©acb mtmpmmwe is 'guidei not oal,y 
by bis opiaion of tba degr®® of unetrtaiaty, but also by bis 
ability m& williagasss t© b©ar unoertainty, llils pyoblea 
has b@0ii approached ia variotis ways by 4lff®r«at authors* 
flntatr, for txampla, iatrodmees an "ua0©rteliity prefertat® 
functional*' whll® Shaokl® replaces the aatiolpatei prob-
• 2  
ability distributioa with a "surpris# fanetion", to cit« 
only two. It most' useful» ia the non-rigorous approaeh 
made htr©, to treat the r@g®rilag th® prie® 
funstioas facing th© participating fir® m-m&mihX® to aiu0B 
faluta so that th@ tquilibrluia ooadltloias poiatt4 out in th« 
previous s«0tioa hoM for dttermlnatioa of the max:iHii®i dis-
eountti stream of antioipatfd profits* Tk& nature of tht 
unetrtaiBty of txpeetatlone then oomes in under' th® ooordia^  
objectIT®, th® aialaiaatlon of the variability in th@ profit 
str@att, whioh it disouasod in th« last two sections of th«, 
pr@s@at ehapt®r» 
At lieks points out, sixpeotttions as to future prioes 
aad prlet-quantity rtlationshlpa are gui4@i.,by psyehologieal 
%latn@r, Gerhard. fh@ fh®ory of Production under •Hon* 
sttttle Conditions* Journal of folitiotl iconomy. S0se4S-
667. If42. 
%haekl©., d. i. S. • S:£p«©tations in loonomios. Cea-
bridgt llnlTersity tr©as» lew York. It49. 
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m w@il at lx«ap|.et oftlit fir at ajpii 
politltai »««»,. aM tli@ gtaefal h«altfe ami st&t® -of 
mim€ 0f the Io#aoai@ tmt^m ia^amte a©wa 
rtgayftiiig apetifis fmete^ i. lit# aa»k«tf ami gtatpal 
©•eosemiii ©mtl@©li «t attitut®® t©*ide€ tkm 'tutmrn to«&aTl<ir of 
g 
eiASf^ at tetats im pjjiet-tmaxity r®lati®ssllp»» Ei«lc» aafi 
.a.,/ .0 t.. ..f ™ o. .xp,»t«tlo». 
aa tks elaatiolty #f • #xf^^tatioas • fhti ©lastieitjr will to® 
atfa mm as# ©easMsytt «Btir«lf t»p©r«yr 
aaa to ba¥« a© m txk%m» tat terns, m&. will b« 
aaitf wkam #mf^ if«at «&»»««,» feyiag a ©Issg# ia «::^ ##tat-
ti©m« ia th# sasa 4if#eti©a aat Im tfet 8S» fr©p©jetl®a« fii« 
«3E®«.©tatl©aa at# ia«l&«tie |#Msti«ity ©f «Xi®^ ®teti®a is !«»• 
%hm mily) a fttl Itis*) i» t&« «»«at prit«-^ imality 
if,#lati©af.bip will 'tfems# ifit«3ft@a|»©mi s«%'«titati©a toward 
Csgaimst) .«»'r®iit flai»#t fmar©li®8«i ami towftfi (mfaiaist) 
fmtw?«' plftoatA 861#®, astmii# imt#i'est tat# tuastaat. 
\mm ex$%9%mUm» «lastif. a fall |©» »i«®| ia tb» «W3?®at 
p^ i#«^ t«®atlty rslatioasMps will Mm tlm wmmm mtfmt. 
©f, ©it*,, f. g04»ilt. 
®I,aag«* ?ti©« flexibility# . • • f» BO-Si* 
*%lagtloit7 of e3Ep0ctation» is deflnad m tke ratio of 
tli« proportional iaorement of the ftxpectatios f©i? th® ftttw® 
to tfi® proportional increment of tiie present etoaagi* 
ggs -
fhen tha of «x:peQtatioa is mity a change ia 
emrreat pri©»-qmantity i-alationahips will hriag ahout no-
iatsrisffiporal siahstitmtlos within the fim. 
In aMlti©a to exp©§tsti©»s of th® •supply fractions of 
inputs and demani fmotioas tor -oiitprnt-, the participating 
entraprenear ia mnmmwi. with his antieipatiea® regarding 
technological lano-ratioa®, th« • mac©rtain 0l®a«nt« affecting 
the optratioa of his flm, m& the attitni® aai hchaTior of 
1 
other cntrtpreneiirs participating in th@ Joint plant. A« 
with th@ pri0«-tuaatity relationshipis, thes# factors are not 
glTcn for th@ fira ia the dyaMii© world, h«t -simst h® aatiei-
pat®4 hy the ®atraprta©ar, fhmf alao mast h« r#dac«a to 
siagle-Telaet «p@©tatioa® ia aay tia© period throagji th® as« 
of aaeertaiaty prtmiaas ani dlscoant® la or4©r for the 
lihriw coaaitions dis®u»f©d in th® prsTloms leotion to h® 
applied accurately* fh® effect of elastic aai inelastic 
expectations is the iem# ia the case of th©8« anticipations 
as with sntioipstioaa rtgardiag the price-quantity relation­
ships affecting the firm# 
111-® ®xp®et@t rat® of interest.has an atfiitioaal rol® to 
the participating eatr#pr©a©ar la planning protection sine® 
the inttrest rata a@tenain#s th® relative iaportaac® of 
variahlaa in th® near futur® ani those in the mor© disteat 
Bm p. ahoTfii. 
* ig4 • 
%f sp#®tfyt3ag diseoimli rat®* tf th® ©iaiti'eity 
of tk0 l»t«r#st rat# «irf@«tati©» li matl,r» ® la 
iat«r#s| rate will tarns# 4ft%«rt@af©r®l. agalnat 
%km ffio-st enrreat ©iitfmts aad ia fav«r ©f tii# »0#t eurreat 
iapmti, A ris# la th® la«tr«st rate wtil tevt %km opposit® 
With fiaiti© im-ltrtft rat« ®xf@©tati,6ms tMs ®ff#ot 
will li« im tMe air«@'feiott a»i rnmmmMi »r« pr©ttoma0«i, 
w&il® witH ia«lafiti© l»t«rtat rat# ©^tefatloiis %hn 
miXX al«©- he im th» saa® -fomwliet less TOtie®-
lB$®r«s% rat® shmagt® mitkim t&« 'w&wml raag© will 
%m9 a irtry limlttt •ff«ft #» tto« tii®0miit«4 ?®slm©s ©f tapiits 
aaS ©mtpmt® Is tfei.« ftttmre. Bm&h @kmn%m are ©f aiaor 
®Qas@-qu«m00j, «al«gs tlm mtmpmmmSf. %mmm of tM t®®toi®al 
pr©4m@ti®a m ii ©agagsi is er %h» al>s«»®© ©f ©xtrsa® ti»©®r-
taiaty i» tliii preametiea, m tootli., plaat -tTm astirltifif for 
til® fim for « jf®lati"r® l©og p®ri®i. Bi«@©wited t^ iatol®® im 
thm far fatw® ®re v@ry s®s#itiir® t© ©3Ep®etatioas of 
iBt®r®st .rat® ®laa^ »« 
fto® fim wMm pmti&tpmtm ia & ee»®» plaat loiatly 
wit^ ©tfetr firs® it ia ipiasie ttttilHsrima wlita tb® a®Ge»sary 
e®aiiti©a» art apfll®i to tli® Ai««mnt®A vftlM® ®f tli® aatjei-
i?at«a Tariabl®#, th@ ftam® &$ i« tm® for ®ay fira. Bftoatts® of 
til® rssmltiag ®tra®tmr«, howeirtr, «€«®t&ia« ma»t h@ b&U mfeoat 
%M iistlaetiT® 6ati®ipati@as m& applitetita Qt aatieipatioa® 
ia t&® partiuipatiag fira^ la tb® fir»t pla©® all T®rtit«lly 
%f. Hieki# ©p. ©it,, p. ils«SE®. 
• sss • 
tlmsj. iaelmdiag tfeoi® operat# t^ m Qt mm ©f tlsstt 
plant# J«>imtl|r,.. t&m m ©mtprnt mark#* mlf ia tktiu flaal 
flaat ami m mm psetaet iaprnt aarkst ©aly i» tMalr ftt»t plaat. 
As was polatai #mt ia, %h%' prwietis e^ pttr, tfe@a® firms 4© 
a©t-»-lh«r tto MffiaftX 0©it «aa t&« aairgiaal 
1 
3f®ir«aa# In me% pla»t, . •Iii»t«aa' tMi' «t»^ e »«» of the 
eoat fMattlc>as Is all plaat® witl %h® Mtgiaal 
mrmm fmaetiom is tfee flaal plaat, TlmmtQm tli# eat^ e-
p£«a«mt -©f ttet "rtttleslly iat«grat«4 fl» ii ®©»®eya«t ualy 
witk Itee aa"ll#iftt®i fifiet-*qmaa.tltf t«l»%l#a8lilp t&w ©mtpmf 
ia lis fiaal'plaat# Ai®© tlis §^ %m «at,t©ipatl©ii« tov tapata 
to Bot ia©imi« 11®'fair |)3f©ta©t iapat ta tk# ft^ -at 
plaat. tf ^ iratiafelllty l« t©ii|>®fftll®, t^ i»-
mtmat tlat tii« ?®?tl@slly ist«gtat#i titm. will #•©»» t© 
©^ mili^ ttwi at a. %m'§m ©mtfmt im «&eJi flaat thaa w©al4 
iaiiTi-taal fifM. p«3?f©«iag tli® t«pa.fat® .faaatioaa of «aek 
plaat, l#©aai#' -mae^ t^ataty ai»g©mt« m aatisifat«i 0atpat 
f#¥@aa8» aai aa©««talmty pteaittus ©a aotielpatti' i^ mt 
will 1# tmm tla«« ia tit® f®rtl§ally 
iattiifa%-»i flm. It i» p®saltol«, vitli tM rl#it m^ Mt 
A^stmmiag %%m ©atire prodaot is mmM. tto®a®li ell 
plaat® wltto ae «al«« aaA# @3E0@pt f^ oiR tk# flaal plaat. -If 
tto®r® mm fey-product a from soiae plaat, m it m* flaat ii 
®p#3?at«€ at a aia@ which utilize! aoyt fJiaa tM #«pl«t« 
output of tfa® othars.,, additioaal oaf teats will a#aaei'a tto 
fijfa ami aatitioael aatioipatioai of psita-tttaa^ itsy lealatios-
®lilp« will tea mQ@smitfm 
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#OBditi©si;i fo3? thm tmtimX %© d«ef«a:at tte# 
©lattifltf 0f t&® supply a»d/or 4@»sat f®®tag tli® 
fim, mpmt&lXf wfe«® i»t#.p?aM©tt Is ii@$©»pl4BM®4 ttoomgli 
a J©imt pliiBt, mm "lliis 1« trm® tfm #pp©sit@ 
lihtim. lit a .sa&li«* Im 
© f f @ f  t i t  m t e i f l f i l R t i t s . ,  
«T«a, %hm «•« ftirthsr fli# lft9y®a»@a wttk®'! 
pows'ir, 
»m»ml f%m& ©ip®-?a%'# a singlt flmt joimtly, m 
eoapaif#^  to mm fim mmfimg &mt th.« §m* fm&tim ia€i-
Tlimally, mattttnlaty ©y Atttlslf ©:t#t mytalsilllf ot tli« 
«xft«tsa fi?is« ytlatt$a®liips> m» well as 
afetlity la futtsf #«eh fiw t® orilaarlly 
Bii» Is im« %© •tli# tm% IMt tl® |j©©llmg pro^ ®®® 
whitb tal®# flat# t® tb# |©lat t2.»t t®Amea8 thm irajl&feillty 
ft®isg fl» ^y afttftfltti Of - #pfeaAiai fh# maoaytalatiaa, 
la p#lat<ii ©m% tills ias«tftliity of e's^ saetatioas 
fafilag «»th ptetiolfatlsg fi» l,«.oft«ii ttsxthmw Isy 
p0©lliig fetlwteii dafattrntBtn aai mm tin® ta t'li# Jolat plaal;. 
Smeto ?®4mQtt.©m ia tm w&wMiXitw ef sxpeetatieaa f©:e »a©fe 
faftieipatlag tlm alto tot m& offset ©f im«r®«aiag tte® 
ayaamie ©•^ iliirima ©mtfttt of task hmmaB 
mmmst&imty tiseemat# sai meertaialy 
It will Rls,0 Mf® %k# &t immmim leagtfe of tfe« 
1 
flaaalmg fet »a«fe p&]ettttp8tiiig- #mt::p«ps?®B®w. 
G^f-. I^ ag®. fy,i.e» f.ltxt^ iltty.: * • • p. ii* 
- gs? 
flit partioipatlug eBtreprenettr aust also eonaidei' tois 
aiatloipatl©as of tli® attlttid© and b©to¥lor of th® otbtr 
®atr«pr@ia©mr8 partietpatiag in the Joint plant. la %h.& first 
plae«, sine® the r®l@vaiit se^ eat of tht aargiaal eost 
fmiiGtieii land if a Joint aarktting plant, also of th® aargisal 
]p®T«mme fttnotioo) in tli«' Joiat pleat to ®aeii firm is the 
3©g»®at sta,rtiiig with tht sus of ths otitputa of all partioi-
pating firmi, wheatTer p#x wait eosti mvj smffioiently with 
volOT® ia this rang®, a Qhrnge in th# output of on# partioi-
pating fir® will throw th© others out of ©ttiilihrixia. There­
for®, under dynaaie oonditions, each entrepreneur must ooa-
aider mot only th® ©urrent output of the others, hut also 
hia eicpeotatioE of changes the other# will aak# in their 
output in the future- tJnoertainti' of this ea^ eetation intro-
duoes an additional uneertainty premiua ©ausing an inter­
temporal suhstitution against the aore current inputs and 
against the more distant outputs of the pstrtioipating firm 
as well as substitution against the Joint plant aetivity. 
Secondly, the faot that deeisioas concerning the Joint 
plant are aade by the partieipatiag entrepreneur®, as a 
oolleotiv® group mean® that ea§h faees some uncertainty as 
to these deoislons and whether or not they will be made in 
the best interest# of his Individual firm. . As long as each 
antieipates that the interests of aoat of the others corres­
pond to his own, and that a minority with eonfliotlng in­
terests will not dominate the »©Jorlty, the uneertainty 
- gg8 -
premiums and disootuats, arialag from partioipatioa in tli® 
joint activity will be rathtr saall. If am iadlTidual 
participating tatreprenewr exptet® tlie latdrests of tla® 
majority to ©onfliet with lii® om, or that a minority wi%h . 
opposing objsotifes will doaiaat® ia tli® 4@eision aakiag, 
M will partioipat© in the Joint plant only if -h® afitioi-
pat@s 0mffiei@at gaia by tolag so to eoap®ns«tQ for this 
moertainty. fMis rtqmlrM, antieipated gaia nay b«'®ttbst©n-
tial to sueb aa ©atrep'eaeiip, .partieularly'if'loag tias. 
proiaetioa plaas art r@tttir®<l ia the Joint plaat, fla® 
aatioipatioas of ®mh pertioipating ©atreprenemr relatiT® 
to th# soatiausfi partioipatioa of tli® othara affoot 'hii 
prodmotioa plaa ia tlie a®®© aaaaer# 
The firm whioM participates in e Qmmon plaat Joiatly 
witM otbsrs mast o©asid«r tht iisoouated aatioipat«i most 
probabl# Tala# aad th® aatieipatei variability of fmtar© 
relatioaships ia or^ or to arrive at tht pro€aoti©a plaa whlnh 
aaximises tlbe diEooaated mla® of tb© expeot«€ profit stream, 
fhia is trae for all firas mador fiyaaaie ooa^ itioas. Tfe® 
partidipttiag eatropreaear aast also ooasidtr th® effect 
partioipatioa ia tim Joiat plaat to® oa thos® aatioipatioas 
ia ittormlaiag both the'best protaotioa eombiaatioa aad th# 
optiaa® outpat, ia terms of the effioisaey objective, for the 
firm ia ©aeh oporatiag period. 
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e. Ai4tts,ta@afs t© 
filt #eeojad ©ssmei ofejeetiv# ©f tb# payti©ipatlmg firm 
In s (l,3ra«l.@ te aiai»ize tb® -radiation in tli® 
ftati'Olpate-i fs-efit 9%tmm mm ti»®* Xm ort«r to aofai@f® 
tkis ®iitrepr«»«mr, Ms ©ii^ o^tati-oas and 
antiaipatea ai*©ma #soli @xp«§tati©ii, s#l6ets %lm 
pjroda0tio» plas ps©fli@® for the *©s-t #@oai»it 
mat to th,® waewtalHtiea* While tliis ob|«ettve snd %h® 
aa3Eiai»ti©a ©f th« profit st?®®® ebltitite 
aiS0m««®d ar« iiitimet ©tejeetlt®®, th% two ai?e Intefrelated. 
It lift» b®eK B©t®4 tbfit iiaeeftam txp®otatloa.s iatroitae® 
UB0@rtaiat7 pi-tmimas asA iiscemnt® wliieh mm% he eoa»i4«r#d 
ma4«r tb« fwfit aiaxlaisatloa obltelt'T#* Likmlm, the ©o»t» 
of makimg rniimtmmtM to- iia@#rtaliity sttst b®. takta int© 
aee.©iiBt mftSer tit Tsslatioa alaiaiMtlea ebj®«tiv@* ae two 
0bj90ti"r®8 os'timifllF l®at t© ©ptimm pcssltloas, 
ii0W®T«r,, ami mm»t bt rnnMimmi. Jolally l» ©r4@» to establish 
tli® fiaal #Q«iiiibri«B p©slti©». 
Att iiBp©ftaa% ©easiteratloa tiaft®r tMs e®eom4 ©bjeotive 
flescibilitF wlthlm tti@ flm. G^ oasld®^ lag the aatielpettd 
tiBptysioa aromai toia aest proMbl® mpmt&tlom, the^ -@iitr«-
pr«tt©w otoo©8®s tb® prodtiotlom plan wbiob, wbil® noi opti»m 
I^ir«ii wi«i ©trtaint^ , prl©« varlattoas, varying ©utpmt, 
t@ebaol©glQal progr##*, ®te«, gif® i-i®# t© tbis steosi ob4®<3» 
ti¥@. Cf. Iftift. ©it,, p, 9-50., ast Stigl®!?', Q®orge. 
Pr©te©ti©E ant OistrlMtioa in. tto Short Mm» .imm&l of 
Politioal Mmmmf* 4fi3t§*3if» ifSt. 
• mo 
foy the mst pf©1&abi« ixpsctatioas, Is oftiaiiffi eoa®li«riag 
tli« provable mi'lations arO'^ iM tli#»© $xp©,otatloEs. tJadei' 
til® ©feJ#0tiT« ©f aiuiam vaxiatioa .la tii® ®^ «etecl profit 
stmm al®a®, th® mtmpsmmT .wtii B«intt.ia fl«xi"bilit3f 
wlttoia th# fim to th®' potat wMm tto • marglmsl 
gala la flexibility is ©qmai t© tb.@ «xpe©t«4 merginal Qost 
'Of• ototalmlng tli® flexibility* It is p©ss.ifel0 that mder 
this o|'3e#tlir® It will tea #o0a©ai8 to ©fgaaii® for, fl@x4-
bility la product toa t© th& peint mhm& the ®f#rag® .©©st 
fmaetloa is borizoatal ©irer^ .'tli.®, gatlr# relevant-raag©#. low 
far a glv@a .firm will go %n this airmtton depasds up®a tlm 
te-Glmi©nl eeaditioat of pr©daotloa,, the entielpetsd veriatiqa® 
Intolvta, aad the eostf of atfeitving th® flegibility»• tip to 
& point .suaii flexibility la orgaal«etio.a and operation of tb® 
firm •is litely to' he ©.©msistaat .witii.-tie sazlmliiatioii, ©f tfee 
profit ®t?.saia otej.oetl'r#.. la tM  •gtiglO'i' oost f ox  
#xaiipl®, proamotloa along' tto# flatter awrag® ooat mTf® »ay 
retmra a blggtr strtsia oir«r a.ieriot of.tiae-, eoaslierlag 
.varlatioas ia'omtpmt, -tfean'pro€motl©a aleag'm® a¥®reg®'eost 
fmetloa .wltli th© lowtst alalam poiat^  
Fl«3£l.totlity la prO'iiiatloB mM ataptalJillty to ©Mag® are 
obtiiiaei la mmerml mys, • Itulpmeat'•wliloto eaa readily %& 
c&aagti ©•¥«»• tQ.©tli«r 0pe.©iflo u0«s, ©rgaaizatioa' lato ualts., 
moh of idalofe eaa fea ferouglftt lat© - prodmetloa ladepeaieatly. 
S^tigl#r-, 'op, ©It., p. Slf. 
• mi -
aa4 aaehiBftiS wbleli ©iterate at a faiyli" ktgl «ffiei®aoy ove® 
•a ©ii'bstantial range ©f p?odM©tl©a sat@s all aal^ ® fer 
iaii-sassd fl@.xibilitf» 4 hi# jpfttt© of Taylalil© ©osts to 
fixsi eofts iaiieats® aei-® fltxltelllty ttoam a low ©ae#-
Slallayly a Siigbi ratio of »«lati¥®ly lifiiit assets- to 
r-tlatifsly fix®4 ass«ts witbla tto® fim a-taas- a r-alatitely 
flsiibls ©rgaBiaatioa# Laboy tsalBti t© ferfora ®aay of 
th® fiiff©relit typ«,s of auti©a in %h% plast al.®0' imfma@s 
flaxibilitf aad adaptability# Mlaislmtag tli@ pyodmetioo lag 
las th® seme effect 4 If tli# aafgiaal ©ost of making tli®s® 
adaptatioBs witblB tli© fi*® is selattfely low,, mni tb,e 
m&TEtml $&in. is flexifeility rslstiirtly ir#at, tfe© ©rgaiaiaa-
tioa towas-a flexibility will mmt®& omt mmck fartli^ r tMa 
'H 
if tbs costs »m rslatifely liigb ikiid tb© gala if flexibility 
relatiTely smll* 
iBOtber imfortest eeasidtretioa ia nisimiziag'tJi.® ex.-
p#et«4 mrimtioa ia the profit atrtw te tli# fim is iirer-
slfiaatiom. ©f proiuetioa* fo be' ©oasistent *itfe t&® stabilt^  
o'bjactiTS, t&« fim will «iTei?aify im tli« ili*#itioii® ami to 
the-point wlisr® tli© ©^ p©®ttd margiaal gala ia stalsility ©¥er 
tiia® from dif^ rsifieatios is ©qmal to thm ®^ «0tad laargia®! 
e©»t of ttm ai"re*sifi0iatlom« fhe fim may diversify ia tli« 
typos of oMtpttt, by •rtrtioal iategpatioE of proinetiom of 
eaob ©utputi ia tfet tyf®a of impute mtiliseA fey th© fim, &n& 
ia tb.® oggaaiaatioa of %m tsthmioel proawotlom prooasa, A 
gif®3a mtvepsmeuT will tim diir#j?sifi©atioa aost 
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in M® tim « the Isasls ©f tli© t#<itoleal proilit«tioa 
ftiattioas ©ad tbs iapmt aa€ output feeing tto flm 
m wtll m Ills aatl'slpalloas as to tli© eosts of iiTerslfyiag 
and tb© gsljft ia 4at®rt«ap©-r«l st&Mlltf frea diTsrslfieetios* 
A thisi ©o.jasl€©fati©a toT Tasiatiom la 
tte® profit tlireitgli tla« Is th® tpteial telafl of ilT®?» 
0ifi©at4oa wk«f« a®liYlti®» mm itletttt wbl©fe, 
mhm t&km together ia e©»bliiatl©s, Blal®i2« the aatielpat®# 
dlsfersioa ai?©mi fk# -txpeettd »©st preljabi® profit 
'fk@ m& ©f uaeeytalatj iiswmiiti &M prealiMss will not aiito-
aatlO'Sllf dtflB® m proinstloii 0©»^ iaati©a fet^ aus# 
aiitlQip®t«t iispeifsloa ©f mm vatiable aaf #ffa®t the aatlel-
I^ a%«d disptrsiea ©f anetM®!?.. ' fills objeetif# #ottaid#red 
alone, aietates tMt the firs airoid "rlsl:|*« a@tiiriti®« tjnless 
TH.E ®xp@.cstM TSRIATL©A# In TFE© PROFITTBLLITIR ©f OB« of, th© 
aotlTltias are anti©ipat@d $© oour^ ttr-tyelle to tli« ex­
pected 'farlatioBa la prof It ate 1 lit y of ©a© or more of th® 
©tfe#i* aeti*rltl®», as sigtot bs trm®, tow In feftioaaJr 
i»t@gi'at®i p'r«4iaetS.oii, .Agsia th® eost of sii©,li orgaalaatloa 
la pi-odtietloa «0t fe@ ooaslAerti# 
flit flaol 0oa»ia®ifatl©a tow tfea o^ lsatlT® of statolllty 
of profit o"r®3? tlas to ttie flm whMU will be memtloned is 
resfa?Ql aat slallax jrogyaea ia ortes to mrn^  ate®®st of 
tealiaologleal iaaofatloas# 1&« flm will wpaad smefe pro­
grams t© th® potat mhme tteii? aatitlgstti aayglaal prote©-
tivlti' i» t®me of profit stabllltf 1® ©t^ a^l t© 
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IMir aatiflpatei aargiaal aM wi'll select tfe© speolfie 
program® wbiek art to b# th# mcst pj?®totti¥« fresB 
this j»taMf©iat* If th® a«aaai ©art®® faeing tfe« tivm ar« 
yelatiTtXy Imlattle, tM fli-® will oa oost 
lim©^ ati©as, aai oa ii©:r® ®ff«setiv« aflTertisiaf 
aeli«ae®, but if %h& dtaaai einvea for ©litpats ar« forftctly 
tlastie. the tiwm will ©©aetalrat© m teeth ©©it refimtlag aad 
omtprnt tmtmMing aai 4o aetliiag la the.way of 
adirsi'tlsliag i'eli««s., flie fi» will attempt to fiad Etw w^ ja 
•Qf agaiaat lafrnti with swpply w^srm whiQh ar® 
ia«lastl0 to tm ttwm aad paytiemlarly tMs®^  ®h©«@ sttpply 
mrY%9 &m ©xp^ etti to beeoa® mom inelasti®. flm may 
comduat its ©la y@t@arch pTOgfw,. it m&j ©©atratt with rswsrdk 
ftge»al®s, it may tsfsmt mpoa rapid at4ptatloa of publi® 
emv&h tiMims9t m it aaf ¥asious eoabiaationt of tliei® 
aad oth«» metboda, iiipsaaiBg tipoa th# margiaal pro­
test iirity ®ad mafgioal «o®t of tath. 
If th® fiia is f®e@4 witli marfett® wh®m iafmts,«« ra-
tioaei to it, wli«r« th# omtput® wM.Qk ^ an bs mirkdt®! ar# 
limitti, or wher® |>fi®«« or aargias ar® fi»d, tkt fifa i« 
Iti® fltxibl® to ttafi"®ai@t»bl« ©feaagts ia ooaiitioai whieh 
aff«et it tlaa is the eas# la the ab@@B«ie of th«a® toperf#©-
1 
tioas. iai.a»@f©i»# tto® orgaaizatioa wittoia th@ fim whl©li 
aiaimizts tli© «fft@t of thta© Basket iafti-ftitioas! is also a 
S^s® Hairt, op* §it.,, p» SS-§0, 
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fo? eoasi-staaey wltti the stability 
obJ©©tiv®, Tk& nest &mmm eni most iapofttat market ii^ er-
fe0t|©a tmm %M stfi»ip0i»t ©f maay firas is oapital-ration-
iai* la •gtaaraX tM abof® ©.eaflitioa® for stafeillty OT«r 
ti» witiiia tit® tim l@mfi t© a rsAmetioa la»fit«l-rati©aliig* 
lor 9i»apl®, ©rgaaiafiti#n for flexibility ii hmu^ &hm% toy 
r«l®tlT®ly &i^  lliimitity* th@ san® ii ijrdiaarily trm® of 
41t@rsifieati.©a «md al«© ©f tie^ mt# iastiraae®- ©evsrag®. It 
is possifel#, lew&irer, tliat «apltttl-rati©aiag m&f %«, r®tm©«i 
still fartji®r l>y md|*ista®ats la^  aiiitioa to th©s« coailtioa® 
f©r sta,biiity» e©rp©3?at« l«.g,tl atruttttrt,, for @3caapl#, ha® 
this ®ff®et, to a B©rm liaitsi txttat tlilt is tr«® of 
tlie parta«ralip« f© a fiirea firm oth«3? t|p#@ of aijtistmeat 
m&f ®ls© ©apltftl-ratioaiag# Agaia# if tlie ai^ wstmeat 
la to to® mommM t® tk« fim., tl@ aargiaal cost of m&klng 
tM© adjii®t»©at am#t aot exsetfi the aargiaal gala fro® th0 
i«#r«as« ia eapital-retieaiag. 
So amh t&v tli« a4Jm®tM©ats for statollity ©f profits-
©f®r tiffi© as apflltd to %h& firn ieaerally, ikat sp«©lfio 
©pplieatioas amst to® atit wbea tk® fira partioipat«s la a 
eowoa plaat |©latlf witto other firas? first ©f all tli« 
group of partielffttimg firas »li©ttld 'ooasiflt ©f tlios© firms 
wltlt ttoe mlniMm dlTergeaty of laterftst, m m t© Blalmlz© 
tto® aatleipat«i ©oaflltt of iat®reat aaoag tte« swtral 
f^or m e»all®at dltsmssloa of ©apital-ratioaiag «.®9 
lart.* ©p. ©it.'*, pm 39-49• 
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partlelpattng Speoifiaetlsa ©f fk« eoaditieas 
of paytieipatioii, in  %M sftlel®# aad-tej law# of the  mssoeia-
tlOB wliX also helf to laiBlals# this'aatioipatsa oonfXiot of 
lats'i-ist sai tli© mtertalaty of .eostlmmed parti ol^ atIon of 
til® ©t&@i' fl£Bi, fhm fartielpattmg firms mot® im th® dir©©-
tiom of mlnialziiig this of interest aiioag tb@m mp 
to tM joiat wli,a,r« %lm exp@©t#d aafglaal gaia is #t«al to 
t&8 #xpt®te4 wi^ egiaal ©oat, 
Fmrtlclpstisg-fiai aaf gala stafellitj %j lnt®gMtlai 
T®rtl6&lly,, aa4 will io to-j as lomg as ©xpteted marglaal 
gala In statiiiity txeteAs tM® aaJPfinal ©ost of tli@ Integrmticasu 
By opsritl:^  a #i*©a plint Jointly,, aftiitioiial froecssts, 
mUiQh artquly# a largf^  slm® fm :«eo.B03alo operations., beoo®® 
#eoaoffii0 t© flms mliioto, «® sot of suffioieat aia® to cariry 
out tM« iBtaffstioa It is ©©*©» for so-v®3?'al 
suQii, gfomps of o©op€.?»tiag fitas to osrry %h% Toi^ tioal int®-
itlll fmrtaer 'hf ftiwatiag «Bd 0F®3?atl.iig a aingl# 
plaat Jointly aa a patt of tli.® aotlvlty of eaoJi of tto® groups, 
lot omlf li Wm v®rtlfall« •iat#gtat«4 op©ration llktly to b® 
mor© «tafel« la fltw ©f tti^ orayy fluotmitioa.® la. aay^ st 
ooaaitioas, for tht mm^ m. polat«a omt alaoYe, feut beoaMs® 
of the higkmr of oooriiaatloa of tfe® mxiom proo«s8®% 
It is llksly to nor® adaptall# to .^angine tteiinleai mat 
©eonomi© ooaditioaa affeotlnt the fli-m# fbt iivar®lfio«tloa 
wMeh xt«mlts .also i®©3?®as@s the aatiolpatoi Tarlsbility of 
profits ofor tin® to tli® paftlslpatiag fit*.*. 
Im efiditlomi th® partielpating flmt 'aay gaia steblXlty 
hy AimtMltfing la tks |©1b% plant and la 
th®!!? iadiTia.mal plaats* Wli®!'® tifear# ar® ssfisal depaftasats 
ia .til® o^int plaat,' all ©f iMioli mm iBts^ ated with tli© 
la4lTlittal aetifltita of th# pejp-ll^ lpatiag flM®, tli® antiei-
patt4 stftfeililf ef prdfit§ .©¥«i* tlai f©r mak partloipat.lag 
flm will ortimai'lljr ¥t p'^ atei' tlisa ia tlie alis@ae« of tU'Sli 
diiraraifieattda# fills is pmtimlmelf tra® wli«r® oomater-
ayelic flmQtmatioaa ®.»« ti:p©git®i asoag tk# aetiTittes ead 
©tttfttts of tbt fims, 
fb® ©pp#2?*isaltf to pml moertalsttes wltliiB tfe« gr©«ip 
©f pajtieifatliig eittr®p?«aemss has tmn »©fitioB®d as 
a sottre# Qt ImwmmA satialpatet stability of preftt# OTer 
tim® to ta#li firm. Smtfa ©ppeytualty a3?is«s solely fr©® th® 
faot tiat tM« fimt & mxmom plant jelmtly aat 
sdlatts sfteifieallf to ttaet..ftainti«« growiag ©tit of as®©« 
eiatti pfoHttttioii astifitis® •, tit Joist aetivity is 
assoeiattd *itfe tli® iativiteaX a©tiirlti#.i of ®aeh fium, feow* 
emVf tlis ©^smltisg matielpat^ i pjr©flt stability affeets tfe® 
tntii-e op«r'atl®»s of til® partitlpatiag'fims* As was polated 
•omf la oli«p-t0i?.« § aat i, tme#?taint iet>. m%u tb©u# 
speoifio to a giwit t©p«rt»emt^  oir'©3p©t«.tiag p«tl©i, may be 
poolta b«t*»@tt depmftaests ant ow tia©*- fMs tea® tie «f-
feot of ir®4woiiig tl« @xpftt«d fsofit vaflattity t&T %m% 
fim^  m& will b® ©arrlei ©iit l©ag as tk® dxpeetet gaia 
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atabllltf to tl® exfettai aauginal. ©f orgaaizisg 
for utatoiiity iimst fe« ec^ ua I f©r all mstliois mst4 1>y fim 
to aefais'r# stalfoiiltf tia«» II amst fe# ia^ ossitol® to 
isertm,## expettei ttaWlitf hj ttsimg a ii#th0a mot h®ln§ ustA 
or hy diaeeatiawtag a memoa wlii@li i® feelag fbl# 
equilibfliaa p©ilti®a amsi itmlsl® in tlie semse tiiat if 
tM fim is fkmwn ©mt ©f ataliilitf atjmstntats 
to agftia m«®t t^ « aeeesssfy eoaiitt^ ss will mm& ©onwiesloa 
t© aQuiliteim, 
!• Iffioiency ami Stafeilitf 
Mwm til® pfdtmetioa plaa wbieli maxifflis®® th.@ diseotaattfi 
Telma of tlis -Of i»fits aji4 ttoa profiuotioa 
plaa whl0ls. mittiaias* ©xpsetti iisptrsioB ai?©UBd tk# most 
pTOfeabls profiti mm tia® toT a pa^ tioipattag fir®, the 
taa^  is i?®s0lf#i, lat# tii« of t^ ® feest coaffomls# 
po-sltioB '^ stwte.B %hm% two. fli« lo^ atiea ©f this @emp3?oiiia@ 
position for a givta fim~will 4©pfii4 mpoa tti® »t«©liBie©.l'»» 
rslat isBsltip l3itw©®a tits# Iwe ofe|e6ti?«@ ami th# ia4iff«S'-
'«s« map of t&« a#fiElmg tlie ml&tiw® ispor* 
taae® of tb® .two 0'fejf0tl«s to him* If hottk thm tmhulmX 
rtlatioasMf as€ 'tm tadiffeseatt. map &m assm«4 to to© 
d®fiaitt aai clearly aat wltboiit disoostiauiti©®, a 
unique ©ptl»a posit lorn will %© dtserib®^  hy tb® point of 
t®ag@nc,y of %M teefeaieal jtlationsfeip fnaetloa aad aa 
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imiiffei'taat msfe  th%m %WQ 
a® iatlff@t«ii©» map festweaa anS statelltty 
is pwi?#lf ia tfeat It existi mlj  ia tli@ aiai-* 
p®i»kaf« svsa i©»©wtot maeeassiotiaXf-^ of th@ partleular 
«atftpr®aemr.# It is i-tasfaabit to expset tbat iadlTiteal 
eat:r#s»r«a#tt3?» tot® ilfftytat ladlff©r®a©@ maps, «ad tMat tM 
©f a partlettlaif eBtrefi?#B«mi>' aftf eteag® ©wi? tiat. 
Som® @Btf«pi?«a@wrs «# nor® irtatwssea# tli,aa 
othtr®, aot mlf bettttts© ©f theXv attltai®,. bat feteams® of 
4iftti?«a©®s la tfe® tati© ©f a«t w©3etto t© total asset® aaoag 
othsrwl®® stailwr fi»s. la- attitat® %&mv€ 
feas4ae0s' ventures m&f nfeaag© a@. kl® g«a®F«iI attitai® 
sliift® tmm motifatlea by 4»fi?tssiea ptytJfeel.egy t© »©tiTstion 
bf latletlea psfetelegr. It al&o m®ms. m&amMe to «3Ep«,et 
tbat |i#tw©®n ©atttfi-taaax.s, aai €lff®T®ae©s oTtr 
tittit .f©s a gifta eatttft^ afw aaj oot®,ir a tmm*-
WlXltaia®®s t# assaa® tatrepr#a«aipsbip aleat ia41«at@# som®-
tlilag of a feat.mr®s©ffii! spiytt. ta tfe.# ©th« haai th® faet 
tMt «e©Beai® li©i?l»ai &m llaltti m& tliat Bmmwitj h&s ® 
positlT# mlm laiifat#^  that s©®® »atieip«t«i. r^ wari Is 
reqmlr«d as ia<im##»«at tm bta^ lag aSditieaal aa«»i'talati®s# 
t% i» proteafel# t&at som© e©av®xlty towai»a %lm ouigia, as is 
tjpieel of tka msmftl imAiffmmm& 0mm^  aad soae a®gatiire 
8l©p« ta tlt^ se imitfmmm iiatvsa th© ©«s® 
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 ^ r«l4ttoiisMlp b®twe®B ^ ttt&imQf aat 
iav©l.T#s smbl@0H.Tt ®ls©^ mi. i® iikeli' 
to w&itf ®oa®wiiat h@%wmm ©a-li»tpy®»®tt3fs' ftjifl m&x tis®. Botit 
otoJ®etiv#» are feastd ob itatieipatloiiSj^  aot ©nil- as to aoBt 
probable value® h%t sli© as to iispejsioa® afOtiad t.h®s® m©»t 
probablt w&lmB* Botfc ooasift®® aiitieip®t@4 ttobnioal pro^ ue-
tioii fiia«%ioa«, antltlpatmi m&sket eomiittotts, asa antleipafei 
td0littologi®sl iaaomtioas,. la mm of tli« fajetioipa-liag 
both oom»l4«3? aatielpetloa. as to tlit attltmi®® 
and hQhmiov of eat2«f3r®a#ttf« participatlni ta ti® 
4oiat. aetiTitjr,; Tfe« mfttaf® of ffets ^ ©latlonsliip itpoaflu 
upoa tb® aaottut of ©:Ep««t«a ©ffltleaof seorlfiwi 'Cor guiaci) 
m txp##t«d itatollltf is iaoreaafti ia tht firS| and vio® 
ftrsa. It is logle-iil to tttppos®, ttet ov«s ® iiait«i ranfie 
as #xp®©t®i tfftii«aoF i«.' imptofai «xp«©t«d staTsllitf is 
ai»o im©x«as#i« lowasst towajpn tk® te^ st ooetolaalioji of omt-
pmt« at %im. laast ©oat temteiaatiott f3P©» tks ©taaipoiat of 
«ffioi#ii©y will pi-okrtlf Is® mmplmm&tmf with iaeteasti 
itability mp to s©a« poiat. f&oa tk«3?® will pfoMbly be a 
llait«4 ^ attgf om^  wkisli ©pttoaa #ffi©i®ii@y will &® ind®p«nd-
m% of SBXiaw «tafeility. flatlly ttoare m@t fee a T&mm 
witlia whiob mf tuwthmT gsis ia «xp®et«i ©eoaoai© 'fffi-
oieiiey o©i»i oaly at tit® •aofifte® of ©xpeotet stability 
omt tia«. fkm saa® ttoe# ,0t&g«® «® ptobatoly also passed 
tlirougte. a® stability m%T ti»® ii lao3r©as«t, la this ofts# 
a» loBg ®fi %m two tootoaieally eoapltiieatayy, 
or ai l0iig.es eitlmT- or stefellity &m b« iaeytaiiia 
wltM©ttt ©f til# otfear, tlit firm will iaproir® i t s  
pQsittm hj mmin^ m% @X&n$, -teb# mrm B.mf fyoa th® stxis 
1 
r«gar€les® 0f tfe« ttatmi?® of tim map* Th« raag«-
of tiiii mtm whisi ii ©:ptteial f©r 4®t«aiaiag th^  optimtaa 
posiisi©a of' tfae fi» is omXf ttat Mgrneat, of turv® wh©r® 
optiatia ®ffi@lea.ay aai ©pt-laaii staliiHtf withta tht partici* 
patinf fim mm TOap«titi?«, 
T&® OftliMa tm m givta fim misr iyaaa,i® 
©©aiitioa® eoMiitiriag tl© «0©«©al© olsjeotiw® ia 
fitmaliatfi in fig«r-# f# lffi©i«a0f it »asMf«i oa. Il« % 
axis inersaalBf t© tk#. right aasi- stabilify is measmifisd ©a 
%h& I &zt§ iii0f«&®ing upmm€f fh® t#0Mai#al i-elatiomsbip 
fe#$w©®s tffiiieaey aad' i® r#fje®a©iit®S by t,h-@ mxm 
IBGDlf, Oftiaim tffitisiiar i® sepfeatatei hf 01 m, tfet X 
axis aa4 mmimm stability by ti oa IMe f axis, T&e-.. imiif-
fts-ea®# ®m3?ir®s I,. II mi. Ill mpmm&t th® 8®rie» of #ffi-
0ieBeyfSta1&ility prists wM'Cii tfa® ©Btrspi'taettj? is 
iaiiffereat* i.a€iff#i?«as« ©mr^ ts iatr^ fts© f»$a-the 
oarigia i© tfeat III i® tie lii^ tst ©at shewB* h%s% 
positiea is mt%m§. bytfa# p©ia% ©f taagefity -©f th« ABGDIF 
omxT#' aad ittdi,ffiif«a©e/ ^ mfT# III at OJ #ffiQi«a-©y tad OS 
stability ©wt'.tiJB®*-
\al«.®« of ,.oours0» t km iadifferen®# eurires twa feaofe oa 
ia tfti® mlmmnt faaga wlilali is indsti. mm% milk®-
ly. 
Value of discounted expected profit stream 
Figure 9. Relationship between efficiency and stability 
objectives. 
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fbe se^ ®a%i of th# tscMieal 
ralatioaslfeip ettfir« AB' asi' J1 w&psm@tL% T&ugmM of ®ompl@-
aenterity* At ts ts^ m © t© H stabiJllty 
Is laer«a,8ed tmm A to S, aai as stability Is fsom 
© to L effiei«a®y .ti la0r®Bs®i fi?©a.F to K» The two «rbt'«is 
of the -jeefi##* %h% piJOfeafel® ease of d«Qreas©a stablj.-
Ify at ve?y Im #fflel«3aof ©ai ats:i?®as#i ttfieitaty at a 
mxj mstable fJi® i«g»®ttt W rep3r#s«ats tb# 
ia.e»®aa®i «f.fl©l«a0y fi'om 1 to I wltk a© satsifie® (nor 
gaia) ia ®tability, aai tfe« s#gii«»t W ,r«p£ifs«nt8 tli© ia-
©r«ai«4 stafetlity fr©a L ts M witli m l&sm {mw gain} is 
#ffl®ieaoy, §.m. repres®ata tlit eoapetitiv® taag# 
•wli®3»® mmj immm& in ©ffitltaey a#®a« a toirirespoadiiig 
loss ia stability esi fift mtm* fhm exmt optimtia positiea 
t}®tw««m aaa 1 mm mXf te# i®fia®€ by tM iaiiff#ren«« etarws 
of ttoe t»ti?tp»emi». All poiat® to the- left of Q aad bslow 
B mm iraratieaal t«ia,yiltas of %h&. slept of the iftiiff@r@iiG« 
«mrT«s| tiM fim will always ptoto@® «t Itast at 01 effi©l@s-
oy (with OS stafeilityl sm4,at Itast witli « stability (©t OK 
tffi©i®»ey)• 
Tk® ttflmiitl felatlomaMp between ®ffi©iiiuiey aad 
stabilitj gb.©ws ia figw# i, ABasif, Meiia to r«pi@seat th® 
iitmtion with. te^ pe-Qt t©' %%9 fim festielpatlag im a ©qmos 
plaat Jointly witto ©tl#!- fims.'quit® rtalistitally* The 
.©xaafle glt®a m mm illmst?at»s a gaia in effloi«aey 
without loii la stability liy sktriag pfie® 
* S44 
©t«i? ti«», aaA woiiia i*«pi?®s@nt a aov»m®at 
aleag tlte fmaetloa tmm 1 teward G 
ia. ftgm® f#. M&mmnt al©ag this mTr<& from A. te B» wltli 
aetmei gaiS' in stability aa ®ffl©i©a©y is might 
ir#ll reprtseat tli® ftm*s ©rigiaal ieatsl©a to paEtieipat® 
ia tiie -lelttt plaat# a® effisitsdf- gaia is illiaatrated hf 
mrmmnt tmm m§* t© ma fox fim 1 ia Figw© f#. 
stafeiliti' gai» mtmB tb© eppQrttisity, as a f@iult of 
partieipatioa tm tfe® Jelat aetiirity, • tliat th& fim lias t© • 
pool t)m U3i®®*talat|#s la ©onmeottea wllfe lli® €!oo:rAlaatea 
aotiTity witl. t&s ©tfeti? parti oipat lug fir as ana ttos redtiea 
th« aatleipeteA- dlapersloa ai»oaii4 tb# »o»t pirQlabl® 03E|ieet®» 
tioas a® tlitf, tarn , tbe flm« 
ka as «i:aiiple uf iie"f«»#at froai f towst4 1 along tliis 
t@6li»i#al. r#letl©astelf fmttiea,' wkleli r®fr«i#Bta a gala ia^ 
.effitlsaejr at at^ feility i» torisldtf th® oa®# of 
dlT@3?flfloatloa fe»ls©at®ll|' ia tli,,# Jelat plant %f aailijg a 
depaytaaat wliteh IA also lutegratei with t&a &ativlti«s ia 
tli« iMltifiual plaBta ©f tSi# partletpetiag flm®. Suppose 
tiiat ttot s#w €«ps3?tMat is a.ta@4 to tak® full adTaatage of 
%h& @3cpeet9i eoMmttf'^ eftli© ao¥ta0at of tli« woeiftaln prie® 
ohaagei of, tli« ^ protmst ©f fli® etiiei d«p«ta@at eoi^ air®4 t© 
those of tto# f3?o4mot of tli® ©M t#pai!tii®at • la tfels ©as® 
til# ®xp^ #©t«fi gala ia stefelliti" is ,i?©adllr apparent, m& it 
may toe a®f©-mpeal®i by a gain la #ffi0l#me|* Buaah a.« it 
illustriitoa l» 5A %y mmmut fmm U.m* to lAfG* 
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OrgaBlzalita for ia tlia proam©ti©a 
©©Bdtiettt ill -111# Jeimt plsat «p t© a point mj mpwmmmt & 
gala in stability mithmt a eofi-etfoaattt® lost la sfficsieaey, 
as if0f3f®®«at©t %!• mmmmt tmm 1 %o » ia Flgur® 9, 
iaitallattoa of a ppe^ essiag aashitte ia Jelut plaat 
whleto 01^ total tlas fmm mm »eatl to om® wseie, 
tad at tMt i.aa# tia« a«ltl®r ia-03p@as-ts ao? t®'<s^«s.®®s total 
pes mait pr©e®s#lBg Q©at® is as eicaaplt, 1 fain in stability 
f@stilta tmm. tim sttettA protuotioa lag* m& m ©©rrdspoaaisg 
sa#rifte® h&s lje®ii aai® la effleiemt?. fha totioml mmtlQU 
of t]Q.t stateiXity-fttfiiiiaof CI, i® iilmsti-eted by 
reo-j-gfinlsiitioaa to gaia etafeilitf la the p«rtielp«ttiiig flmi 
wMcl 3?0®tilt In 111# lm» &t ©tfieleaof, smh a® t&@ ms© of 
labor td nmk aix«d f®@fi rati©** tfean awteaatl© saeMiag tq^ ip-
maat ia a Joiat tmA f^ oeessiBg pl«mt.» And altetaatively 
tills BBgmmt ot %M ataMlitj-efflQiemoy fmotloB, r®p£#a«ni,t« 
raorgtulzatloa to falm ®ffl<}ita0|' ®t th% #xptii0® of stability 
in tie fartieipatlag fli®s, a® th® porelias# aad operattei 
of a fi@«t ©f motm trmkn 3?ath«^  th®a %hB mam of mm.m ear* 
ri#is ia a .Joiat potato mafic#ting plaat» ^ 
Xjm&T ay»eai# «©a€ltioss tM# fim wM#li partislfatea la 
oa® ©If mor« plaati Jolatly witli firas will always 
equate th® .fall© of t&t ilsQomat«4 aaffiaal «3cp@»il-
t«r« tm mvih. Imput to tke #xp#e.t®i assgiaal pbysi.@al 
pro toot iTity ©f tli« iapmt tl»®8 tli« ©xpeet-sd diseomat^ d 
ma^ giaal 2®tiiia for all omtputs in the fim.fbeth witlaia. aa4 
zm * 
outsii# tit® plant) lo loag aa ao stability is «aari-
f i©©d .toy d©i»g s#, e®a®14@ylag tli® satir® opsiratloas of thM 
tivm., eaob p©,3?ttaipatiiag eiatyepriiaauir- will p37oamee at t1l« 
total C5utpttt wiiidli mivmtm ti® disoomatea. ©xpietst aargiaal 
iQr®Rm for saoii outptit witli.tii© dlseomattt aaygiaal oost of 
tb« etttpmt s© losg fi« It mtaas no m&'sitim ta 
The paxtleipatiag flra will also atilia# tall msthods of 
aoliiairiBg Btafeilltf witMa, total fiim to t!i« poiat wfe©r@ 
thB «p®©t«i ttargiaal gala la stafeilily is ©§.«al to tb« 
matliefis %&km togetlisr, m long as it mectas a© ®a©rifi®« ia 
Wmn #ffl«iisaty sai stebility baeuas ©oitpetitiw, 
tlia partieipatiBg ©atrtpi'tiit'ffie will eboos# ti« p:ffGiiiotioa 
•ooaWaatioji aiii tba total oatput ia #aoli-pai^ ioi wliish Buahlm 
him t© mmh tli# fetgfetst possibls stallltty-®ff iQisaoj iMif-
fereaaa eurT®. 
a$tlio<l.| and for all majfgiaal tow 
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XI. LMAI WRH G0®IST1KT llfH lOOHOMIO SflUefTOl 
Im manj r®spe«ts tfe® ©xtstiag legal straetmra foy e©op-
emtim astooiatloni fails to r®fl«©t eitttmat®!!- tli#ir tm® 
monomiQ nature, la gtaeral tli® ©nablimg statat®s mMor whSeto. 
0©op®retlv# a«so0lati©aa laeorporat® ar® patt@r»®i afttr tlie 
daabling laws i#®ipii«d for tbe ©orporat© firs, Although 
Tariotts aodifitatloas ha-r® gredaally 'beta latrodti©ei iato 
th«i® 8tatmt@8 ia ©ri®r to aer» a.®«rlf adapt tkem to the 
distinotiv® mtum^ ot the eoeptratiirt assoeiatioa, tliey still 
l©&v© a great dtal to b« itsiyed, la this eomtrf the in* 
0orporat«d ©ooptrative h©©oa»8 a lagal p-©ri©n Whitsh. txists 
stparat® mad apart fr#m the pertieipatiag fims» a# full 
oorporat® priTllagei are «soiif®rr@d upoja th® oeoperatiT# 
aisociatiom*- fkm@ priaclud® llf® apart aai bai'oad 
that of aiaj oa« of its a®ah@r@, fall power to transaet bmsi-
ii«ss in its owB aaae and eater into eontrauts with third 
partita, liahility to- ©rsditors only tO' th® Qxtmt ©f aetmal 
capital all©Qat«t to th® eeoperatiT© hy th« partieipating 
firm®, aad, withia sora« limits, power t© alloeat® ©araiags 
la Btkf mmmx spetified ia th# artiol#® of i»eorpor«tiom or 
hylaws or W board of dlr«etors» emoh law-s tend t© throw 
th® Qooperetiv® - iato the fra»@worl!t of aa iad»p«adeat fira set 
up and operated hy iadividutls who do h«sln«®s at th® eoop-
@rativ©, fh«3r 'aasuffl® that partioipatlag eEtr@pr@a©urs set 
up © s®parat» tooaoaie ©ntitj h@tw®®a their iaiiiridual firms 
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aad tfe# reletraat mA%t either for ©utpmts or iaputs of tli«lr 
firms. Under suok n fraia®wori£ the @atrtpr®a®w0 who om and 
oentrol tM® oooperativ® ar« plaaai la tfe« paraioxicai poai«-
tiea of aaxiaiaijag profits la tfcitir e©op®ratif« by traasaet-
lag bwla«s-s witti tiieir OWE iafilviittal firas im whioli they 
ar® als© it#kiBg t# prefit®, 
la Gthtr ©$ttBtri@i, auefa as Btmark mi. lollaat,. tli® 
eooperatlf® assoelatioa is lookti ©a legally pr«tty mmeli &a 
a parta«rsliip« fta.« •toopsrativ#, in this ta®« iota sot exist 
apart froa it© a©»b#i^  firs®, aat tlie#« firas ar© jointly 
aad s«pfirat«ly llafele te the ©xtaitor® ©f tb# eoeperatiTf 
assoolatt©m. I.sg«liy Um&irm tM ©©©psratiir© is still 
0oasid.®rad a firm ©w»:©d aai e©iatr©ll®t It® fatron.®., fba 
partioipatiag firms are still fe«t«i witk the mm parafiox. 
in eitlier eas® th# vtrtieal iat#grati©» of «©T©r@iffi mit# 
throm^  a jointly owm®i aafi optrated plaat is a©t ai«qiwit«ly 
r®c©^ iaed. TI10 ©oeperati^ ® is treatet simply as a speeial 
kiat ©f jointly ©wa«4 firm wliioli fit® imt© tfe@ lagal frame* 
werk ©f the corperetiQa ©r tli« partaersliip, ©r s©a® sort of 
hybrii b®twe®a th.@®. 
•li«r« laws proTii® for th® la®orf©rati©a ©f ©ooparstl'r® 
sssoeiatioBs ©a a ©apital atook basi®, a® dlstiagaisjita from 
tli« aon-©toek form, %h® teaAeaey' t© ap® th© ®orp©rate etrrn©-
tttr® is ©Tea fr©at®i?, ft® eoimoa ami pr©f«rr«i stoek aai 
other see«ritl@s of the espital 8t©ek oo©p®ratiT® ara givea 
the sa®@ lefel fora as the sa«s ®®©ttrity ia th# ©orp©ratl©B, 
- 24® -
exo©pt ttot mimallf uteres of voting t©ia»oa stook whidM 
oaa Is® h®l€ bj aay oa® iatividrnX 1® limitet,. tfa« ©waei'shlp 
of tfe« atoet i® 0oatroll«i, and th# stook ilTiasait .mm 
aamtlly ftwd» Mtwllf th# eooaoaie aatmi® of oemea sai 
pxefewtd atotk in th@ eafltaX stotk e@©ptratiT@ Is ooasider* 
alsly Aittm®nt tmm th& se©m©ffli« satttr© ©f tli« mmmn a»a 
steiik is a eo]ep©reti©B et Jolmt stoek ©oaipafiy. 
A Itgal fom §o»slsttat witll tto. feasl# ©©©aoal© mtm% 
of the ©©opeyatiTe ass©©iatioii amat fiv® fttegsitioa to tfes 
fact tk»t mp&mt® ftfomoffiie asit® smrry m « p#i»t ©f t.fa®ijp 
total ®«©iioai® aetlTittes Jeiatly aat <s©©riiaat«ly In a ©em-
»on plaat.' it mmt •pmri&  ^ fGv tute assoelated ©etivlty 
wltfeemt atiforelag it froa tfe# septfate a©tlTltl«s of tit® 
paftltifatlag firms. It provtd# for #ttt4t«bl® partiel-
patiom in all ®©©aoai® rtlatlensJiif# to th@ Joint 
activity by &mh partieipatiag fim, amt giv« mQh mtm-
•pTmmT Tm&ou to ttot tli®'©tti#y pai-tiaipatliig ©Et3?«-
preasttrs will also partieipat© ©t^ i^ fcately 4a tfe^ se yelatioE-
shift. It amst provite iadsjwateae® to ®a©li participating 
«nti?epr«iiemy relative to. bis laditiittal «ati?itl«i wki^  are 
'^ 'trtieally int®grat@d with tM« |ointly eoaimet«d eeomomie 
ft'StiTity.. And fiaally it mmst pr®?i4® a framework wbifh 
aaalJles the partieipstiBg eatrepreaeurs to ©perat® tfe® o^int 
plant In tfe«ir .©wa %m% i»t®r®st» oeasitering ths -©ntir® 
'^ ertieally iategrated sotlTity ©f %mh. fartieipatiag fir®. . 
Am aa«feling a©t wiiich r©eo^ i»s t^ ® ^ asie ©eomomi© 
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nattiy® of thB eoopefatiw assotiatioa will m% €© th& tSuea-
tioaal Job of ®aki.ii all pa^ tiolisatiag fiiems tk® 
full implieations ©f the toopefativ^  atftietiir#.. It will not, 
liow«Ter, stani in tbe way of smclbi asa ttiiitifsta»4iag, sua sotmi 
®a"ti'9pj'9ii©usiaX mtim hmmA om suoh ma«?sttiidiag, as pirtsaaf 
«nabliiig laws teM to 4o,. 
At of issoeiBtlom 
mm a gpomp of fim# fom a eoopei-atiir# a«so®iatioa 
for pm£pos®8 of' ooaaaotisg a past of thtir Msiatsa aetivity 
o^iBtly, tM ©aaljllmg l«gisl«tiom shoaM for tlfee 
fillsi^  of »©rt.i@l#s ©f ®#so®leti©a*» i?atli.« tbaa aiptiol«« of 
iseotporatloa, a© fai-ti-oifatiBf fijrms. ihoulA h& "aasoeietsd'* 
with r@sp®ot to tMir, Joiat eetiTity, tout tlitir Joiat aotitrity 
a , s  6 U Q &  s & o t t l i  t t o t u t e o m l d  
legally as well, as tooaomioally la a group of. iadividua! firms 
fttttotioaiag. ©ooidiaatftly witb jesp«et t© a pert of ttieir total 
a®tlTitl«s ratlier tliaa a Jointly owaed soT®r®iga aai ttaattaob-
©d tattiprist iMQli m tli# eorporat# fira. Iht ©ooptrativ® 
should legally exist oaly as aa i»t®grat®d part of tb@ resp«o-
ti¥# bmsiaesf aotlTities ©f tlw sewrtl mtrnfeM flras. 
l^ egal «a8S0@iati0E** ahottld ,giir« th® Joiat aetiirity per­
petual lif«, «itber dirtotly ©r'isy proTiding for ©Mrt®r re-
aewal. It sfeowld proTide aacfeiEery for firits to withdraw from 
mi. to Joia tfe® a»so©iatioa witfctomt Jaopardy to %M associated 
• ESI 
aotiTitj as smeb, it shetiM glTe tli® asioeiatioa tfa® power 
t© tjyaatact busiaeas with tliii?a psrtits im its owa nan©, tli® 
right to owa property, iaeluiiEg rdsl estate,, md t.h« right 
to 8uei aat fee sm«a ia its own aam®. It shoiiXS proirii® for 
an o«ra«rship eapital fmai whioh is al.loo®t0i to th© aasooiatei 
aetlTit^ ,. It should provii® for a bo.aj'-a of dirtotoi's aad 
d®cisioa ffit'kiag aaehiae:r,f fm th« asiOQiatiom. It shomli 
proTia® that th® sigaatms® of th® presideat aai seei-atayy oa 
offioial doommeats, coatiaetg, agsmmmta, #te,, shall legally 
hiad th® aasofietioa aad its to th® e.xtaat suthoriised, 
as sp«oified ia th« articles of ®®eo.eiaiti©a* All of th@a® 
thiags should b® proTid®4' ia a maaatf whle.h teeogaiu®® th® 
eoordiaat® faaetioaiBf of eommlm aaita**th® paftieipatlag 
firms. 
1h® -Joint aetivitf a.homld aot h® iaeoi-porated as an 
©atity ®3ciatiag apa.-rt froa th® partieipatlag amtts-. Hi® 
owaership ©apital fmat ia th# eoope.ratif® aisooiatloa should 
I'epttsfat a past of th® ®atfep?eaemi'al oapital of aaeh par-
tieipatiag firm, whish is allooatod hy aaoh of thea to thair 
Joiat a®tiTity# fhi® capital is prodmotif® to th® partieipat-
iag fi^ iw bseaaa® thty as® it to furth«a? their owa ©eoaomie 
aetivitias.' fh® r«sida«l owaarship capital iai th® eooperatif® 
assooiatioa shoali th«r@fore o.arry ao vot® aad draw ao iatar-
est aof diTiieadt Aay r@tmra to suoh eapitel -would a-dd aa 
aqaal -aao-aat to prodmetioa costs aad so woald h® simply a 
hoolckeepiBf traaaaetioa, fSis® eaabliag statat® should aot ap® 
zm -
tli® ©apltal stools of th® ©orpoyat# flm* fUere is 
no eapital la the toepfiipatlv® aissoetstlea ec»parabl© la 
©conoaio Eatur® to ©Ithti? ©oaaoo sto-e& ow ste^ek la 
the oorporation. foras aad terms slomM aot he ms«d 
ia th« laws for assoeiatioa, m ©Mapl# of suitahl# t«ras 
for th« residml ©WBsrship espital ia th© esso©iatioa ii 
giT®a ia th# app«ndi3t tO' this ©hapttr. »eoac»l0 aatur© 
of tooads is th® sAue la hoth 0«s®s aai th® sftn® t«rBiaoi©gy 
eaa aad prohahly showW bt 
la ©ontrast to iaoorporatloa, legal a®soeiation should 
prtftat r®i>r®setttativ«s of th« pfirtioifatiag aaits from 
serflag la @al«rl®i, »aaag®rial eapeoitits ia the oooperatife, 
•falik© oorporat® aaaagtrial fersoaa#!, aaaooiatioa aaaagers 
©arry ao ®atr®fr«B®iirlai respoasifeility for the hasiaess. 
Iast«0d th»f ar© sJcillei hmsia#»® or 'faaotloaal t«eha.iGlaas 
for th9'(|5tQlfl0 ft-etivity oarriei on ia th® aasoeiatioa whose 
salary is hased ©a their .aargiaal prodaetivlty la their 
©j^ loym^ at. Hot oaly io th»ir ahiliti#s,. r^ spoatibilities, 
aad datiea differ fron thoe# of the partiolpcttiag «atr®-
preadmrs, hat thair iat«r«st» ar« priaiarily limlt«i to th® 
joiat aetiirity as suoh rathar thea to th# ©atir® iat®grat®d 
prodaotioa of th# farti0ipsti,ag fitma# W^ m legal atrmotar® 
eoasisteat with the @0oaoBie aatar® of -th# eoop#ratife 
assoGlatioa will th«r®for« draw a sharp lin® b©tw@®a th® 
immgmmt fmaetioa aad the ®att«pr®B®^ mrial fmaotioa ia the 
Joiat actinKlty# 
** 0^  ^* 
Legal mnmimtim shomlfi not permit laarge aeemulation's 
Qt uatll©a®t©i'rasertes aad turn surplus ia th# joiat aetiv-
ity a® mn alt®:paati'rt Maaas of ofetaiaiag espltal. Sueb a 
poliey w©ulil b@ liktlj to toTm ua@eoaoat§ alleeatioa of 
eapital withla tli# paftiolpfttiag firms tomri tlie Joint aetiv-
i%f» In the first pla§« tli® ttpaftaemt os plant mming mw 
capital fo? a fira has no speeial claim ©a that e&pital. fh« 
®atr«pr«n®ur will allooat© smth tapitel wTummmt to sntiei-
pat@« it will h® th® sost produitl-r®. a»0©Btlj, in an iat®-
grat®d fim at, thos# partieipetlag la th« Joint plant., 
•aeeouatiag proe-eSut© aloae'ea© t®t®r»in# whieli ttpai?tm@nt s 
or plants appea?-to to# aoet profitatel®. As a prmetleal »at-
t#ff, 'b^ eaus® of maeertalmti#® ani iap«ff#et teaowlefig®, e 
small sts©3»v® should he huilt up ia eonneetlon with th@ o-o©p-
«ratiT« aasoeiatlom, Su®h .should stsrf# as a. he4g# 
against tht uae#rt«intiefl of hi#t «toit® in th@ Joint plant 
enfl aa ® msans of iptsailng m pooling thdse matertainties 
ottt ti®# r&ther than m a aouj?## of ©apital to.flnan©# ex­
pansion as in th® e©'3?poF®t« fifs« fh®r® shoult h® statutory 
limitations, with pr©Ti»i«>ii for mm® fltxihility in the ar-
tieleii ©f assoeiati^ a, ©n th®- mount ©f ©ueh reatrves ia th« 
oooperativ© aiseelttion, @n4 proTision ihoult h® t© 
r«TolY© th®® wh«n th®y reaeh this limitation. 
finally ths enahling laws shoulA-proTi^ ® for mor« liaittd 
powtrs-of the hoard of dir@©ti©as in the assooiation than in 
tht oorporation-. mmrna® of th« isttgratei nature.'Of th« 
assoclatti j aai tH® laiiviteal aotifltr of tii® 
partisifatiEg firms, ttos okmrnB of ooaflletiag wims aM 
iattr«sts is gjftatet mm$ the pmtieipmtM in the oooperatiw 
assGtlation tliaa ««osf thi« st©eMi&M«rs of a oorporstioa. 
lT@a tteotigli til afiitts®rs of t^ « board of dljf©t©»s air® «ntro*-
pr#B«mr# of paiJtioipttlag legal pTOTlsioa: amst.. be aad® 
fof m a4.«tmat® oli#ek mi. balaaet .sfst®a In tht epope^atiY© 
@sso®latloa# a© easbliag lagi®l«tl©n slioQid proTtde tov 
r®f«r©Btim eai for Bseliaeiy tot ©alllag sp^eial a««tiiigs, 
of tl@ partlolpatlug witli auttortty to aoilff 
board policy aai to ?#plat# boas-ft effi©@i'® aat 
«apl©|-e©® of ©etlfity if .B#@#asai?j« Minority !»• 
t«f«sts tfeouia %« giTta »©3?®. ai#tmat® 3?®e©gaitiOB aafi protee-
%lm la til® asio.®iati©a t&aa ia tM® ©ofperatlom. 
B-. ' frop03fti©a.at© Llablllfir 
iacatta# %M |oimt attiTitf is an iatagratefi p«t of th© 
protectioa aetiTltl#s ©f th« pai-tioipattog fiJ?ia«, Itg®! 
••ass,oeiati@a** stoomM sot p'rofii© tQW liability of th« paiftiei" 
patiaf fimi whitli is lisitta ©aly to tht ©stent of tli« capi­
tal %Mj Mr® all@®at«4 t© the Joint &©tlvit|'. Swell a proYi-
aioa fails to rsfogaizt tb© iiit@grat«4' natur® of the assooiated 
a©tlfit|- ftM the iMiTiiiual aotlTity of th® pmyticipatiag 
firm#. It .t@Eis to force ths issoeietot activity isto a form 
of orgaaizatioa asA a©thot of ©pe^ patioa which are sntirtlir 
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ia®oasiat#iit witli its feasio ©©©aoatie aa%tijre« It teads to 
©itabllsli. limjfiXe® to tfe# tooaomie alXoeatioa, asd eoiistaiit 
f^ alioeattOB as. eoniitieai sbaaga> ot sapltal between t&@ 
•Jolat plaat and tJi® iMitiAmai plants witbia eetli participat­
ing , f ira., 
for eoapl@te eoaslst^ aey • wttli tli® mmm%& m.atur® o.f tb® 
cooperatiw asscaeiatieHi tli.® parti©! pat lag firms ili©^ .4 
legally b© liable for tli® a®bts of tli© a®8©elatl©a.j aot only 
to tti® «xt®at of, tlieir eapital all©0ate4 to th« Joiat aetiv* 
ity, but to tbe txtest of th.e #stlr# a®-t wmtU of the fira if 
a«e0ss.ary, laeh iatiTitual partieip.at ag #iitr«pr«n«wr, bow-
«v«r, should b@ liafel# oaly for tto® prologtiomate Bh&m of 
the joint aativlty iaelwisd as a part of bis fir®,# Iseb 
abomli not iadifia«.®l,ly bave aall»it«t liability for tb® 
aebts of tbeir asaooiatioa* lor ei:®B.pl« a fim rtprtsenting 
oa@ fsreeat of tli@ total Joint ©otiYlty sboali legally b« 
liabl® as,a fira for &m p®.r®«Bt of th@ elaira.» ugaiatt tb® 
joint eetlTity a» siaeb.. 
fb®m tb® assosiatioa is tbtts legally baelced not only by 
tbt a®s®ts alloeated directly to tb@ joint aetivity.^  bwt 
proportionetely by tb® ©mtlr© as-s-ata of ©aob partloipatiag 
firm, tbt assoeiatloB U oa a basts wbleh ii- mmeli aor® somHi. 
fb@ asso0iet«i aoti^ lty is ItgaXly r@oo@Biz@i m aa lBt»grat@4 
part of the total operatioas of ®a©b partioipatiag fira. Aai 
yet @a©b parti el patiag firm is prot«0t#d from tb® iae<}uitl®s 
of ttaliait:@a iitdividmal liability for tb® wbol© Joiat ®etiv.ity. 
m% -
Also th® ta4@p@ai«iie@ ©f tk&t paft of tli® total actifity of 
eaeto, paftieifatiBg fim ©litsMt of tH® asso0iat«€ mttrltf 1» 
r®00giiis©i,, 
I©o.a©ale lalat ieaahips 
fh.t proportioaalitf .§ojfte#pt, as tl® gaii® fey whieh 
partsolpatiag flms sb.®?#, Ih® seoaoaie i?®la.ti©nsliips arising 
fro® ttoeiif Joiat aativltj,. ahoiili be giv@a legfil reeo^ itioa 
ia tht saalliag statrntts. Y&% proportioaalitf sliottld not to® 
r«tatr@d law to tli® polat whsm it mmQs tioaomio in®f* 
fioi®B©i®a ia Ti®w of ©oaaitioas aueh as <liff©i?®ae®s la tli,# 
laarglaal prodaetlTlty of capital aiio'ng 'the participating fla^  
short ti» flastaatioas in th® pyoportioaatt pertioipatiea lay 
the assoeiatea fims, a«faJ?tMsatal iiff©reacts ia the Joiat 
activity, and ^ i^  costs of d«t@miaiag sxeet ffoportioaality 
of paytisipatloa. Thm «aabllag statut® sliouXt mt tb® pattera 
for tii« proportleaal stefiag of th# ©coaoaiio ralatloashipa 
hut pyo¥idt eaouik flexibility 00 that m -glTsa essoeiatioa 
oea, la It# attiele© of associatloa> sak® sieptatioa to Mb 
/ 
peQuli&f aoaditioas# 
Proportioaality should fea idfiati la tlit ©aatoliag ItgiS'-
latloa as tli« p«©8at&ge • ms« ssit of tbe J,oiat aotivity by 
eaefe firm ©a t&® aterag® 0¥t^  ®@:"rerel O'perattag je&vm. This 
sbowia b« a aoviag sTtTag® wfaiob adjusts qait^ - qaioisily ^ 4 
aeaufstely to se-oalar eliaages ia p®ro®atag@ partioipatioa by 
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@mh fia. Special proTlsioa sbould b® mad® f©r mw firmi 
Jolaiag as partieipaals in the Joint aotlvitr tliat imm mot 
ytt ©stellislitd a m&rtnig awrag# as e. hmin tor tbe Sstei?-
ffiiaatioa of p%x&m%&$% p»fti0ipatioa, Xi©gal pyovisiea shomW 
lie mate for the optisa of atfialng prop©ytioaality s@pexat«ly 
ly aepaftm#nt» wliSB there Is mort than m& fispartmeat in tli« 
Joint plant so tMt la assocletiotts wbere lijseirtaiit iepart-
mental dlfftraa®#® sxlst tliey ®aa b« rtcogalstd, 
Fartltipatlag firms s^ ottld lefally te« r©t«is'«^  t© nh&m 
til® fittftncsial reapoimsitollity' f©r tli» Joint plant oe a pro­
per tlonal basis as a eoaAitiea of partitipatloa. fMis do.«s 
not aeas that thsy b© rttuirst to alloeat# eapltal 
aireetly to tli® assetiatefi aetiflty m tli© ss?«ral iepart-
a«ats of til® aaso0tat®i ft0ti?ity a«©tssarily ©a a strictly 
preportlonal ba®i.s* ah allosatioii of mmmkif eapital is ao 
amoamt determlmsd by tii« r@tttirem®iits of %h.% lolat' aotifity 
sliGUli b@ r0g.ttlr«i a® a toMition of partielpatioa. FroTi^ m 
•sboBli be aad®, h&mr&w, f©r tl# IMifiiiyial firm to provide 
omly a part, of tliii eapital in ©asto ©ad sign a not© for th« 
rest to b6 psid at ®o»9 later iate ©rtotes wltli lat«r®st, 
wh®a sueb pr©«©itir« will improt® ®ffiei«oy in « given asso-
©iatlOB* fo offset this, proviiioa aliouli b® aadfi for other 
partioipatiag firs© with eapltal that has•a low pr©4«ctivity 
is thtlr iaiiTiimal plants to proTit® eapitsl on a di«pro-
portioHiit# besi# for a fi3E64 lat«r@.st rate at a Itvtl d®ter« 
iaia®i, by th@ elroiiastamees in a partio-ular assoolatioa# l^ e 
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pwtiGipating talrtpteatUTi will still assaa© tto® fiaemelal 
rssfoaslliilitf ©a t pr©p©?ti©aal btais hf agre^ iag to pay 
w&atsTex rat® of interest is oeetssarj t© litdm©« tWs ©epital, 
aad tliet iair«®t®d iKf Itot pB^ lia, to aeve lato tfe« asaoelatei 
aotlflty^  Pi?-©Tisioii sliemld aa4« to reaijatt tit® rsqulrtd 
owa«raMip csafltal tlleeatei %f @a©}i fartielpitBt ai proportioa-
ality ehftages. 
fir©Tt®i©tt sleult to# «ai.® fet tk® ws@ of rsfolving fund 
fiaaneing at tlie optima' of ea«h asso'eistloa* Tb# lew shoiiM 
permit y«i'irolTliig fma^ s of patyoaag® i«toeti©ma, patronag® 
rtfaads oi* aay Qt%m ©llooatiom ©f eapitsl to tlid Joiot 
aotlTitf toy tfe.® partlotpatiag fi»i ©a a prepottloaal bails, 
ii'i 
©itlier for tli« ass^ elatioa or a wlol© '©f by iff at » 
laeli partisipatiag mtTspmrnm shomia hm glv#sa fevolvini 
fma e@rtifi©«t«0 as «vld«ii©e of hit tqiaity ia tie pewlTiag 
fuai. 3u©b ®®rtlflettt«s sliomli ®mief m© 4m® dtt® and iraw 
a© lat«3f«st» la aM#!? t© salstista pi'ofortitaslity owr time 
til® l&w siiomM provit® that tfe# olfisst rtTOlTlng faat esrtifi-
0at»8 yetiwi first» 
file pwtielfatiag firms slioala BhmT& tb« ©oatfol of the 
a@so®l8t@t aetivitf oa a preportleaal basis ala©. fhis m#aas 
that the iadiTida&l aiitliorl2#t t© r«pr®s@at each partiolpatiag 
firm shottM to@v@ th& au^ ar of mtm ittemlaed by th© p«»-
©«attge -of th@ total activity jr«pi?@s®at@i by %m partioipatioa 
of his fim» AS oatliati abov®, this p@re®ataf« participatioa 
shoali b® bas«i on a iseviag avsrag®' of th# lest ««¥©r®.l years. 
• Sit • 
fi?o¥ts4®.B sfeouli to® -a®.#® tm r&ting pmpmti0m%&lf hf 
&»pQrtmmt»^  Im tkme, m»mi&ti0m$ mm® it- is 
to 40 »©, Fif©Ti8i@a atoeuH 6l»© he »i# la ©aabiimg 
l«gi®J.ati©ii tm 9qmmJ. mtim W t&« psriisifatiiig tiitm m 
m aXteraatiT® ohQim t© m@k m'BmtstimM Mmb pmriBim 
Is memssmwf t© all.©* «Qm®i wtisg is mem ili«3p9 it i» ea 
a»i t0®B©al« &ppmximtim %© g5©p©yti©ii,tl Tetimg# 
m will fe@ thft ©as®, fof sxaBpl®# tm r&i&tiem Im 
pemmtm0' pmti&ipmtim fsi?its mmM fmm f®« to yeay foy 
til® ®a»i fii?iii tkm II tots he$wmn tim§ ia girm 
fhB law sh'Omli ttfiily# ttol tb® aetMi ©f steiflag toting sqb-
t»©i ia ®a©li as®@ti®ti©a to# »tat«4 ia its artielst* 
flit r#t«ir@t ttt©3PW sheuM a if«aie,i«|il2r lairg# p®p-
of til® t©tal tiigiblt && t0 pw9mmt do»iaa» 
Hm ia 0©ftty©l if a mhAI 'itomp# 'W^ tii# tu all p®ttl(sipatiag 
fims. of tli« f®Xi®ia® %& hm itiidat at m9h mtafiag sliomli lia 
•»#tmir«a ia tfe« attafeliag: #©€«• A ii*pl« m.J©rity will 
b@ suffielaat i» iafamimisg. tfe«. aer# i^ mtiaa -pelisias, fent 
,imp©rtaal 4@0isi®mi, »%uh m t& %tm astielas ©* 
bflaws sMemM *e«|«iifa''t&# peiitiv® ir«t# ©f a l&sgm »e|ority 
thm t^ is i» oMas t© feaaeaa afta^ ti?®. 
fii« law mmM pteirii© tfest all •#©#%« Aasat pr®-
f©fti©»telf l*!- tto pas'titlpatiag fims, aitfeaf foi tli® aaao-
eiatieta aa aili©l« m If Aafartsaati. ia t^ t essQaiatiaa* 
UtayBBtiT® satMoi® &t ©jsa^ atisg. tM aaaeaiatat- aativity at 
aest to tlia pattitipatii® fim® •«€ of tifiaimf tfeaaa aoita 
• S0O • 
b«tws#a tli®a gieopo^ ti©iiatdl|- sbotalt fe® pfc»irld«4* Asstsament 
©f eosti- airtetXy, a, poeilag optratioa, qt a ptarekas® aM 
sal® operation sJHottli m maA® ©ttially a®0®ptatelt. th® 
law. Any s@ttias«at tto® paftlQlpatiag fims am-A 
tbeir assoQiatet .aefiTitf'at ti»@ of traasaotiom sbould be 
legally r«®ogata®a ma tmt&ttre oaly -approxlmt# 
watil aetaal cost® ay® ®a<l to th«»« 
©Gsts is fii® «aafeliiig stitmtt slie«lfi i-eqiilr® that the 
mttlioa, of aijuiitlag ateommtiaf traasaetioas wifto partieipatiug 
flras to a o#st ba«l» ami tM a@tliM-''ef p3?©p©:rti©nat0l|' shar*-
ing Bmh Qosts shall toe speelfiti ia tfe# ajptleles of esseeia-
tion. 
TM partieifatlmg' ftraa sli«3iil4 Is® ytqmii?®# to share tlfe® 
GO-sts. of tbt iesertl mmrf<d statlioaed afeo?# m a pifofoytioaal 
basis aot ©aly la a glTsa op«rating period but ©¥««?••'• tint m 
lell. Bi® ©aebling Itgislatioa »li©iil-d aot oalj pvorim 
t^atutoa?!- llBitatiOB# oa tliis mmtm in tli,e 0o.ope]eatlT« asso-
eiatiea, hut ttot, aftmi? tli® mmtm hm s?®aeli#a this 
iialtstioa, emrrsmt i®4u%liioiis tm th«. seserf® stell hm m®ed 
to mtiwm th® oldest 0©»t^ ltettti©ai to tli® t»8«-rT©, This is 
a«©«saaify ia-oMer that emrteat partioipatlag. fir's®, as well 
as those la th® passt, hmm thtir pi»©portloaat® «har« of all 
cost# la eoaa®$tl©a with th© Joiat aetifity. 
•Maaf of th® p?©'fisloas «^ g«,stea la this ehapter ar® ia-
0O3?p0?at®d to a Tsryiag ©i^ teat ia preaeat ©aahliag lews, 
H©irtT©r, prastat laws io aot tals® ai@t"ttat®, aooomat of the 
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faet 'til®! thm Jeiat a'Otiflty.ls m lateiratea fsrt of the 
©••apatat# a«tiirlti«s of all p®rtl§ipa$iag flms, m& that tli® 
partiolpatlmg fims op®rett th@ Joint plant oaly to miximiM 
profit© to tbsir jpeaptstift fima* 'a® ©mafellng laws in tMs 
Qcmati'l' MBkm th.® eo0p®,t-atii?e asse^ latiom a ©erperafios 
tb® law, w&ll® tMos© Qt somt f©»l,g» eomtslss eoasiaei? it a 
pertas^ sMp* As^ kat ti®@a tsea,. a«ltM®s legal eeaeept r«fl®©t® 
ti« basie ©©eaoaie m%m9 of tl« #©©p«3fatif0 assoolfttioa* 
ffao Isgal ©oaeept ©f «ats©elatl©a'* witl t^  pi?©visioa.a sttg-
gtst«d li®r® wornM do lo. 
« mu • 
Afp@aiix oMftm xt, m€9i. tm 
tti® mmrni e©4« Is ta ox-i®y to m em-
a^ ltag statmt# t&£ atsoeift'll^ as whl&li aAtgrnatelf 
%M ijasit m^mmiQ' 9%wmtwe9 Qt't'hM e<H>»«ra.tiT@, 
m& t%9 i»#la-llomsMifs %km »®afe«,ae fias farti^ipatiag 
Im %M 0o©riiaiif®€ eetlfi'ly. It fef se-meaa® r®pr#»@n"fes %m 
mlj M&t of ptmiBimu wM^k mmia ,i«galiy tk® 
toonoate aate® ©f th.® rnGprnrntim, 'mt lasttmt Is oa« 
#%aapl®*' la %M& mM llttl# • i» faii to %hm 
p3faQtieabli4t|' m mmUmhllltf Qt th« pf@Tl®i«s« fii« iatta-
%lm k^m is t© A3.1m«tgat<i fir«sfi8i©ii» «#asii%eat wltfe tk@ 
eeoaomie' aat\»ir« ©f tk# ©oopwmtit# ass©el«ti©a, m% to 
mp th« i4«al law wMtJi #©aM %•« writtda imto ©»•*•• 
fefeiiag sta%mt«» aa mm* ©ttlf tli,©» pro-rlfilQas ralate 
to tli« oi?gaal»®ti©a opttafiea of' tk# a#i©#4@%l©ii ©f mop* 
ar at I'll® fiyma mm »© fjf«t«as« la# mmm. naft ©f 
«3ipr#ssiag thi® pmriBims in i«g®l f©ia of laatistiig®. Wtm 
tM» pelat ©t Ti«w tto i® ao ieufet ait^igii®«ta asi 
i»t«fialt@ at f©lat«. 
i. C0Qittyatif» fe»»-o0i&tl0»» 
Amllm'bM* my two m ©©rpeyatlem®, 
parta®sshifs,> ff@pi?ttt#3?#bt|>s, ©r a«r ®©»feima-
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fe» a# pwrpos# for wJiieli tfe® assoeiatiea is fomti as 
to %h» aetlTltifs &t asiocieliag firms {f©^ 
example, «to p.fetldo, msmfa^ture, p3?©©ts.s» pmek&gt and 
iistrlfemt# lirmtmk f««4 to hm mBSt im tlie prodsetloa 
©f liveste-tM aM liftstoele pseimets b?" thm assoeiat^a 
fir»»«}. 
0. fbt imritl©!! <sf th« astoaistlofij wlileM mj be 
fefpetual.. . 
1, aasi«,.p©s% Qttim «4dif@s« &m m%m§ of tjj® bttsi-
aeas ©I'gaml.saflea asd mtifitlmm of ©ecb. assoeiatiag 
«, ®i«. attafeeif th@ir tualifiwtioas a.a& 
t#m of offl®«,. aat %m tixej sliail b© ohos®a aai r^aoTti, 
f. m&t miilts ©» tsiigibl© foj^ a®«tesrsliip aaa conaitioaa 
«3s®ii%i6l tm eiitifeiXitf I how skali fe® aiialttti 
®ad aembftifstiii lost hm 0©sti.» risks, 
toatTOl and l&titefi'ti will %« hf tbt a®s.ostet«d 
malt®, aa4 bow ass»ts will fet distjpllsmtsd la liquid&tiQm. 
g. fke 4at« ef til® fit it etaamal ®Q®tl3ag of tM autiiox-
laed •r#p3f#«®atatl?#s of %M sa®©0lat@i ftr»», asseeia-
tioaa h©ms«MMa* 
arti^lai of mstoetstloa s© provld© by­
laws iiaf b® aaopt#4 t© sttpflemtnt''t&® attlal®# of e#so®iatiom. 
The aftitl#® of aaaetlatioB aa4 bylaws 
maj* b# mt asf spoeial mmtimg a# p3?©?14®a tm s@Qti©,a 
3,E. 
' asBoeiatlea orgaalmed iimd®r this stoplier 
• urn * 
mf 0at©f into mmtrmtB ami aoaimet tomslBtis in its own aai», 
aar lioli inslMdii^  rsal mtmU ia its own' aa*# aat 
m&f sm« and b« iusi in its mm asm©* 
'yyopwtlome-fee .l>ia%lllty.» fk& fimsi as@®©ifttions er 
wlile&'i>a,ylilolp-at@ 1B mn assooletiett oj?gaaiE«d *md»r 
mi® ohaptti? sliall fe« pFOportisnallf ilafel© tb.« €@bts ©f 
tb® asso^iatioa. I^is JliaMlitf shall met mlj %q th.m ex-
teat of iissdts ot ®mh pa^ tl#ipaling 'lialt la tk# .Joint aetivil^ , 
bwt to tb# txttnt 9f tltt ®ntii?® assets of eaoh malt,. p^ OTideij 
toowwtiP:, tfeat.n© pfti'tieipatiiig fita, tia-oeietiem ©r ke«s©holi 
fhalX hm ILOM llstolt feefosd It® proijeffi^ m^at# store in %Tm 
4oiii,t eeti¥it|% PropostioRel.iti' tm tbls piwijoaa ihali te® 
BB d®flaefi in 12« 
^ • WitMyawal of Pagtiei-i?atiM "gait a« Mf tim,- ass©-
eiatiom or hottsehoii nay wttMrm fmm paftleipotiom in aa 
asa.oelatioa oygaEixefi uM&r tials oiiafter at tlid ©ad ot mf 
aeeottstiBg yeay fey filing wlttem p-ttitlen witti tli« seeretarf 
of tfee aisoeiatloB not l®ss thsB Mixty 4ayg prior to tk® @w£ 
Qt Bmh eoooimtliig year, wltlitrawai slail ftet® tmm tlM» 
oXoit of tba sur^ant ateommtlag- ®.ad siiell tfft©-
tif« aft#f being pieeatatti at^ mi, 4ttly :e®#05i«t in 
alnmt#® of» th© annmal m®®ting of tfr® ®sfi©©iati#a. 
S,. ixpulgiea of Pattielimting falta^* iny fira, .asio-
cistioa or liemseholi isftf U'S ®xp®Il#i fs-oa pa^ tioipatlsa in 
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b® •tattj'ti «3ii a aambdrsliip of association, A 
Qopf of thii ii®t sball M attaol«i to tl® aKsmai balaao® . 
slit®t and ©peratiag stattiieat *«po3ft aM iiatributefi at tbe 
mm&X m®®tiag» fliia list sfaall h& poBt#4 at all tiaea in 
a •®oBspi«i©mi plan® at tb« priBQlfal |>la#® of temsiatss of 
tli® assoeiatioa# 
IB. PrQ'BOgtiomalitT» Iic@@ft wli«« ottofwis© pyo-rii^ i, 
pastiQipating maits skall sMr® all j«lat4©BsMps frowiag 
oat of tto@ tiS00iatioii ©a a laais froportlomal t© tli® un® 
aai® of th® aasoeitt®^  attlTity. • ®tii fj-ofoiftioiaalitj to 
us® shall hm calculatei ©a tbe fes.fl® of th® aoTiag m®mg@ 
of til® ttert® most mmmt fmm* If the articles of a®S'0©i®-
tioa so profia®! assotiatioas Q-p&m%ing mof® t&ea ©a® depart-^  
ii«at m&y s®gy.egttte tto® r®latioa@te,ifS fej aii4 base 
freport ioaalitf ©a th® ms® mi® of eseb. 4®pattm«at mmt tto® 
aoft ir®0«Bt tluf®« ytmrt# 
' fgoBortioiimlIty tm M®w g&gti®ii?atln^  IMts, Tb® 
u&@ of th®. assoeiatft mtititf fm BOW pa^ tieipatiag mmita 
for pujposts of ietemiaiag prop©? tloaalitf shall bo m 
ostiiii,ti©a agjfsei mpoa toy tM mw partieipatiag wait ana th® 
board of iittetor® o-f ^ th® ais©®iatioB. a® ®®0oaa year the 
tvfirag® of th® pr»?loma y«ar*# as® ast tht® estlaation shall 
h® tak®Bi th® thiri y©ar,th® avertg® of the two previowa 
years aai thi« ®®ti*atiom shall h® ta»:@tt| aai thenoeforth 
the airerag® ma® in the thr®® most r»0®at ytars as provia®t 
la s«eti©a 12 shall h® tak@m.» 
• 208 <• 
OQRtgeX. Oeat^ ol ovtf the a«so@iat#i aotiviti' 
sMall ms% solely with %M paa?ti©ife.tteg (klmQtlf 
mmd ttoougli tbeir feoart^ ef iireetofs* 
toting* Qmlf-&u%kmiz®^  »®f»»«atatiT#s of the 
partloipatimg maits list®4 iJa tk@ i?«gist@r shall 
to# tllgibl® to v©%t ©a affairs of tkt ass©«iati©'ii ia aaaual 
aEd speeial s®etiiag8» fetiai shall 1a« ©a s prepoi'tloiial 
basis as txplaiaM ia s«@tioa IS, -©itM®? foi? tli© activity as 
a whole Of by m pfoviitt ia %M aiftlQl## of 
a«so©iatioa, if tk© ai?ti®l®8 previd®, votiiig 
aay be fioa®" oa «» ttwal basis m m spproxiaatioa to p?©-
p©i?tio»alitf. 
X6. Boasi. ££ 2|£est£|a* If mm ttoa %m maits pajftici* 
pat® la tbi« sssoiiatioai a bgaii of filTOeto-rs sliall fuaetlom 
foi? tb® a#s©oi«tt©at sliall bt «l«@t®i by %h@ tmly 
mthOTi%m& ref^ f s#ntatlv#s of 'the partitipailag units from 
tb«ir nmb®!'' for aiiife tmwm aat ia suefe. menner as tb® artiol«s 
of tfsoeiatiOB pfovlit* Wmm tli« mmb®r of pattieipatiag 
ttnitS' is t#ii or l®«», tbt toly amttoisM r#fi?ts«mtatiir©« of 
tliss® malts sbail to# ®oasii«i?#<i t^ # boaj?i of fiit«et©rs, 
©®l?t tJhat if tfe© aftields of assoeittioa provii® fot a board 
of in aiiitioa to tbl# e>mm$ boaift shall oom-
siat of tbi?t« QT mowM rtpr0®©ntat,iir®» fey tto gromp. 
TmmQlm m tb© board absll b@ flllti by bo&ri appoimtaeat 
uatil th@ mxt mmual. »«tiBg. Amy bo«d »#abey may b« m-
mmi from otfim tbromgb sp#«ial as 
o 
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- BfO *  
smh §mpX<3j&@M m m&j aaQtaaai-y.. Stieli wpleyees 
shall b® ©toigea witli «##©M,%lag f#ll©t®« 0«l by tM®' 
mtatoeifship ani t.lis bo-erd, end may .edfia# rsistdtBg polley^  
Ijttt sball ia m way a®t policies for' tfet afsoeletlea. lu 
Official mpmnmrn^ tlwe of say parttetpatiag u»it shall to® 
aa eapleft© of tJit ass©0|atlea* My massgerisl ti^ ley®® aay 
be dissht3?g®d tteem^  sp@eial atellnf p?0@®dw« as ©mtliEsd 
in ttetiQft 3g, 
fimmm» fM fas-tielpntiiig mits as a groap ®liail 
asim« tJie tmli fisftaeiel i'#®,p©miWlity foa? tli® asaoeiatloa 
and sbar# It on a pfopottieaal liasii m ia s®«ti©a IS, 
Qwaersliip Cegtifioat®®. ill psJtieifatlng malt® 
sliall l?@ 3?sqmlr®t fe «.ll©0at« eapital to tli® etsotiatloa by 
pur'Qtosiag o*a®.af®feis ©®;etifts«tfs in tb,® rn&m&i&tim as a 
ooaditloa of pai'tieipatieii, imsii owsers&tf ieat®® aball 
ls0 Itgal tfiitacse ©f ««»b#rsliip i» th® aasesiatloB. fli® *ralw® 
of smeh QvmmmMp .sfe©li b® stated la tk® 8i»tiel®8 
©f fi«a©eittl©B aai sliell '%& |»©po:ptioaal' to m».« a« •©•tttliB®^  Im 
®t0tl©ns Ig asd IS* If tke festielet s© pi-ovlde, pairtlclpatimg 
waits may gi^ «s tlie alternfitiv© ©f puftslasiag suofa owaer« 
akif -©©rtifleatss witk ©asit 03? of puufiilag a part of tiL®lr 
sttls'striptioa in eas'k aai slgalag a a.©t® tm th& rest. Sm®k 
nQtm ifeall itaw lat®f®®t at the fl»i jat® p3r«a®i'llj®t la 
tMe afti0l®i* ffc@se a©t®s aay be *ttlr®t by perl©€ie ©asife 
payments j pattoa«.ge ietaetlotti», petroaeg® rtfuais or In asy 
©tto«i' mmnmt pjeeserlbei ia t.fe® astSeles ©f asseeiatiom# 
- mi 
Owaership mj mmh&r malt bMII act b© 
r@tlip@i mtil wltfeirtwai 01? expml»i©B of tfee aemfeer malt tmrn 
tM assosiatloa, ©r mtil ii»a©iatloa, wliehtirtr toat® first# 
lo iEt0r#0t Bor aifiitai a.toli to# paid m smh ©©rtlfleatts# 
ffcity @3iall aaaatliy' fe« atjiast«i-1© preportiosallty as, dtfiaei 
in »e©ti®as li m& 13, freviidi# Mmmwrn, tMt a© a44mstseat 
sMall B@ at©«si@ry ttalsss tli« Al«fr©tertl©»litf ©XQSMS 
t««at|r-flf® dollars er mor®* 
IPagtici'gaiat- lartgitBeat Ctgttflgat#g\. Xa adaitloa 
to tht i?«{|air«t ••©watrsMip eerttftQat#®.,, mtabtr malti m&f 
pmreM.ss partfoipaat lafMlmsat 0®rtifitat«®# 13i®s® oertifi. 
oat®« sMll aot hm atallabl® t© aea-pertltipaats, aad shall 
b« aoa-traaaf#rtbl®. m&f or aaj sot earry a 4.m fiat® 
aad will draw « timi. iat®r®st or aoacammlative) ' 
as preaeribtd la tlt$ artielts of bflaws ©f th& &»®©elati©a.» 
flittir 0wa@r#faip at@d. aot b® ©a propertloaality la aay 
way« If mti^ Xm of mamiBtim so pr©?ifls, tb©8@ a«r* 
tifi©ate«, ©r mf part ttoereef,, may b®'r®tir»€. bf tb,« 6ss©~ 
olatioa apoa faf©rabl® Tot« at mf aaamal or spetial m@@tiag 
ef tb® m««b@rsMp. . 
Q^ b®r Seoarltl®®, If pro-riasft hf tb® artiolea of 
s®8o0iatiom, otter iat®r«it bearlag. s^ oarities. aay b« 
issm@i to til® la-rest lag pablie, Saeb s«0mriti«s m&j b« traas-
ftrabl© or aoa-traaafertbl#. fh® iat®r®st oa saeh a©earlti®« 
shall b« ©malatif®, aaA sball aot exetet W »or# thaa tlir«® 
p®r©@at p«r ®mw tb© iattreat rat® oa ipr, S. frtasary boads 
- gfg . 
at til# tl»# 1««©4. If %h% artleles of ais©olattoa so pro-
Tlie, thas® or aa^  part th®r#0f, m&f h9 r®ttret 
at til® (ii8er®tl®a -tf th« asso^ iatiom^  
Itirolvlag fant. If %M artlales ©f mm&lmttm so 
proiria®, a rtfolirliig fmat maf ms®d to proTli® eaplttl in 
tht® asa©@tatl©a, reTolfiag faad say tonaist ©f petr©»ag® 
i@4u,©tl©iis, patreaage rtfmadi m mj otfe.@r .soatrifemtioas maa« 
hj th9 partioipatlug, taaits m a basis preportioMtl t© use* 
PartlQipatiag mits shall be laswi r@TO3.Tlmg fm& mrtiti-^ 
eat«« for thair eoatritentloiis t© tM® fuM# Wn.ma@ mrtiti* 
aateig tliall Mm a© dmt dat« ami ahall traw ao iiit«r#st aor 
4iiri4®ai, sbmll r@tJ.rtd i» tli# eliroaolegieal orttr 
issutt. Oae rtwlfiiif f«ii4 Mi' b® ®«t ap for tli# associatloa, 
or aeparat# rsTelTlBf funds naj %m @®t ap toy itpartmeats 
w&er© tl«r® Is mor® tliaa ©a® i«p«rtMefi.t is tli® assoolatet 
a'Stiiritj. • 
H6>tirQffi0iit Qf•• aeemrltigs ©f ftr»iaatinis Meateershipa. 
.Fartieipatiag malts withiraw or ©r# «3:p«ll®i from t&® 
a.«ae©ietloa ®iiail haT# 'tlitir ©waersfelp @©rtifi©.®tes aM 
partl©lp«mt Imsatmnt mxtltimtm r«tlr«€ wltWa ©a® year 
after tbsir ttrialBatloa %#§««.§ effeetlve. Fartlfilpatlom, 
e«rtifieates will ilraw their aermal int®r®st matii 
rstirti. Owaertlilp @@rttfi©at«s will toaw e flxei rate of 
iater«@t in m m&\m% sp^ eifiei is tli® artioles of assoelatlom 
froffl tM« 4at® ttrffiiaatiOB mmmm #ff#0tif# mntil aetually 
rttlrti. ISTolviiig ftini ©ertifiaates aliall fe# retired as 
- B?3 • 
paii OB tlis »©fiial i^ etolTing basis, withemt ial©r«8t* 
Coatribmtiea® %© "lb# gsEefal aad t© mntingmQj 
TmmmB sball a#t b© r©ftta4«t .to watts wMloli iiseoat.iame 
•partieipatiom# 
SSSS,* -^ 3.1 ms%& im %ke as@©eiatioa shall b® bora® 
by ttos psrtieipstiag laits aa4. sliaj?®4 thm ©a a pro|>or* 
tioaal basis m ©mtllm«i, iB s%'Qtim IS* 
of Qmmtim* m# a.ts©ei:ati©ii .shall r«aa®r 
s-0rvl©® fey %h® f®.|ftitipati»i mit® at test. ..faads t© »®®t 
ftxptasta aai- b® pmrMM hy tifett ®.ssti@mtat ©f fix®i 
Qkmem for s«rvi©©s|. by tl» ia^ lmtiua of mrgias eeletilat#t 
to e©.t.ef m&ts in t«alatiT© #«ttl«meat®, by tli® Aetm'mi. 
payat-nt ©r peeling »«tli©«t, as wy b# fretiidi .is th« artiel®# 
©f as30siati©E* ftaasaetiomii bet*##!! partieips.%iag units ant 
tb@ asaeeiatti .sttifltf iMll b# e©iisia@r®d fiir»l|' teatatif® 
miitil o©sts liaf« b®®a tet©i®ittt€ im&. fiaal settlfiwsnt l.s »i©, 
MSSSSB* 3?«®^ «©a«fel# aao«ttt shall b® spe®ifi®.S 
in th© artielejof msmimtiQU to b@ p«r mait ©per-
atiag ©Qit®. #at«!h fmie ®«3 platti iat a g#ii®p.sl. mmrm matil 
smh rtserft thirty p®re«.iit ©f the tetal m^ aber 
eapital 8ll©-§at®a. to th# as#.©@iat«i astifity m » pr©portioa®l 
basis# fhi.® smmr® shall bt tea.» mpea ©alf at sm©h times 
m- .0OBditi0as a&k© it iafoaiifel# t© tow fixed eests in the 
assoeiati©!.. fh©n thlt, rts-ew mmhm th# aii©mt, 
eurrtat ooatribmtioBi to th# M%mm® ihall b« ms®i t© r#tir® 
th$ •0®ntrib*iti'®aa t© th« rtaerv® to ® baii« whieh wa» 
» Bf4 * 
propoytieaai at th© tia® %h& eciitslbmtloa was wii,#. -iTotliei 
b©w@ir©f.g tkat amh papi^ nts itell b« »i# ©aly to uaits whieli. 
AT® ©asiaatlf partielpatiag ta t&® mmmMtim*, Oldest 
eoBtrlltttiOBS 'Sliall fe# mtim  ^ at ttot mm ttea tmm TtXmd 
at ti®@ &t ooatjftomtioa at sfeoura oa tk& l)o©ks. of %M ais©eio-
tt©n wttMout iat@rest* la aMltiom smeli @©atiag«a©y v@bw¥@» 
as m&f feg proTliti ta tli® srtielss of ®«8'©aiatioa »my t>© s«t 
af agaiast speeifi® ®oatiag«ati»i• 
Mm»wmmW¥ Buslneg8« ji.»so«t«tt©aa o^ 'g&aized aaitr 
tils eliapt«r sJialX^ aot traasa#t iwisiatis witk »a-»«mbt2»s aa*^  
1«8» the hmw4, of il2f©«t©» se«#©a t© tkat 
prsiae-tioa @t «rk#tiag pm uait @©ats t© psrtieipatiag waits 
m& h® fey tb® siM#t T©l*a# ©f toaslasss. 
la ao «as® shall th© 'TOlait# ©f aea-ae^ e? basla@as exesM 
tweaty-fiTt f#r««at ©f ttot ©f Msla@si, S«ttl@a®at 
witli aoa-a®abej'« at tia® ©f traasa'otioa, ®.liall be ftaal aai 
i^atiag oa pafti#S| ytgatiltfs of t^ ® m%h&€ ©f ©p®a?a-
tl®a ia tk® aisotlatluai, 
4aaaai Mt»tia«t 4«.@©elati©as otgaaii«a aaats? tjila 
eMpttr sball feeli aa aaaaal tot- tM dmly aatfeiiiriz«i 
r«pr©s«at®tiT«« of a4l •pattielpatiag aalts withla tlxty day® 
®ft«i» tli« &lm» of tfee fisotl yesT for the aflsoeiatioa. All 
pajtlGlpetlag aaits alitll h® gifaa aut Mm tbaa t«a iays 
wfittsa ttotisa %j tka tatrate^ ey atatiag th« tia® aad plaa® 
of tl». aaaaal uaitiag aai aay ipaeial bmsiaass t© ©aae lJ«fo.r« 
ta« «® at lag, R®p»s®atativ«s of pastleipetiag aaiti 
- mn * 
* 
of ell eligible Totas shall ©©astitmt® 
a tmoria*. Busiatta shall ttaaaattti fey maJO'iJltf of all 
fot«t ©att» 
' • 8&®®litl Ktttmss# Spteial m^ etlaga of dmlj 
&n%hQTlm€ of Ufet i^ arti^ ipatiiii aaitf mj 
Mela a« ^ mf %ijm imtlmAiag tli« %im ©f,. aai e©a©ttM«atlj 
wltbj, t&@ ammal »©#fiag* ifselal m^ tin^ s m&f he mtMrizmi. 
tfc@ boari hf siga®i b|- dmly 
att%li©^ i««:i y#t®@8#a%fttiv«s froa fasti©lpatiag mitM rtpreseat-
lag t«a p#!"©#!-!' of th9 ©liiill® votes» ftrntliofiiatloa, 
sfseial neatiaga sfaall fe# ©allM toy t&t psesiasat, and th# 
s0@i?fi1saf J shall 8®si Witt®® aoti^ t ©f tli® ®at plae® 6f 
the 'Sp^ Qlal aad its .p«poi@ t© all pai'tieipattog ^ 
imlts aot l«ss-%haii tmmty 4tf» fslor t© the meetiag,. l®pr®» 
s0BtatiT8a ©f paftitipattftg mits oii®-li®lf of 
til tliftibli m%m. «h«ll 0oagtitmt« a twrm* iu®la#s-« at 
&nf fp#§lal m«#t4ai shall h% t:ea»si£©t®a If & two«t}itra« 
»aJofity of all TQtsi #aat« 
• i®^ I2S5SB* ©f' ©afttolfd of tli® 
iiir©ttors, p^ ©Tltdi is twly ®nt#rafi into tM 
lilnmtes of the a««tlag in wtoi®fe t&« «eti©a i« tak«m, mf 
mtim ©f tl« Ijoajri ©f dlstetoi»s sfaall to® i?'tf®M?«a t© a 
s.p«0lal Qr amml ,ss«tlmg foi? eat©f»©»iat 03? je«4«otl©s» a® 
aotioB ©f til© slall »ta»i aaljl ,3?t4®©t«i at %lm aimmal 
03? special saetiig# 
ggiQgity gf glalas at SiaBoliatifim^ At tiasolutiea 
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following triosltf of ©Xatmi sMll itaat tm assoeietloas 
©naniaed uat«r thia 'alaftef, 
a« H©Xi«-rf of llabillti@s a,gai»gt. tin® assoeie-
tl©a. 
BmmM Xmrnm t© ti@ ««9©®lati6a# 
0.» leatQBS t© WtM assoolati®®.... 
i* lelifirs ©f dtis aat« a«emfltl®0 #©X4 to tto,® geaeral 
pmlsli®--^sh©r%t8t t®m 
e» H©M«r8 of «®©itfltles with m tes dat© and omttXa-
tiv# aeM t© th# g#B®taI 
f. HolieM ©f participant#-* iaw.ata^ at e«rtifl©at®». 
g. loMers of t«irolfisg fiai 
b* Holisrs'of t@?1;ifiast«» of 
1. ®os« wfao to th# $m»ml »««!?¥«. 
J. If smftliiaig rtnaia# It' ihall to tli© 
'etirteatXi" faftieipatimg timit® o® tto teaii# of tfeelr 
aveirage pmftltipatiom ©f«r tl® »©»t wm&nt %kme f@m 
f@yi@d» 
- gff -
XII, fHACfiGM* mMsummmm 
la,® fufp©» of till® ©liaptst iB. tQ iltem®!. aem® ©f tlie 
mTvmnt tnsms aad pr©|>l«ai jrelatlf® to ©oeptmtlTes mi 
their oi#rstieas m fit© tetis ©f tl® ©oaoapts 
to tilt feesi# mmmie aatiai'-t of- tM@ ©©©|>®3?atlf« 
asgeei&tiQtt* is deiag s-o tii# ©f tto ma#fmla®ss ant 
apfll^ alillty of th# multt-fim plm% mnmpt t© 0©©p0ratiT« 
aisoela-tloms ia firattl®# aal es am sW t© fli« seltttiom of 
praetioai ,oo©p-@ratif© frofel#®# will lat ttifdRlet# If tii« 
oeaeept ©f th# Msle emmmi§ -of ©©©ftrafiT® 
t,®soeldtl©B, and wli-a% mtimml hmhmriQV wtthia 
s-iioM a strttotmi'®., ia to fe# ©-f mmh aoi*® tliaa -seat®aie 
#ft, it slieuM sli«t lt,^ t -oa fyaetieal-tw«sti©as and pr-obleffls. 
?o l&@ of' maxtaw m.i® tba stomiA proTi^ # teasie 
©»l©»tatlQa fmm wMqU all pTObi«as- mmmmim -eooparatlT® 
a»gO0tati©mi-, ptmtlmX sat tliaQi'etlaal allfe, wi3,l 
app-roaohei asft 
Obirt©-mslf UBttkm %hM ®o-eaa.l®a "priE-olples of eeopei-a-
tiOB« SOI? tilt mmf ant tiTtrgsBl •»piities©ffei#s« of ©©©pera* 
tlem fi?ovt4® a ft»ewoyk* fkm priaciplss 
mm siBplf i«s«iptiv« ©ygaalzati^ aai mA ^ pmrntioml pr©ee-
ittsas &T gmide-®* Soae a%mr® wltJi th& feasi© aatar® ©f tto 
©©ef#ifs-tife-, Willie ©tli©i?s ai# irirtlawat# Soat of thm pro-
Tli# -a o©»sist®mt mi. mmtuX p-©iiit 0f tdpsstwst f©3? -solflag 
psobltma att in CMDOf tratiir® a-s-soeiattoas#' O-0©psratiir@ 
• g?a -
phtilos@ffer psrlsafily &as t© &q wltli •»%&% tfe« ^ teiloa©pfe®t 
0©B@0iTr©s t@ fe© til# of til® ©©©pQipatlir® assQtiatlea, m 
wMt k« h%l%mm tel# aliemli b#, la mf mm It pro* 
vl4«s llttl# la. t%€ mmf Qt A MSIQ • fraa#worl: tm approaeliisg 
a.otmal #6opef«ti*« pr©%l®as, It gmmm l«st<sal to- sspfoi# 
tkat mnmpt of thB mommie ttatuwr® of tli# ©-©©ptrttiT# 
ass©Ql®tl0ffl mmt pjeorlie tliit basl© p©lat of 
fli® prat-felt-al 0©ii®li©rati©i» disoust©! to.«rs eerlaialf 
i© aet fSEliamst' li®t» SaJaf ©thei"® QmM feaT© %®«tt ofeosta 
f03? tfe®' lllmstxaflv© Ifiteat ©f'tli# pastel ©hmptiT. flios© 
that ar« ia©lmd#4 «!•« aot mtthtjileallj t£S®it®t ami are hj 
m mmm a<i«qmat®l.|' itftlepei, fh^ f um iaoluied onlf t© 
folmt ttp s#'» ef til® feasi# lavoltti fini t© isaitat® 
til# y©lati©s.«ilp of th© t©©so»i@ m%m& of tie ©©opeifatiT® 
asseeistion to feaslo'iMmea^  
At 'Si® t&mm fax Qtttstlom 
Om of tbt most wiitlf iisQitsisd imMmm rtlatiT# to 
mQ^ mtim mamim^ tms 1» tto fea«l-s miJ©» whi&h f«€®fa3. 
Q©?p©rat® |ae«t tax is «g«iast tli@a« ajf® tw© 
.sp®tlfi© iasmt® In tmestioa ftlaliif® t© Immmm tamtio® ©f 
eoopsfatl^ ## in %k% mitrnA States| ttes« two &m fmqu@mif 
eo'afus®4 in 4ise%s«lom« ooaosifaimg tb®' ««tts»* flie first ©f 
tbei.®: is tfa# statutory #x«aptioni ef fa3?i»y o^opem* 
•iiT«s tx<M 0#3?taia f®d«3?al ia@©a# s««omi Is tfee 
- -
iaeeme tm ©f patroMg# t@ftt.iids med® to 
partiQlpatiag firas is, e0©peratlv« atsetiatioas uMer eertala 
Qir©m»ttE@©8, 
Ai l©f®l entitles, te^rmm eoop«fr-stif«s whtefe qualify 
are graatsi exeaftloji trm te&m&X oorjpore-t® Ineo,®© tsaces, 
®l®Bg witli mmj. tjpms &f organizatiams, mfier aeetlon 
1 
10,1 of %.li« Ssteraal ls¥©s«# UMer tli« 
A#t of 19il, #0Ofe3?a4iTSi sew pnj fedejral Inoom® tax 
om mf opeiatlag b#I pjr0,eseis mt ©lloeetea to paptidiptJiag 
ftms ia a mrnimm ttel would mak® aaomitt $a»fel« to 
S 
meabtr#, fh<$f ar« aot irsquittfi es eoyporatlotts to pay 
f«t«y«l iB©0a« tax m iaoaa® ftid bs ti¥i4»mAs an slocifej In-
®Qm tmm aea-optratlag S,.©UI»q©S,, iRoeme 'tTm fettsla®!® ion© 
with tli« f«€eE6l im&Mmt&l iaeoa® aBfi sapital 
galas, al,l of m& iiiolttiafel© i«i tte tax oalcwletloas 
of a©a»®xsaft eoopesalil"?® asso-eletioBs aa€ GQrpor8,tl,oa.s„, 
l©a-«x©aft me^ emttm asioeiatio-as pay ftftsrsl iaeoae • 
tm®n l.a tii« ssm® aaaaer aM at the gam© tate m Qthm 
s©rp©ratl©afi* Patrmag# mm m% exsHpt tmm ineome 
%ax@» at til# as»,©'eiati©B 1®1'«1 hf amj ,statmt® ot 
admiiiisti?«tl"rs rullag of t&« B»parta®mt# Whet® prioj? 
%©r a diseuisloo of tM t^ wptlon aat requi3e@iB®ats f©3? 
«Maftlo,ii m& Bavia, H» An sooaoalc loiali'sli of tto@ tax 
status of t&wmv mmvimn lastitut® ©f ©©©ptf®* 
tiQB# fasliiait©®, D. C. ItSO# p. 59-84• 
%te teas,., i* Imome fax 0teiig«« 
Aff®etiag coep^ rstlwi# 11 • S# fa» -Sredtt Adaiaisttatlea. 
Mise. B@p©rt l§i» w&sliiagtoa, S. ltil.«. 
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obligatiea t© makt pstTOttage rtfmaia exists, tli© of 
tiiid o©imt3?f ItaTi feeia ffeat thef are Isgally i-ejfMaaa of 
#X0®ssi¥® Qhm$m tm op®^atin$ o©sts iaclmt#i i» the teata-
tiT# i@ttla*eEt, wM.efe ar« to tlie pattlatpatlng 
flras after netwl eost® m& ®al«® la?® l5«ea 
©©rnirti kaY«.,rai@i. tliat %My mm simply a 
of adjttstiai til® "Ismaia^ tions t© astusl, ms%» 
Siat« tli«y &m m% inmmm at tfe© f©i'p©*'at« %h&f mm 
mot subj#@l to fedti'al ®©tp©2fat® la©©a« tax®®« Befmats mea® 
%Q c«st0iiiss i«b®a pri©^ ofeltfatles exists hmm 
b««a lisl4 laot te iataiw. t© mj 0O3fp@Jrati©ii, eo©p«s&tiT© 
ats©elation oy 
fh» flms perticipetia® la a «©©peF«tlv® a®»©<ilatioH 
p&f fedfiral is^ dat' tax«s ©a all tl®if imm^  iatlmdiai that 
r««0lT«4 trm tlit 0d©f«tati¥e ass©#iati©m.» If tb®»« flims 
•are iadlviimal p®©pirl«t©r»hips, tto© @aty«py®a««if 
p&f» titii la6©»« tax at tli® pm-mm&l feiti'al tot«a tax ret®. 
If tMf sa?@ fajrt»»tliips^ , th® paj- tb® t,^  on tbeia? 
rdsftotif# ibar© of tlie total tt@t iE«i©a# of tMa fim ®t th® 
pe-ssoaal t&imml tax yate. If tlity , eorpe^ fatlons, 
%Mf pay f#d«3?al lusos® %mm» at tli® mwpoT&t^ rat® ©a tlieii-
total aet l»@6a®, ani tbtlr stoeWiolitts mv Inooii® 
taxes agftia at th# fdysoaal 3?'tte ©a mnf ef tils iae©»s paid 
©ut to thm sto#lEtool4#*s» 
a© umh fOT tM %ri«f itaeriipti^a ef the p?#«eiit fatt^al 
iseoffl® tax of mo-p&T&tim aaaoelatlems ant th.® 
®-©©a0sls imtts ibi^ l ©rgaalz® 8,»a ©p#i»at.f tlim» It is 
mwiom that th0 pm&w&% fMafal im&m %m 'PqUqj witb 
tsspsQt to femslatss uait« is based oa th^  legal ^ 
Hatmr# of th©as tmita yathts- th«a on tlselr •aeoaoaio astur®. 
•fit® ®©oa©alo aat-urs of tM, flm is the aamt wlhellier it is a 
sQ^ pora-ltOR &T a pa^ tBs^ sfelp, tut it *iii "b® tax®# aifferestly 
asoorilng to iti l@gal Plamts own®4 and opsratsd by 
a aingl® parant fira maf or Bay aot b© iaoerporgfs€ s«farat%| 
if tnfofporeted flit flaat Is, or oaa be., a ta'^ -
all© unit for ia«oii© tax pmrpos®sj if not it is 
©rtimarily s paart of asotter taxa"bl@ imlt. Aa4 siass it ii 
iaaorpetattd, aad ®t®», ia iastftnets wli«a uiiiacorporatei, tlx# 
Joiat plaiit of til® f06ffixatif® assooiatioa is a taxabl® uait 
fQt f«4«rdl iHc-oas tax pmrposd®. 
fk» tax of patpoa^ g^t t«fim4i ii l3as@€ •©ntirtljf 
©a tlia l®gaX i«fimlttea of wJaat' is SBA what is a©t construe-
t|v« imom« to 11® t#of«i?atlT# e©j?pofatioB» Leg^ lf, patro®-
ag@ mtwMB, pri®y toatraatual ofeiigatlea to maka thm 
exists, sr# not eoastrttctlT^  iummQ tc. anj eei'fefatioa s© 
aot taxalbX® to tli® ©o^ ferfttiT® as 3u@:h, #r to emy ©ofpoyatloa 
using thrnm. Sine® tto present tax tj®fetetmt i# tfems teesea 
striotly m legal TOneept®,. all tfeet ta# ®«©ii©aii.t eam saf 
to thii poiat is %M% tiie legal aoaeapt #f pfeyoaag® refiisfis 
«Bi t.&dir is.eo»t tas ®t6tm« ©etwapoBii to tlielr tree 
@@oa©ai© satire* Htswsfsr tli# Itgal l©gi© teeliiiid t&is rwllng 
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does mt oorrtspoad to the seonomie logie. Ki® 
heart of th® ruling as to tht legal aatur® of patronags .re-
tmia ia based OM the prior coatra-ottial obligation of th® 
cooperative oorporation to ask® them, ttis Is typically 
backed by the concept of the coopermtif® asaocietioa as a 
legal agent. 
Some federal decisions hafe been bottoaed np 
on the theory that by reason of pre-eifeisting, con­
tract, the oooperatlT® if aerely an agent of the 
aember®, and, ergo,.- ©an haf® a© income of its om 
acoonat# ill' funds eoaiag iato the possessloa of 
a cooperatiTt, under this theory, are held by the 
cooperatiTe as agent for itg ,prlsci|els, the pa­
trons both members and aoa-memberi.^  
®ie ecoaomic nature of th# patroaage refund, on the other 
haad, growa out of the multi-fira plant etructure of the 
cooperatiT© association. fhe "purchase and sale" method is 
sii^ ly one coavenieat practical way of operating the joint 
plant. The "prlee" at the tiae goods aove from the Joint pli®^  
to the iadiTidusl pleats ©f the participating, firms, and vice 
Teres, is not an economic price, but only a tentatiT# settle­
ment. Patronage refunds, and they could coaeeiTably be 
negative as well as positive, are the means by which final 
settlement is made uader thi.s iiethod of operation after the 
total per unit cost of operating the Joint plant and the 
%easel, lugeae L. Taxation of Cooperatives. In Jen®en, 
A. Ladru et al, Oooperative f3orpo.rate Association law, and 
Accounting.! 19iO. ''p# 81-103. American Institute of Coopera-
tioa. tashiaftoa, B, C. p. 90,. 
®As presented particularly ia Chapter®m, W and Tabove* 
BBS . 
propertioaal ntt r©tura to ©aete partisipatlag firm lias b«e» 
i®t«rmiae4, fli® moimt of tb©s® patronage refmis at tfa® ead 
of aay ©p«ratiag year mn bt mafi® larg® or smell simply by 
varyiag t^ ® aeeomatiag «triot« at th® tla® tk# goods ar® 
traasf«rr«d h&tmmn ta® Joiat plaat aai tb® iaiividual pleats 
of til® partisipatiag firms. 
So'loag a® tto® iaoorporattd ©ooptratiir® assoeiatioa is 
l®gally & eorporitioa, aat so loag a« taxatioa poliei®® ar® 
bas®^  striotly os ta® typ® of l®g®l aait, t&is eoatribatioa 
is all that 'th® ®oa©®pt of ta® ©eoaomi® aatar® of tb® eo©p®r®» 
tiv® assoeietioa oaa offsr toward ta® aaterstaadiaf aai ©vala-
atioa Qt ta® federal.iaeom® tax treatmeat of eooperativ®®. 
Legally ia tb® iat@r««t ©f e©astst«a©y it woali s®®m tifficalt 
iadee^  to ^ astify a stetat® ®»isptlai s@l©0t«a Gorporatioas, 
aaea as ®3:®ap»- f&rwr ©oop@ratiT«s aad ©«rtaia ota®r ©orpora-
tioas, froa i®gally ©oastraotiif® iacoa® to th® oorporatioa* 
It woali s®@a efnally diffiomlt to Jmstify aay statut® taxiag 
aay legal aait for aay iaaom® mot ooaatruatiTely r®e®ive.d by 
it» sa©li as ® statttt® mkimg patroaaf® refaads taxable to ta® 
ooopsrativ® ©orporatioa woalt ao. fa® Aot of 1981 
aa® gr®ttly r«aao®d tli® iaportaa©® of tb« axeaptioa of fa-raer 
©oop®ratiT®« aai e©agr«ss so far feaa »®«a fit to pass a© 
legislatioa eoaater to tb® d@aliioaa of tfe® eoarts relative 
to th® ^ taxatiea of patroaag® r«fuats* 
l^ai also aa taxlog rebate®» disooaats, ate., to aay 
oorporatioa woali to. 
ZB4. -
the p^ tsaat poliey of basiEg taxation strictly 
©a th© l@gal sti-ttetwr# ©f btisiaess units withomt t© 
tli0if emmmie atm&tmsm it ineonsi»t®iit ami entirely without 
©©©aoBic f©ma|ati©a» SmeM s tax fore#® aoat fiftas to opetat# 
ia@ffi#i@Etly in tjfetlr owa best ©o^ semi© imtmmt. It eseate® 
serious tax «lo©p liola#**, siai oa\is@s iasqiiities a« betweea 
fim® wfaie.&.«r® of diff#3?#at legal n&tum aoi «® b«t'ir««a bmsi-
msn mi%& with th© mm& l«gal aatmr# bmt iiff@r®Et mQmmi& 
struetmr#». 
A mu@li 'sor® fair, •0©a»istettt» aii4 ©fftotiv# fttsral in-
QOB® tax poliey towar# bu^ iae## units womlt b® to tax th® 
•BmmmiQ fir® whisJa aakts. aad km title to tte® inooia® at « 
rat® ©offiparatel® to tliat of tb® persoaal iacoa® tax, ast «x«mpt 
from per«o»al iaeoae ta»8 all- fuMs wbieb -Mr® previously 
b®«a, ta3E®d to til# firm, smeM »g diTidead® ©»' stotls: and distri-
M 
butioas ©f pBrtaership -aat IMiviteal proprietor skip ©araiags* 
Umitr iueb & polity tb® firm, regarilcss of ita legal 
form, would b® taned- as a. unit, leoaomlo plaats op®rat®i as 
part of the partst fir« would be taxed only ai a, part of tit® 
par tat, fir®, rtgardltss of ttoe legal fom of tk@ plaat, 
aorporat®•fir»s woult b@ taxed as they ar© at prtseat, sxospt 
that tiTldtni® mi ©tli«r ailoeatious to sto«fehoM@rs woulfl be 
wtot wo«M b® isefficiiBtly in th® abssne® of sueh 
a tax policy* 
%lrtually th# asm# r^ fults ©oult be a eh let® d by tliaiaat-
iag th® iaeoma tax ©a bmsiatss uaits «atir®ly, md oolleotiag 
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exempt from taxatloa agaia in tli# hands of the stQCkholder. 
Fajftaei-shif aai iMifltual proprietorship fims would els© 
h@ taxed in this maim®!', aad mf aHoeatioms to th® parta®r» 
or to th® proprietor womW he exempt from taxation again ia 
their haais. I© plaat, oorporatt ©r otherwis®, woalt 
h@ taxed as smeha Thm iaeoae pr©4mo«d in th® plant r®pr«js#at« 
•an addition to th® iaeoiae of th® firm, ftad muM h@ taxed to 
th® fins. It oaaaot h® eompmt«d aocurat®ly amy other way. 
It is iapotsihl® to d«t«.raiii@ any actual profit or loss, 
at distiagmisheft froa ® purely aooomatiag ••prof it« or «l©s.»", 
ia any siagl® plaat of an integrated fira b®eaus« goods and 
r»aoar0#s noviag twm ont plaat to another neither enter th® 
market nor ohaag® hands and no prio® ia established for th®m. 
fht entr®pr@aemr of an intagr&tfd fira does not if©®k to maxi» 
ais® profits in any on# planti inde®d, whtn goods and resources 
ar@ transferred between plaat® ia tht total opiration of th® 
firm, h® oaaaot» Instead h& se®k» to operat® all of his plants 
ia sneh a way as to mmiMiz® antitipattd profits t® tha inte­
grated fira as a whole. It Is etonoaie nonstnio, therefore, 
to ttt®®pt to m iaooa« tax on a plant a# smh» fhe ap­
parent iaoos© 'Of th® plant may b# hi# or low dtpending upon 
th® aooomting »priee»" aa«d for ooiaBOditlti sad rosonroes 
transf«rr«d into and ©at of th« plsnt by th® eatr#pr«a®mr of 
all iaeoae taxes on ptrsoaal ineo*©* uaalloeated reserves 




tia® pai?@at fijea# 
Israetlf tte laae it trw of the Jointly epdratei pl«at 
of til® eoopetttif® ftfi-sotistiott* Sia©@ tM® plaat is Joiatly 
oparat«4 tli® paftiftApstiag ©at^ eprsaear® m aa iat«g3*atei 
part of ©aefc of tJisii' firas, mf iaooa® aad® iby th@ oporattoa 
of ttoi® Joiat plaat Is 3?#fl«0t®d as aifiitloas to tb® iaoom® of 
ttie partieipatiag fims* Altlieagli laooupofatloa fail#, to 
reflect aieqiifitftly th9 ®@oaoaie straetar® ia tli« co©p©r©tiv® 
assoelatioai tbe fast ttot th# asso.®latioa Is Isgally mate a 
eroporatioa ©xlstiag laws 'ia ao way iMiiifl## its basie 
©coaoaie aatmr®. lot ©aly io®s tb« appar®at iaeoa# la t]h# 
joiat plsat d«p«a4 apoa t.lit b©©tt®«piag ^ prleea" for goods 
aad r«8©ar©®« traasf«wed to or froa th® Joiat plaat hj tlm 
partieipatiag «atr#pr®a«ar.t froa m to tbsir iaa.iTidaal 
plaats, %ut also mpoa tit® atthoi ©f optratioa matt ia th® 
joiat fliat, fbea.tlie Joiat plaat li op«rat»i ©a a eost 
oarrtatly, aitlitr fey a.isessiag. oosti to tke partieipatiag 
firms as tlity ©eear or are aatieipatei, or toy a pooliag opare* 
tioa wb@r® aotaal ao-sta ar® tafcea aoaoaat of before ©attlemeat 
is aad® with ®atli partieipatiag ®atr«pr®a«ar, littl# or ao 
apparaat ia0©»« is atewamlat®! ia th® Joiat plaat# flita tfe® 
Joiat plaat is optratad oa a pareha®® aat sal® basis so that 
T^bis -aaalysis applies oaly to aetaal safeaiiiary plaats, 
aai aot to lat©rlookiag airectoratss, iatsrlookiag stoek 
owaeriHip#, #tG., wh@r« o«rtaia eoatraotual arraag«a®ats 
axist,' bat th#•s«parsts aait® ©aeb param® tb@ir owa aooaoaio 
oarsar• 
« mf • 
final ie *4# wilfa. the pattielpatiag firas after 
actual oofts ©r PI?0©«ETG for tfe® optratiaf year 1IET« TETA 
dtttmiata, til# appareat ime«e fr©a tM Joiat pleat may tot 
substantial, Aetually tlisr® is no mmm -ithf t&® rtal eoa-
tributiea of tb# Joiat plaat to th® net tmoma of tfe.® p®r-
tieipatiag firms sli©ui.d tat iiff@r«Bt siaply toeeamss of a 
partieular a«,tlioi ®f «»p#3?atioa in the Jeiat plant. 
OBlf ftalisti© mf t© levy as ime©®® te^ K on tk® 
iaeO'ffl® pr©dme@d im th.« Joiat plast ©f tk« eeeperatiTt ®sao-
oiatioB from tk# staaipoiat of tc©n»ie strwtmy# is te tux 
taok partielpatiag fim its ©stir® net in^ oae, iaclmiiag 
its propoirti©a©t® s%m& of amy et»»«iit im«ioM@ aot alleeatei 
to tke partioipatiaf ®mtreps«m®mri ®® smh but r©taia«d im 
tk® Joiat aatifity as eMitiomal equity eapital, R@gardltS8 
of tk# sours®.of imoOM fro® tke plant—eapital gains, 
noa-neak©!? kusiaws^  iaoideatal iaooa®, goirenoroat business, 
or tk® aetuttl proiuotioa iat®grat^ i4 witk separat® plaats of 
tka partiQipatittf fims, aai rtgerilsts of kow tkis iaoome 
metma to tk® parti©ipating fim0»»4ivid«Ms on stoclc, uaal-
loeatst ©arniags, allooatti earaiags r®tala#d in tke Joint 
aetiTity, eask allooatioms ©f ©araiags, or aii®i iaoom® ia 
tktir iadi'Vidual plaats, wkiok from m aeoountiag standpoint 
is not, attrikutskle to tk«. Joint aotiTity at all, tk# tax 
would'ke l#¥i®« dir@etly to tk® partiolpating fim# of wkisk 
tk® Joint plant is a part. Thus if ftd#rel iaeoae tax laws 
w®re t>a@».d on «®on©mi© units ratk@r tkaa on legal uniti. 
- a8© -
eempafabl# bm»la«si ia@o®® tax®! would b« Itfied on all 
tlm® regai?il#s» ©f tl#it legal nature. How«far, plants 
would mO't tea taxtfi as ®u©h. lB.st«ai tlie imms produe«t in 
plants louM ta:s®a as a part ©f tli© inco*e of tk® fim op 
fira# to wliloh tte planta btlong. The tan status of pertlel-
pating firms in a ©ooptratlir® aisosiation wouM h& very mueh 
like that of partners la a partnerifelp at present, esE.espt 
t&at It would fee, partleiftttag tiwm wtoio'fe ar® ta»4 ratbtr 
than partieipating iadiiyidmalg as in th® partner ship now. 
tJni#r' &mh a polioy the p«rtn®r»liip would he taacei the sfiia® 
aa mw ©th®r flm, whicsh would h« misf mmh like th@ corpora­
tion ii now tax®4, «x@«pt thtt allocations of ineoa® to th® 
indiiridual owners ©f th« fim wouli not he taxed again to th® 
indiTiduals, 
Th« present imom® taxation of hmsiness units in th® 
llnlt®t States is bas«d sntirtlf on th@ l«gal n®tur© of th®s« 
husln®ss unit! rath#r than on their ©oonoaie natur®. Sin©© 
l«gallf th® eooptrativ® is ©rdin«rllf a oorporation, it is 
taxed lik® a ©orporetion, txoept for ®«rtain tualified farmer 
eooperatifts, whieh art Mid® sligihl® for @x«ptlon froa 
oorporat® inoea® taxes ©xoept on earnings whieh are not al­
located to th® partioipating firms, f^h® oooperatlt® associa­
tion whioh makes prior oontraetual arrangemsnts to mak® 
patronage refund® do®® not paj oorporat® iaeoa® tax on thes® 
refunds when alloeatod to it® patrons. Th® preseat tax 
treatsent of ®oop»ratiT® aasoeiations a® well as other 
- g©s -
eorporati©a» partaarshifi amt otheF tjusiaess malts reflects 
tlid legal bmt aot tlit «o©a©iiie aatur® of these aiff®r©Bt 
hmimMM rnits. 
Mot omly is lnoorforatloH Itself Iscoasistsnt witfe th® 
©eoaomie mt%m of tfes ©ooperatlT# assoQietioa, tout tte.# taxa-
ti©m of all similar l®g&l malts is %%& saa® aamn@r wltliQtit 
2f#ga3?a to tlieir, ®©©m©mie aatmr®, aM tb,« taxatioa of dlffea?-
©at Itgal uBiti- iiffertatly mm thm^  %h®iT eeoaomi© natw® 
is til# ®aa»., «aaie fmrtli@r dlffi&ultiti, a# mmmmiQ fim 
is tM tasi® «®©soal0 mmit ia wbieto pfoduotioa desisiosas are 
aade, &m t&e a«t tmQm it my »aa« im this produotioa 
preeoas aeefws to'tb® fir» aa€ Iti tatf^ preaemr* Bi® 
•isoaomio plaat i® aot s basi© teoa©ai@ wait of predttetioa ia 
thii ®0ms®, hut omly a past of soa® fim, Joint plant 
of th© eooparatiir#- assoeiatioa is a part of eaoli participatiag 
fim. fht basi® tooaemie aatme ©f eitlisr- th® fim qw tM® 
plaat in aeitfeer i©t®mi»®4 ner 0feamg«i hj its l®gal aatu3*«» 
If the iaoeat proSaeei tomsiaess uaits is to b® ta3c«4 to 
those ttsits, til®' @so»oaic@ily ratioaal we.f to to so Is to 
tax tH® feasi©' pr©4metioa mit, th© fimi aat t© %&x it ia a 
®©a0lst©at »ana®r ?©ga3?ai«s«. ©f its legal aatmr#. fli® 
©eoaOBie plaat stoottl4'l>t taxti ©.all' as 6 past of its p®r«at' 
firm, QT firat. TM plsat owasd aad op®3?a.t@d o^iatl^ r fey ® 
gromp of ©ooperati.^  firms is ao diffei-'tat ia its #eoaoaie 
aatar© tiaaa ® plaat ow»@d aai op@ret«t %y a single fim. 
BfO -
B. MBimsM wltto Hoa-Fartlolpatlmg fimi 
M oft@B disemssta Issm® is th® ©d-risabilltjr'and ©rea 
th® poistbiiity of •«a<ia«»ail®r temslaess" la a trme eooperative 
assGQlatton, A r®lat#i qa^ stloa is th# ©oonomi© traataeat 
of mn-mmhem who do basiatss with fh® sooptratif© assoeia-
tioa. AGGcirdlag to Sosliamoff, *•. «' •"bmslaess traasaetad 
with ©wtiideafs it the'feasie faet©r ©f the degtaeratloa of 
•oooperatiire ag®r®gat«s thr@mgh ps®mdo-c©op®rativ® forma iato 
. s • 
eolleetlY# eat#fp3pl.s9s«'*' Some haf@ argm-©d that aoa-a®iib«r 
biisin®.#« as smeh d©es -aot tefleot a wstttotss of ooop03?atiT# 
ohapaetar, feat that B©s*»eab«rs should he treated as a#fflb«rs. 
fhis provisioa is oa® of ths r«tiii»ffi®ats for «xemptioa from 
ftderal iaoom® taxes under S#otioa 101|lg) of ths FtdtPal 
3 
latsrnal Itveam# Code. Othsrs argue that a©a-»i@ab®rs assme 
ao eBtir@p3f«aearial i?®ip©a«ibillty for th« Joiat plant aad 
thdpefor# ar® not satitl@d t©' oomparahl® treatmtat, the 
prasent eoop@i?atlT« atsoelatioa »aabliag aot la Iowa mak@a no 
provision for papi«at ©f patroaag# refmads to aoa-aembera ©x-
e«pt those who hav« salisorlhed to nfflBhership.. 
"^loa-msaher httsiaess-** la th« -Joint plant is aesd to m®aa 
th@ purelas#. of iapMts from or th« sal# ©f oatpate to aoa-
partisipatiag firms in addition to th.®s@ sam# iaputs ohtalaed 
from or outputs fmralshad to th® partioipatiag firms, 
^^ ©liaaoff# op« eit., p* gSO. . 
®Gf. Oavia* op. olt.., p. i0-68« 
l^owa cod®, ms, '11409,30, 
• mi • 
l©w®ir«r,, lik# that of a©st othtr states, th® tmm 
itatttt# »©a*«#ite«» bmslat'as ttf t© aa m&mt ©quai to 
aeaibtr bttstii.«is., m$ I&mi®® if aaoag thmm wh@ h$im eriti-
tised .sm©h a cjewe^ atiat ton the §mp'$m»lQXBtm& A&%^  
h® has stated %m to IM® 
But suoh asaooiationa are permitted to diisi la 
thf proAuots pf uon-meiabers to an amount t© 
th08« hanaiedl foi' mmhem* This provisioa weikteais 
»at«rially th# non-profit eharaoter of asso@i«ti©»« 
teaM under the law,. . . 
.» . ,lt wo-uiai aeem that permitting Hi«a /ooof«»«,» . 
tS.v»«7 todsaX upon such terms as th«f aight »•« fit 
4E, the product of outsiders raduoe® thfis to th@ Xtwl 
©f a profit sharing form of organiaatiea*^  
Basitt##» with t© a r#®i©»bi« txtent ooatinufs to 
h« t Qmsmu la oooftr-ati*?® iii!s©«iatiom«, h©w®T@r, 
1». m&f «•#.» srt as atahtys aai 
eorpertt# me pa|i %im afi#o@iati©a m ©armia-ga 
tmm S»a*at^ tif hii«ia«88 i« ©ppattatlj a eoafus-
iag isguf ami s point wk%m th«r# is' wli« 4iv«rg#ji@« h«tw®#ii 
th« opimioas ©f Matty ttfttiative ®0OB©miat.s. and what' is 
ftotmalli' dOB® iJi pratti#® 1® ^ ©©perativt aaseelatiosi# Dr. 
Sour#® l« ths $aat ®©aB.t#ti®» e.@ that ©f th© ahov# 
quetatioa fria h'i»f 
At A matter of practical sxpedierioy, it d©as appear 
to fe® isftportaut th^ pt cooperative assodiatioas ©lioulS 
aot h& prevented from handling the produet ©f aoa* 
ffltmbers under any and all ciroumsteBoes, • # « It 
Is th® opialon of the writer that the situatioa ©ouli 
have heea bettsr eat by th® piecing of ® liait of 
»om«thing like 10, 15, or ev®B 20 f#r &mt mt©» 
l^ tgal itatm®*. . « * f. i56»g§©» 
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baalaeis whiel B© ion® for Bom-meiaber®* 
Is there aaftliag in tM@ Isasi® teoaoai© natmr© of the 
eooperatiT® asaoaiattea wbieh. is countey to th« oataia® 
purohei# of products fey the Jotet plaat ta aMitioa to tkos# 
supplisi to it hj t&® iadlvidmal plants of tlit partleipatlng 
firms? OJ? iiit#xaat#iy is tli#f« siiytfeiag wfeiali Is eomater t© 
tli8 otttsl4t lal® of prediists fi?0» the Joint plant ia aMitlea 
to thos# amppliti t© tli# tmfiititeal plants of t&a participat­
ing firms* It wdmld i##a tliat if smell 'praetie® laorefests tJi® 
aBtieipatesfi profits ®mi/©r stalbllitj of profits to tiie 
parti©ipating fi»s them is m iBgoasisteaoy, But if saofe. 
pifaotlo® is m©ti¥«t#i hf a 4®aii?© to aake ttea J©iat plant as 
suoh moT9 pr«>fit6l)l®., witliomt to tfe® ®ff@et ©a tto® 
partiolpgttiag ftras, tM# praetlet is iaoeasist^ mt witb th® 
©ooaoai© aatur® ©f tlie. eooptrative ass^ oiatloa# 
ttta the shfiptcfth® loag rm ©Terags cost fuaetion im th® 
Joiat'pmr©lia®l»g pleat is smofe tkst per wait §osts wmj 
red-uet^  by afifiiag afliitiomal tolttae, tfe@ fe.rtioipatiug fims 
art litetl^  aot |» prodm^ tioti ^ quillferim. ft® ©©sts of 
Optratiag tfe# Joimt aetififj aaf he rttoetd tO' saoli of %h®m 
hj inereaslng tb@ ®ia# of th® Jeiat plant* la tfeos® cases 
wlier® ©ptratiag ©fflQltac-y may h9 ia©reas#a by aMimg volm® 
ia th® |oiat plant, tM« ©sabar firms will gain thia ©ffioiaaey 
Most #§©.o©fflieallf hf iateeiag aiditloaal fims to partieipat®, 
1 
Ibi<l», p. 255-256. 
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fliis ia Meamst the. afiied partieipatlag firms will al-
loaat® r@soure#s to tl® Joiat a©tivity, s© that tli® aM«4 
mtfiQimQf 0Offl@s witliomt additional outlay as far m ths 
preTioms gromp ef partiaipating flms is ooaeerata. Ordina-
fily, th®T9fgm^ sscpaaaiea ia tli® joint plant will tak® plae® 
in tbis way. fypioally, hows^rer, tli® ©Mtpwt of the joint 
puretoasing plamt ©paymtiag at aja (Sffieieot -relw® aay iaelmd# 
somt «stapltts" aot a®®4®a la the iafiividual plants of tto 
partleipatiag firas, Sttch smrplas is iisposed of by sal® to 
noa-aeatoers—fixM ^  wbieh it ii fflarreatlF taaeeottonie. 
beoamsf of eoaflifting ©bJeoti"r«s» th® t@]^©rary aatmr® of 
their d@aani for this proAmet, laalaillty to bear th® waoer-
taiatifs of th© joiat aotivity, aor® produett^e opporttiaities 
for their resow®®®, eai similar reasoas, to partioipat® in 
th@ Joint plant« fhis aort of neii-»®ab@r bmsiaass is eoo-
noaio to th© partisipating'firas, and is sonalstent with the 
©oonomie natar® of tha ao©p#rati¥« a@a©©iatlon« It will «n-
abl@ th® partieipating flras to Inorsas© operating effioleney 
in ©aoh of their fiai®, ana thersbyBak# the op@rationa of 
as amth mors profitable. Ortlnarily suoh^ nom-
meiibtr baslness will repr©s§-nt a tmall psroeatage of th« 
totel Tolum® is th® Joint purshasing plant. 
"Bi® esse is psralltl when th© partieipeting firms 
Jointly operatt a marketing plant except that, as shown in-
chapter 8, th® optimm plant sia® is dtfined by equating th« 
slope of th© long mn mm&ge cost aurv® (which is n®t of raw 
- 2f4 * 
pr©fiM§t iaptit eoat®! wltii slop® of tfa® loag run average 
r@v@ime o^ rv®. If this ©Terag© »©t return to ®mh partlel-
patlag fira tmm tte@ .Joint piast mn iaertssed by a 
i®rg®r @i!£® ia %ha Jeint pleat., tli#s@ f.inis tr® likely aot to 
be in proittetio.ii eQwilibriaa.^  Btyond th« poiat wbsre it is 
pos«ibl# t© 9mum aidit.ioaal firas fer partieipetioa in tlie 
Joiat aet.iiflty, tfe# parti^ ipfttiEg firmi aay a<shi®T# tfae 
optimm size in tlis Joint plant by pwreMsiag tb® "deficit" 
raw proimet input froa a©a-parttoipstl»g firms--firas, wbicb, 
bteaiisfi of tbeir ©wa p©sitl©ii,.. find it m#e©moai0 t© partiei-
pat® in the Jeiiit attifity. If the impply emrt# for th.«s® 
raw proauot.i la sueb tbat it is ®eon©mle to txpand md«r ttoi®s© 
eonditioEa, it is a©t oaly ©oasisttat t© traaeaet a limlte-t 
6mottr!.t of aoa-member bmsintst in th® Joiat m«rk@tiiig aotifity, 
bmt mmMBBsy to io so is order to iebi#v® .proimetion ®qmi* 
libriia®. In taeli partisipatiag fir». 
Ibat abemt tte« itatms ©f tb#. firs tbat traasaets busia@8« 
witb tb® Joiat ©©tii'ity, biat flais it ®ooE©«ie not t© partiei-
pat® la tb® Joint netiTity? On tbe basis of tb« attlti-fira 
plant §oii©®pt, tb0 Itatms of smeh a firm ia strietly that of 
outsider, fb® prodttotioa aotlTlties of tbs aon-partieipatiag 
firm is in no mf ijftt®grat®d with tbe joiat activity. Sudh 
firas ba¥0 «iit©r®d iato boh# of tbs nittlti*l®t®ral ©oomomie 
relatloasblps wbiob ®xist aaoag tb.e partieipsting firms. Sfeey 
bav® ao obiigatioa—legal, moral, ©r ot.herwise—to tb® Joiat 
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partial, Hewtver, aaa-mtmbei' feusiaets •eaa be a definitt 
sympt©» of til© i«gaa©fatlom of th® tri® ©eonoaio ebaraeter of 
the ao©p®tatiTt assotiatioa. If th# aon-ataber toslasss is 
ffiotifatsd bf antl§ipats4 profits io the Joint plaat ai ®woh 
froB tills basiatss witbomt to ttoe efftet of th® a©a-
a®»ber buaim«@s oa the effieieaej ©f tli« pasJtiQipatiag firm®, 
til© «©oaoiii© metar® an4 parpos© of tli® ©ooperatiT© assoois-
tioa jfeai bsta iisr«gaiet#«.* iMfias#* la B©a-at»b®r business 
ma.d«r 9mh oirewastsndts repststfit ti?u® itftmratioii of tli# 
eeoaoiiie ehasaotsF ©f tli® 8©©pei'atlw assoeiatloa, fb® joint 
80ti¥ity mmm t© b« an iat0,grat®a past of the 
total activitie'S ©f tfee partitipating fiyas, and ptirsues mors 
aai aor® aa i»t«'i>«ai©»t «©oaoaie mm%v» fhe resmltiag stmo-
tva® is s Joiatlj owaei «eomoiil@ fim wbiob buy® f^ oa »ii,d 
'sells to tbe'atmb®* fiias as .wtll as aoa-ffltab®? firms for ® 
priG® wfeiob will aaxlmia® its profits. This jointly owm& 
fim is liktly to ska^ t its profits witk th@ foratr p®rtiei» 
pat lag firag whiob. ooiatiBU® to fetroaiE© it. Ae4 tb® mort 
the jointly o««4 fir* ©aa gais by aomofoly or moaopsony 
«xploitati©a of tb®«® p&troaiziag firas, tb@ greater tbe 
profit® it will Mm t© sliar« witfe tb«m.. 
It is not tli« mom-member bmsiatst* p®r s®, that oatises 
tb« a«g«a#rati©:B, If tb« Joiat plant rtmiaa aa integratei 
part of tb« pafti«ipeti»g firma, and it is eontrollea aad 
operated by the partl«ipatiag eatreprtawrs la tb® b®at 
tooBoait l»t®r®st of ©tob, ooBsidering tb© total inttgrated 
- 897 -
product ioa is tb® partieipating flms, dtgeaeratiea milt aot 
take plae«. mm B©B-a®iife«r tomsiaess is earri«a omt only to 
tb® ©xteat ttot it is motivat®a hj %be opportmity to laersafi® 
th® operatiag tffleieasy ©f %h% participating firms sad 
r®pr@seats optiama wmomm «Xi©©«tl©a witMa tJi«s« fir»s, it 
is ooasisteat witli the basi© ©©©aoBi® mtvs^  aad purpog® of 
tlie eeeparatif® assoeiatiea# 
0* ifciataiaiaf .tjoatrol 
Til® proteltffi Qt Maiataiaiag aflsqaat® e^ atr©! ef tli® eoop-
erstiv® asseelatioa ia tli®. liaafis of th® pftptitipatlag eatr®-
pr@a«ttr ii ©a® of smistantiel prattieai iji^ ©rtaae®» Alway® 
s0ffi®tMag of a pr©bl.®a, ®T®a ia' th® Iseal assoeiatioa soveriag 
a iiaitti gtogrepbi® tree, it bmQm& mmk mm eraeial la 
large aad rtgloaal ass6©lati®as of betli tli® .fsteratai aad 
eeatrallztd typ«« §rdiaarUy' tfe® ©aabliag atatat®® for eo©p-
®ratlTs •asio®iatl©a,s eoataia both aogatiT© ftafi posltl?® 
pr©¥is.ioas wbio'li iasar® faSiy ateqmt® aaoliJaary for ©oatrol 
X 
of til® Jolat plaat by the pertielpatiag eatrepreaaars» 
Primarily th® problea is la®ae«pat« atillzatlea of tb® m®'-
obla®ry wbitb i® available, 
Tb© concept of tb® baaie a®tar® of tb® oeeperatiT® 
aaaooiatioa baa lltti® to ©ffer la regard to makiag aor® 
T^bis maebiaery tor et®taat® aemb®r firm coatrol 0¥@r 
tb® Joiat activity is aot aaiT®rsally satisfaetory, b©w®ver. 
- g®s -
sffeotlir® as® of tMs To a layg© escteat tia® solm-
tioa to tMf pr©'bl©m Xlts otttslt® tfe© fisM of tJa® ©ooaoalst. 
S«0ii dlaGlpXiatt peXitleaX aeitae®, speiology and ®v#a 
psfQMlQBW saa 'Siii «ast offer tk® fettle soXiitlom to it. fJi® 
teasio aatttie# ®f tli® toopeapatlire aasooiatioB tagpilsias whf th.# 
probleiB sxists.,- how@wp, tei mhj it is ©f umh 
m0 iiia®rit|' ©©wt©:!! *t®elEli©14®r im a eorpo^ at® fim 
B©ttli#r wei-jjiei aor attds to worry mmeh tteout an ©ffoetiv® 
Toiee im %M eoatf©i #f %h& eoyporatioa# sia©-# the corporate 
firm ptiratits «a iMepm€m% «eoaoMie poXiof makera 
are aoacs#ra@i oalf ateomt tli@ ©eoaoffiie optratioas of the fim 
8S amek.. Im gsaeral, m loiig as tb® sa^ ority stoefcloidea? 
acta retionaUj' is om l5®it iat«r«sts, k® mill a©t ia t&e 
feest iutm&Bt of tbe aiaeritj MtmWmoX^ m m well, a© iaoome 
of Ijotfa will- fe# at a mxiamti. wMn th% ©orporate firm prodme®® 
at tli® ]^ 0st produstiea ©owfeiaation aad at tii» ©utpmt whiQto 
meximigis profits to th& fira. fbe opiaioa of the mall stoolE-
feoXder m&y i-ittms witli tlat Of th® eoatrol atoo-leiioMtr as to 
reser^ ® pollsy., ©xeeiitifts* salaries, aaft so oa, tent ia 
gtaeral 'Im ia willisg^  a»t wia®ly 90, to h® guifitd without  ^
qusatioa hf t,te •mm® #jEp®ri«K0.#4 aa4 oapabX® ©Etreprsaeurial 
deoisiosa of tM« Majority sto§^ hoM«r. Salaried maaageatnt 
is als© iiit'@r#0t#.4 ia m -^Kimizin^  profits- t© the eorporat® 
fir» aa suoJi, aot ©Ely btoams® aaneg®riel personatl are 
typically stoateto©l4®r$» m% also ^ eeams# thtir valmt to tke 
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f imt. 
file partleipatlag ©atyaprtmemr wfeo rtfus®® beeo»« 
Involftd in tli® ieflsioaa oomeeraiag tli@ Jolat aetifity l» 
aotiag IrratioBsily in lis «Btr®p'3?«a©iirial roX®, lis pro-
portioaat® slar® of th® Joiat plaat^  is aa nuek a part of tha 
eeoaosi© fim mait? his ®at»®ptta®arship as I9. his iadi?iamal 
plaat, aai his deoisioas ia #a®h aast b® aa-d# eoasideriag th® 
two aa aa iat®gr«te4 prodastioa mait. While he eaa ©oaat oa 
the small gfoap of partioipatiag ©ntreprtaeafs who act ratioa-
ally ia th« best iat@r«it of their ©wa firms to aafee aaay 
ieoisioas ia th® Joiat plaat ooasisteat with th# iaterest of 
his fim, i.e., •effioleaoF withia th® Joiat plaat givta th« 
aotiviti®® Goaim#t#i there, th©r« art oth«r deeisioas which 
h@ ©aaaot eoaat oa th«» t© itak® ia his h®st iaterest. -Saeh . 
thiags as e:^ ansioa by further wrtioal iategratioa, additioa 
of sp®oifio aew departmtats ia th® Joiat plant, iaortases ia 
th« onaei equity ia the Joiat aotifity, or ooatraetioas ia 
aay of th@s® ar« likely to affeet sob# of th® partioipatiag 
fir»B diff«r®atly thaa others. 
It is iaportaati therefor®, that smoh ©atr®prea@arial 
policy Hsoisioa® with r#sp@ot to th« Joiat aetifity aot h® Biad® 
by th©' board of dirsoteri or ®©a« other s»all groap, bat fey 
th@ majority of the parti©ipatiaf ©atrtproaturs at aa aaaaal 
or special ae^ tiag. fh« partioipatiag eatr@pr®a®ars should 
have all relevaftt iaformatioa b«for® mkiag th® deoisioa. 
fh« quoraa for sa#h a@«tia,gS' shoald ©©rtaialy b@ more thaa a 
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h&m^ tVLl of ttk® partlsipatlng «ntieef3f®a«iara, ant tfe© aeoiaioat 
should m% -fe© *4® hmttlft hut 'OBlf •aftdi tot sttidy aafi dlt-
cmssi^ M, I®f6ir®a4m «®0Mi»©rj shouia also bi pr©via«d and 
ttsad wM«a®T®r ttotr# i« asy Qutstiea as to aa|©3fitj eiidoi-statrnt 
of a gl¥«a d®elal©a' aa«t %f tM b#a^ i of directors. I3@cl8l©B® 
whlQfe, by tMlr wemli b« mad# ia ® Ilk© aenmei? la tlie 
best iBt§?est8' ot all peftlflpatiag mtmpsem.®mT9 er© mo?# 
eff®0tif»ly »ad© hy tlit b©ftjd of dii'®et©rs tliaa Ijj tli®, s®v®fal 
parti§ipatiBg m%mpTmmit» m® ® gi'emp# 
§ettiiig ®(i©<|mt« partitipafioa la eatrepraatwrlal eom-
trol by laie »fii|©i?ity of paytielpating ®atr#pir®»«mjfa is 
frtqtttatly a aerisms p^ astieal pj^ etslem. An umiei-itandiiig of ' 
tl© basio @Qoa©ml® mtum of tii® 0Oop®Fati¥t assoaietlem hy 
t&@ partlQipaats will redtio® tke aagaitud# of this profel«*, 
la ad@taat« wadfirataBdisg %f mQh ©f tk® issa# t© fes decided 
and the ©ffeots ©f th# degiiloa m tlitl? total prodttotloa 
a0tiTitl®s will fe@lp &!•#©• A Qoastfmeti^ # attltmde, ba»«d 
oa adaqmt® ' iaf0i?aati0B m ••%1m part of tli® teoerd ©f dii?®et©rs 
end managemeat, wliitli will aioti^ at® tli#ii to refer i»portaiit 
issttes.eai all iaforsatlom rtldfant to t&@»e ii©u«8 to t&« 
»®Bljers&lp, is hlglily ii^ ©ft®iit» Asd not to hm forg©tt®a is 
%h9 mmtnl of new partieipatiag firms, o^tto from 
til# staadp#int ©f their eoiitlsmitsr of iat«r®et aad of their 



















































































































































































©xpaasloa prograa i» the JolBt plaat i?®pr@a«nts rational 
eeoneaio h®hm%QS to tibi® pai?tiGipatiiig firms, it is appareat 
tbat til® aafgiaal preductivity of tto« capital tiei mp la th» 
expaasiom Jtistifis® .the aMitioasl ail-seatiea ©f capital t© 
tht-J©iat aelivitj* fe b© ra.tieaal., %!• txpansioa of tlie 
Joint plant mm% tl® b®it altsraatlT© ms ©f 
©apitel ia tto# partieipatiag fims-pmslAetiag %M total 
py.0auQtiQa ©pereti©a® of 9mh pa3?tlQ.ipatiag ®atr«pr®.a«mr. 
If tiiia is t&® ©as®,, the Kdsber'fiims'.thomli not li#grw.ig« 
the expaa»i©a progifoi,, tout walaoa# it as %hn b@8t alteraativ® 
m®@ of the i^?®aoia]p«i©s withia ©ash firs# ©xpaasioa prog3?aa 
«ill'«na.hl@ th®a to la^ i'sms© th#i^  aatiaipatet profit®, or 
the astielpat®&. itebili.t|- of thts« profits, aai warn to a 
higher stahility-tffieieaoy ia.diff®r«a0# emrrs {am figmra 
9)'* Sfta thoagh m&li partioipatiag #a%if«pr#a®ar .fiais thet 
th® expaaiioa prograa ia th# Joiat R@tiirity palls som® of 
th.® limited ©.apital reso^ wroes av.ailabl® to hia away from his 
iadividnal plaat, %.h# sxpsasioa is rmtioaal if th® ©o'oaoaio 
position of th# partidipatiag firm is .iaprowd hy sach a .move. 
• On the other haai aot all th@ appar^ at earaiag® froa 
th® Joiat aeti^ itf ahomli mmm&milf h® in th® 
produotioa astiTitiss ia th® Jo.iat plaat. They aay hav® 
h«tttr alt@raetivs ua@s e.l®«wh®re withia th# psrtioipatiag 
firms.. The rats at whi-ah dollars of petroaag® rtfaads' eaa 
he aeowmlattd aa4 tsferrti, for ®xaiipl®.» i® not ® aouat 
basis for'det.ermiaisg aa ®xp.aBsioa pollay ia th@ eoopecative 
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assoolation. Smeh a plan may resTilt la ©vsrea^ paasloa or it 
may result ia an iiaitraxpamsion of tbt Jelat aotlvity, 
4«»6B4iag iipOB thm aairglaal proiMtivlty of capital ia this 
us@ compared to ait®i?metlv® mtes la th@ paytieipatiEg firms. 
Of 0©tir»©, as has l>®®» «#®a, the aaomt of patroaag# reftiad 
atailahl® to th« parti©l®atiBg ®atr©pre««urs 4«p®ad8 on the 
aecomtimg »*prie«** at time gooi« ar@ traasf@rrei• b©tw®@m th« 
joiat plaat ®a4 tli@ in&ifMml plaata of th« partioipatiag 
firms, so that eoafideret aloa# th® patroaag# rsfmiii la no 
ffitasmrs of th® ©ooaoaie ©ffleifBoy of th@ Joint plent* But 
beyond thii, ao om# -itfartrntat la aay fira has speeial elaia 
to aetual profits for th® firm aais hy that i.®p®rtMnt. 'fhe 
©atreprtoeur dliposes of th® profits aGOorfliag to his 
tatioas aai laiifferea#®®. If profit# ar« inv@st®<l ia th® 
firm, th® «atr«pr®at«r will tlr«ot this aswly ®fira«i oapital 
iato th® aatlQipst«i most proteotlf® as# withla the fira. 
©lis will aot Biio«®0arily h« to the €tpertia®at whioh @ara©d 
ths oapital» 
Ixpaasioa of th# Jolat activity oat of th® apparent 
©aralags to th® partleipatlag firaa> with th® rate of ©xpaa-
sioa d®t0riiitt®4 hy th® i«oaat of th@s® .appareat earaiaga, as, 
for @xa*pl®, flaaaeiag Joint plant ©xpaasioa with deferred 
patronage r®fimds, will repr®s0nt «ooao»ie«lly ratioaal 
b®h®Tlor only by «®0ii«nt# Beeaas® all alternatlv® ase® for 
capital withia th® partlclpatlag firms aast he ®oasia®r®4, 
suoh. 0 polioy Is aot ooaparabl® to th® reinireatment of profits 
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im a '©orporat# firm# ill adtltioEal eapital iaTestei la 
flrai toy tii® partiaipattag aatrepr6B@Bi?s sfeoiali be wsefl 
in the mmt predmetlw alfernativt a® 'defiaet hf th® effect 
of ©aeh • alterastiv® ©a tke ©ffi.olaaoy sM stateility of tbe 
total int0gre.ttd optratlemt ©f tfae'Tlma. In a givtn situa­
tion this may aeaa ©Itfeer vertieal ©xpansioB ot th# aiiitiom 
of a@w iepartmsnts la th® joiat plant> ©r alteraativaly it 
may m®m ®-:^aissi@a of tl® pi'©4u®tl©a ©Qtivities earriM on 
in tht iMiviiual plaats of tbe partioipating firM». ixaotly 
th@ S8tt@ is trm® whmm tli« @xp«iisioii is fioasee^  fey borrow@i 
capital ratb0r,tha» partieipatiag eatr@pir«n@»r ettaity ©apital. 
!• fiBaB,0iag tb# Ioin% "PXmt 
fli« proxies of steuriag ad®qmat© fiaaaeisig for tli@ ;|oiat 
plant aad of aaiataiat'ag tlie iistributtos of tti© fiaaneial 
rtsponsifeility m m eqmitabl# feaais aBoag tto,® partieipatiag 
firms always seeas to ,t>® a problem, -or at i©®st a potential 
on®, in cooperatIv# assoeiationa. Gmrrently, with tb® growth 
of regional eoop^ rative ftderations, tk@ a®or«ased pnrehasing 
power of »on@y eapital for tlmA and working faoilitl«#, and 
iniifferene® anfi laok of miftrstanding of some me^ er® regard­
ing their .Joint activity, tk® probltm i® mgnlfi®4. Both th« 
fiasnaial protol®ms and tfe®ir solution s@«m to vary froa a.»80-
oiation to aasooiatios. It is hart to find two coop®ratiir® 
asaooiatiOBS with fimansial structmr®® ©xaotly alike, ffeer® 
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appi3?eatly is ao obs bsst metfeoi m oombiaatioa of aetlofiii 
of fiaaaciag tie Joist ft§tiTity ttnder til oiremttaiiooi, 
frettttstlj' eustom, sai tM of the paytioipat- ^ 
ing entre.groMwrs, ratfao? tbaa tht ©onsistenty of tfe# 
fiaaa^ ial plan witli tfe# eeoaonie aatmi?® of tto eoop«r&tiv® 
asaoQtatloa, datarmia© tie plan la tiae. 
ffe.® flaaaoial r&apQmBlhility of tfe« pertieipetiag mtm-
•^ rmeuTB for tie Joimt activity, aafi tl® apfileation of th« 
proportioaallti' ®oat#pt to the alieriag of this respoatibility 
has fewa ais©iiss®i, pai-tlomlarly In ofe«pt®^ 8 S, 0, aai 11, 
It was a&m %h&% tie partlelpatiag fims will sliar® th# 
ecstual alloettioa of oapltftl oa ®, proportional basis only 
whta tk# n&sgimal proimetivity of capital is agsw®#^  to he 
aqaal amomg all parti©lpatiaf fifms. It m.& also pol»t«i omt 
tliat, asawaiaf fix®d qmsatitl#® of squlty ©apltal la mok 
firm, til:® paytlolfetiag #otr«pr®ii®«?8 as ® gi»omp will proTii# 
611 of tbe .tapital fot tte jolat aetlTlty only vhm th«y sr® 
unable to obtain tii® ms« of oapital in. tb# aiuktst for loss 
tlan its aatioipatti Mariiaal p^ oftMotivity'to tteea ia t&tiy 
joiBt pla»t« fli« mm mhem seslior fims Saf® om© • 
pereeat ia tk®. Joint pleat, aa4 slis^ e this equity 
among tii®ms®lT©» oa a propo^ tiomal 1i.asi®.., is dtsiratole only 
under apooial aqii,iiti©ns. It @«rtaliily is aot an iiaal or 
goal to to® stfivsi fm ia all oooptratl-r® assoelatioas, as 
is qwit# fretwoatly ¥®li@voi ia practle«. 
Ill dlrecst allooations of oapital to tlie Joint plaat as 
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a ooaflltion ef pertlclpatioa shomld b® oa a pro-
portloa.al feasls| te©w«T@f', jfttfee? than ©a a pet firm basis. 
Xb »ost looal QOQpsmtiWQ aisoflatioas, smefe xequirsd al-
loQatloB of ©apltal la ©itfrw la tfea for» of a ii®ffite#rsiilp 
fm 03? « sbsy® of mrnrnm sto®^, hQth of whl<M am ovdimniXf 
m a p©! fira ba®i» ratfee'i? tiita om ® bails p^ eportlonai to 
partlolp.tttloa ia tlie J©tat Botifitr., Th9 par value of smok 
mmmm stoek or memtoersfelp fm is s® saall ©rtinarily, feow-
#T©r,, that tit® iltproportiottalities agalast th® smaller 
partioipatlug firms ®r® a®gligifel«. Ia smeli ©aaes, th® 
profelta is that &mk allooatioa® fail to proviit e siifflci«at 
aaouat of ©luity ®apit»l for tb# Jolat^  plamt, th® par 
iralu# of @©rtifl#at@® of m®mb®rstlp is high ©aougli t© 
profid® auffi0i«at capital,, th® diapertloaalitie® amosg %M 
partioipatlag firiis hmme mwimn* fba oaly aolutlon,. it 
would ©®®a, da to b®®® smob all©©8tio»« oa p®r©eatag« partloi-
patlonj oth«irwi®« th.m rissttlt will h% soa® ©oaproais® 
two important profel#ii»-*iiisttffioi®at @apital allooatioae. to 
tM@ Joist aetl¥ity la tils aaM®r, aai tisproportloaalitlss 
among tJa@ pfittielpetimf firas. 
tM margijaal pro&taotlfity of capital differs 
oonsldtrably amoag th& partiolpatlag firiasj, as it does withi 
1 • 
fiCT,s @agag®i ia agrtemltiiral prodmetloa, for «xaapl@, it 
is Importaat ttiat ®mh partioipafiag flra 'to® proTldefi th& 
1 
Xarg®lf feaeams® of tbt aoraal llf© eyel® of tto# family 
fara firm. 
• 308 
alt@3?aati¥® of su^ js0?lblng this ftqmirti aapital alloeatiom 
to th« J©lat aetivity and all©©Bt« a. part of it ly a s«rl®s 
of psriofil© iastallmsats, ®ttfe03? fFoa his app®r@at eaimiiigs 
from th® Joiat plant ot froa aon® ©thss souse®, fkm firm 
ehoo'sing this altsfastlire rtioali b# t-o pey a fall-
rat® of ittteriiat oa hi® mipaii smhseriptioa,, and can well 
affori to do so vhm %M serilmal, proimetivity of eapital 
la tht firm la high# •.flr»s i» whish th« aarglaal protme-
tiTity ©f eapital ii low«r thaa this iaterest rat® will 
ohoos© te Bftk® their eatir® re^ uir«i ©apital alloeatioa 
dirsetly rather, thts- la. perioiie iBstallatnts. 
fh©a iiff#reao«s la th# aargtnsl proimstlTity of eapital 
httwtta firm® exist, it is iaportaat also that partieipeting 
®ntr®pr«n#ttr® Mm the opportiimity to inTtst aiditioaal 
capital in th® Joiat aetiirlty aat that thty h« iaimoei to do 
so hy m attrastiv# rate of lat®r«»t ob smeh m investaeat. 
fhe lat«r®at on sueh eapital hteoms-e -aa 9ipli§lt prodmetioa 
oost in th«-Joiiit plaat. aetual eff®®t is that partioi-
pating flrna ia whiah th« margiaal protmetivity of ©apital 
ia high toorrow capital fr©» participating firms in. whleh the 
aargiaal profim©tl¥ity of eapital i®^  low.. As iat^ rest rat® 
oa this eapital 'scmtwhsrt fettweSB th« Barglatl produftivities 
of eapital im' tha two groups of flras will laproT# th© 
ecoBomie position of th® firats- la hoth geotips* As a praeti-
©al matter, from th®'stmadpoiat of fiaaneial security in the 
assoeiattd eotlTity* it is well to bav@ saeh luTestmeats wtll 
- m$ " 
41strll3mt®4 amoag tJi© iia^ i-tleipaliliig fims, so thst witMrawal 
of ©apltai by aa^  om tim will mot ,j#opardlm« 
the positloa of th© Joiiat plaat# SiIb pollsf aiso iasur«,s 
that til® int&mata of %mh. partietpatiag eatr@pirom®mi? m ®a 
iair®stor ar# mmMrnj to liis iatetssts as a psi-tieipttat in 
til® j0tat. flaat as m late^ gyatei part O'f tie total pfoduotioa 
aotiTtti$s ©f Ms firm. 
lT«m wfeta, pr#Tist©a is mais f©r aMlties&l liifestmtats 
la the 4'OiBt eotlfitf fey iatai?@st®4 partioipatiag #at^ @-
preaeuss, it is mn&XXf %@m<emie f©^  the grotip to borfow ad-
ditloaaX oapital fr©m ©utait® soiiire®®# fkis will b® %Tm 
wtimmei eapital o«a l-©ip3?©w«t on t®if»,s which. »ak® its 
cost l@s«-t!iaa tteis amtteipatti marginal pifeteetlTitf of.th.® 
capital to tlj« gromp Qt parti-olpatiag fims' aa a wfeol®, 
Capital n«94@4 s#a,»«js®llf la tto Joiat plant smeh as that 
to finane# iafaateries, ©am proteably fee ©totaiBei moat 
#ee»oalcfillf m &%m% %mm 1mm. froa lailviimals, 0©iis@r@ial 
bamks^  hmM f©r ©o©fesatif«s, ©r alsewlie^ ®, toptmtiag tip©E 
wbioto BQmm will l©aa oa tM aoat fave^ alsl© t@m®. long 
t®fa loams f^ oa slailar as® msmally moir® siait@i to 
otlitr !spltal s.®#is la tb# J.©iBt aetlflty* la aidlties to 
losa eapitel of this klsa, tk® partielpatlRg antreprtstiir® 
as a group mey fiaS it to thelx adfaatag® to ^ (orf©w o®pltal 
by sslllBg «t5©aa*type« sseurltles to %h9 g#a@i»al imm%ing 
pmlJlie. Bmh slieulA represent striotly loaa capi­
tal, and sbotiM earry a© partlQipetloa provisioas of aay klaA, 
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Fei-tieipatiBg fims often allocate equity eapltal to th® 
Joiat aetifity ttosugli -a gtvolvisg capital plsa-. Tit Tmolr» 
lag fmfi aost mwm&lf eonfist# ©f deferred patronag® refmais, 
but ye¥ol¥iiig pg%y©a®g© t#imctiom» also fafetiieEtlj us®d, 
partiemisrly toy »aykttiii§, m&pm&tifmB* Moth plans ar® ais-
omssei la ebaft®!' S» fh&m Is mefe t© b« aali la of 
thi« us« of til® tawlTiiig, fuai fey the partloipatlag flms to 
tlmmm ttoalr Joijat plant * It proTltes a coE^ eaieat praetl-
eal aeaaa ©f waiataiiiliii propoiftleaality in tfe-® alle-oatlom 
of ©apltel f©3P tlie J©tatly e©ti<imet®d irsimetloa actlTlty, liot 
oaly lE &mh operatiaf ymmt, temt omw ti»« as w®ll. 
I.s TOt&lag afe©mt^ -"tfe© w&roMM f^'aai. wlii©li ii basleally lades-
alatsBt *itk tfe© aataa?® of tM« ©eopera.tiT@ «3soola-
tloa. fraetleml pro'feltaa hm%mr tov# gtowa omt of its ms@, 
pa:rtleMlajfly It is 4«i>®ai#i mpOB foa? flrtually all of 
ttot pai'tieipatimg ftia ©tulty ia tli® Jolat asti-rity. 
B®Qam®o. of tke alftmmmm in tke mrgimal proAuetlTity 
©f capital la t&t pajtlelpatiag firas, xm&lr%s^  fnn§., 
mM tfe# j^ egulting ttfist pfoportioaality in aotually proTid-
lag tb« eapltal for %M |oiat attlirltyt as 4istiaiui.ali®4 fi^ om 
fto.ai'iag the finaasial r©gp®iiii%iliti#s oa a pTOfOftloaal 
Isasis, ©.fttat## iaefttiti#® ant iQ®ffi©iaael«t wltliia tk® 
particlpatlag firms* llao tli« rsTolvliig fua^  wli®n o¥«r-
•©mployea is too a'iaf#matts ®ad nay 4iT@yt aemb®.r firm ©apital 
into the Joiat activity wkldh, for %h9 as e wliol®, 
mm'M fe® aea?« pTOtmotlTa in al.t«»atiir® mses within th® 
- Sli -
partloipstlnf firms# Or alt^ raetlTsly it nay provide iastif-
flei®»t tapifal is t«ra« ©f its aargla&l pr©toetitity ia tbe 
Joiat plamt. 'then i« eosMaatloa witb other ia®t&o4s of 
allooatlBg eapital to- th# Joiat plant so tfaat the rsTOlving 
perioi'is Ictpt r-«®8omafely short aai tli© 4ifftr®ao«s. ia tli® 
aarglnal pr©dM©tlvity of eapital aaoEg tb® partiolpatlag 
firaii is takea atoouat of,, tto.® revolviag fmi mn %e T@ry 
us®fml, 
fh« ma® of m®llo«t®i reservts §r®at®i ottt of app®r®at 
©araiags ia t,h« Joiat plant as a meaas of provlfiiag eapital 
for th« Jolat a«ti¥lty li ia gwertl unaati-sfaet-ory aai ia-
ooaslst«at wltb tit® aooaomie aattjtr® ©f tli® ©oo-p®rati¥© a«80-
oiatioa^  fHit- preoafittr®, wtoar® msM, ii sopitd froa tife® 
eorporat® firm surplws ani otfe#r g«a®ral rditrws, wbieh ar® 
typleally, ajs4 with -setimi mmmi& fomiatioa, as®d fey th® 
stocld6i©l4«r-« to provl-i® aiditioaal eapital Is tii® oorporat® 
firm. Si0'ii t protedur® in tli® .©©-operatiT® aisoeiatlosa 
®c®pl®t-©ly igaores tli-© faet that tko ^ oiat aetlvity la iat«» 
grated with tii® iMivitml profitiottoii aetlviti.®® of tfe® 
part i©ipat lag firas# Vmm tl® polat of t1®w of prodmetloa 
dquillfe-ritm ia tto,® psrtieipmtiag firms, it may r®smlt la • 
either ©¥®r@zpaiisi©tt or ma4®i?#xp©a®i©-a of t,li@ |oiat aotlTity, 
•aad will ©0r»««poai to opt laws. r&sQmm elloeatioa ia tfa® 
m@afe®r firm® oaly by aoci-ieat* Asm# froa -a limited reserv® 
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a»»oei®t i©iit is m 
t©©»©*t© mtiritj Is eomametdd ia 
tb« fwsttit &f tht «©©ii««iat hm 00a-
mtm& Mmaelt femt witu its l»tsi® e©oa©at® sattir®. 
fJa® literatwe fftlatiag t© «t©p«^ atiT® attiyity 
4« So*i,aat«i hf t&« iat«i'fr@t®tloai aai 
wtm MBtmiml tsA i&t&m&tim* f&» s®-«all.«a 
fees is «priiteif3.«s ©f a,r« r#f®jr3?et t© freqwatly 
ani witfc 0#iiaia@ifaiit «if4«3P# 1« tMlr stgaifiean©® 
a®3?l©m«3.f «®©tt®aisls, ©it tfa« other 
hm^ t toy# stlitm af«®|.fi@slly M t&t 
e®©p®rmtiy« mBmi&tim* ttot® fQQpti-dfivei at® maatioasi 
at all th«y liaTt fe®«a m eim^ I »« » sf«fial klu& ©f 
®©rp©ftti©ii* e®Ttr®i %nit9 fey Ife®- thmsf 
• 1 
of the tlrm* 
mut ©tt-l»*a«Ai»g wtfk ssletlir® to %%@ emmQm%% aatw® 
©f tilt •t©of«3fa'l4y« aisesiatioii ii fc«llaii©ff'*« »leoaomi© 
i 
fhmtf ®f Go©f®fati©ii,'* lii f?iB«ip®l ©©atrilimtiQii i» th» 
d«ytl©fm«iit ©f %l«@t®tieal ©©mttpt ©f tkm-m&mmU atw-
tw« ©f • tlie ii©#p«itt|v«. ael4*pi#ir«« t&« t&@©ry tliet eoop-
emttV9 is a klat ©f «e.©s©mi« fim, ast ®©aelM«s 
itt:it@a4, 
i#mldi»g» ©f# @if.|. i« 444-44S# 
%a©li«@ff» m* 9it» 
• 
, • #©0f#,3?atlT@ es»oeiati©» i*®pr®s®nt0 
fti,s©©iat«t •«#©a®aic units la thalr funotioalng 
&M aet t&®if association s^.-a separat® e#©ao«l® 
«atity| sa as8©#latioa or aggregate is faiiftion-
lag as 6 tetEoh or pert of associetfi eeonoat® 
miiltfi I® tfeet *#sp#at it la parftotly ia«mtios3. 
witii Iks iftfaftassts or brandies of slngl® 
%mmmie mlta** 
Brofeasor loliotMa lias also Mm m lesdiag #aatribmtor . 
to • 4«'r®l0|!®eat of tb® ttooretioml ooacept of tte® ecoEomi© 
iiatttr# of til® @©@p«eti-r« ass©'©lfttto»« ©f iobotte"*® 
pmfe3.iih«t e©atribmtioa.s, «faieli mfmtmB.tQXf A© mot rw®®! 
tb® full extmt of Ms iaflmeme:®,' t» erti^ lti ar® for«mo«t« 
, 8 
fbea# are L^tgs^ itoaoai® Bt^ lleatieas ©f C®op®rsti.om**' sai 
»*A fIi«or|- of Cooperation^ , . loMtfee ba® poiattt m% th® 
ii^ ortsae®. 'Of t,li® fast tfeat t&e teoaoml® aetlTltl«« of tfe® 
®©©l>»ratiT« ar«, lat^ Egattt vith tfc© imitfltml ftetlTltits of 
til® partldlpaats: 
Ifery trm® eooperatl?® represents an effort 
Ott tk® part of two or more autonomous units jointly 
to eofttttUt, coordlnately I'dth each other» given 
©peratlomi •sseatial to th® economic activity of 
aamber mnlts. It is the aTowed purpose of tru® 
oooperators not to impose a business enterprise 1» 
th® uBual sense between tharaselTOS ant th® narket, 
la t leehaioal eoonomio sense, this ©an only m®aa 
that it is tkeis? purpose to funotion in their oma 
capaeiti®® as sovereign units, that i», to perfoaai 
designated fuuetioas or services as iate^atei with 
their individual economi® fursuits.* 
Hhm.t W* 849, 
%ohotk®. iego^ ieono*!.®# « » » 
%ohotte* A Theory# « . . 
%ob@tlEa# I»9go*l0oao«i®» • • • p# 5SS# 
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lobotka Ms also ©oaitrlfemttt ambstaatialiy tonard %b© elari-
fieatlom of the #06a®®ie natmrs of tb® ttw.3.%l»lat®i'6l relatiQU-
stoipa existing among tli# pastlelpnting units la a eooptratlv®, 
and Mb poiatM ©tit ttet, ''*'&& ©uoperatlT® orgasisatioa con­
sists ©f tb® @m ©f tto 3*©latl©asklps efti airaagemsnts «stab» 
lisli@a fflioBg, moftteej? ttalts ia ortsr to -iffeetuate th©ir piir* 
X 
Wesntjf, Hlrs$ii Has. *4® « smbstantial eomtjrifeuti©a towayi 
teflaiEg til® o^ sditieas of optlaia o«tpmt m& prie®' a®t®rffilaa-
tioa wafl«r wlileli a •feftioalXy iat@gi»at®i fir®, amh. as on® 
parti.clpatl»g la, & ®o©p€»atlfe afsoalatloa., will ffiaxlialE® its 
profits uaiiiaf .®tatl© eonditioas. Hii'aeh s^ majriaai his 
aaalysis toy ©ayiagi 
. ltgairil«ss of %h» mw^ m of l®f@la t© toe 
iat#gpsttd| w# foaad t&at this wjwia l»® aehievti 
at a v©l«a« {Qj w^ lsli woml.i tfuat.e tli® ffla3?iisal 
iermm of th# 1®t®1 slost-st to t&# ultimat© ©on-
»\m&T »ltte %he msirglaal oost of tht l®v@l farth#st 
r«®ov@.4 imm fe.ia» flie pi?let would h% dtterralned 
at this ©mtput oa th,® eoxytspoaaiag iftmad funo-
tl©.m.. T«t w« feuat also that we womlt have to 
adjust til® atyglaal e©@t fun.©tloB wMch Is farthest 
r®ao?ti from th© consuatf If Maaillag ekaiges «®r® 
payeblt to out a Id era fiM/©r w®|© funstlonally 
telat®4 to tfae volum® Masfildd#® 
By building .©a tlis eeatrlMtioai of th®m ®«n, ani on th® 
ooat«p©i?iiiff teoaoalt theory of tte flw, tli® attempt hem has 
hmu to d«T#l©p a realistie, workable, aiad reasonably complete 
I^bit. 
M 
Hirsch* ©p.. elt.., p» 101, 
• 31# •• 
tbteyr of th» mtmw ef ffet 0@©f@3?.ativ® e.ss®©iatieii. 
mis fwmsmrk Imwltm teeaemie 
©f til# .0©0]p@afatl.f@ a«®d<@tatl©ji, tk« 9mmomi^  t«Xatloa.»lilpt 
•@a®mg tM parttotp^ tiag' malti, #»i tkt ©eaailteai necssfarr 
feu uati^ mai ©tomeals te«liaTi©jr ta tto« §mpsmH»g flma. 
fto.9 I'oia.tlj %«!'.&%«# fiftBt 
Wli«ii a ipr©uf ©f iailTliti#!^  fli?M fom a ®©op«»allv« as* 
soelatioa tfa«y slapiy agwt t© mp a flamt aat' 
©ptratd ,11 as as part @f »a©k ©f t^ elr 
laai-rldual firas |#i? 1» tk9 ms0 ©f a namwrns 
1 
fk« s#op«y©tiT« mo mwm mmm%& life or 
ptWf©s# af®tt fif©a tMat «f lit pa3?«iit ,»©»%,#? fl»« • tliaa ©a.® 
©f th& iaSlTldwal plsatf ©f a leyg® mnlti»pXm% flm» 1% 1» 
t«©toi«ily mmmt ©f tfe® flant aaA of 
#©0ii«,?atfiag f|3?wi» Mt s©-t ©f tto» e®©f®ratl?® fim# 
As aa «e0a«iii,# tli« aseoeiatlos 
Is mt m nf persoat, «It lis? m laborers, a« 
oapital mmwihvLtmm-t m m patseas, fur tl&t t% 1» 
m as -i^ liaaoff sat liolM p©iat oat, 
3 
of ioirt.»«.lga tooaoait aaili»*-fims m teast&oMi. Saylag 
d^f,. Wmmm, Ltgal Btmtm* . « . p» Ifl# aad loteotlea. 
L@go-"l0oao»l®,. # 
t®m »ft3»'*''a»®i leip« aad ©ls«ii^ #2r#.will %•« aai#r-
.tt©o4 to mmm fim. ®i? teowdfeoli., siac© strmetmyallf, ®©op«r®-
tlT#« of flfwi amt ©®©p«fmtiir«s of lioua«fe©Ms m@ Mmtiml* 
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©aek of th® mtatoes firms, m& %ha aarginal pr©'to©ti¥lty of 
%hQ last tellef ii ©fasti la mmj us® wlthta mch fim* 
fli# 0oopttati¥« a^ tivitjr i® m. m&mmln pleat operatti 
Jolatli- as a pest ^ f s#*eral fimst fh® eeeperatlf® agso-
glatlon ©oBslst# of %m »«a of t&e aulti-leteral epreeaeats 
emoag tto© fl,3?«s partlolpatli^ , la oi-ter that %Um9 flmt mj 
fmetloa' eoeraiaately ttosmgH tltlr •©<»©» plant, a© 
0©op@retlTe m ©ttsh liit® m ftstiepf®a®ttriai' malti its 
units mah tisT® their •eatr«pJ@B«titr. AltMow# «aeii. ratslBs 
its ladiTlimal mmmi^ nty, all flms ar® »or@ than 
1 
•^ dggregat®^ '* wltto vmp&Qt to t&elr jelnt plant—they ay® 
aasooiat.si hj «ilti--'lfttft3?al tg?««»at la a mthm d®fi»it® 
aaimtr. fhty are not a,®£'g«4 hmm&T* 1x6®pt for tJaeir Joint 
«p«ratloa of tfe® ®©©p«ratiT« plant, tb»y ®i# maa«s©'etatet 
and mii®o©i?dlnat#i, fiia«ti©nlng entlttly lii4tp#Bt®ntly of ©n® 
aaotliti?. 
With tespaet to tfat soertlMt®*! «<ioa©ale eetlTity, moh 
partieipating m&m% saorlfte® b^ mb of fell "ruggei 
Infiividttfilisa'* ami ugsm to Iteomt on# ©f m @Q©no»ie 
%mm* 1® smit smfenit to t®aa, dteliion, ©s d«ttminti by th@ 
majority of the latlflimal »@ab«ts of tha t.©am, &mn tbongfe 
tlieaa i«©lsl©n« may s^ attiwf 0.0aflio.t wltfe M B  indivitmal 
Z  
Intai-ests* Ht mmt sabialt to p©ol@d ma©@rtaliit4ts end pooloi 
%©® la®lian©ff. ©p# ©It. 
%1» firm will wltMf&w fro®' partlelpatlea In til® Joint 
aetl'Vlty if tiiis ©oaflitt oamse^  pa.a?ti-©l|satl©a to hm leas 
©conomiii than ills lest alt«rnati¥#» 
53, f • 
QOsts-» r«ga3Pil«it of hie owa positioa. If tM iaaivliwal 
iat©ftits of %lm partletpatiag fims differ rmf lamoh., their 
©p«r«tioa ©f a plaat JointXj will. ma(i0©iioffile» b-tsaue® tli® 
®so».0al«s of italt ia tb# flaat will toe aot# tb&a offset Isif 
isdi¥l<itial dlfft-rtat®# moM fims. ©le o©op«ratiT® 
fims, however, iserifig# m wlnttsoever with 
i?#8f®et to theif IMiTitoal ©peyations outalt® tk® 
plaat* ft® imiiiriimal. sratrtpremttirs mmf ©oaplet® t^spom-
silJllitj aa^  fuBetiOB ©atlj?«i|- apart from the otli#3f® witb 
r#fp«at to amk oy^ ratioaa, ©©ssiderlag %h% total op^ ratioa# 
of ®a0h of tlitir iate-grated fiyas aa an #eoiioaie uait. 13i® 
eooparattng enti-apsaaem^ s fts a, tsiaa have »o iaflwa®© oter 
til® a#tiviti®® ofm® iadivlimal partloipating fims outsite 
tM JoiBt piast« 
B. laletioasllf s aaoag Pertl^ ipattng FirM 
mtliaaoff ha# aitgrnatilr wrlttea, •"All ©oonomie relation­
ships of a®ab®f« witWa tiieit a.ggr0g8ts ar# toasti oa tli® ip-
revQoable priaoipl® of proportioaality of tliei? ©ooaomie paif-
tiaipatiott ia iiotiviti#a of lb® a,gg*«gat« ^ ©©p®3?ati-5'e7.« 
fli®s« 0@oaoffii.« y@latio»sliip8 esong meBber firms eriiiag fro» 
tlitiy Joint ©•f«3?atioii of a Q&mmn plaiit haT# to do witm (I) 
tfe® m& mai© of tto plamt, {g| tk« itoiiion saking • rtgartisg 
l^aeliaaoff, • op» ©it,, p. £8S» 
- MQ 
tk# plaat ani Its ©peratloas, (3) the flaansial rtspoaslbility 
for til® plaat, (4| tM fiSEti aad variatol® oosts of operating 
tlieir plant, |S| ttot ms®rtalaties ia ©oaatetioa wltb tbe 
plaat aaft Its operatioas, aat i&l tM ©eoaoBlo beaeftts 
(positIt® or aeg&tiw) wliieli otomr fro® operating tliis'Joiat 
plaat, 
ms ^ooop«rating firM ar© fe©#a with tifo questloaa coa-
eeraiai, ©aeli of thm® rtlatioaskips: |l| what spiififi© group 
is respoasi'fel# for saofef m& tB) feow art %h®f to b@ shared 
aaoag meml&tr® of t&e grompf 'ftois rtspoaaitol® group i0 obvi­
ously th® sm of tli« «atrtpr®aeurs of tk@ iadivitoal firms 
that ar« optratiag ti® plaat Joiatly# Ko otto.®r p'oup oaa t>« 
«xp®'et@d to us© til® plaat, to extreiae eoatrol oi?«r it, to 
asauB# ta# fiaaaeial rtspoasibility for it, to b@ar the eosts 
la eoaatitioa with it, to ©houlAtr the eoastqmsaoes ariaiag 
from ua0«rtalati«® la ooaadotioa with it, or to ptrtsk® of-
th® tooaoffii© b®a@fits of th« Joiat plaat. 
•fh® oaly tquitahl® way th® tatrepraaemrf of th# iadi-
¥iiual eooparatis^  fims oaa sliar® ia th®s« sooaoraio r«latioa« 
shipa if oa a profortloaal haais—a haais proportioael to th® 
us® which th® &l%® ©f ®aeli fira. dictates Its ®atr«preaeur 
1 
will aak® of th« Joiat plaat. this is the oaly way whioh 
"^ ©r® th® joiat plaat p®rf©r»s a limitsa fuaotioa 
ehuraiag aa€ mrketing hutttr) th® slae of th# pareat firms 
whieh detsrmia® the perceat®.g® of us® taeh 0atr«pr»a®ur will 
mal® of th® plaat «tll only to# that part ia taeh fira related 
iir@ctly to fuaetioas'of th® plaat pouads of huttorfat 
pr©iu©«d aa4 smppliei to th© joiat plaa^ . 
- 3S1 •* 
Will Mtmallf satiafaetery t© ail partloipatiag eatr®-
prtaeurs, totoamse ©•al«allci'<ii,ti©E ®f protoetif® ®^somrc«» 
among ©©©peratiag fiaa 'Will '•rtsmlt froa skartog them oa anj 
toaal,®, fhM mtfliets ©f shaiflag all %lit other ®®©Bomie 
r®Iatl©asMp» a»oiig' tli® ooopeiratti^  flms is therefor® 
sp#0lfl«4 a#sw€inf to tfa® prsportloMt® us© {p&tmmg®} 
&f tto« Joiat plant aat® hf m§h* 
tu a departiwat ©©©ftratlT® for a given ©per at lag 
p«ri©a,' tli« pr0|>©rtiea@l!@ m@ »aid of th@ eooptrativ# by tli® 
®ntr@pr«a@i» of «®eto p&rtlelpattag fira will^ i la othtr wor€», 
d@teriiia« the mj will 8Mar« %M eentrol |votlmg|,, the 
uaeertalBtj bearing, tb® tests, tM® flaam©lal rsspoBslbillty, 
aad tilt, ©eomoml© fetaeflts Imidmnt t© ©r arislEg fp©m 
J.olat plaat. . fkaref^ r#, froa tit staMpelat of teoaoBle 
strtt0tmre, ?©tlag la tta« cooperative assotletloa fill not 
fe@.4efa® on a pet flra Cese-aan 0a««vot«) feasl® bmt oa a mse 
Cpatroaag®! tea sis | all 00s t® la.cludlag sosts of risks will 
fee ajiartd ©a a mm •feaslii tto uao«rtaliit|' l»@«rlag will aot 
ba sbarftt gu ® per flra baslt bmt m a »s« baslsi flaaaolal 
respoaslMllty ettfe®r' previaiag th# aetaal eapltal or 
paylag tto@ iat«r#st aai provldlag tlit seearity rtqalrtd t© 
obtaia It)'will be iAar@4 on. a as« basls| aai the eooaomlQ 
beasflts, If aaf> will, b® sbartd oa a aa» basis. 
\ 
Glv#a p®rf#<it ka©wle4ge «t ©#rtalaty, tb« ral® of pro­
portionality la til® s&arlag ©f tb« eeeaoaie rtlatloasblpa 
aaeag tli# eooperatlag firms als© applits over tlma aad 
- SEE * 
%®%mm «l©partm@sts» tFiiiti* ties® assuapti^ ms, %M tims 
J©latXj operatlBg tasl departBtta'! will pastielpat® la ail 
•©0©a©®io relatioBShipa ffoporti©aal to as® of that 
40p.a3?t»@at, ^ lastlitmef# all rtlatloaships arislag from 
thie ©p@fati©n of Ik® Jotnt plaat' th&t aus soiiaoa to s®T@ral 
a®psrta.tati. will b® sMrtd hj tl® greafs ef t%vm» partioi-
patiag ia m&h of tfe« 4®fartaiats mm@Tm€ m a liasis pro-
port loaal to tta# f3?a®-|loa total ©patatiea of th® Joiat 
plaat rep3?®B«Bt«i toy @a0& Qt tfe®ir depcr'taitats# Costs, aa« 
e«rtaiatits.j fiasaaial rispoasibilitifs., «id fiteisioa® 
sp®0ifi@ to a givta i©par't»eat will fe@ of a©ae®ra oaly to 
tli® firms Joiatly ©p«atiag tlat i«pertia@at» 
Hiat atoout tha iaterfira relatioasbips OTer tim® whiok 
ari®0 from their partisipetioa ia th« Joiat actifitj? A 
giirea proportieaal aliariag of th® Joiat plaat '{Buch as that 
showa ia ligar® 1) for ©a® opsratiBg p«rio4 will aot mm&* 
sarily hoM foi? ot,&#r tiat fsrl©it» proportioa^ lity mast 
tb©r®for« he naiataiael betweea tk© gromps of pertieipatiag 
firs® ia «a0,li operatiag pdriot m w&ll as witfaia ©aeb smh 
groap# 111 r®latioasliipi wMah - #xt@aa otw tim® will to# 
sbareA a»oag tiit gioaps of firms op«ratiag tMJoiat plaat 
ia emh perioH oa ft %a«ia proportioaal t© %M relative siz® 
of th« plaat ia ©atb'periO'fi. Islatioasliipe wklcb «re 
F^rovid'td the relatioasMp® aff«et' Qmh. op@ratiag period 
©a a hmiM propertioaal to tfae .size ©f th® plaat operatioa ia 
®aeli, ptr iod. 
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«p©0lfle to a gif«a ©ftaratlag pti-ioi will b® participated ia 
oaly %y tl@ gromp ©f• firms sbasiag ia tlie Joiat autivity 
durlHg this |j«fi©i, Iiite3?1;«ffif©ral ani liiterd®partB©atel, 
 ^rslatiensliip# ar# hj tlie gr©mijs of psrtioiptting fima 
involved. 'Tlmf share tli#si r#latioasliips proportionately, 
botto witliln and b#tw®«ii tk® p«i?tioipatiag gyotips* Belatioa-
ships sptoifi^ © &» t© tiMt aad itpartsent will be sfearefi only 
tef til# group of partieipatii^ , firas 
. tlai«r Qoiiaitieiii of maotrtaiati' mi. iap@rf@®t kiiowX«dg®, 
proportioMliti- is also t3i« %a-als upem whiefe the fima par­
ti oipatiag .in a J0i»t plftBt sMm the salti-laterel «eoa©ai.©. 
rtlatiQaslilps, iaelmdiag those wbieli ar# ittt«ri©ptrtm«atal 
aii4 iat@,r temporal. low«fer, it is plennet pro port ienality 
• rather ttoaa aetttal r«a.li2®4 .proportionality tliat gaites t&® 
p©rtioipati»g firms mitr tli@®@ eoaiitions. It may also to® 
•»ooa®»l© te p©ol r«lati6a®blts w&i©^  ^mm speeific t© a gif«.ii 
departmeat ©r tIm® t®rioi im ori®r to redmo® tli© @xpeet«4 
iispsrsioa aroanS th® s©®t pro'feabl® antieipat«a values of 
rel#vaat variables feting ©a®! partiaipatiag ©mtre,pr®nswr. 
How far tiity will go ia tliis iirtetioa a#p«Ms mpoa tim 
aatioip#t#;d-= iiiif«rtaiati«s, tlie ©xpeetei r®ttt©ti©ii in tJiis 
ii8p@r®i©m t>y laterd®patta#at®l intertemporal pooliag, 
%hm p0r®@atags of owB«d ©qmity is tfe® pertloipatiag fima, 
and tlie iMiffireae® towari relative eertainty aa^  relatiir® 
tffieleoey ©f tM© aaj©rity of th@ partitipatiag ©atreprenetirs. 
To the ©xteat tfeat spetifie relationships ar# pool®^ , tley 
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alt© will 8latr«4 taoag tli® groups of partielpating. firms 
iaT©lv04 on th« 1aa®l« of aatieifttcd proportioaelity, 
Q'». F&Tt I Qip&t i&g •F^m IPmtit rnxlmimatim 
feXXowlBg tlie stati© assiMptioag, tli« ooopsret-
ing firms lo/dlviimlly stek to maxiais© their profits, eoa-
sideriag tlie fart of tk#ir operstions ia tlie Jointli^  ©p@rat®d 
pXaat as w«l.X a§ their iniifiimal opsratioas omtiid® of it. 
Two 0©aditioa0 ar® mmsgarf in order to aGe©iiplish this 
©bjeotlT©. la the first plaet @a.(sh partiolpatlEg firm mtist 
h« in prodw«tioa tfttilibrim, SteoEttf tht joiat plant mat 
he of optiam six®# Although th«.s® tw© criteria are relttefi, 
it is posaihl# to satlsfr «ither oa# withetit satisfjiug th® 
oth@r, Tli# profits of th® partisipatiag firms are not at 
thiir ahsolut® aaxla«a iinleas feoth ar« B@t.-
fhe mmsB&Tj @t«illbriw eoaiitions are the aaat as 
thos© for aay fira* Tk& ht®t ©offlbiaatl©a ©f ©utpmts will be 
pr©4ue«<l at the i®aat o®st soahinatiea whan tht ratio ©f th® 
aarginai «xpaa4itttr# to th# aergiaal revmue proittQtivity ta 
©quel f©r all impat® ia the protuotieii ©f all outputs withia 
th® firm, fh® ©pti®yw firm aim® will l« dsfiaed at th® point 
whicsh iitmat@.s the nargiaal ^ 'awam® with tha marginal- oost of 
•aeh pr-odmet produe^ t and for all prMm#ta takta together. 
*a@s® eeii4iti©as tegsther ataa that th® nargiaal v®rmm 
prodttotiTitj Bmst «-%m©l th® aargiaal ©xptndiitur© for each 
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imptit in, all ©Ittmativ# nasi within the fim» 
partioipatiag flras ar@ ofdiaarily Ttrtioally 
int®grat#<l In th® ®«as« that th® ©tttput of tb« JoiBt plaat 
is tbt yaw preimst Input of the iniifiiual piamis of the 
partieipatlag firms,, m alt#i?»ativ©lf th© outpmt of th« 
IMi-riiual plaat.a of tli# partlolpstiag firms is th® raw prod-
1 
uet-lnpQt of thtf loist plaat. As pr©itt©ts mwe fro®, one 
plaat to aaotli©? im % mttimllf iat«grat®.i, firm, their 
ownership a©«« a©t thau®© a.a4 no pri©® is ©atablished for 
them. Sueh a fira ii aot iatsrettsd la th« profltahility 
of any oa® of its plants considered aloa®, tmt rather la. 
th@ profltgbillty of th® ©oaplet® ehain of inte^ &tm^  plaats 
operatlBg m t mit# optl»«« ©•uttpmt is €®t©rmia®€ oa 
th# basis of th® to»fl«t« op«ratl©a aai, if m@as.t»®€ ia 
eoaparahl# units, will h® th@ »aa« for aaeh of the plaats. 
a# «rtleaily iat«grat»4 fi» iftetermlBes this optimm •omt-
pmt by ©fmatiag thsi am of th® »ergiaal oost fmaettoai la 
all plaats with th® aargiaal r®v«am© la th® fiael plaat torn 
g 
which th» prodmet is »ark«t®t» fha ©ooptratiag fir® tqaates 
Hh« «xa®ptlo.tt l8 th© plaat operated Jointly hy two or 
Bor® firms to proemr® tpeolfl© eapltal resoarees, taeh as 
farm aaohiaary for afrltultural firms, la this east ©aeh 
partlelpatlag' ®atr«prsa«ur will eqaat© the jaergiaal oost la 
th« o^lat plaat with tht aarglaal Tmmnm profiaetlTlty of 
th® r®sourt® la hla lailfltual plaat. Smeh partlolpatlag 
firms art also lategrat@4 la th® seas® that s@ir®ral sta.f®s 
la th# pro.da©tioa fr©@«.s8 m® brom^ t iiat®r oat @atr«pr®a®aiM. 
eoatrol, fh® mor® aetrow Aefiaitloa of vsrtleal lategratloa 
u@©4 la th@ tmt is mmamtf, howtwr, for aaalytlcal purpoB©!. 
®Cf. Hlrsth. op# ®lt. -p. 9f*144.. 
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•fen® sum ©f %h& eOifiE Its iadlTltttal plaat ©r 
plaats aM mwglmX mn.% ia tlm |ciiat plamt witb tli« 
aa^gtaal mtmrn^  tmm wli«te#"r®i? ©f Iw© tk# pretu^t i.® 
mark«t®i* 
fjm ©f tli@ Ba^ giaal o©®t fiwstlOB ia 
ttot piaal to fStftistpatiMg i# t&at 
btglimiiif wltli tiif. «m @f %h« #fa,lXllirtwi of all 
partiuipatijig mthm tfeaa at »«r© 
mefe ismst eeasiisi? %M «iditl©nal mB%» in %%& 
Jotat'fltat tiimltiag twm Mi velisw# &t Tli® py#* 
Qim ©f mj #»# pa^tidipatiag ttxm ««aB©% 
fe® rnaltti tb« ttmiliferlm ©mtp-mt f©? ail ©titer# 
is glTta., %mma& %h%» intmwmttm t&® ®»®% 
of th@ aarglaal mmt fm$t%m mhi&% %* t#l«irtat &mmt 
1 
fdts&i a«3.att#n 0# tli« ©jttrea ©mtpat fm m&k 
farti@lfa1fi-af. flm ta€ tl® jeimt plaat, gtwm tli« ai»fe®r ©f 
pattietpatimg i« f©#«iW» %f Bimltmmm 
mlf* If tlt« ©m,tpmt fiFeim©"! of pattlsifatiBf firas is 
a®3?,fc«t«i frea plaat,! ®v«iffttolag mim km hmu 
aald n%mt tii.« if#l,®¥ant of %M J©tmt plam* aargisal 
m9t ®wv« to «8di film i« tfii» of tM r«Jl«iraat ifaag# 
of til# metgimitl ©iifr«. 
%hit i» mot ttme tf tfa« ai«gimal ®©st- ftt»etioB la. 
hotimmtml omw tfe® t®l«TaBt mmm-* 
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As Id® fsoiB Tariatioai due to tli® 8tjwstm«iat to optiaw 
output in aaeli flta, tM sise of th@ Joimt,plant is tattr-
ffiiaad by th© ouatoey aai iiz« of tfet partioipatlag firms. 
Asid® froa mf #xp®et®4 opportuaity to iafluaae# th.® r@l®Yaat 
aarkfit®, the teeaoffiie motiTatioa for eo®p#rati©H aaong soi^ -. 
trsiga, firms is a 4®tr#asiag long rua &mmg& Qont eurir® OTer 
a 0onsit«rabl# fang# tm a part of t&® total eeonoaie fmo-
1 
tioa, m eoat«Biflfitet fm#tioa|. of tM sef«r®l firms. Bjr 
pooling th>ls pert of tbtir setlTitits aafl fua^tioaiag GO-
oriiaattly tteoagH a toimoa plaat, tity sr® abi®,» undtr tli#®@ 
ooniitiOB®,.to ia^ tsafit tfe«ir teoaoai© effifitaey by approaeb* 
ing more a«arlj opti»m ti2« for t&is: optratioa. One® several 
fims agree to s#t up aad op®r®t« a plaat Joiatly, they ar® 
iat«r«st®4 in ©btaiaiag' tli« tizt la ttosiif, Jelat plaat wfeieh 
will mBxlmlm pl&at ®ffitieaey aai aak® the gr@atest potsibl® 
©oatributioa, to tM profits of ea«fe partleipatiag firm. Wli®a 
th® optimua aim for thi Joint plaat km bata €©t#niia«i, 
aijustm#at to tliii opt law is »ai® mm th® loag rua by vary-
iag the aimber ©f partl@ipatlag fir»®. flaat sijsa is r«auo®i 
by failurt to r#plt®® flm® that jcatir© fro® partlelpatioa 
aa4 «xpsat«t by ea@ouragia« a«w firms to partlolpat®. 
How la th® optl»im aist for th® o^lat plsat iet@rmia«i? 
fM Jolat plaat will b® of optlaum ais© vhm tli® averag® a«t 
f^aitr tyaaal® asaumpti©as| tlie opportuaity to pool ua-
o«rt8lati®B is a ttetivatiag fore#.* This is iisoussed la 
@@©tioa D b@lew» 
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mtuitn tmm %M plaat Is at s, saxtmm beeaus® tii® greatest 
oo^ ntributlea of %M plaat t© the profit of mmh partieipatiog 
firm, rtgat41®a# <»t tl® sii® ©f tb® firm, wiil be at tMs 
X 
poiat* til® output of  t k9  joiat plaat is mv predutt 
oy sp«0ifio i-aso^ suret iayit tm tb® iaaifidml plaats of th@ 
partioipatisg,firms, eptiama sia® ia the ^ oiat plant is 
isfined by tk# ni&immt poiat ia flu# long rm mrmm^  eost 
funstioB i» tto 4#iat pl«at* This eost funetioa iiieliid©s 
betli tH® 0©st® of faetor iaprnti sat tk# e©sts of tii® rmw 
profilet inpwt« aai is eoapajrabl# to tk® 3?uii awra^  
eest fmetiea la m iaiifiimsl fim parfomiag tiia saa® 
fuMtiett ai tbat pei-fcsraei im-tM# joiwt plant* Sia©# the 
partiaifsting fiiss ©p#»att tli.« Joiat plaat to imfply %M%x 
iEdiTidml plaats m& tUemfom fam ao mvmm& fmnotioa from 
tli@ir.Joint plsat,, &pUmm fXamt sis® wiii not h& tk@ sam® m 
th® optimum sis# for «w©&. m ia-difitoal fim.,. kowsmr, ttiil®as 
tfe® 4®»tad 0iirir« fm ©mtftit fasiag th® fim is perfectly ®JLat» 
tie.' 
th® otjtput of the iadiTiimai pleats of tte® partiei-
patiog firaa is tU& mw prodmft impit of tMe Joiat pXant, tii® 
optimum sia« for tb® |oiat plaat is definei at tli© output 
wkiofe aaximlss«s tlit '^ srtieal distaae® b®tw«»a tfe® loag rmn 
aT®rag« mv^ am ®«r*r® and tbs^ loag run awrag® ©est 0uTt® ia 
c^f.'PMii'ip®.. m* ©it«» p* 
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the Joint \plaiit, fht pleEt loag xm a¥«rage eost fimetloa 
in this msm is att of the $©st of w&w protuot inputs, 
pli©a ffOffi tfcia iaai¥l4tt0l plasts of %h® parti©lpati,iig firms. 
Again tie ©pt,i*m for tb# Joint plant will sot n®©ti-
sarilf'te® et th® aaat ©mtpuit at t^ # ©ptimaa size for aa 
lnd®p«Bte,at firm la tfa® iaa« tBVlroaaeEt miess ^ %M a«in®iii 
eyrf# for omtpmt and slso tto smpplf emrvt for t&e raw 
prodmet iaput for tlit fira are p®rfe0tlj ©laatia. 
If tlie pmittotioa ®arriei -on. fey tib# partioipatiag firms 
aak@s it «'e0aoEi0 aai tli® long rum p@r mnit Joint aost 
teersasss witli wlwm® la tht Joint plasty t&a participatiag 
firms will all mmxiaiEt tli«,ir prof its toy eMlag i@partii«iBt» 
tm tb® Joiiit plaat, ®a®& of 'optimm .sl8«, 'tiiitil. a slz® I® 
r@a©lifi4 wliiel »iaimi»®® tl« l©mg rua per malt Joint cost. 
ftoi® fi®t@raii»atloii of tM ©ptl«w siz# ia tfet Jeint plaat l« 
distlnet fr©a th,e iettrslnatioa ©f the optiiR» stm for ®aeb 
psrtiQlpatlag fira#, ©ptiam Joint plaat atm i® achieved by 
varying t,h«i uwahm et partieipatiag flms, mch of optiaum 
siz®. Both ©ptiami ,aust h# rtaehei if th<a profit® of taeh 
partioipatlag ,fira ar® to b« an ahsolmt® asxiauia. 
»# ByEattlQ 0©a»id®ratlo»» 
laier SyBamia ooatitioai the partloipetlag firm i® iater-
@,st0cL aot ©aly in the maximm expeettd ilsoomatei valu® of 
th« profit itreaii, but also is the minima ©sEpeotei "rari&tioii 
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In this itream otm tlm®. Foi', saeh ©ntrtprsatmr in any 
given planning psrioi.,- tli©r« QOWLmim^ Xj must Ha. soae 
optimum balano® ls#tTO®a th«s® -two ote^ eetiirea, Th» aeeesaary 
oonditions for t.li® aaxiam diseoaatiA exp@©t«4 profit .streaa 
for tii® fimz-iS' any periet siallar to tlio®«-uaier static . 
ooniitlons. ' fh@ firs will •protue# tb« lest eombiaatioa of 
oatputs at th® least- eost @omMa®tiGn when th© rati© of the 
dia©ounte.€ ®x:peot-«-i;'«iargia©l sxpesaitar® to th# 4i-s0©unt®d 
expected mrgiaal r®T®aa® proamc>-ti?it-y Is equal for all ia-
1 
puts ia all. alternatlT® ust,® within th® firm. fhe optiaaa 
plamtd output in 'ta-eh period it ief iaei ^-hj th© iat®rs®otloa 
of the expeettd discouat#ia .marginal eost eurT'e'ani'the 
©xpeettd. dis©ouat#.i atrgiaal reTeau® fuaotioa-.. fhe suffioieat 
ooaiit-ioas mus-t pro¥id® that anytlm® th®- firm is throwa out 
of «quilihrlua, ad-^ ustit€.ats to again m»#t the aeoe'siary 0o,ndi-
g 
tioas will earns® o.©af@rs-loa to the #ffiel@a©y ©quiliferiim-. 
Provided the MS and functions are so defined as to 
include interteBiporal relationships. The same input or out­
put in different time periods is considered as seperat# in­
puts and outputs* The anticipations are adjusted for uaesr-
tainty premiums and discounts. Cf. the follo^ iingj 
Hick®. ©p-».0it,, p.. 19E-280, 
Carlsoa*'. op'^ .' cit., p. 103-lgf. 
Lange. Prief flexibility. , . • op. cit.., p. gO-44. 
lart.. op-, ©it. 
a^auelsoa#. Foundations. ... op*- oit.., p. S5?-349. 
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la to ho la sqailibrlua under the ©b^ t^otiv© of 
aaxiaaiiB stabtlltj of th# profit str®®B over time, tiit partioi-
patiag fira aiiit allocate rtsO'tir©®® ami pXam profimotioa so 
that tM ®xp®0t«i aarglaal gala ia stabilitir ov@r tiw is 
©q-aal to th« «xp®etea aatgiaal eost of tke orgaaisatioa for 
stalilllt|f. Til® ratio of t'li® #igp®©t®4 sargiaal gaia in 
•dtabiiity to tfe,« @xp©@t®4 sargimal e^ »Mit«re of organissing 
for .stability amtt b« #tttal for all aetbois asei by the fira 
to aehievt profit stability ©v#r ti®@* fkla dQttllibrim ffiwat 
also b# stable in tli© seas® tliat if tba fira is thrown oat of 
©quilibrim, aAJmstaaiitS' to'agaia m©#t th® aeoessary coati-
tioa® will eattst eoaversioa to th® stability ©qtillibrim. 
Oiven th« protmotioa plaa wMeh naEiaiz#® th® diseomt®4 
value of th« ®x#®©t#t itreaa of profits ami th« frodmetioa 
plaa will eh miaimi|s«s the «xp«et«!d asporaioa aromni th« most 
probable profits ov®r tim® for a pertisipating firm, the task 
is resolvefi iato the s@l®etioa of th® btst oompromise po®itioa 
b®tws«a th® two* Hi# loeation of.this eoaproMis# positioa 
for a givea fira irill ieptad upon tht n®ohai«al** relatioa-
ship b«tw#ea that® t»o ob|@otiv#s aai the iatiff»r«ae« aap of 
th® eatrepr«a®mr i«fi,aiag th« relative iaportaae® of th® two 
obj«etiv@s to hia. If both th# ttohaioal rtlatioaihip sad 
th® iadiff#r«ao« laap ar® to b© 4@flnite eai el®arly 
defiaed aad without disooatlaw!ties, a maiq,m® optimtam positioa 
will b.« a®aerib«a by th# poiat of taageaty of th® teehaical 
relatioaship faaotioa aai aa ia4iff«r®a©« eurve betw«ea th®s® 
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two obj0oti"r«8, Th® onlf ratloaal segaent of the ttoMieal 
rslatioaship fanetioa, is that pai't vhem th® two ofe^ setives 
ar® eoapetltlvt, b®®aiis@ this eatr#pr#a#iir eaa improT# hia 
position, fef aoTiag iato this raag® r®g®rdl®ss ©f th# slop# 
aad shape of his iadiff©r©ae© ©mrfts toward th® two, 
fhs conditions for optiiwia efficleaef ia the firis par­
ti cipatiag In a Joiat plant poiated omt ia the prtvious ' 
sectiom are applieahle mier ifnamie oontitions if aisoottated 
aBtiolpat«4 Tariables, iaelttdiag ailowaaeta for maeertainties, 
ar@ stthstittttti' for gi*r#a on«s» and, if lmt©rt®siporal rela-
tioashipa h«twe«a farietslsa ara proTidtA, for. ihat aho\it th® 
ooiiditioas for optisas stateilitf in the partieipating fira? 
first of all, as loag as it is ©eoBomle, th® aatiolpated ooa-
fliot of iat«r©st aaojig part ieipst lag ftatreprsneurs mmst he 
aiaimizetd. fhis.ataai an assoeiatiea of roasoaabl® homoge-
aaoms rather thaa h@t«r©g@aeo\is partieipating fims, Speci-
fioation of th« ioafiitioas of partioipatioa la th® artieles 
and hjlaws of th® assooiatloa will also help to miaiaiz# this 
aatlelpat®a oonfliot of iaterest. It will also earns® #aeh 
@atr@pr«B«mr to feet less maecrtaiatjr as to th« 'eoatiamtd 
partioipatioa of the other firms. 
Seooaily, asti® froa this iiacertaint^  aa to the ©ttitttdes 
aad aotions of th® oth©r ®atrepre»«ars, partloipatioa ia th# 
joiat aetivltf ia itstlf t®a4s to r«too« %M aati©lpat«4 
variahllitr of th® profit® of @aoh firm or&x tia®. Vertical 
iat@gratioa, hf T%^ mlm amher of markets of eoaoera to 
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thte p'Siftioipatlag makes th® pi-oftts of bis fim 
mom stafel« aatei? tlmtmtt.m m&xkmt ooadltleiia, Aifo becams® 
of tk® i#gy«« ©f eoorilnatlom of thm Tarious proQ®ss®»,, 
til® T@rtl©silf isttg^ ated o-peratioa will orilBaflly b© mor® 
aaaptalsle to ©laagtii® ttefcaieal aai eaoaealc ©©aiitloas faelug 
tli.9 firm, fb# partitlpatlmg firas aef gaia fttrttisr stability 
by iiverslfytag Ii0r4s©atail,y aa«l Itterally botb la tfa@ Joist 
plant and in tb«ir iMifiteal plaats. Where tfetr© are 
s©¥«ral 4@partM®st» la tb@ Joiat'plaat, all ot whieh ar® int®-
gratifd with, tb« imdifidml a©tivitt®fl of th® partieipatiag 
firms, aRtloipat#€ itstoility is usuftlly graat^ r than womld 
©therwis® b« tto« ©as®. This isf partiotiXarly trm® wher® oom-
t©r-oy®lie flmetmatloms ar« #xp©et«i aaosg the aetivitieB anfi 
outputs of tilt p®fti®lpating fir»s. fh« opportmity t© pool 
ma^ erteiaties withia tH® gromp ©f partislpatia® ®atrepr®:a@iira 
is aitotl«r Boutm of iaer«astS-antl0ipata4 stability ot prof­
its ©v«r time t© ®a®k firm* It will often fe® teoaaaie, b«e®ui» 
of tb® gaitt ia aiit4eiptt«4 «tability, to pool msartaiatie# of 
tbe Joint plaat ©p#r6ti©a whieli ar« spteifie to'a giwa i®-
partmtat or tia® p®ri©4' bet*®#a i«partaents ast over ti*e. 
All suoli tmm&sem ia tte aatialpat#i stability of profit® 
t© t&© partioipatiag. firas orm tia® result cilreetly from th® 
faot that tliey toi&f®. earriei m% "©oaeerteA iategratioa*'. 
S^«® lobertacB, I3» The CoatroX ©f in&mtTy. Htir-
eoart, Brae® «Bt €©• l«w York. 1925« p. 4f. 
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Part ielpat ion ia tJi© joint plaat of tea T@&mm oap it el-
ret ioaiag aad otli@r aark®t li^ r^ftetioaa fsciug th© fir»., 
CoGsider eapital-retioaiag as aa ©xai^ l©» Fartieipatiag 
fim®. ere uemllf aible to ofetaia credit ea a group for tk© 
Joint actlfity ss smeh., ©vda tbomgii som© of them iadividually ' 
are WBwilliag Or mnable to obt»ia tlie mat of aay aor® oapitai. 
The atruotwre profides maohiaeri' vMmhj partioipatiag firas 
with a liigh. aiiriiiwl prodmotifity for eapit®! »ay borrow fro® 
thds« nitb a low ®arginal prodtt©ti¥ity for ©apital. Iir»s 
ar@ willing to feorrow mor# eapital fettoause they Jointly a©-
sm© tke anticipated addtd maeertaiatiss arisiag froa .the 
additioael borrowed ©apital aad ©xpaaded produottoa aotivitios. 
r:.h f ohiaf result of. %lm reduetioas i» e;aplta.l-ratioaiag aad 
other »arlc®t iBp@rfs#tieaa ia that th&j provid© for aa 
iaertase ia expected ©eoaoaio for ©aeii participat-
iag firm witlieat ® oorreapomdiag tsoreas® ia the ©xpeeted 
profit feriateility over ti»s, aad Tiet forsa. 
It Praotioel Ceasideratioas 
TH© o©a©«pt of til© basic ©ooaomie straeture of th® 
oooperatiT® assooietioa aad tke iattrfirm relatioasliips .re­
sulting from tfee joint owatrsliip aad operatioa of a coaiaoa 
plaat sMoald providt an importaat workiag teol to tli@ applied 
eeoaoaiat, th® eooperati"?® attorasy, tJi® oooperativ© aoootiat-
aat, tba praetioal ©ooperativ© leader, aad tb# law maker alite» 
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It should avoid the iasiaaouatabl® aiffi§ultl#s aad iaeoa. 
aiateii,oi©0 whleh ari«® when tli© o^operatlv® i» looked upoa 
as a firm &M its operatioa. stmdiei apart frco tl® ladividtial 
operation® of th# participatlag firms. Oaly a few examples 
are givta her© to illustrtt® the applieatlea of this basie 
©oaeept to prohl®»8 ot cooperative poliey. 
• What is th® legal struotur# for oooperatlT® assoeiatioas 
ooasistent with their hasio ©oonoaie aatur©? la th« Uait«a 
States aad ia waay othtr oowtri#® th©' ooop^ rfetiTs assooiatioa 
is legally a eorporatioa with eertaia apeoial provisioas to 
eoaform to th# "oooptratiT® priaeiplei'*. Ia soa# eouatrits, 
Hollaad aad th® SQaadiaaviaa ©ouatrl@a for exaaple, the coop­
erative is legally a partaerihip. leither of thase ai®qaat®ly 
rtoogaize th© basis tooaomie aatur© of the cooperativ®. fhe 
©ooperatiag firms shomM legally be allowtd to "assooiat®'*. 
fheir joiat activity shomld fe-# givea logal rteo®aitioa by 
providing "artlelts of associatioa** to th# pRrtioipatlag firms. 
Th« Joint plaat shomld legally b© reoogaised a® aa iategrated 
part of each participatlag firm# 
fhe artloles of assoclatloa should provide adjwst»®ats to 
differ«BOes ia tht aarglaal productivity of capital a»oag the 
partiolpatiag firms. fh®y should aak@ provisioa for th© joiat 
plaat to ooatiatie la operatloa as a bmsiatss anit ovsr time.,, 
as old partiolpatiag fims withdraw aad a®w oasa com® lato th« 
aasociatioa. fhey should aot provide th® corporate limited 
liability, bat should imk& ©aeh particlpetiag firs 
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propogtlonattly llabl® for o^int aotivity as a flm, Mt 
to th© ©xttat of its ©apltal allooat®d to the Joiat 
plant, laeh fira sliotild b« puoportioaately liable only, bow-
•ever, ]patb#r tbaii. be iniivldually liable for tb® entire Joiat 
activity as la a partaeriblp• 
A legal fo.m ©oaslstent wltb tbe ba®le eeoiioalo natMre 
of tb® eooperatlve aasoeistion muB% give reeogaitlon to tb® 
fact tbat separate eeoaomlo mits ©arry oa a part of tbeir 
total eooaomle aotivlties Jointly and eoordlaately ia a - 0O3®a^ » 
plant. It must provide for tbls essoelatei aatlvlty without 
divoroing it from the separate eetlvitlee of the participating 
flra®. It mttst provlie for equitable partloipatIon in all 
eoonomio relatlonsblps laeiientto the Joint activity by eeeh 
partielpetlag flr», and give eaob entrepreneur reason'to 
believe the other partielpetlag entreprenemrs will also par­
ticipate etmitably in the®© relationships. It mmst provide 
Independenee to eaeh participating entreprenemr relative to 
his IndivldMal activities whiob are vertleelly Integrated 
with the Jointly ooaduoted eoonomie aetivity. And finally 
it amst provide a framework liiloh enables the partlolpatlng 
entrepreaemra to operat® the Joint plant In their own best 
interests eonaiieriag the entire vertically integrated ae-
tlvlty of eaeh partlolpatlng firm. 
On the. basis of the econoalo nature of the oooperatlve 
association, what can be said abomt federal Income tax 
policies toward ©ooperatives? If tax policies levied on 
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btisiii@»g units wer© conslstentlir mai©, th@f wotald tax %%.» 
profit iaeom® of tht ®o©aoai0 flr» to tM firm, r«garil©ss 
of %h& legal aatwa of th,® flm. I&e tax wotili be l«Ti«d 
oa til® firm as a busiaesa uait, sM aay msmingn taxed to th® 
fim and dtstyibttt®.! to stoekkolAers or otbti? iadlTTltoals 
would not b0 taxed again in tfe® liands of th&am iniividuals. 
Only nadejf sueh an inooat tax policy can tb® inooa® of tfe® 
participating firms la a eooperativ® assoeiatlom be realis­
tically taxed. 
fo b® a©©nrat® and €onsist«nt, tto@ tax anst be levied 
against the partieipatimg fims indlTliually on tto« total 
net profits of eaoli, .So profit it uate in tlie Joint ao-tiirity 
aa 9mh any mor« than In any otlatr ®eon@mie plant. Tli® plant 
is operated as tb® part of its parant flra—In. this oas® its 
8«v«ral parent firm—with tb© ©xptotatlon of inoraeslng. tha 
profits of'tha firm. In a givaa short rm aitmtion, profits 
to tha parent fira may ba aaxlmlzal by oparating one plant at 
an aeconnting loa©* It is iapoasibl® to detarain© any aotmal 
B 
profit .or loas • ia say single plant of an intagratad firm 
beeanaa good® and reaotiraes aoTing fro» oaa plant to anothar 
within the fim do^  not ©haaga tltla end no prioa ia astabliah-
ad for thaii^ . . •fha antrapranaur-of aaeh partiolpatln^  flr» 
l^llainatlon of inaoaa taxas on business units altogether 
and at tha &mm tine alialnatlng "loopholat** ia parsonal in­
come tax ragttlations would .aeat^ lish tha s®iia purpose, and ia 
likaly to ba »ora satisfaetory froa the ^ ability to pay" stand­
point , 
%8 diitinguishad froa an aooounting ^ profit" or •*loas". 
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opdr&tts -hi# mtim lat«gr-at«d firm, ia©lu€iag tliat part ia 
til© Joint plant, so m te maxiniz# his antioipat#! profits 
in th# firm. lsalig«d profits eaa a©©iar«t®ly and raalis-
tieally h« textd mlj to th#, «eir@ral iadiviamal firms par- ' 
tieipatiag ia the ©#op«ratiTt assotiatioa, 
•Th,e pr@a«iit laeoat ta»tioa of hniijaess malt a ia th« 
tlaitst 3tat«s is has«i^  aatirely oa the legal aatmr© of th«si« 
Btaita rath«r thaa ia thtir ®©oa©ale aatur®. Slaee legally 
th« oooperetiT# asa©©latioa is ttswlly a oorporation, it is 
taxed lik®. the eorporat® fira, ®x©®pt for eertaia t^ alifled 
far»®r oooperetifes, whith ar« «x®apt from Qorporat® iaoom® 
taxes @xt«pt ©a taraiagi which art aot alloeat®d to partioi-
patiag firs®. 'Bi# eooperative whieh makes prior ©oatraotmal 
arrang©a@«ts.to *a&» patroaag® refimas do#s not pay ©orporat® 
imooma tax m thus# tsfmads wbsn alloeatui to its patroas. 
l,«gally' sttoh refmnts art not ©oastruGtiw laeoae to th® ooop~ 
«rativ« assoeiatioB# fh® present ineo» taxatioa of ooop-
@ratlv®s is iBtirely oa lo.gal eoasideratioa®, so that 
th® ©xplanatioa ©f the pr»»«iit iaooae taac polio lea with 
r®S'P®et to feusiats® naita i» priaoipally a loiftl »®ttsr. 
Ill that oea really ht said, froa the poiat of vitw of 
th« #eoaosie- aatmr® of th® ooopsrative asaooiatloa, is that 
th@ logel eoaotpt ©f patroaeg® refrnds aad their iaco»® tax 
status oorrosponts to their trw ©ooaomic aat^ r®. from the 
staadpoiat of the eooaomi© •uatur© of the oooporativ® ®s»o-
eiatloa th« •"purehas®- aad salt" is simply oa« eoaT®ai®at 
* m9 * 
way Qt tli® Jeist plast.# !ai.« a%, 
%h® -tim# gm€» mom from tli« joiat pitat to l&« imtiTli.«al 
jpiaats of tM faytitipatiaf ftmSf/aat-yi®# fers®, is m 
®®©a®ttit at %%% @»4r ?®tr©a-
«i§® f®fia4s, aai tli«f mnM ®©a«s®imt3Lf b.®-i^ gativ« m wsil 
a® f®»ttite,. w# til® a®'sBs- fey w&ieii ftmid «®tfl«a®mt i® asi® 
wi®» this m®tl®a #f @fsi?atl#a- aft®*- -tit t©t®i p«» wit ©©ets 
®f ©ft^ aiimg' Ife®' |#iat f,tot h®m i®t®iMta®i' m€ Mm 
Ft®f@rfei#»at®lr t© tl® f«rtl®i:fttiag fi»®, 
i®a-*®*li®* Mitosi 1» til®' &®»#®iati«»a i« 
eaetii®* irii®ly ii®«m®#®t Amm&im teiilia'ao-ff, 
•feasia®®® tyiaa,i®«t®i witM is tto te®i® fa®t©r 
©f tfe® i®g0a®fatt$a of ®®©f®t«tiv« «t0e®ia-|®a-ttowgli p#«mi0* 
3. 
@®@]^ ®ta%iir® f0xm tat® ii?. S®iirs®,. 
li©w«ir®f, hm. tal:em fositioa ttoat *®« ® «%tef of pi?«©ti®®l 
®aif@ii«mey, it ie®» apge-at t® M -thst ®®©f@*ative 
®®»©et®ti©a« ttot to® p»e^ ®st®€ tmm liaailing tk® pj-otoet 
2 
©f a©ii-««a&®?i m4®» ®3^  ®a4 ®11 eit©wa»taa««8#'® I® thrnm 
attftblai 4b %%& ^ asi® •@®a©ale attmt® .©f tli® t©©f®fatiY® 
a«®©®i,atlom whim U ®oiiat«r to m®a*®®:^ ®* •bu»itt®asf »#» 
B@a'^ a®»Ji®r fem«ia®»# i« la •m&m t® »®4m®i.. p@r mit 
e®»t8 is tm i®iat a^ tlyity tfeeroby aal# tto® ®®W61 flm® 
of til® mm »ffi®4®ttt, smk 
t^o®liaa©ff» ®f-# fit-., p. tS#« 
%0\ir®®» i.®g®i'g.t®t:m®» # , • p* tm* 
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with th# Joiat flsat t©me®pt ant tim 
©fe|«@tiv«8 of tli« fattielim-llBg tims, m tb® ©tto«3? taaad, if 
flit aoa-i8«Bl#y bm«ls®s«^  ii aettwft^ i by aat|#tpa$## psoflts ia 
tlia jeisi flftat m #m«& tw&m llti# »»gaifi $© 
tb® &f $1# a6a-»mi^.«i' t>Bsis®ss m tlit #ffi'®i@a#y ©f $h® 
firms I mmmmin' asi ©f %li# 
eo^ pif-ett'Ti' asaatlali-tB las tis3?«gatiM» 
Im mmB ©ptteJlag mf i® ia«©®»«i fey 
aMimg in tti# |©4»* plsat, tm »#»%«» fim« will gtim 
tills tffl0i#sey »§•% toy imimttag fetiitiuniil 
firaa to pe3*ft«ijpat#, hmmmse, it»«e a®ir ft»s will &1-
l@0at« •© tM« Jsiat aetitity, tM& tiitl »ttiQim@f 
mmm witfaomt eititi©»l ©mtlmy ®s, fat t,s tfe« pp®Ti.©m8 gfomf 
1» It mf m&% alwsys h® p®:s®ibl® to. t© 
ttols, If «.©$ I it *f to#. ##@a©ait te ttamsatt wltlfc 
som-BS«is«t ft© wfaleft It In «m-:rt-«iitly i»®@©ao«i<s • 
t© fattieipiit# la Joiat pla«l* o»ii»a?ily #m«fe aoa-®®*-
:%M»%mm will ttpi-ssaat a a»all ©f t&t fetal 
TOITO® iM tm ioiat ilast. f&@ mm&m^  stetms of aom-aeal»'®f 
©tte®? tlittfi sw%s©riber»,. m fm a» tkm |®iat plamt is 
if ttot ©f tlirt patty• fte fTO4»@tto» eotlTities 
of tli« aciB^ faftlftipattBg fi» is ta »© »y iat®gp®t®4 wit^  thm 
Joiai a®ti¥ity* Smeb firwi- l»ir@ imt® a«m« ©f tli#*Atlr 
lattirlal «®©s#ai0 i«#lati©»siift .wfeiefe «xi«t «»ag th# psrtici* 
pati^  firiiis* ««y tyaai&©t Him tli« |0iat plant, ©i 
attmally witlfei tto# partieipat lag fisas, ttet tftromgi. tli® o^iat 
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plant as do tli® a«fe©r flr®s. 
ftoiea aon»B«aber liwislness is oarfled out only to tfe,® extend 
that It i» motifatei fej tk® opportiinitj to inereas'® the opar-
atiag ©ffloien©!- eperatlBg staMlity of the partleipating 
fixms,. and 3?epr®®ent« a stooni ehoie© to seswlng new partici­
pating fimi ia th« Joint aetivitf, it is eonslstent with th« 
hasio econoffiie natuf© and ftirpos© of th« ©oopQfatiT® assoeia-
tion# 
The®® thr®# hritf examples aaj serve to point ont th« 
usefulness of th@ ooneept of th® .Msie «©onc»i«s natnr® of 
th« co©p®ratiT® assoelation# Mmy ©ther» oomlfi'"b# eit«d. 
An nnierstanding of th« eoneapt as developed her© eltarly re­
veals the abi#a@© of soi«nt4fi®-hmsis for sneh statimtnts as 
fin th® ooopftFatlv# assoeiation people not capital connt-*", 
••faetories ar® fret to tooptrativ® •*QOop®retion is 
a anperior wmf of doing hmsiness", "to th® extent that th® 
eooperativ® is'4iff®.r®nt from oth@f types of hnsines® aotivity, 
 ^soe.i&l ©rgnnization** ant »»in hnsiness, ©©operation is 
the antitheais of eoap®tition«. Smeh so oall«A «eooperativ® 
principl®®'* as «hualtt«»s with ffiemh«rs at market prloes« and 
"one-aan on®~vot®", «lju»iB®@8 on a strietlf eath basis" are 
if®v®el«a as inaoeurat® or irral@vant.» And finally th® mmmp^  
c :an eontribnt® aneh towari ii^ rovtd finanaial struotnres, 
iiiproved aooonnting proe®dnr®s, ant b®tt®r polioy deoisions 
within eoop«rativ® as-soeiatiom, and aid in th® formulation of 
sonnd public poliei#® m they r®lat© to ooop«ratiT« aetivity. 
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